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ABSTRACT 
Economists, politicians and bureaucrats can no longer accept the conventional belief that the free-market 
(neoliberal) development model is the only one that can transform less developed economies and put them 
on the road to growth and prosperity. Adopting an appropriate development model to promote an African 
Renaissance continues to be a concern for African politicians, policy-makers and African allies. The 
unprecedented economic growth of the East and Southeast Asian developmental states makes the 
developmental state model an interesting alternative in the African context, where successive neoliberal free-
market models have failed to spur economic development and free the continent from persistent 
unemployment and poverty. This study examines how the notion of a developmental state is interpreted in 
the African context is examined, more specifically, what it means in practice in the Ethiopian context, with 
specific reference to the case study of the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation project. Based on this case 
study, the primary question of this research is what does the developmental state mean in the African 
context? The general objective of was to assess how the developmental state paradigm has determined the 
institutional environment and arrangements for achieving economic development in Africa. To answer the 
research questions and to achieve the overall objective of the study, both qualitative and quantitative research 
approaches were utilised, based on primary and secondary sources, and mixed methods of data analysis. 
The literature review in this study the focus is on the mainstream conception of the developmental state and 
on the concepts that have been developed in the African literature on the subject. The role of the 
developmental state in promoting development is unquestioned because state intervention is essential to 
address market failures, and transform the market and capital by integrating the roles of the market and state 
institutions in the economy. The developmental state paradigm will/can be effective in achieving long-term 
economic development in many African countries, provided they have committed political leadership as well 
as context-specific institutions. During this study, it was confirmed that both the internal and external 
environments (as sufficient and necessary conditions, respectively) are receptive to the adoption of the 
developmental state ideology in many of the African countries, so long as their respective national economic, 
political and social contexts are taken into consideration in the process.  
Moreover, during this study it was found that the developmental state is a feasible model to realise viable 
development and transformation because it enables the state to channel the required public investment into 
critical development projects, and boost the role of the private sector in the development process. The Raya 
Valley groundwater irrigation case study revealed how the Ethiopian developmental state built context-
specific institutions, which enabled it to allocate the required public resources to develop both human capital 
and physical infrastructure to utilise water resources in a sustainable manner for the betterment of the 
smallholder farmers, and rural development in general. In this case study, the indigenous/customary 
institutions received as much attention as the formal institutional arrangements, which strengthened the role 
of the community in addressing the various communal issues at village level, including the distribution and 
management of water resources.  
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OPSOMMING 
Ekonome, politici en burokrate aanvaar nie meer die konvensionele mening dat die vryemark (neoliberale) 
ontwikkelingsmodel die enigste model is wat minder ontwikkelde ekonomieë kan transformeer en hulle kan 
help om te groei en te floreer. Die aanvaarding van ’n toepaslike ontwikkelingsmodel vir die Afrika 
Renaissance is van groot belang vir politici in Afrika, beleidmakers, asook hulle vennote buite Afrika. Die 
besonder vinnige ekonomiese groei in die ontwikkelende lande in Oos- en Suidoos Asië maak dat hierdie 
ontwikkelingssmodel ’n interessante alternatief in die Afrika konteks geword het waar agtereenvolgende 
neoliberale vryemark modelle gefaal het en nie die kontinent van werkloosheid en armoede kon bevry nie. 
Hoe die idee van ’n ontwikkelingstaat in die Afrika konteks interpreteer word, word tydens hierdie studie 
bestudeer, meer spesifiek wat dit in die konteks van Etiopië beteken en veral met verwysing na die gevalle 
studie van die Raya Vallei grondwater besproeiingsprojek. Die hoofvraag wat tydens hierdie studie 
beantwoord word is: Wat beteken die ontwikkelingstaat in die konteks van Afrika?  Die hoofdoelwit was om 
te bevestigr hoe die ontwikkelingstaat paradigma die omgewing van instansies en die reëlings vir konomiese 
ontwikkeling in Afrika beïnvloed het. Kwalitatiewe en kwantitatiewe benaderings is gebruik om hierdie vrae 
te beantwoord en om die doelwitte te bereik. Die benaderings is baseer op primêre asook sekondêre bronne 
en gemengde metodes van data ontleding is gevolg.  
In die literatuuroorsig was die fokus op die hoofstroom siening van die ontwikkelingstaat sowel as op 
konsepte in die Afrika literatuur. Die rol van die ontwikkelingstaat in die ontwikkeling van die land is 
onmisbaar want die ingryping van die staat is noodsaaklik om tekortkominge in die mark aan te spreek en 
om die mark en kapitaal  te transformer deur die rolle van die mark en die staatsinstansies in die ekonomie te 
integreer. Die ontwikkelingstaat paradigma kan die langtermyn ekonomiese ontwikkeling van baie Afrika 
lande verseker op voorwaarde dat daar toegewyde politieke leierskap is dat konteks-spedifieke instansies 
Daar is tydens hierdie studie bevestig dat die interne asook die eksterne omgewings (onderskeidelik as 
genoegsame en nodige voorwaardes) in baie Afrika lande geskik is vir die ontwikkelingstaat ideologie op 
voorwaarde dat hulle onderskeie nasionale, ekonomiese, politieke en sosiale omgewings tydens die proses  in 
ag geneem word.  
Verder word daar tydens die studie bewys dat die ontwikkelingstaatmodel kan lei tot lewensvatbare 
ontwikkeling en tot transformasie, want dit maak dit moontlik vir die staat om die nodige geld in belangrike 
ontwikkelingsprojekte te belê en om terselfertyd die rol van die private sektor in die ontwikkelingsproses te 
vergroot.  Tydens die Raya Vallei grondwater besproeiings gevalle studie is daar bevind dat die Etiopiese 
ontwikkelingstaat konteks-spesifieke instansies gebou het wat dit moontlik gemaak het om die nodige 
openbare bronne te gebruik om die menslike, kapitale en fisiese infrastrukture op te bou en om waterbronne 
op ’n volhoudbare manier te gebruik om die omstandighede van kleinboere en landelike ontwikkeling in die 
geheel te verbeter.  In hierdie gevalle, studie is ewe veel aandag geskenk aan inheemse instansies as aan 
formele reëlings met instansies.  Dit vergroot die rol van die inheemse gemeenskappe veral in dorpies. Dit 
sluit die verspreiding en bestuur van waterbronne in.  
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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to this study 
The role of institutions in addressing market failures
1
 (imperfect information, transaction costs, etc.) to 
facilitate the development process, particularly in developing countries, has become one of the most 
debatable areas in development economics. Since the early 1990s, it has become commonplace to blame 
institutions for the growth and development disparities among countries (Stein, 2008). The debate on 
economic development is centred on institutions and institutional quality, because weak institutions have 
been one of the main causes of development failure in many countries and the role of institutions has 
emerged as a major issue in the development process (Kapur & Webb, 2000). This means that economic 
theories have tended to focus on identifying the governance capabilities that are required by the state to 
intervene in the economy (Chang, 1994; 2002; Khan, 2006). Institutionalists acknowledged that state 
intervention is indispensable to accelerate socio-economic transformation in developing countries through 
proper state–market integration.  
Institutions are a set of formal (market and state institutions), informal and private sector self-regulatory 
bodies that facilitate coordination and govern relationships between individuals or groups in the economy 
(Chang, 2002). Institutions constrain people’s behaviour, and are constitutive of their motivations and 
perceptions (Chang, 2002; Chang & Evans, 2005; Hodgson, 2006). Most people in both developed and 
developing countries prefer informal institutions to facilitate their transactions; however, informal 
institutions are more important in developing countries where formal institutions are less developed and 
weak (World Bank, 2002). Developing countries have faced different market failure problems because they 
have adopted non-context-specific development programmes that have been imposed on them by developed 
countries under different terms and conditions. For instance, international financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), inaugurated the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs)
2
 and the Washington Consensus as rescue packages for crisis-ridden African economies. By the mid-
1980s and early-1990s, many African countries had adopted one form of SAP or another. However, these 
programmes proved to be more harmful than helpful to African countries; in addition, they did not bring any 
meaningful development outcomes. Instead, these programmes exacerbated the state of crisis in Africa, with 
                                                     
1
 Market failure (it does not in the notion of a neoclassical) is a situation where the market does not work in a way 
expected of the ideal market, which is equated with the perfectly competitive market or a frictionless market. For 
instance, a neoclassical economist would assume that market failure implies economic failure because they assumed 
that market is the only dominant natural institution in the economy. In contrast, institutionalists regard a market as one 
of the many institutions that make up the capitalist economic system; market failure may not matter as much because 
there are many institutions other than markets working in the economy (Chang, 2002). 
2
 The SAPs initiated by the international financial institutions during the 1980s to promote a fundamental restructuring 
of the economies of the countries were presented as being universally applicable development programme to any 
economy regardless of its overall national context, i.e. the policies were viewed as generalisable under any socio-
economic and political condition. These programmes did not leave any room for policies that addressed development 
issues in accordance with the context of a particular nation (Nissanke, 2001).  
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the result that the last two decades of the twentieth century are called the ‘lost decades’. This indicates that 
most African countries spent these years under a ‘one-size-fits-all’ free-market paradigm, which theoretically 
assumed the existence of a perfect and efficient system. However, as Chang (2002) has pointed out, 
neoliberal markets are institutionally very under-specified for an immature economy, so the shortcomings 
would be addressed through state interventions and the nurturing of far-reaching institutions based on the 
particular contexts of latecomer developing countries.  
Real world practice is characterised by numerous uncertainties and risks. Within a world of ‘incomplete’ and 
‘imperfect information’, ‘high transaction costs’ and ‘asymmetrically powerful relations’, research suggests 
that the existence of diverse institutions (i.e. integration of market and state institutions) is necessary to 
overcome or minimise these uncertainties (Hodgson, 2006). The existence of effective institutions would 
help to minimise many of the development constraints and to accelerate the development process. However, 
in practice, most developing countries cannot address the existing development constraints properly because 
of the absence of effective institutions (Kohli, 2004; Chowdhury et al., 2005; Khan, 2006; North et al., 
2007). Differences in economic and political institutions are considered as the main factors in determining 
the disparities in per-capita or economic growth across countries (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2010). 
Institutional bottlenecks, which are considered as a major hindrance to development in many African 
countries, are the result of practising development paradigms that were imposed upon them by the West 
during their economic crises of the 1980s and were not fitted their contexts. For instance, the international 
financial institutions inaugurated SAPs and the Washington Consensus as a panacea for the economic crisis, 
which limited the role of state intervention in the economy. Peter Evans (1995) notes that neoclassical 
economists contend that the state’s role should be limited to nothing more than a facilitator of the process 
(i.e. as a protector of property rights and a contract-enforcement institution). The question is how should 
these developing countries address the historical legacy of the neoliberal paradigm? As a possible solution 
proposed by various scholars (from both an institutionalist and a developmentalist perspective) and 
international institutions is either a paradigm shift to the developmental state (state intervention) or marginal 
adjustments to the existing neoliberal paradigm. Today, many researchers have assured that state 
intervention, in the form of the developmental state paradigm, is critical for sustainable economic 
development and structural transformation (economic, political, and social) in developing countries. 
It is clear from the vantage point of the end of the twentieth century that state-led development efforts have 
been more successful in some parts of the global periphery than in others. States in most peripheral countries 
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are important, active economic actors, engaged in varying patterns of 
state intervention (Kohli, 2004:1). Furthermore, a central concern with the economic role of the state in 
development really does not require any justification. It is more than an idiosyncratic assertion to hold that 
states are important economic actors in developing countries and thus worthy of serious scholarly interest 
even if rates of economic growth reflect a host of other factors (Kohli, 2004:3).  
Therefore, marginal adjustments cannot completely address the existing multidimensional problems; rather, a 
complete paradigm shift would be necessary to address the existing development constraints and accelerate 
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the development process. Recent arguments have confirmed that Africa, as a continent, would make a 
dynamic socio-economic structural transformation under a context-specific developmental state model rather 
than marginal adjustments to the existing neoliberal model (Mkandawire, 2001; UNECA, 2011).  
Scholars define and describe the term ‘developmental state’ in various ways because there is no one all-
inclusive agreed definition of a developmental state. The available alternative definitions differ because of 
their disciplinary emphasis (i.e. economics, political science, public policy, education, sociology, etc.) and 
their respective contexts in terms of time and geographic coverage. These definitions of a developmental 
state essentially put an emphasis on how and to what extent state actors are involved in forging economic 
development, but the role of state has not always been perceived positively. The concept of a developmental 
state is often associated with the type of economic policies followed by East Asian states in the second half 
of the twentieth century and, in particular, with the post-Second World War Japanese economic model. It 
could be understood as referring to a state that intervenes to guide the direction and pace of economic 
development (Caldentey, 2008). 
Hence, the concept of a ‘developmental state’ was justified and formalised with the publication in 1982 of 
Chalmers Johnson’s seminal work on East Asian developmental states, and particularly Japan. Johnson 
coined the term ‘developmental state’ in his study on the role of industrial policy in Japan’s development 
achievements, which was based neither on Soviet-type ‘command economies’ nor on the ‘laissez-faire free 
market economies’ of the West, but on market-conforming (integration of market and state) methods of state 
intervention (Johnson, 1982; 1999). Johnson (1982) formally defines a developmental state as follow: “A 
developmental or plan rational state intervention is one that is determined to influence the direction and pace 
of economic development by directly intervening in the development process, rather than relying on the 
uncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate the scarce economic resources” (Johnson, 1982:319–
20). 
Swilling and Annecke (2012) strengthen Johnson’s explanation of the concept of the developmental state. 
Since the 1960s, following the construction of Japan and Taiwan after the Second World War and then the 
rapid development of the ‘Asian Tigers’, there has been a third governance trend that is neither ‘Keynesian 
welfarism’ nor ‘neoliberalism’; instead, it could be referred to as a ‘developmental state’. Developmental 
states have tended to be interventionist, ideologically opportunist and protectionist, resource intensive, 
obsessed with industrialisation and, quite often, authoritarian (Swilling & Annecke, 2012). Nevertheless, not 
all developmental states are authoritarian – some are both developmental and democratic, and these have 
referred to as ‘democratic developmental states’. Following the classic concept coined by Johnson, Chang 
defined a developmental state in institutional perspective as: 
One that pursues policies focused on coordinating investment plans; has a national development vision; takes 
the goals of long-term growth and structural change seriously; engages in institutional building to promote 
growth and development; and plays a critical role in resolving the conflicts that arise out of reactions and 
counteractions to the development trajectory between winners and losers (Chang 1999:192–9).  
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The concept of a developmental state also described in economic perspective as it is:  
A state puts economic development as the top priority of governmental policy and is able to design effective 
instruments to promote such a goal. The instruments would include the forging of new formal institutions, 
the weaving of formal and informal networks of collaboration among the citizens and officials and the 
utilization of new opportunities for trade and profitable production (Bagchi, 2000:398). 
This definition indicated that a developmental state as one that gives top priority to rapid economic growth, 
adopts workable policies and strategies, and designs effective instruments to achieve these development 
policies and strategies in a successful manner (Onis, 1991; Bagchi, 2000; Fritz & Menocal, 2006; UNECA, 
2011; Bekele & Regassa, 2012). Moreover, Adrian Leftwich also defines developmental states from a 
political perspective as ‘those states whose successful economic and social development performance 
illustrates how their political purposes and institutional structures (especially their bureaucracies) have been 
developmentally-driven, while their development objectives have been politically-driven’ (Leftwich, 
2008:12). Furthermore, a more comprehensive definition, which covers major aspects of the concept of a 
developmental state, is given by Edigheji, who sees it as one that:  
… Authoritatively, credibly, legitimately and in a binding manner is able to formulate and implement its 
policies and programmes. This will entail possessing a developmentalist ideology. Such a state also has to be 
able to construct and deploy the institutional architecture within the state and mobilize society towards the 
realization of its developmentalist project (Edigheji, 2010:4). 
This comprehensive definition looks at the ideological and institutional dimensions required to realise 
economic development. This definition points to the fact that a developmental state is one that promotes 
macroeconomic stability and establishes well-functioning institutions; it invests in infrastructure and the 
development of human capital through effective social-sector development programmes (Mkandawire, 
2010). A developmental state is strongly associated with a strong element of nationalism as the basis for the 
ideology, which guides development-oriented governments to realise the overall socio-economic 
development to ensure the well-being of the nation. Furthermore, the developmental state is often described 
in terms of its ideological orientation, which promotes the developmental agenda, and its institutional 
arrangements, including institutional capacity, to articulate and implement its development policies and 
strategies (Mkandawire, 2001; Edigheji, 2005, 2010). A developmental state is acknowledged further as one 
that has the capacity to deploy its authority, credibility and legitimacy in a binding manner to design and 
implement development policies and programmes that promote transformation by expanding human 
capabilities (Benedict, 2014).  
There are plenty of literatures produced by various scholars and international organisations, which gave 
emphasise on the importance/the role of state intervention within the developmental state paradigm. More 
recently, there has been consensus on the ineffectiveness of the neoliberal paradigm in both developing and 
developed countries. Scholars have recommended a new alternative development paradigm (i.e. a 
developmental state) for the latecomer countries to achieve their socio-economic transformation and 
sustainable development processes through proper, state–market integration approach. As the success story 
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of the East Asian developmental states bear out, a developmental state is essential to accelerate socio-
economic transformation in latecomer developing countries and ensure well-functioning institutional 
environments and arrangements.  
In the twentieth century, many of the East Asian developmental states were obviously authoritarian in 
practice in their governance approach. They gave priority to economic development and socio-economic 
improvement at the expense of democracy and building democratic institutions (Mkandawire, 2001; 
Edigheji, 2005; Fritz & Menocal, 2007). A major weakness of the twentieth-century developmental states 
was that their coalition was not broad-based, inclusive, and comprehensive of all stakeholders; rather their 
coalition was limited to the state–private sector. Broad-based coalition/cooperation with the society (or all 
stakeholders) at different levels would, therefore, be one of the crucial instruments necessary to build a 
successful developmental state model in developing countries. A developmental state model with broad-
based coalitions would ensure popular participation in the process of economic development (Barbara & 
Terrance, 1997; Mkandawire, 2001; Fritz & Menocal, 2007; UNECA, 2011).  
Developmental states differ from one another in their origin, evolution, context, trajectory, leadership style, 
nature and extent of intervention, prioritisation of development agendas, manifestations and institutions. 
There are different characteristics in the emergence and nature of developmental states around the world and 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach cannot be applied when building a developmental state paradigm. Developmental 
states have emerged largely through ‘trial and error’ or ‘learning-by-doing’, based on their own respective 
contexts; there is no universally designed template for aspiring countries to copy (Evans, 1995; Mkandawire, 
2001; Kohli, 2004; Evans, 2010; Mkandawire, 2010; UNECA, 2011). However, this does not mean that 
developmental states have nothing in common: they all share a principal development policy objective to 
achieve rapid economic growth by means of active state intervention, and they make a considerable effort to 
meet this objective. Thus, despite differences in their economies and overall development approach, the East 
Asian developmental states share some common features and serve as an example of good practice 
(UNCTAD, 2007).  
The twenty-first-century developmental states will build on the experiences of others, but unreflective 
imports of ready-made models are likely to fail (Evans, 2010). Essentially, each country should adopt the 
paradigm based on their unique context, such as their historical endowments and the character of the 
surrounding social, economic, political, and institutional structures. The ability of developmental states to 
execute their roles depends on the ‘embedded autonomy’ of the state bureaucracy. ‘Embedded autonomy 
combines Weberian bureaucratic insulation with intense connection to the surrounding social structure, 
offering a concrete resolution to the theoretical debate over state–society relations (Evans, 1995: 51). 
‘Embedded autonomy’ requires strong state–society relationships, strong commitment, and efficient 
bureaucracy with the ability to execute developmental goals. Without ‘embedded autonomy’, a 
developmental state is not in a good position to facilitate and accelerate economic development (Evans, 
1995). More recently, the concept of the developmental state has become paramount in contemporary 
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development literature; it is now accepted as being one of the most common developmental paradigms to 
accelerate economic growth. Developmental states arise from an urgent need to promote economic growth 
and industrialisation to improve the well-being of the population. This helps a country to protect itself from 
global or regional threats, and to gain legitimacy and credibility by delivering steady improvement in the 
material and social well-being of its citizens (Evans, 1995; Mkandawire, 2001).  
To summarise, institutions that are associated with the emergence of the developmental state have become 
entrenched because they are associated with the transformation of the economy from poverty and social 
dislocation to prosperity. The institutional architecture of a developmental state plays a crucial role in its 
success or failure. A country’s institutions are considered as good indicators of its ability to formulate and 
explain its developmental programmes and implement these in a credible and legitimate manner to achieve 
the overall development goals (Edigheji, 2010). Nevertheless, the developmental state paradigm is not an 
end in itself – it is considered to serve as a springboard for further development and as a means to attain 
specific development goals (for instance, to transform the economy from a low-income level to a middle-
income level) in a given period (Mkandawire, 2010). The attraction of the developmental state paradigm is 
that it places responsibility on the respective states to direct the development process for the betterment of 
their citizens. Therefore, state intervention within the developmental state paradigm would be considered as 
a panacea to the problems related to poverty, backwardness, inequality, and the high levels of 
unemployment, which are the main economic problems in many African countries. 
1.2 An overview of Ethiopia’s development policy and strategy 
From 1991, the Ethiopian state has tried to adopt an ideological position that commits it to embarking on a 
transition from being a predatory and quasi-failed state to being a protective and developmental state 
(Negash, 2011; Nishi, 2013). This implies that the year1991 is considered as a turning point for Ethiopia 
with regard to the social, political, and economic changes that became possible after the military government 
removed from power. During the military regime, the country suffered under a command economy that had 
closed itself off from the external economy. There was no appropriate policy and strategy to achieve 
economic development and living conditions were poor because of both market and government failures 
(Teshome, 2012; Melke, 2013). The current ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF), launched pragmatic development policies and strategies that relatively fitted within the 
Ethiopian context to boost economic development and address the persisting socio-economic problems. 
Since mid-1990s, the government has formulated and implemented various economic policies and strategies 
to re-energised the agricultural sector and to accelerated overall economic development by strengthening the 
forward and backward linkages among the various sectors. This occurred in the form of an agricultural-
centred development programme known as the Agriculture Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI), 
which was formulated in the mid-1990s (MoFED, 2002b). The ADLI aims to achieve industrialisation over 
the long-run through robust agricultural growth and boost the forward and backward linkages between 
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agricultural and industrial sectors. In other words, the ADLI sets agriculture as a primary stimulus to increase 
output, employment, and income; it is also considered as a crucial springboard for the development of the 
industrial sector through its positive spill-over effect (MoFED, 2002b; Ohno, 2009). 
The rationale behind the adoption of ADLI is the recognition by the Ethiopian state that Ethiopia is an 
agrarian society in which over 80% of the rural population depends on agriculture. This sector accounts for 
40% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and is a huge source of commodity exports. Labour and land are 
the predominant factors of production; efficient mobilisation of these factors would generate rapid 
development in general and rural transformation in particular. All development actors (such as government, 
donors, farmers and their organisations) have expected to make deliberate efforts to transform the 
agricultural sector and laid the foundation for process of industrialisation. Therefore, the adoption of the 
ADLI as the national, long-term development policy has contributed to socio-economic transformation and 
sustainable development. For instance, the proportion of the population living below the poverty line was 
44% in 1999/2000 (MoFED, 2002a). This was reduced to 29.2% by the end of 2009/10 (MoFED, 2010; 
CSA, 2012; World Bank, 2012) and furthermore, this declined to 26% in 2013 (UNDP, 2015). 
Agriculture is a major source of employment and income in many sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, so 
promoting the agriculture sector is the only way to overcome abject poverty. In other words, raising 
agricultural productivity and production using modern agricultural inputs (such as chemical fertilisers, 
insecticides, pesticides and irrigation), as well as the rapid accumulation of capital from the sector and 
diffusion into labour-intensive sectors can enhance growth substantially and ensure that the fruits of 
prosperity are inclusive and more broadly shared. Smallholder farmers are more efficient in the allocation 
and use of resources (compared to large-scale commercial farms) so supporting smallholder farmers will 
enhance equity as it increases returns on their assets. Reaching out to smallholder farmers and changing the 
agricultural sector are important components in the alleviation of poverty and the reduction of inequality in 
developing countries. The Ethiopian state attempted to shows its commitment to accelerated economic 
growth and lifting people out of poverty, which is one of the widespread economic problems. To achieve 
this, the government has tried to allocate considerable resources to agriculture, health, education, water 
supply and other basic infrastructure to boost the socio-economic prospects of the nation.  
Under the ADLI’s development policy, emphasis is placed on the transformation of smallholder subsistence 
farming to more business- and market-oriented agricultural production. This is being achieved by boosting 
agricultural extension services that promote the adoption of improved agricultural inputs and practices, as 
well as the expansion of small- and large-scale irrigation schemes and rural credit services to address 
farmers’ financial constraints. Furthermore, integrating farmers with markets, expanding rural roads and 
electrification efforts are expected to have a further positive effect on smallholder farmers by reducing their 
vulnerability to shocks (MoFED, 2002a). In line with the basic objectives of the ADLI’s long-term 
development policy, the following four successive mid-term development programs have been put in place: 
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1. An Economic Development Strategy for Ethiopia (EDSE), 1996/97 to 2000/01; 
2. Sustainable Development Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP), 2002/03 to 2004/05; 
3. The Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), 2005/06 to 
2009/10; 
4. The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP-I), 2010/11 to 2014/15. 
It is clear that the economic growth of Ethiopia began to improve during the 1990s, but since the state 
officially claimed a ‘developmental state’ in the early 2000s, the economy has shifted into a higher and more 
rapid growth trajectory. In both the SDPRP and PASDEP mid-term development plans, agriculture was 
considered as a strategic sector for poverty reduction and this changed the livelihoods of the rural residents. 
Under PASDEP, greater emphasis was given to the expansion of medium- and large-scale irrigation 
schemes, the commercialisation of agriculture, diversification, and private-sector investment in order to 
move farmers beyond subsistence farming to market-oriented practices, and boost the export sector (Ohno, 
2009). During the planned period, the government called for the decentralisation of the delivery of basic 
social services to improve governance issues, reduce social vulnerability and improve social security, and it 
increased public expenditure in the rural-development programme in general, and the agricultural sector in 
particular (MoFED, 2006). Even though the agricultural sector is considered as the engine for the Ethiopian 
economy in the current, mid-term, five-year development plan, the industrial sector is also receiving 
particular attention. The expansion of this sector will be promoted based on both export-oriented and import-
substituting strategies to satisfy export requirement as well as domestic demand. Therefore, the 
government’s efforts to eradicate poverty and expand development opportunities will depend on it being able 
to maintain rapid and broad-based economic growth in a coordinated manner (MoFED, 2010). Accordingly, 
the GTP plan has the following major objectives: 
  To maintain an average double-digit GDP growth rate and meet the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs); 
  To expand and ensure the qualities of education, health and other social sectors thereby achieving the 
MDGs; 
  To establish favourable conditions for building a sustainable state by creating a stable democratic 
developmental state; 
  To ensure sustainable growth within a stable macroeconomic framework;  
As the World Bank (2012) report confirmed that, due to formulating and implementing these consecutive 
five-year mid-term development plans, the Ethiopian economy has been growing at twice the rate of the 
SSA, averaging 10.6% GDP growth per year compared to 5.2% in SSA over the past decade. As the report 
further indicated, modernising smallholder agriculture, the development of new export sectors, strong global 
commodity demand, and government-led development investments, and so on, are the factors that have 
contributed to this impressive economic growth. This impressive economic growth has been a characteristic 
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pattern of the national economy for the past decade and now the government is committed to sustaining this 
economic growth rate with the aim of joining the middle-income club by the mid-2020s (MoFED, 2010).  
The state is committed to play a major role in keeping the economy close to the leading edge in the 
development of knowledge and technology by investing in a human development programme. It believes 
that this will be achieved by pursuing an intensive human capital development programme under its 
officially claimed ‘developmental state’ model, based on the good practices of similar developmental states 
in the Global South (Habisso, 2010). The government claimed a ‘developmental state’ model as its official 
ideology in the early 2000s in order to address abject poverty and to facilitate the overall development 
process. As a result, Ethiopia has embarked on a reform programme that is based not on the neoliberal 
paradigm but on the establishment of a developmental state model specifically tailored to the Ethiopian 
context. The key objective is to transform the pervasive rent-seeking political economy to a favourable 
value-creation political economy (Zenawi, 2006; Ohno, 2009). This implies that the Ethiopian state claimed 
the ‘developmental state’ model after evaluating the impacts of SAPs for about a decade. State intervention 
in a developmental state, adapted to the specific context, is indispensable for creating fertile ground for 
building efficient market by boosting public investment in infrastructure development and nurturing context-
specific functional institutions. 
In line with the ideological shift towards a ‘developmental state,’ public-sector investments are targeted at a 
few productive sectors to create a new economic platform for sustainable economic growth and 
development. As Teshome (2012) explains, since the break from the less pragmatic neoliberal economic 
policies, the state has developed and implemented economic policies and strategies based on the country’s 
socio-economic and political contexts to satisfy the development requirements of the nation. Instead of the 
neoliberal emphasis on ‘getting the prices right’, the focus is now on specific ‘binding constraints’ that must 
deal with intensive state-synchronised action, including institutional change, targeted regulation and 
intervention, strategic policy-driven public investments and other intervention instruments that run contrary 
to neoliberal prescriptions. Accordingly, the country has set itself the ambitious goal to become a fully-
fledged developmental state, seeking to create a middle-income society and build a green economy to reduce 
the impact of climate change (MoFED, 2010; FDRE, 2011).  
1.3 Rationale of the study  
The issue of state intervention in the economy is not in question because state intervention is critical in 
addressing market failures, and promoting market and capital transformation in both developed and 
developing countries. Almost all states around the world intervene, either directly or indirectly, at some stage 
to varying degrees for various reasons. The question is what type of intervention and to what extent is the 
intervention conducive to promoting the development process? This means that how the state intervenes and 
for what purpose lies at the centre of the debate (Johnson, 1982; Swilling & Annecke, 2012). The history of 
the twentieth-century developmental state has shown that an appropriately configured and governed state has 
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a key role to play in the development process through the proper mobilisation of resources. However, to 
conceptualise the role of developmental state for a very different context, one needs to recognise that the 
twenty-first-century developmental state sits at the intersection of the simultaneous transition that is taking 
place at the industrial and socio-ecological scales (Swilling & Annecke, 2012). Since the start of the 2007/08 
financial meltdown in the United States, the notion of a developmental state has returned to the centre of the 
discussion about the global political economy. The role of state intervention is regaining a necessary 
relevance in both developed and developing countries (UNECA, 2011). The economic crisis presented 
evidence that unregulated markets are unworkable and unsustainable in the long-run, particularly in 
developing countries. It has reinforced the proposition that markets are not always self-regulating and that 
state intervention is crucial; it has also given credence to those who argued for state intervention and made a 
more convincing case for a developmental state paradigm (Edigheji, 2010). 
In most of the literature, the term ‘developmental state’ is associated predominantly with success stories of 
the East Asian developmental states, which have achieved prolonged and impressive high economic growth 
and realised social transformation in approximately three decades (Bagchi, 2000; Mkandawire, 2001; Meyns 
& Musamba, 2010). Over this period, a set of city-states and countries, including Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Taiwan, underwent rapid economic growth and essential socio-economic changes. They 
moved from being poor, agrarian societies to producers of high technology and high value-added goods 
based on the export-oriented development strategy (Page, 1994; Kohli, 2004; Fritz & Menocal, 2006). 
However, this narrow regional focus on the concept of developmental states is contested in different ways 
and by many scholars. For instance, Mkandawire argues that there were developmentally focused states in 
Africa in the immediate post-colonial period and that the two most cited examples of ‘democratic 
developmental states’, namely, Botswana and Mauritius, are from Africa (Mkandawire, 2001). 
When thinking about building a developmental state that fits the context, it is important to take into account 
the institutional architecture and development policy orientation of that particular country. A developmental 
state’s capacity to formulate and successfully implement its development policies and programmes are 
determined by the existence of context-specific and well-functioning institutions; these can be deployed to 
mobilise the society around the common development objectives. Therefore, the concept of a developmental 
state paradigm is understood in terms of the political, ideological and institutional aspects of that particular 
country rather than a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach (Evans, 1995; Mkandawire, 2001; Kohli, 2004; Edigheji, 
2005; 2010). 
A developmental state may set performance targets (such as ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ instruments) to reduce 
inefficiency and wastage of resources, and to distribute economic rent through effective public policy to 
increase productivity and production in the economy. It may reward (‘carrot’) those who meet the targets and 
punish (‘stick’) those who do not to minimise the wastage of public resources and rent-seeking practices 
(World Bank, 1993; Stiglitz & Yusuf, 2001). ‘Carrot’ and ‘stick’ are key instruments to mobilise, utilise, 
distribute, and manage existing scarce resources (natural, human, capital, and others) in the economy. By 
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using these instruments effectively, a developmental state is able to boost its legitimacy and credibility, and 
retain power long enough to implement its long-term development policies and programmes in a sustainable 
manner (UNECA, 2011).  
Furthermore, successful developmental states coordinate investment plans in such a way that they ‘crowd in’ 
rather than ‘crowd out’ the private sector in the development process. Such ability of the state to 
accommodate the role of the private sector in the economy differentiates developmental states from other 
state-intervention approaches (Gumede, 2009). To promote the process of sustainable economic 
development and transformation, developmental states pay due attention to the issues of efficient resource 
mobilisation and allocation by improving their institutional and bureaucratic capabilities (Kohli, 2004). 
Visionary and pragmatic leadership (i.e. a developmental leadership) is considered as a hallmark of a 
developmental state. The state bureaucracy needs to be insulated from political pressures and should have the 
capacity to manage economic interests effectively (Leftwich, 1995; Gumede, 2009). The notion of a 
developmental leadership is not about building personality cults or strongmen, rather it is about providing 
clear direction for socio-economic changes, creating a powerful pro-developmental constituency in the ruling 
and bureaucratic elites, and harnessing the critical economic and social forces in the economy (UNECA, 
2011).  
During the post-colonial era, Africa has had examples of countries whose ideological inclination was 
developmental and who pursued policies that produced high rates of economic growth, achieved social gains 
and accumulated human capital. Nevertheless, many of these were not successful (except Botswana and 
Mauritius) due to different internal and external factors (Mkandawire, 2001; Fritz & Menocal, 2006; 
UNECA, 2011). Therefore, most of the literature on the developmental state lacks the confidence to 
recommend the applicability of the success stories of the East Asian developmental states to African 
countries. This lack of confidence emanated from different internal and external factors, as well as from 
contextual differences in the East Asian developmental states.  
Accordingly, this study is motivated by the observation that a developmental state paradigm and institutions 
are receiving more attention for long-term economic growth and development especially in developing 
countries of Africa. The demand for the developmental state paradigm originated partly from the success 
stories of the East Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs) and from the failure of the previous neoliberal 
paradigm to transform the economies of these developing countries. Given that there is an emergence of 
states in Africa that are defining themselves as ‘developmental states’, it is necessary to assess these claims 
critically in the light of the literature on the developmental state, particularly from an institutionalist 
perspective. Furthermore, this study emphasises on how the developmental state paradigm realised that 
context-specific institutions – even at the grassroots level – accelerate rural socio-economic development and 
sustainable resource mobilisation, utilisation and management. This was particularly evident in the Raya 
Valley groundwater irrigation project in Northern Ethiopia. 
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1.4 Problem statement 
Developing countries in general and African countries in particular face daunting market failures and 
institutional inadequacies, which, in turn, create vicious circles and poverty traps in their economies. This 
means that many African countries are characterised by inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of strong 
institutions and bold development plans to manage complex economic policies and strategies. Market 
failures and institutional bottlenecks can be adequately addressed only through active state intervention by 
means of a selective and strategic approach; the historical practices in the East Asian countries serve as a 
good example here (Akyuz et al., 1998; Chang, 2002; Dorward et al., 2003; Hodgson, 2006; Meyns & 
Musamba, 2010). The economic crises of the 1980s, accompanied by the ideological shift against the role of 
state intervention in the economy, seriously aggravated the economic problems of many African countries 
(Akyuz et al., 1998; Meyns & Musamba, 2010).  
For instance, from the beginning of the colonial period to the pre- and post-reform periods of independence, 
the institutions and investments that are required to bring technological changes to agriculture in particular 
(which is the main economic sector) have been markedly absent or weak in Africa. More specifically, the 
adoption of the neoliberal paradigm (drive towards liberalisation and privatisation) as a panacea for the 
economic crisis (the debt crisis) resulted in pervasive market failures in many African countries. The 
neoliberal paradigm almost failed and did not bring about the expected outcome in many of these countries 
(Mkandawire, 2001; Chang, 2002). All these situations probably made it difficult to recommend complex 
long-term economic policies and strategies for these countries for a considerable period in the past. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that these countries should not consider any long-term economic 
development policies and strategies based on their unique contexts today. Africa is not in the same position 
as it was in the twentieth century – it is now starting to registered fast economic growth and many countries 
are joining the middle-income club. 
Regardless of constraints, the development policy agenda in Africa today focuses on changing the existing 
weak economic and political situation and improving the well-being of African nations. However, one of the 
biggest challenges facing many of these countries is the absence of a contextualised development paradigm 
to articulate workable development policies and strategies, and to nurture far-reaching institutions (Dorward 
et al., 2005; Dorward et al., 2009). By recognising these problems, some African countries have made a 
paradigm shift away from a neoliberal to a developmental state approach to transform the existing weak 
socio-economic and political situations (Mkandawire, 2001; 2010; UNECA, 2011). Adopting a context-
specific developmental state paradigm should help to progressively address these development constraints 
through efficient resource mobilisation and management, given effective institutions. Therefore, based on 
theoretical and the historical evidence, it has become clear that the developmental state paradigm – and the 
importance of the state’s role – is necessary if the latecomer developing countries are really committed to 
achieve meaningful economic transformation in a specific period (Chang, 1999). It has also become obvious 
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that neoliberalism, advocated by the West and its international financial institutions as a panacea to the 
African problem, has failed to bring about the anticipated development and transformation. 
Based on the officially claimed developmental state paradigm, therefore, Ethiopia started to implement 
different development projects in the form of public investment at both the macro and micro levels. One of 
the many projects is the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation scheme (the case study) located in northern 
Ethiopia of Tigray regional state, which was implemented to protect/guarantee the drought-prone area at the 
grassroots level. There is no doubt that this type of public investment at the grassroots level is essential for 
the smallholder, rural farm households to improve their productivity and alleviate poverty, and improve the 
agricultural sector in general. In the light of this, this dissertation seeks to investigate how the notion of a 
developmental state is interpreted in the African context. More specifically, what does it means in practice in 
the Ethiopian context, with specific reference to the case study of the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation 
project.  
1.5 Research questions 
The research questions are constructed around the above stated problem. The primary question for this study 
is what does the developmental state mean in the African context? Following on this, the specific research 
questions are:  
 What is the mainstream conception of the developmental state in relation to institutions and 
institutionalisation, as articulated in the international literature on the developmental state?  
 What conception of the developmental state has been incorporated into the Ethiopian state’s official 
development ideology, as reflected in both its official documents and the written perspectives of its key 
representatives? Is Ethiopia’s conception of the developmental state adequate for the context in the light 
of the international and African literature on the subject? 
 How has Ethiopia’s conception of the developmental state, as articulated in its official development 
ideology and its key representatives, influenced and shaped the way in which the state has assembled the 
institutional arrangements and practices in the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation project? Is there 
evidence of a direct relationship between Ethiopia’s conception of the developmental state and the actual 
institutional arrangements and practices in the Raya Valley project? What are the successes and 
challenges of the Raya Valley project?  
1.6 Objectives of the study 
The general objective of this study is to assess how the developmental state paradigm has both influenced 
and determined the institutional environment/arrangements for achieving economic development in Africa. 
A case study of the groundwater irrigation project in Raya Valley region examines the potentials and the 
limitations of these institutional environments/arrangements related to resource utilisation and management. 
Based on this general objective, this study has the following specific objectives. These are: 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
14 
 
 To provide a detailed review of the theory of institutions and developmental state paradigm 
 To provide a detailed review of the role of the developmental states and institutions for achieving 
economic development in Africa 
 To assess the role of the emerging developmental state in economic development and building context-
specific institutions in the context of Ethiopia 
 To investigate the role of a developmental state and the existing institutional arrangements for 
sustainable utilisation and governance of groundwater irrigation in the Raya Valley 
1.7 The conceptual framework of the study 
The development models/ideologies, policies and strategies of developing countries are derived, directly or 
indirectly, from the developed world, and attempts are made to make developing countries resemble the 
developed ones, regardless of their differences in context. In most cases, there is a discrepancy between 
seeking to address the development constraints and the available development policy tools, which 
developing countries have adopted. The development policies and strategies that emulated in developing 
countries without regarding to their unique contexts are incompatible to achieving their development agenda. 
This emulation of development policy practices is not yet regarded as a problem because it is common 
practice in our globalised world. The real problem with is that many developing countries do not 
contextualise these to fit their own specific situations, as per their development requirements.
3
 The adoptions 
of these development policy practices are significant only if they take into consideration the wider social, 
economic, and political context of the adopting countries. In the first place, to adapt any development model 
and to design workable development policies requires an understanding of how the socio-economic and 
political contexts of developing countries differ from those of developed countries. A developing country 
needs to articulate its development policies based primarily on its unique national context, and the existing 
international situation, to accelerate its development process (Kohli, 2004). However, the development 
efforts in developing countries are challenged by their capability/capacity to design contextualised policies, 
strategies, and implementation tools. This requires the commitment of the political elites and the autonomous 
state bureaucracy to formulate context-specific policies and strategies, and then apply these in accordance 
with their development objectives.  
Developing countries need forms of political governance that enable them to transform their economies 
rapidly and sustainably to improve the social well-being and human capabilities of their citizens (Booth, 
2012). The developmental state is expected, by definition, to achieve rapid and sustainable development by 
                                                     
3
 “Development must, therefore, be conceived as a multidimensional process involving changes in social structures, 
popular attitudes and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality 
and the eradication of poverty. Development, in its essence, must represent the whole gamut of change by which an 
entire social system, tuned to the diverse basic needs and evolving aspirations of individuals and social groups within 
that system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory toward a situation or condition of 
life regarded as materially and spiritually better.” (Todaro & Smith, 2012:16).  
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taking these as its main goals. In other words, the aim of a developmental state is to accelerate economic 
development that substantially raises the average GDP per capita with the emphasis giving to 
industrialisation and urbanisation. Since a free-market approach in the real world is very far from being 
‘perfect’ (though ‘perfect’ in theory) both in developed and developing countries, the role of a 
developmental state approach remains indispensable for developing countries (Chang, 2003a). The 
developmental state is crucial to tackle major infrastructure bottlenecks, to improve human capital status and 
to nurture far-sighted institutions to accelerate the development process by effectively mobilising domestic 
resources in the form of public investment (Evans, 1995; Kohli, 2004). 
The emergence of the developmental state theory into the state ideology indicates a detachment from the 
conventional neoliberal ideology and the involvement of directed state intervention in the economy. It 
assumes that this interventionism does not handicap socio-economic development; rather supports a 
developmental trajectory for economic transformation (Kohli, 2004; Bolesta, 2007). The developmental state 
has to pay considerable attention to the capacity of the state to make development happen, and focus on 
creating a developmental-oriented bureaucracy and well-functioning institutions. Since the late-1990s, the 
focus of developmental states has shifted from massive investments in material conditions of modernisation 
to establishing well-functioning institutions and a knowledge economy created by the information revolution 
(Chibber, 2002). As argued by numerous authors, successful developmental states build on the market-
conforming or market-friendly development approach by adopting diverse institutions, because in the real 
world, either the supremacy of market or the state approach is imperfect, especially in developing countries. 
As UNCTAD (2007:61) asserted, the situation is that ‘neither the “market” nor the “State” can by itself 
deliver the ultimate goal of development. The real path to sustainable growth and development emanates 
from a pragmatic mix of markets and state action, taking into consideration the country-specific development 
challenges.’ 
Based on this, a developmental state is about seeking the right mix of state and market, governing the market 
and market forces to prevent market failure, creating capital transformation and new market opportunities, 
and supporting the private sector to realise its potential to create economic growth. This indicates that state 
intervention in a developmental state is not an obstacle to socio-economic development; instead, it supports 
the developmental trajectory by nurturing well-functioning diverse institutions (Bolesta, 2007). The 
existence of diverse institutions is an important element of the developmental state. It facilitates cooperation 
between the private and public sectors – or the state and society – and contributes to better economic 
performance by minimising market and governance failures to mobilise resources for development purposes 
(Johnson, 1999). Many of the East Asian developmental states were authoritarian, but this does not imply 
that all authoritarian regimes are developmental, or that states need to be authoritarian in order to be 
developmental. Instead, there are many examples of anti-developmental/non-developmental authoritarian 
states in the developing countries of Africa and Latin America and, similarly, there are states that officially 
claimed to be ‘democratic developmental states’ (Fritz & Menocal, 2006). However, the emerging 
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developmental states in the twenty-first century have an opportunity to achieve economic development in a 
more democratic approach than the previous Asian developmental states, given their contextual differences 
and today’s global environment.  
Achieving substantial economic development is not an easy task; it is obviously a challenging issue, and it 
needs more committed political leadership and well-functioning, diverse institutions. Institutions do not work 
in a vacuum – they need to be integrated into the economy. Far-reaching and strong institutions are crucial to 
achieve robust economic development and they are always shaped by the political, social and economic 
contexts of their particular nation; institutions cannot be imported directly (in a direct copy and paste 
approach) from developed countries because the terms and conditions are quite different. For instance, a 
fundamental contextual variable across African states is the shape of political ‘clientelism’ and the way in 
which rents are managed (Booth, 2012). Internal political, economic, and social transformations are crucial 
factors for strengthening the role of the developmental state and accelerating the development process in a 
given nation.  
Aspirant developmental states in the twenty-first century will pursue their developmental roles effectively in 
a broad-based participatory approach through the involvement of all stakeholders, subject to their own 
context-specific institutions and competent bureaucracy. The developmental states need to provide incentives 
for economic actors to invest in their own capabilities by providing basic social services to enhance the 
capability of the citizenry. In addition, the developmental states must define the developmental goals then 
make them a priority (Evans, 2010). However, the role of strong institutions in the field of economics is also 
extremely important, and the recognition of this has fed into the reassessment of the role of the state from an 
economic perspective. Strong state institutions with the capacity to promote economic growth – without 
being captured by interest groups – are seen as essential elements of the developmental state (Evans, 1995). 
Therefore, this study departs from the theoretical argument of the institutional political economy (IPE), 
which says that the existences of diverse institutions in the economy affects the market and, in turn, are 
affected by the market. In other words, the market is not the only institution that determines the fate of the 
given economy; rather there many institutions in the economy that determine the fate of the given economy 
(Chang, 2002; 2003a). Having a variety of institutions can help to facilitate the process of economic growth 
in a developmental state. Institutions govern the interaction between individuals and groups, and are 
constitutive of their motivations and perceptions. Negotiating, monitoring and enforcing such relationships 
are, therefore, a key aspect of institutional analysis (Chang, 2002; Herrera, 2006). As Edigheji (2010:5): 
The institutional architecture of the developmental state is crucial to its success and institutions that 
determine the capacity of the state. In particular, it is the institutional arrangements that are in place that 
explain the state’s capacity to define its developmental agenda and to formulate and implement policies in a 
legitimate and credible fashion towards the attainment of its goals. In designing institutions, however, a 
developmental state has to build distinctive capacities to achieve its various developmental goals. Ideally, a 
state with strong institutional arrangements would have good working relationship with non-state actors such 
as the private sector, civil society, trade unions, and even the society as a whole.  
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This study focuses on the role of developmental state from an institutional perspective, based on the 
theoretical and empirical review of the literature on the subject. In addition, it examines the role of the 
developmental state at the grassroots level through a case study of the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation 
project in Ethiopia. This is a public investment project operated by the Ethiopian state, based on its officially 
claimed developmental state ideology. It is clear that institutions need to create an environment that is 
conducive to state intervention to promote market-friendly state capitalism by addressing the pitfalls of the 
perfect market ideology. In turn, the state also plays its role in building well-functioning, legitimate 
institutions, as well as improves the quality of institutions to facilitate and promote economic development.  
In many developing countries, policy, institutions and social factors than technical factors such as physical 
investment (Gebremedhin & Peden, 2002) affect the success of irrigation projects more. This indicates that 
institutions play a decisive role in the success of public-investment projects in developing countries. 
Irrigation development and management is moving towards a partnership between governments, farmers and 
their water groups, such as water-user associations, for the sustainable utilisation of the resource. Involving 
farmers in water management, based on the participatory irrigation management (PIM) approach, gives them 
a voice in decision-making with regard to water distribution, system operations and maintenance which is 
vital for the sustainability
4
 of the resource (Xie, 2007).  
Generally, the point of departure for the analyses of the role of a developmental state in this study depends 
on the review of the mainstream developmental states, which include stories of their successes and failures. 
These stories should serve as a learning curve for the latecomer countries and enable them to make informed 
decisions about their development pathways. There is little doubt that many of the Asian developmental 
states have been successful in achieving rapid economic development and overall socio-economic 
transformation. Therefore, their experiences are crucial for today’s emerging developmental states – most of 
the good practices (common features) of these states are relevant to African countries. The proviso is that 
these experiences have to be interpreted in the light of the social, political, and economic contexts of a 
particular developmental state. However, it is possible to analyse the role of developmental state in the 
African context by taking cognisance of their common features. Figure 1.1 shows the overall governance of 
the developmental state, and adapts these to fit the current context.  
 
 
                                                     
4
 Protection of the environment, restoring the natural systems we depend on, and ensuring the equal rights of future 
generations. The gradual emergence of consensus among countries supporting the UN’s value-laden Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) signifies a growing acceptance of the essentiality of values in economics and other fields of 
social life, especially the value of sustainability (Jacobs et al, 2017). 
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Figure 1.1: The framework of governance in developmental states 
 
Source: Adapted from Ahrens & Stark (2013) 
1.8 Research methodology of the study  
Research methodology deals with how a researcher obtains the desired knowledge and understanding of the 
research topic and it provides the assumptions behind using a specific research design (whether quantitative, 
qualitative or mixed methods). In short, the methodology is a systematic way to solve a problem in a study 
and provides the logic for decision-making about what to do and how to do it (Henning et al., 2004). The 
forms of data collection, analysis and interpretation that are proposed by the researcher for the study are 
called research methods. The data is generated using different sources (secondary or primary or both) and 
different instruments, such as document reviews, survey questionnaires, focus group discussions and key 
informant interviews.This study explores how the developmental state paradigm has determined the 
institutional environment and arrangements for achieving economic growth/development in Africa. The 
theoretical foundation of this study is based on the work of heterodox development economists whose 
contributions have broadened the understanding of the role of the state in structural changes. The heterodox 
economists have provided ample theoretical and empirical evidence to counter the orthodox economists who 
provoked the primacy of market institutions and minimalist state intervention. The heterodox economic 
development theory posits a positive relationship between the developmental role of the state and the 
substantial economic outcomes. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
1.8.1 Sources and methods of data collection 
The nature of the research problems/questions of this study required both quantitative and qualitative data 
from primary and secondary sources. This provided a comprehensive analysis of the research problem 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). The study encompassed a combination of textual analysis (a review of 
literature), structured questionnaire surveys, semi-structured key informant interviews, and focus group 
discussions (for the case study). Using contextual analysis, the study reflected on the successes and failures 
of the developmental state model and highlighted some crucial lessons for developing countries when 
considering the developmental state as an alternative model to tackle the vicious cycle of poverty.  
Secondary sources of data were crucial to provide analytical, empirical, and comparative information for this 
study, as well as critical opinions. Some of the research questions that were addressed using mainly 
secondary sources of data are:  
1. What is the mainstream conception of the developmental state in relation to institutions and 
institutionalisation, as articulated in the international literature on the developmental state?  
2. What conception of the developmental state has been incorporated into the Ethiopian state’s official 
development ideology, as reflected in both its official documents and the written perspectives of its 
key representatives? Is Ethiopia’s conception of the developmental state adequate for the context in 
the light of the international and African literature on the subject?  
Likewise, part of specific objectives addressed using secondary sources of data are:  
1. To provide a detailed review of the theory of institutions and developmental state paradigm 
2. To provide a detailed review of the role of the developmental states and institutions for achieving 
economic development in Africa; and  
3. To assess the role of the emerging developmental state in economic development and building 
context-specific institutions in the context of Ethiopia 
Hence, to address the first and second research questions and objectives, this study relied mainly on a 
detailed literature review, including various scientific publications (research papers, articles and Journals), 
books, reports of regional and international institutions, and policy document analyses to acquire relevant 
theoretical and empirical evidence. With regard to the international sources, data were obtained mainly from 
official documents published by international institutions such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and annual economic reports on Africa to understand 
analytical and empirical evidence. Likewise, to address the third research question and objective (the case of 
the Ethiopian developmental state), information was derived mainly from published and unpublished 
documents of the ruling party and the consecutive mid-term, five-year development plans. The ADLI (a base 
for all sectoral development policies) was used as a policy document, because it outlines the policy 
orientation of the country and gives a clear indication of the goals of the Ethiopian developmental state 
model. In addition, official documents issued by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
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(MoFED) and other ministries and agencies of the Federal Government of Ethiopia, and the development 
plans and strategies, and annual reports of specific sectors were other sources of information. For the 
statistical data, the main sources were the official statistical reports issued by the Central Statistical Agency 
(CSA) of Ethiopia. At local (district and village) level, data were obtained from official reports of local 
government and various organisations. Other important sources of domestic information were online 
newspapers and research outputs written by scholars.  
Primary sources were also crucial for the case study of the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation and 
information was gathered from the community on their perceptions of how the irrigation project was 
progressing. These primary sources included beneficiary farm households, their associations, village leaders 
and extension workers, as well as district/woreda leaders in the case study area. Different techniques can be 
used to collect primary data and the choice of a technique depends on the purpose of the study, the available 
resources, and the skills of the researcher, the agro-ecology, as well as socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the studied population (target population or sampling units). Accordingly, the primary data 
were collected using focus group discussions and key informant interviews based on a semi-structured 
questionnaire, as well as a survey questionnaire – this is not only valid but it is also the most common type of 
primary data collection instrument used in the social sciences. Moreover, useful information was also 
obtained from many informal conversations with the local people, who provided valuable opinions on the 
nature and practice of the developmental state at the grassroots level in Ethiopia, as well as personal 
observation in the field.  
Data collected from the beneficiary farm households using the questionnaire and other instruments are 
crucial in the case study to address the research question. These are how Ethiopia’s conception of the 
developmental state–as articulated in its official development ideology and the perspectives of its key 
representatives – influenced and shaped the way in which the state has assembled the institutional 
arrangements and practices in the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation project? Is there evidence of a direct 
relationship between Ethiopia’s conception of the developmental state and the actual institutional 
arrangements and practices in the Raya Valley project? What are the successes and challenges of the Raya 
Valley project? The specific objective is to investigate the role of a developmental state and the existing 
institutional arrangements for the sustainable utilisation and governance of groundwater irrigation in the 
Raya Valley.  
The questionnaire consisted of three major parts and many of the questions aimed at quantifying various 
issues of interest in the case study. The first part comprised questions related to the socio-economic 
characteristics of the respondents, for instance, sex, age, marital status, level of education, family size, land 
arrangement, and so on. In the second part, the respondents were asked questions related to services such as 
access to training, credit and modern agricultural inputs. The third part assessed access to groundwater 
irrigation and its benefits, such as: How many hectares of land they have cultivated. How many crops have 
been grown? How much of each crop has been harvested in the different seasons? What are the issues around 
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groundwater irrigation management, accessibility of institutions and the market, and the challenges 
encountered?  
1.8.2 Sample selection procedures/techniques  
Sampling is the process of selecting elements (i.e. a portion of the population) from the total population of 
the study, which saves the researcher’s time, cost and effort. This is a recognised method of collecting data, 
apart from the saving time and money (Sapsford & Supp, 2006). There are two sampling techniques –
probability (random) and non-probability (non-random) sampling. The former is used mostly for quantitative 
research, while the latter is used for qualitative research. Samples selected for quantitative research are 
usually large, random and representative of the population (Creswell, 2014). Therefore, for this study, the 
random (i.e. systematic random) sampling technique was applied to select the respondents from the larger 
population. Systemic random sampling is one of the common sampling approaches for selecting samples 
from the population; i.e. in the systemic random sampling, every element in the population has an equal 
chance (opportunity) of being selected.  
The case study of the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation project was purposely selected because it offers 
access to modern groundwater irrigation systems that were developed through deliberate public investment. 
Because of the area’s relatively good groundwater potential, the government devoted substantial public 
funding into the development of the water resource for irrigation purposes. The sample of respondents was 
selected from villages that have access to groundwater irrigation in the project area. To make the sample 
representative, five tabias (villages) were deliberately selected from the project area, based on their distance 
from district towns, to minimise the cost to the researcher. However, the deliberate selection of studied 
villages did not affect the representation of beneficiary farm households in the study because there are no 
significant variations in agro-ecological and socio-economic phenomena across the Raya Valley project area; 
i.e. there is homogeneity in all aspects across the project area. After selecting the sample villages, using 
systemic random sampling techniques, 226 sample respondents (households) were selected from the project 
area via a complete list of beneficiary farm households (see Table 1.1). Due to the homogeneity 
characteristics of the project area (i.e. agro-ecology, socio-economic factors, access to markets/roads, 
irrigation system/infrastructure, and so on) the selection of tabias and sample respondents was not that much 
complex.  
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Table 1.1: Sample respondents selected from each village  
District/woreda Study village/tabia Sample irrigation schemes  Sample selected  
Raya Alamata Gerjele 2 44 
 Harle 1 22 
 Selam Bikalsi 2 52 
Raya Azebo Wargba 3 71 
 Kara Adi-shawo 2 37 
 Total 10 226 
To triangulate
5
 the information gathered from the survey questionnaires, information was also collected 
through focus group discussions with leaders of the water-users’ associations (WUAs) (i.e. beneficiary 
representatives), and key informant interviews with people that were well informed about the project 
implementation to obtain the necessary information – the participants were purposely selected. Focus group 
discussion is essential to understand the issues related to the case study in the studied population. 
Information gathered from focus group discussions enables the researcher to understand the selected issues 
from the participants’ point of view and provides a wealth of qualitative information. Likewise, key 
informant interviews provide vital information on individual perspectives and experiences related to the 
study. Experts from the offices of District Agriculture and Rural Development, Water Resource and 
Farmers’ Cooperative Agency were some of the key informants interviewed to obtain information related to 
the implementation of the irrigation project. A few academicians from various disciplines at Mekelle 
University provided information on what is going on with regard to the official developmental state model. 
The difference between a focus group discussion and key informant interviews is that the former is 
undertaken with a group and the latter with an individual. 
In general, all participants in the study were respected concerning their right to privacy and no 
data/information was collected without their consent. The researcher informed the participants about the 
scope, purpose and nature of the study, and obtained their permission. This ensured the voluntary 
participation of the research subjects before the commencement of the questionnaire interviews and focus 
group discussions. Using different instruments during fieldwork in both formal and informal discussions 
with individuals who are part of the society is crucial to supplement the secondary data compiled from 
different sources. This study is ‘interdisciplinary’ in nature, (i.e. it incorporates institutional economics, the 
developmental state and development economics, etc.). In addition to using these secondary and primary 
sources of data, the researcher also consulted with experts from these respective subject areas to understand 
and discuss issues from different perspectives. 
                                                     
5
 Triangulation is used in the social sciences to describe research strategies that use different methods to answer the 
same question or, alternatively, to describe the collection of data from different strategies in order to improve the 
validity of the results. Data triangulation refers to the gathering of data from a variety of sources (Tashakorri & Teddlie, 
2003). 
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1.8.3 Methods of data analysis and interpretation 
The purpose of social research is to understand human behaviour, perceptions and experiences by means of 
qualitative and quantitative methods. An analysis of the broader context of this study was dependent on 
primary and secondary sources of data. This aspect of the analysis provided the basis for the theoretical 
analysis and linked the outcomes with broader discussions of the developmental state and institutions. 
Therefore, the analysis and interpretation of the data depended on the information provided by informants 
from the case study, as well as documents (published and unpublished) used as secondary sources of 
information. These were analysed and interpreted using both quantitative and qualitative approaches.  
A quantitative method of analysis focuses on counting and measuring events, and performing a numerical 
analysis (quantification) of information. The results are typically presented using statistics, tables and graphs 
(Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003; Marczyk et al., 2005; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Kumar, 2011). The 
outcome of the quantitative analysis of the data (from both primary and secondary sources) is 
numerical. This implies that the purpose of the quantitative survey is to test statistically the effect of the 
existing policy intervention in the form of public investment (Marczyk et al., 2005; Khandker et al., 2010). 
Whereas, the qualitative method are appropriate to gain an in-depth understanding about the contexts and 
perceptions of the respondents derived from qualitative information. By definition, it is exploratory, based on 
in-depth investigation, and it explores information from both groups and individuals participating in focus 
group discussions, and key informant interviews, as well as observations and document analysis to generate 
theories (Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003; Marczyk et al., 2005; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Kumar, 
2011). Qualitative methods explore the perceptions (from different perspectives) of the participants who 
provide information on behalf of the studied population, and involve a continual relationship between theory 
and the actual outcome of the study. This generally emphasises the exploration of new phenomena to 
understand complex realities, and focuses on the provision of in-depth information (Marczyk et al., 2005; 
Khandker et al., 2010).  
Mixed methods of data analysis, on the other hand, involve collecting both quantitative and qualitative data 
and integrating both methods of data analysis (see Table 1.2). The core purpose of mixed methods of data 
analysis is that the combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches provides a more complete 
understanding of a research problem/or the contexts of the study than either of the single approaches. Mixed 
methods of analysis lie in the middle of this continuum because they incorporate elements of both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches (Creswell et al, 2003; Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003; Tashakorri & Teddlie, 
2003; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Creswell, 2014). In the mixed methods approach there are two 
approaches to data collection. The first is relatively simple, where qualitative and quantitative data are 
collected concurrently (at the same time), while the second is a complex sequential approach (where the data 
sets are collected one after the other) (Creswell et al., 2003; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). For this study, 
the first approach was applied; i.e. both the quantitative and qualitative data were collected at the same time. 
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From a methodological perspective, this study utilised mixed methods of data analysis; one of the advantages 
of this is that it enables the researcher to make inferences across both the quantitative and qualitative data. 
Table 1.2: Quantitative, mixed and qualitative methods 
Quantitative methods  Mixed methods Qualitative methods 
Pre-determined  Both predetermined & emerging methods Emerging methods 
Instrument-based questions 
(closed-ended questions) 
Both open- and closed-ended questions Open-ended questions 
Performance data, attitude data, 
observational data, census data 
Multiple forms of data drawing on all 
possibilities 
Interview, observation, document 
review, and audio-visual data 
Statistical analysis Statistical and text analysis Text and image analysis 
Statistical interpretation Across databases interpretation Themes, patterns interpretation 
Source: Creswell (2014) 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, therefore, facilitates an in-depth understanding of a 
phenomenon from different perspectives and is useful to obtain a comprehensive view of the effect (positive 
or negative) of a specific public-development programme. Moreover, such methods offer a greater diversity 
of viewpoints and allow for the inclusion of a variety of data sources, which broadens the extent and scope of 
the questions answered (Marczyk et al., 2005; Creswell et al., 2003; Khandker et al., 2010). These methods 
are considered a vehicle for improving the quality of the inferences that are drawn from both the qualitative 
and quantitative data (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). The use of a mixed method approach assists in the 
triangulation of information from different sources, and leads to multiple inferences and confirmations. 
Different methods yield similar results and strengthen inferences, while a combination of methods also 
provide a more comprehensive set of findings (Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003). 
With regard to the role of developmental state in an institutional perspective, a case study analysis is used for 
a few SSA countries, including Ethiopia, based on the theoretical and empirical evidence from the existing 
literature on the developmental states and review of different documents. The general assumption about the 
developmental state paradigm is that the relationship between the developmental role of the state and the 
substantial economic outcomes of that country is positive. The analysis is done through deductive reasoning 
with the starting point being the classical theory of the developmental states (i.e. the authoritarian East Asian 
developmental states) moving towards the contemporary, twenty-first centuries, and emerging 
developmental states. Consequently, a profound analysis of the developmental states of East Asia, in the 
light of the emerging developmental state on the African continent, is developed by making qualitative 
comparisons, which could help to draw an overall picture about the possibility of the developmental state as 
an alternative development model in the African context. To do this, one must analyse the extent to which 
nations satisfy the necessary common (but not sufficient) features of the developmental state. These 
necessary features of the developmental state are not static, but dynamic, and are adapted contextually. Each 
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state has its own distinctive features in terms of historical, cultural, political and socio-economic 
preconditions. However, the global context keeps changing over time and contextual factors are 
consequently crucial and necessary considerations. 
Therefore, mixed methods of data analyses are used in this study to understand the robustness of the role of 
the developmental state and its institutions in achieving economic development in the African context, and 
particularly in Ethiopia. This method helps us to understand the role of the developmental state in nurturing 
context-specific and far-reaching institutions to facilitate the general development process, and particularly 
sustainable resource utilisation and management. In addition, it helps to us to understand state–private sector, 
as well as state–society relationships, and the status of the practices of groundwater irrigation management 
for the sustainability of the ‘common pool’ resources in the study area, based on the state–society ties. The 
analysis is supported by numerical evidence (using the quantitative method) to understand the effect of 
public-policy intervention by the developmental state from both primary and secondary data sources. One 
important point to note here is that the data collected from a variety of sources have been systematically 
analysed using mixed methods, and these are illustrated in the forms of frequency scores, means, 
percentages, tables, charts, diagrams, without the data being distorted. 
1.9 Scope and significance of the study 
The scope of this study delimited on the assessment and analysis of the role of the developmental state for 
economic development in an institutional economic perspective, based on the mainstream conception of the 
developmental state literature and different institutional theories. The literature reviewed in this study was 
confined to the mainstream conception of the developmental state, as well as on the conceptions that have 
been developed in the African literature on the subject. Therefore, the mainstream conception of the 
developmental state ideology was discussed, based on the experiences of the East and Southeast Asian 
developmental states. Following this review of the main conception of the developmental state, this study 
tried to examines the role of the officially claimed Ethiopian developmental state. Moreover, it examines the 
role of the developmental state and the existing institutional arrangements from the perspective of 
sustainable utilisation and governance of groundwater irrigation at grassroots level via a case study of the 
Raya Valley groundwater irrigation project.  
Having this delimitation, the significance of this study lies in contributing to the understanding of the role of 
developmental states, from an institutional perspective, by examining both theoretical and empirical 
evidences of developmental states. Hopefully, this will be served as an additional resource in the literature on 
the developmental state in the African perspective. This study also tried to give recommendations how 
African nations should recognise a developmental state paradigm by designing their own appropriate 
institutions that serve as the engine of economic growth/development. This recommendation could be 
considered as something akin to balancing the political and economic directions in an attempt to achieve the 
development projects of the developmental state in Africa. One of the possible contributions of this study is 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
26 
 
to show how the developmental state paradigm could have been adapted in the first place by taking the 
specific contexts of individual countries into consideration, which is essential to strengthen their national 
cooperation with market and non-market actors, i.e. with all stakeholders in the economy. Furthermore, it 
tried to show how the developmental state can build co-ownership of public resources (in this case, the 
groundwater irrigation project) developed by public investment for the sustainable and efficient utilisation of 
resources. The Raya Valley groundwater irrigation project shows how the Ethiopian developmental state 
built context-specific institutions to use the water resource in a sustainable manner for the betterment of the 
farm households by devoting the required public (financial and human) resources. Finally, this study tried to 
offer additional valuable inputs that could be used by researchers, academicians and governmental 
organisations in their efforts to understand the role of the developmental state in the African context and 
these inputs possible help to fill the existing gap in the literature related to the African context.  
1.10 Outline of chapters 
Chapter 1 introduces the study, providing some background and an overview of the Ethiopian economy; it 
also discusses the rationale for the study, the problem of statement and the objectives, as well as the 
conceptual framework and methodology. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and focuses on related the 
mainstream conception and features of the developmental state, theories of institutional economics, the need 
for and the rise of the developmental state model in Africa – a continent for the dynamic economic 
transformation, as well as the economies of irrigation development and practices. Chapter 3 provides an 
overview of post-independence African economies, which is crucial to see the overall picture of the African 
economic situation under different conditions since independence. Chapter 4 addresses the role of the 
emerging developmental state model in the case of Ethiopia. This chapter discusses how the conception of 
the developmental state has been incorporated into the Ethiopian state’s official development ideology, as 
reflected in both its official documents and the written perspectives of its key representatives. Chapter 5 
discusses the issue of the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation project (the case study), which is considered by 
the Ethiopian state as one of the pro-poor and pro-growth public investments of in the study area. It 
addresses how Ethiopia’s developmental state, as articulated in its official development ideology, shaped the 
way in which it has assembled the institutional arrangements and governance practices in this irrigation 
project. Chapter 6 concludes the study and provides some recommendations. It presents the main findings of 
the study and points out what needs to be considered when countries build a developmental state model. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE DEVELOPMENTAL 
STATE, INSTITUTIONS AND IRRIGATION 
2.1 Introduction  
The literature review focuses on the mainstream conceptions of the developmental state, the theories of 
institutions and the need for and the rise of the developmental state in Africa – a continent, as well as on the 
economies of groundwater irrigation development and practice. This body of literature has made a 
significant contribution to the whole analysis of the study. Hence, the research question addressed in this 
chapter is what is the mainstream conception of the developmental state in relation to institutions and 
institutionalisation, as articulated in the international literature on the developmental state? Likewise, the 
specific objective is to provide a detailed review of the theory of institutions and the developmental state 
paradigm. Following the introduction, the first section contains the theory/concept and features of the 
developmental state model, the spread of the developmental state and some empirical evidences from these 
states in the East Asian countries. These demonstrated based on the classic and contemporary literatures on 
the topic, to understand the existing theory of the developmental state. The second section of this chapter 
covers the theories of institutions, such as the theory of the ‘old institutional economics’ (OIE), the ‘new 
institutional economics’ (NIE) and the ‘institutional political economy’ (IPE) schools of thought. Discussing 
each of these theories helps one to conceptualise the role of institutions. In addition, it provides a clearer 
understanding of the relationships and the differences between these contemporary institutional theories, 
especially in relation to real-world practice. Following this, the third section addresses the need for and the 
rise of the developmental state model in Africa – a continent for the dynamic economic transformation. The 
last section discusses the evolution/practice of groundwater irrigation, the economics of groundwater 
irrigation, and the management of the groundwater irrigation infrastructure/resource for sustainability.  
2.2 The concept, features and spread of the developmental state 
2.2.1 The concept of the developmental state 
Chalmers Johnson (1982) first described the concept of the ‘developmental state’ in his book, Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Japanese Miracle. He used the concept of ‘developmental 
state’ to explain Japan’s rapid and successful economic development in the post-Second World War era. 
Johnson proposed the term ‘developmental state’ as an alternative development ideology to the existing 
(neoliberal) development ideology. This is one of a crucial step-forward in the argument of the current 
political economy that dominated by Western ideology (given varieties of capitalism) and which has 
neglected the role of the state in the economy. Johnson’s main thesis is that the origin of Japan’s 
developmental state is understood by examining specific events that shaped the country’s history. For 
instance, Japan’s struggle for the evolution of a developmental state model was closely tied to its efforts to 
cope with an international order dominated by Western developed countries, and its   motivation  behind 
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building the developmental state for was depend on its condition as a latecomer within East Asian 
revolutionary nationalism (Johnson, 1982; 1999).  
To describe the developmental state, Johnson contrasts Japan’s plan-rationale system – ‘conjoining private 
ownership with state guidance’ – with a binary distinction between the market-rationale system of capitalism 
in the United States and the completely state-dominated (command or central-planning) system of the Soviet 
Union. By positioning the idea of the developmental state between a liberal open-economy model and a 
centrally planned model, Johnson suggests that it is neither capitalist nor socialist in nature. Based on this 
distinction, he advanced three main arguments about the developmental state. (1) Markets do not exist in 
isolation but are a creation of the state and politics. (2) A developmental state comes first before 
development priorities are put in place and (3) the most crucial element of the developmental state is not its 
economic policy but its ability to mobilise the nation around economic development within a capitalist 
system (Johnson, 1982). Subsequent to Johnson’s seminal work, numerous other scholars (cf. Haggard, 
1989; Onis, 1991; Evans, 1995; Leftwich, 1995; 2005b; 2008; Johnson, 1999; Chang, 1999; Bagchi, 2000; 
Weiss, 2000; Mkandawire, 2001; Kang, 2002; Chibber, 2002; 2004; Khan, 2004; Kohli, 2004; Fritz & 
Menocal, 2006; 2007; UNECA, 2011) have expounded the concept of a developmental state. This rapidly 
expanding contemporary literature is concerned with a much broader agenda of the developmental state than 
simply state-driven industrialisation or capital accumulation. 
During the 1980s and 1990s attempts to explain the economic miracles of Japan and the four ‘Asian Tigers’ 
helped to generate new interpretations of this emerging phenomenon and gave birth to a new conception of 
the state – the developmental state. By the early 1990s, even the loyal advocates of free markets and minimal 
states, such as the World Bank, had admitted the significant role of the state in creating high economic 
growth rates and increasing the living standards in these East Asian countries (World Bank, 1993; Howel, 
2006). More importantly, the outcomes from the successful East Asian developmental states generated 
significant contributions to economic development, equity in income distribution and poverty reduction. Due 
to these positive outcomes, donor communities and international institutions began to rethink the role of the 
state in economic transformation (World Bank, 1997; Menocal, 2004). There is a growing awareness among 
scholars and practitioners about the importance of the state’s developmental orientation and effectiveness to 
explain the success or failure of countries to achieve their development goals (Fritz & Menocal, 2007). 
In the plan-rationale state, the government will give greatest precedence to industrial policy, that is, to a 
concern with the structure of domestic industry and with promoting the structure that enhances the nation’s 
international competitiveness. The very existence of an industrial policy implies a strategic, or goal oriented, 
approach to the economy (Johnson,1982:19). Even though industrial policy is crucial in the developmental 
state, it cannot replace the market as all state actions intervening in the economy must be market-conforming 
(Johnson, 1982:317).  
The characteristic of Taiwan and South Korea is also the same as that of Japan where the state has prioritised 
economic development for over three decades. This shared characteristic is also possible to generalise for the 
rest of the East Asian developmental states based on economic development as the first priority of the states 
(Johnson, 1982:305).  
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However, for many analysts the developmental state is the product of a particular period. In Japan, this was 
between 1925 and 1975 and for the rest of East Asia, between the 1960s and 1990s (Mkandawire, 2001). By 
the early 1990s, conditions were changing due to a shift in the global political economy. The end of the Cold 
War and the onset of globalisation tended to transform powerful, authoritarian bureaucracies of the East 
Asian states (Stubbs, 2009). This indicates that the developmental state ideology does not last forever in any 
country; (developmental state is a means it not an end) and, indeed, success in promoting development leads 
to this type of state becoming its own ‘gravedigger’. That is, instead of being static, the developmental state 
is a transitional form of the modern state (Evans, 1995). Accordingly, the developmental state becomes less 
attractive as the economy matures (i.e. when it reaches the frontiers of technology and knowledge) and 
coordination problems become less acute. For instance, at the end of the Cold War, the United States started 
to put considerable pressure on its allies to move in the direction of democratisation and to have greater 
respect for individual human rights (i.e. a transition towards a more liberal economic system).  
The United States started to put considerable pressure on its allies to move down the road to democratization 
and greater respect for individual human rights. The US government commenced a campaign to liberalize the 
economies of East Asia. Using its own levers of persuasion as well as its institutional muscle within the IMF, 
the World Bank and the OECD, the United States began to put considerable pressure on the governments of 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand to liberalize all facets of their economy, especially the financial 
sectors. In good part, this meant that Washington actively promoted deregulation and privatization within the 
developmental states of East Asia
6
 (Stubbs, 2009:10).  
Moreover, new ideas about the best economic policies to pursue were brought into regional governments by 
technocrats trained overseas, especially economists who were educated in US, or British universities. 
Overall, then, the collapse of the Cold War and the onset of globalization tended to transform parts of the 
once powerful bureaucracies of East Asia (Stubbs, 2009:11).  
However, even after the 1990s, scholars have continued to investigate the developmental state from various 
angles, following the popularity of the theory of institutions. Furthermore, the ideas and institutions that were 
associated with the emergence of the developmental state became highly entrenched because they were 
associated with the transformation of the economy from poverty and social dislocation. Institutionalists argue 
that the market is not the only or dominant institution in the economy. Many others play an integral part in 
the socio-economic life of the real world (Chang, 1994; 2002; 2003a). The developmental state 
acknowledged as a new alternative development ideology that contributed to the success of several countries 
in East Asia, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, to Southeast Asia such as Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and, more recently, China and Mauritius, and Botswana in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Chang explains the need for the reconstruction of the developmental state in political, ideological and 
institutional terms:  
                                                     
6
 For instance, the first civilian presidential election was held in South Korea in 1987 and Thailand experienced much 
the same practice. The end of the Cold War ended the massive military and economic aid that had helped to promote 
strong states in the East Asian region. The shift from a Cold War environment to a globalised environment changed the 
way capital entered the developmental state. Declining amounts of aid were replaced by a flood of Foreign Direct 
Investment as multinational corporations sought to restructure their export manufacturing to take advantage of the 
increasingly highly productive and low-cost production platforms in the region (cf. Stubbs, 2009). 
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A developmental state, which can create and regulate the economic and political relationships that can 
support sustained industrialization and takes the goals of long-term growth and structural change seriously. 
And ‘politically’ manages the economy to ease the conflicts inevitable during the process of such change 
(but with a firm eye on the long-term goals) and engages in institutional adaptation and innovation to achieve 
those goals (Chang, 1999:192).  
Here Chang provides a more institutional perspective, emphasising the role of the developmental state in 
shaping the development process by using its institutions. From this perspective, the developmental state 
could be seen as an active manager of economic development, promoting fair distribution of resource among 
all economic actors. The developmental state’s functions go far beyond the conventional sense of merely 
correcting market failures. Rather, the developmental state further coordinates substantive changes and is 
involved in providing vision-driven, enterprising, empowered, performance-oriented government, promoting 
active citizen participation, building necessary institutions and managing inevitable conflicts during its 
economic development by reducing inequality and providing basic public services (Chang, 1994; 1999; 
Weiss, 2000).  
Johnson describes the developmental state as one that determines the direction and pace of economic 
development by directly intervening in the development process rather than relying on the uncoordinated 
influence of market forces to allocate economic resources. This indicates that the state must guarantee the 
policy tools that give additional bureaucratic authority to state interventions in the economy without 
undermining market principles (Johnson, 1982). Adrian Leftwich (1995) also introduced a theory of the 
developmental state that was centrally premised on political considerations, or on the primacy of politics. 
Leftwich emphasises ‘politics as the dominant variable that determines the concept of the developmental 
state as well as the developmental success or failure in all human societies’ (Meyns & Musamba, 2010). This 
means that politics is a prime instrument to accelerate development in a developmental state, although it is 
not necessarily unique to the developmental state. As Leftwich further notes, in latecomer developing 
countries, development turns crucially on the primary role of politics in shaping the character and capacity of 
the state. Thus, suitable politics, in the sense of context, dynamics and purpose, have been central in shaping 
the structures of developmental states, their development aims and their impressive performance (Leftwich, 
1995; 2005b; 2008). Developmental states across the developing world are sharpening their interventionist 
instruments to target all the holy cows of the neoliberal era. Even though G-8 and G-20 leaders continue to 
advocate the virtues of free markets at every international meeting, regulators and businesses are quietly 
introducing a wide range of protectionist measure. Thus, ‘getting the prices wrong’ from a pure market 
perspective may well be the hallmark of the new generations of the developmental state (Swilling & 
Annecke, 2012). Furthermore:  
The recent global economic crisis (stemming from market failure), the rise of China, East Asia and some 
Latin American countries as newly industrialized nations, and Africa’s solid decade-long economic 
performance have rekindled discussion on the role and nature of the state in the development process 
(UNECA, 2011: 95). Meaning that, the crash of October 2008 and the (partial) demise of neoliberalism that 
this represents has effectively cleared the way for some of the more progressive developmental states that are 
keen to promote a more inclusive form of capitalism than the kind of championed by neoliberalism. Some 
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socialist alternatives (whatever this may mean in practice) might also emerge, but probably on the margins of 
the global economy. China’s leaders will feel that their state-managed capitalist model has been vindicated 
(Swilling & Annecke, 2012:83).  
This argument indicates that the developmental state becomes an alternative development ideology for 
developing countries to build inclusive forms of capitalism by integrating the roles of the market and the 
state – but only if countries nurture this ideology based on their own context, given well-functioning 
institutions.  
To conclude, the developmental state, as various authors have described it, has become one of the alternative 
development models to accelerate the development process of latecomer countries. This is because the 
market-dominated (minimalist state) or neoliberal development approach was tested for many years and it 
failed in Asia, Latin America and Africa. It is obvious that a developmental state is one that promotes 
macroeconomic stability and establishes well-functioning institutions that provide law and order, effective 
administration and appropriate infrastructure investment, and boosts human capital development by investing 
in social sectors such as education and health (Mkandawire, 2001; 2010). Furthermore, a developmental state 
is described as one that is able to deploy the requisite institutional architecture and mobilise society toward 
the realisation of its development projects (Edigheji, 2010). Therefore, after the adoption of a developmental 
state, countries can design effective instruments to promote the development process. Some of these include 
the establishment of well-functioning formal institutions, the integration of formal and informal networks of 
collaboration among citizens and officials, and the utilisation of new opportunities for profitable trade and 
production activities (Bagchi, 2000).  
2.2.2 The characteristics of the developmental state 
Developmental states have different evolutionary paths, contexts and trajectories, which result in a wide 
variety of the specifics of their contexts, depending on which case is considered. Therefore, any attempt to 
build common features of developmental states cannot be extended to mean that there is only one way of 
understanding and describing developmental states. However, this section provides some of the distinctive 
features of developmental states, which became apparent in the successful developmental states in the last 
three to four decades of the twentieth century. These features are not a ‘blue-print’ from any one country; 
they are common pillars that a state could adopt and adapt to its own context. Although these features are 
considered necessary, they are not sufficient to build successful developmental states in the latecomer 
developing countries. Authors define the concept of the ‘developmental state’ in different ways and define 
the common features from divergent approaches. Accordingly, some of these features are discussed, starting 
with the classic work of Chalmers Johnson. Based on Japan’s successful post-Second World War experience, 
Johnson (1982:314–20) described four of these essential features as follows: 
1. ‘The existence of a small, inexpensive, but elite state bureaucracy staffed by the best managerial 
talent available in the system. The duties of this bureaucracy would be, first, to identify and choose 
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the industries to be developed (industrial structure policy); second, to identify and choose the best 
means of rapidly developing the chosen industries (industrial rationalization policy); and third, to 
supervise competition in the designated strategic sectors in order to guarantee their economic health 
and effectiveness.’ 
2. ‘A political system in which the bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take initiative and operate 
effectively.’ This indicates that strong cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats have been the 
foundation stone of the developmental state. 
3. ‘The perfection of market-conforming methods of state intervention in the economy’: this approach 
is crucial to develop strong governmental financial institutions, use indicative plans to set goals and 
guidelines for the entire economy, create forums for the exchange of views, revise policies, obtain 
feedback and resolve differences. There is extensive reliance on public corporations; the creation and 
use of an ‘investment budget’; anti-trust policy oriented to developmental and international 
competitive goals rather than strictly to the maintenance of domestic competition; and government-
sponsored research and development (R & D). 
4. ‘A pilot organization, namely the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)’ in Japan, the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB) in South Korea, the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) in Taiwan, 
the Economic Development Board (EDB) in Singapore and the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) in 
Malaysia. The pilot agency emerged as the principal institutions responsible for policy formulation 
and implementation, as well as resource mobilisation and utilisation. A small but powerful pilot 
agency can provide important strategic guidance in the selection of key development projects to be 
encouraged and in the provision of a stable/predictable environment for private sector to undertake 
risky and long-term investment projects. 
Following the above description of Johnson’s seminal work, Adrian Leftwich (1994:378–80; 1995:405–6) 
synthesises the following six major features of the developmental state model in more detail than those 
identified by Johnson. These significant components either are detailed versions of the four elements 
developed by Johnson (1982) or are described in more depth. These six features are:  
 ‘Determined developmental elite committed to the modernisation project’; 
 ‘Relative autonomy from major capitalist economic interests who are always keen to capture the 
state’; 
 ‘Powerful, competent, and insulated economic bureaucracy that enjoys the highest possible political 
support rather operates without too much political interference’; 
 ‘Weak and subordinated civil society which means there are no rival centres of alternative policy 
formation and consultation with them’; 
 ‘Effective management of non-state economic interests via the formal structured compacts, 
incentives, and penalties for the sake of the common or national interest’;  
  ‘Repression, legitimacy, and performance that helps to consolidate credibility of the state through 
having accessible and responsive institutions in the economy.’  
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The first three of these features, namely, the developmental elite committed to economic development, 
autonomy from specific interest groups or factions and a recognised ability of the bureaucracy to implement 
a growth policy are, in effect, important initial conditions and can be thought of as a micro-foundation of 
developmental states. Besides these features developed by Johnson and Leftwich, there are some additional 
key features of developmental states. These are: (1) ‘Possession of embeddedness’ with the society, private 
sectors, civil society organisations and other economic agents (Evans, 1995). (2) ‘Selectivity’ and 
‘prioritisation’ because of resource constraints are common problem for every country that prevented 
countries from implementing all development projects at a time. To be successful, a country should select a 
set of strategic economic sectors and implement these, based on their priority in a specified period. The 
strategic sectors are considered as the backbone of the economy and the engine of all other economic sectors 
in the future (Evans, 1995; White, 1998). (3) ‘Production-oriented private sector’ via used instruments such 
as selected and strategic protectionism, industrial subsidies, and the creation of business coalitions among 
industrial capital, financial capital and state, and then at the end, these are either rewarded or punished, based 
on their performance standards and targets (Booth, 1999; Westphal, 2001; Wong, 2004). 
2.2.3 The spread of the developmental state ideology  
In practice, successful developmental states have helped to change the economic order of the world by 
allowing many developing countries to catch up with other advanced nations in the West by accelerating 
their role in the process of development and structural transformation. The developmental state first appeared 
in Japan in the late-1950s; Japan’s two close neighbours, namely, Taiwan and South Korea, soon followed in 
the 1960s (Johnson, 1982). The developmental state has proved its vitality and has adopted by various 
nations across Asia, especially in Southeast Asia. The recent successes of economies in Southeast Asia (such 
as Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) and China, following the successes of Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan, provide convincing evidence that the international economic order has changed 
significantly because of the rise of developmental states. Some of these have become industrialised 
countries, while others have raised their standards of living considerably and narrowed the gap between 
themselves and developed economies, making Asia one of the most dynamic regions in the world today 
(IMF, 2011).  
This successful development might be explained in several ways but the role of the state remains 
indispensable. The success of developmental states is based on the endeavours of selective and decisive 
economic sectors (Yeung, 2009; Wei et al., 2009). Although the concept of the developmental state 
paradigm emanated from Northeast Asia, variations of this ideology have been seen in different parts of the 
world. Why developmental states have appeared so often in the countries of Southeast Asia might be 
explained by their close proximity, their similarities in customs, cultures, social norms and political 
traditions, their geopolitical advantage at the time of the Cold War and strong regional integration. This 
suggests that the developmental state model has a wider application and relevance – even outside of its 
region of origin (Japan) – when the preconditions for it to emerge are available (Leftwich, 1995; 2008). The 
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virtue of this economic development model has been recognised elsewhere. For instance, Botswana and 
Mauritius in SSA and Brazil in Latin America have adopted similar developmental state models to the 
countries in Southeast Asia (Leftwich, 1995; 2008). In general, however, East Asia has been the main region 
to adopt this model and it has emerged frequently in many latecomer developing countries. However, the 
proponents of a neoliberal ideology and the process of globalisation, in particular have challenged this 
development model, since 1990 following the end of the Cold War.  
The developmental state paradigm was also pursued in the import-substitution industrialisation policies of 
select Latin-American countries, in particular, the Brazilian developmental state. As elsewhere in Latin 
America, the developmental state of Brazil emerged haphazardly in response to economic crisis (Ashman et 
al., 2010; Schneider, 2015). The economic policy of import substitution regarded as the first step towards the 
formation of the Brazilian developmental state (Ricz, 2014). In the early stages, Brazil’s developmental state 
was reasonably successful via the deepening its interventionism in the economy to mobilise resources for 
development. When the country experienced an ‘economic miracle,’ reaching average growth rates of 11% 
from late the 1960s up to the early 1970s, the developmental state appeared to be highly successful in 
aggregate economic terms. While the state was a major impulse for rapid growth of the Brazilian economy 
since the 1950s and transformed from agrarian into industrial economy, it proved  unable to overcome the 
deep economic problems of the country in the 1980s and early 1990s (Weyland, 1998). In comparison with 
the top performing developmental states of East Asia, the Brazilian version of the developmental state did 
not promote a vast reorientation of the economy toward high tech and high value-added manufacturing 
(Schneider, 2015). This meant that state intervention was initially successful, but soon stumbled, thereby 
reducing the state’s ability to guide development. This is because the instruments of state intervention 
became increasingly vulnerable to capture by societal groups and clientelist networks (Ricz, 2014). 
However, the Brazilian developmental state shared some characteristics of cohesive-capitalist states
7
 (though 
not as purely as in the case of the Korean developmental state) and provided a secure environment for capital 
formation, especially foreign capital, to accelerate the growth of the industrial sector (Kohli, 2004). 
Successive governments in Brazil – during the second half of the twentieth century – constructed the 
developmental state, which shared a few core elements of a developmental state including some Weberian 
agencies and effective institutional arrangements for monitoring and planning to accelerate the national 
development process (Schneider, 2015). Amongst the numerous political factors that enabled the Brazilian 
state to facilitate industrialisation was a growth-oriented political leadership; a narrow coalition of political 
and economic elites, competent and technocratic bureaucrats who were empowered to execute the will of the 
state (Kohli, 2004; Schneider, 2015). This developmental coalition intervened to promote rapid 
                                                     
7
 Cohesive-capitalist developmental states are characterised by ideological and organizational characteristics that help 
to define goals/objectives in detail and therefore concentrate resources on a priority development projects. Cohesive-
capitalist types of developmental states have managed to create powerful and effective states that have achieved such 
desirable goals as redistribution of wealth and rapid generation of new wealth (Kohli, 2004). 
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industrialization – including state enterprises, foreign capital, and indigenous entrepreneurs. Public 
expenditures rose sharply, reflecting the government’s commitment to state-led development, funding 
expansion of the bureaucracy, development of infrastructure, and numerous (new) public enterprises. Given 
a policy framework designed to encourage import-substitution, the Brazilian developmental state lacked 
prior ideological commitment to controlling the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, limited 
developmental capacities (the economic nationalism of the ruling elite remained shallow, which led to 
increasing dependence on foreign capital), and lacked a strong and dynamic indigenous capitalist sector 
associated with limited policy options. Brazilian indigenous capital, for instance, was concentrated in 
consumer industries (mainly non-durables goods), namely textiles, food, clothing, beverages, furniture, 
cement, glass, plastics, and paper. In contrast, the Korean state chose to build indigenous developmental 
capacities through strong state-private sector coalition/s (Kohli, 2004).  
Since the developmental state is a transitional form of the modern state, countries that that have already 
reached a certain level of economic development may no longer be developmental. However, developmental 
states are still relevant and necessary for the development and transformation of the economies of developing 
countries (Beeson, 2006). This means that a developmental state may die (outdate) in one country but a new 
one may start up somewhere else because this developmental model is critical to achieve reliable economic 
transformation in a particular context within a specific period. Although state-led development may result in 
an authoritarian environment (as the experiences of the East Asian developmental state have demonstrated), 
it is argued that the role of the state is vital to economic development, irrespective of the democracy in these 
states (Johnson, 1999; Beeson, 2006). As Leftwich emphasises, this is especially true in the developing 
world, given the priorities to achieve economic growth and improve the standards of living. After achieving 
the important goal of economic development, developmental states generally switch their attention to 
correcting the side effects of their rapid economic growth (Leftwich, 2005b; 2008). 
Scholars have debated the role of the state in development and come up with many different ideas, many of 
which are still relevant, especially for the developing countries. Since the Japanese economic miracle, many 
developing countries have followed the Japanese model to transform their economies. Some of these have 
been successful (Evans, 1995), others less so (Haggard, 2004; Doner et al., 2005). This could be the result of 
these less successful countries failing to meet the key features of a developmental state, rather than a failure 
of the ideology itself. However, whatever the differences, the one common feature in all of the countries that 
have adopted this model is state’s critical role in the transformation and development process (Leftwich, 
1995; Bagchi, 2000; Haggard, 2004; Beeson, 2009), even though some of these may lack certain features of 
the classic developmental state (Kohli, 2004). Overall, successful developmental states have demonstrated 
how their political purposes and institutional structures have been developmentally driven, while their 
development objectives have been politically driven (Leftwich, 2008).  
The critical question is what are the internal and external factors that have accounted for the recognised 
success of the East Asian developmental states? The internal factors include the existence of committed 
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political leadership; competent elite bureaucracy accompanied by far-sighted/context-appropriate institutions 
(i.e. the pilot agency); their Confucian tradition/social ideology, which contributes to bureaucratic strength 
and a positive attitude for development; relatively strong state–private sector relations based on ‘carrot’ and 
‘stick’ instruments (Evans, 1995; Mkandawire, 2001; Kohli, 2004; Doner et al., 2005). With regard to the 
external factors, the global and regional environment provided a situation that permitted the emergence of 
successful developmental states (Mkandawire, 2001; Kohli, 2004; Kasahara, 2013). Most importantly, the 
United States was willing to flood the region with capital (i.e. financial resources and skilled human 
resources equipped with organisational and technical knowledge), mostly in the form of military and 
economic aid.
8
  Preferential access provided by the United States to its domestic market for its Asian allies 
was critical for the ‘take-off’ of the region as were the large amounts of aid it provided. For instance:  
During the Korean War, in 20-year period 1950-70, US aid to Japan averaged $500 million a year. Aid to 
South Korea and Taiwan combined was even more massive. Huge amounts of military and economic aid to 
South Korea, and investment in infrastructure as well linked to the Cold War. From 1946-78, military and 
economic aid to South Korea amounted to $13 billion ($600 per capita) and to Taiwan $5.6 billion ($425 per 
capita) (Arrighi, 2002:30-31). The true dimensions of this munificence are revealed by the fact that the 
nearly $6 billion in US economic aid to South Korea in 1946-78 compare with a total of $6.89 billion for all 
of Africa and of $ 14.8 billion for all of Latin America in the same period (Arrighi, 2002:31). 
This opened its rapidly expanding domestic markets to manufactured goods from its East Asian allies. The 
United States was also able to pay the inflated prices for raw materials and industrial products that were 
needed to fight the wars in Korea and Vietnam (Stubbs, 2009; 2011). In these East Asian developmental 
states, government–business relations took place on at least two different levels:  
On the most general level, East Asian governments managed to diffuse a sense that they were genuinely 
committed a collective project of national development. Despite political divisions and governmental 
missteps, this sense of a national project gained surprisingly widespread credence and constituted one of the 
most important ‘collective goods’ provided by the state. The essential complement to this broad ideological 
connection was a dense set of concrete interpersonal ties that enabled specific agencies and enterprises to 
construct joint projects at the sectoral level. The evolution of government–business ties in East Asia has been 
even more convoluted and counter intuitive than the evolution of the bureaucracy itself (Evans, 1998:74).  
Government–business relations are important at the level of policy formulation and implementation, and 
effective relations depend on large volumes of high-quality information flowing between government and 
business corporations, as well as on a mutual confidence that predictions and commitments are credible 
(Onis, 1991; Evans, 1998). In the case of the East Asian developmental states, the relationship between 
government and business is based on an agreement on common goals, strategies and rules (‘carrot’ and 
‘stick’), and on mutual complementarity to achieve developmental targets. 
                                                     
8
 The military aid, prompted by the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the overarching Cold War, and later Japanese aid, as 
well as American and Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI), contributed to the substantial resources that were 
funnelled into East Asian economies (Stubbs, 2011). This indicates that high levels of FDI from the region, as well as 
outside the region, are another factor that contributed to the success of the East Asian developmental states. 
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These state–private sector relations have been continuous throughout the process of the structural 
transformation. ‘Committed political leadership’, ‘competent bureaucracy’, and well-functioning institutions 
are basic driving factors for successful state–private sector relations in the economies of these states. Where 
these relationships matter for the successful achievement of the national development projects, priority issues 
are formulated based on broad consensus. Obviously, the national development projects are different from 
country to country, depending on their development priorities. The relationship between government and the 
private sector depends on the national development projects and priority areas in that economy. For instance, 
in Japan and South Korea, the incentives and resources to guide private-sector activities were result-oriented, 
i.e. contingent on performance. The adopted performance standards usually linked to the objectives of the 
national projects and monitored at the firm level. State supports, which often-involved competition among 
private sectors, was limited to a specific period. To ensure the effective use of state support, private sectors 
were gradually subjected to the discipline of competition through international markets (UNCTAD, 2009). In 
other words, state support was given to the private sector for a limited period to achieve their specific targets.  
Overall, there is no single organisational formula or pathway, which developing countries can use to 
replicate the experiences of the East Asian developmental states. A ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach does not 
work given the heterogeneous characteristics (diversity and exceptionality) of developing countries. East 
Asian bureaucracies and institutions were not gifted from their ancestors. They are hard-won structures built 
by means of a ‘trial and error’ or ‘learning-by-doing’ approach (Evans, 1998; Mkandawire, 2001). A country 
that wants to adopt the developmental state paradigm today should examine some of the good practices from 
these earlier, successful developmental states, and adapt these to its own particular political, economic, social 
and cultural environment. However, the big challenge for developing countries is finding the appropriate mix 
of market orientation and government intervention consistent with rapid and efficient structural 
transformation. It is equally important that the set of institutional and political arrangements should be 
compatible with the appropriate mix of state intervention and market orientation in the economy. The 
challenge in many developing countries is the shift from the state versus market to a market-friendly or 
capitalist development economy through the integration of the market and state (Leftwich, 2005a). To realise 
this, the market-state model needs to recognise the role of diverse and effective institutions in the economy. 
For instance, there was a difference in the institutional approach of the East-Asian and Latin-American 
developmental state/s, especially the Brazilian developmental state. With respect of Brazil, ‘embedded 
autonomy’ of the state bureaucracy from interest groups was limited, which led to the dysfunctionality of the 
state bureaucracy fed by poor performance, job-insecurity and dissatisfaction. This indicated that the 
Brazilian model differed quite substantially from the classic-type developmental state/s. In spite of being 
initially successful, the Brazilian development state was not sustainable – economically, financially, socially 
and politically (Ricz, 2014). 
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2.2.4 Synthesis of the concept and features of the developmental state  
The diverse experiences of successful developmental states suggest that there is no ‘single blueprint’ for 
countries adopting this model. Each country must build its own model based on its existing internal and 
external contexts. The only binding trait of the relatively effective states was a firm political commitment to 
transform the country’s economy, rather than governing for the benefit of a few individuals or narrow 
interest groups (Evans, 1995). As a region, East Asia offered a political, economic and social model, and an 
enabling environment for the latecomer developing countries to catch up. Driving factors behind East Asian 
countries climbing the development ladder included a national desire for material well-being, demonstrations 
of excellence from neighbouring countries, and no imposition of terms and conditions or policy matrices by 
international organisations, as was the case in most of the SSA and Latin American countries. No other 
developing region in the Global South has formed such an organic and dynamic interdependence as East 
Asia did in the last few decades of the twentieth century (Ohno, 2003).  
There are many factors with regard to committed political leadership, competent elite bureaucracy and well-
crafted institutions, including market institutions, which are responsible for the speedy economic growth in 
the East Asian developmental states. These crucial factors include: efficient resource mobilisation and 
allocation; the provision of basic social services and infrastructure; export-oriented strategies; high levels of 
saving and investment through the assurance of appropriate credit and interest rate policies; the promotion of 
income equality and shared growth; productive state–business relationships; and selective interventions in 
strategic economic sectors (Fritz & Menocal, 2006; Evans, 2010). While this strong economic performance 
suggests a shared experience, there has been a growing awareness of the differences in the policies, 
strategies, and institutions used to accelerate and achieve rapid economic growth in these East Asian 
countries (Akyuz et al., 1998). 
Explicitly or implicitly, the East Asian developmental states are undemocratic and authoritarian. Although, 
as a whole, they are effective in terms of structural transformation and poverty reduction, many have 
achieved this at the expense of democracy. Scholars such as Mkandawire, (2001; 2010), Evans (2010) and 
Edigheji (2010; 2012) have argued that democracy is not only possible in today’s developmental states but 
also necessary for them to accelerate their development process. Furthermore, in the current global 
environment it is unacceptable (unlike the Cold War period) to be an authoritarian regime. It has been argued 
that the persistence of authoritarian systems is a major hindrance, not only to political development but also 
to economic development in the current globalised world (Randall, 2007). Hence, adopting democratic 
principles (participatory and context-based ones, rather not these imported ones) is important to enhance the 
effectiveness of the role of the state on both the political and economic fronts. Thus, it is imperative for the 
current developmental states to have a national commitment to rapid development in an inclusive manner by 
allowing the participation of all stakeholders or economic actors. 
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Furthermore, the core project of the twentieth-century developmental state was to accelerate sustained 
growth/development through aggressive industrialisation, and the transition from an agricultural to a 
manufacturing-based economy. The developmental states consolidated an industrial base through 
technological capacity-building, institutional functionality and human-developmental capabilities. This 
provided the credibility and legitimacy they required to prioritise industrialisation and to limit excessive 
inequality through taxation and targeted interventions to promote sustained growth via aggressive 
industrialisation (Evans, 1995; Chang, 2002). The key to success was a massive investment in education and 
human capital, which was crucial to absorb the large investments in economic infrastructure to cope with 
high rates of urbanisation and to create an operating framework for heavy industry. In addition, the efficient 
utilisation of their natural resources and ecosystem services also played a key role in their economic 
transformation (Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1995). 
However, this does not mean that all the developmental states are equally successful in all spheres, i.e. in 
political, economic, institutional, social and environmental aspects. Even positive transformations may be 
accompanied by negative consequences such as environmental damage or greater social tensions, which the 
state and society must address in a subsequent phase of the development process (Johnson, 1982; Evans, 
1995). Therefore, efficient institutions are required to lead the development process by boosting investment 
in human capital development programmes in order to build capacity, promote economic diversification and 
develop massive labour-absorbing (labour-intensive) economic activities, and then transform into a 
manufacturing-based (high-tech) economy. Countries have varying development trajectories even when they 
adopt the same development model because they have different political, socio-economic, institutional and 
cultural contexts, and unequal access to infrastructure and resource endowments.  
The basic features of the developmental states, as developed by Johnson, Leftwich, Evans and other scholars, 
have been discussed. However, there are some overlapping features, elaborated in the works of Chalmers 
Johnson and Adrian Leftwich. Therefore, it would be better to blend the features of the developmental state 
by either merging the overlapping ones or dropping those that encourage authoritarian behaviour of the state 
and weaken its relations with other stakeholders, such as civil society organisations. We would expect 
developmental states in the twenty-first century to build inclusive and participatory development, and create 
a broad cross-section of state–society relations from the grassroots level up, rather than the narrow state–elite 
(capitalist) relationships of the previous developmental states. Therefore, any features that encourage 
autocratic behaviour and narrow state–capitalist relations are considered undesirable typical features of the 
developmental state in the twenty-first century. Accordingly, the following features have been identified as 
ideal for a typical developmental state ideology: 
 Committed, developmental-oriented, elite political leadership; 
 A pilot agency for planning, monitoring and evaluating the development process; 
 Broad-section of embedded state–society and relative autonomy of state bureaucracy; 
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 Competent, capable, independent and efficient state bureaucracy9 or state institution; 
 Selective, prioritised development projects based on the resources and demands of a nation; 
 Promotion of a market-friendly development approach via a proper mix of state and market; 
 Capacity to manage and encourage to create strong civil-society organisations; 
 Encouragement of a productive-oriented private sector (effective ‘productive coalitions’); 
 Development of performance-oriented state legitimacy and credibility by the citizens 
The substantive developmental states in Asia possess many of these ideal typical features. For instance, the 
first-tier developmental states in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong are close to this 
archetypal developmental state model. Initially, most of them had at least the following features: a 
developmental-oriented elite leadership, a broad-section of embedded state-society, relative autonomy of 
state bureaucracy and the capacity and commitment to adopt market-friendly development. These essential 
features serve as a springboard to build the other features of the developmental state. As Leftwich (2008) 
noticed, ‘developmentally-oriented elites’ with ‘relative autonomy’ will generally attempt to build good 
quality bureaucracies, where one or more agencies undertake the planning and, to some extent, pilot tasks 
together. Elites need to embed themselves in the wider social and political environment to gain their support 
and cooperation.  
A key feature of the developmental state is the relative but embedded autonomy of the core elite. The elite 
can formulate and implement policies relatively free from aggressive lobbying but embedded in a concrete 
set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual 
negotiation of goals and policies (Evans, 1995). In contrast to this kind of ‘embeddedness’, the dense 
network of ties that connect the ‘state to industrial elites’ should be replaced by a broader, more ‘bottom up’ 
set of state–society ties to secure developmental success in the twenty-first century. This broad cross-section 
of state–society relations (i.e. inclusive embeddedness) ensures that the social basis and range of 
accountability of democratic politicians goes beyond a narrow band of elites to embrace broader sections of 
society
10
 (Evans, 2011). In the twenty-first-century developmental state, this inclusive embeddedness might 
mean building a socio-political regime
11
 that broadens developmental cooperation with networks of civil-
                                                     
9
 Capable public bureaucracies are more important and without competent and independent public bureaucracy, 
capability-expanding public services will not deliver, as it is difficult to implement rules and regulations, build well-
functioning context specific institutions, and make them effective/successful. Independent means, appointments, and 
promotions are insulated from political-party control; but it does not mean insulation from dense contact with 
stakeholders, including the private sector and politicians (Evans, 2011). 
10
 The old forms of embeddedness may impede rather than facilitate effective state action in today’s developing 
countries. Broad cross-section state–society relations are at the heart of the politics of the developmental state. Effective 
state–society linkages depend on the organisation of civil society and on the capacity of the state and the state can help 
facilitate the organisation of the ‘civil society’ (cf. Evans, 2011).  
11
 A socio-political regime has four dimensions. First, how power relations are arranged and reproduced within the 
regime, that is, how political power is constituted, distributed and maintained by those who have power, especially the 
governing party and its allies within and outside government. Second, there is the underlying policy paradigm, which 
incorporates beliefs and defines the way policy problems are understood by the different policy actors who engage in 
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society formations and smaller entrepreneurs (the broader society) rather than focusing only on the needs of 
large corporates or narrow elite groups. 
Moreover, if the state has autonomy, societies are more likely to support the concentration of state power to 
intervene in the economy and consolidate the process of embeddedness. Embeddedness and relative 
autonomy are complementary in the developmental state, i.e. having relative autonomy with a lack of 
embeddedness, or vice versa, makes is difficult to build a successful developmental state. Furthermore, 
performance should be both a target and a requirement of the developmental state to maintain legitimacy and 
credibility and achieve the long-term development projects. To achieve its targets, the state should encourage 
civil society organisations to become partners and support the production-oriented private sectors to 
contribute their part in the development process by using ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ instruments.  
2.2.5 Empirical evidence of a developmental state  
The entire East Asian development experience, some Latin American countries like Brazil and SSA 
countries (such as Botswana and Mauritius) cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of the 
state in planning and coordinating the course of development and transformation (Johnson, 1982; Haggard, 
2004; Kohli, 2004). These East Asian developmental states (Japan and the four Asian Tigers) adopted 
‘export-oriented’ strategies instead of ‘import-substitution’ strategies in their development process, whereas, 
the Brazilian developmental state adopted ‘import-substituting-oriented strategies12. Thus, starting from a 
subsistence agrarian basis, they could climb the industrial ladder quickly and, by the end of the 1980s, 
achieve convergence with respect to the structures and income levels of advanced industrial countries 
(Johnson, 1982; Kohli, 2004; Fritz & Menocal, 2006). Their economies were characterised by progressive 
demographic transitions, robust agricultural sectors and rapid export growth (Ikpe, 2008). As Page (1994: 
617) explains, ‘The economic growth in these countries accompanied by high investment rates, exceeding 
20% of GDP between the 1960s and 1990s, and unusually high rates of private investment were supported 
by rapid growth in domestic savings’. For instance: 
The ratio of gross national saving to GDP, for instance, increased dramatically from around 3% to 35% in 
South Korea, from about 10% to 27% in Taiwan, and from 9% to 34% in Hong Kong, from about 15% to 
49% in Singapore over the period of 1950/60 to 1990. There were also corresponding increases in the ratio of 
gross domestic investment to GDP over the same period, from 10% to 37% in South Korea, from 16% to 
23% in Taiwan, from 9% to 28% in Hong Kong, and from 11% to 36% in Singapore (Akyuz et al., 1998:12).  
                                                                                                                                                                                
the everyday business of politics. Third, there is the way government and state institutions are organised and operated, 
which in turn, reflects the power relations and paradigm commitment. Fourth, there are the policies themselves that are 
debated and adopted by policy actors within a given socio-political regime (Swilling et al., 2015). 
12
 Brazilian policy makers sought to promote import-substituting industries from mid-1950s by attracting foreign 
investors and building state enterprises. This import substitution was pursued within the framework of expansionist 
economic policies: both fiscal and monetary policies, including short-term external credit, were used to create resilience 
(Kohli, 2004). 
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In addition, a high and rising level of human capital (due to large public investment in social sectors) also 
tells a large part of the growth story of these countries. Another success story is their high productivity levels 
(for instance, in the agriculture sector using different irrigation technologies) which differentiated this region 
from the rest of the developing world between the 1960 and 1990 ‘heydays’ of economic growth (Booth, 
1999). Furthermore, their export-oriented strategies provided them with the opportunity to increase their 
productivity as the benefits of large investments in development, particularly in human capital, contributed to 
higher levels of productivity (Lall, 1994; 1995). Given these arguments, the sound development policy and 
rapidly growing human capital (their investment in human capital started before implementation and 
following it) were the principal driving forces of their rapid growth. In addition, efficient institutions were 
considered the cornerstone for the achievement of their economic development (Mkandawire, 2001). Trade 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) linkages also appeared to be stronger between the first-tier NICs (Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore) and the second-tier NICs (Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia). 
Trade between these countries is growing much faster than their trade with other countries, and the first-tier 
NICs have become important markets for other producers in the region. There has been a mushrooming of 
FDI from the first-tier to the second-tier of NICs, as well as among the first-tier of NICs themselves (Akyuz 
et al., 1998; Kasahara, 2013).  
The East Asian economies received the lion’s share of Japanese FDI to non-OECD member countries. For 
instance, the proportion of Japan’s FDI in the East Asian region’s total FDI grew from 10% in 1991 to 50% 
in 1997. It is important to note that a high proportion of Japanese FDI has been in the manufacturing sector 
in East Asia and not in the extractive sectors. Similarly, first-tier NICs followed Japan’s policy with respect 
to transferring some of their manufacturing firms (their domestic subcontractors) to the second-tier NICs in 
the late-1980s (Kasahara, 2013). Japanese industrial restructuring provided special incentives to the first-tier 
NICs to move into some of Japan’s export-oriented industries. The effective use of FDI to facilitate 
industrial upgrading and technological catch up has depended on a series of policy initiatives by the host 
countries (Akyuz et al., 1998). The regional industrial restructuring process, which is closely associated with 
contemporary regional integration, is a ‘top-down’ rather than a ‘bottom-up’ process (Kasahara, 2013). The 
unprecedented rapid and sustainable growth led to the transformation of the East Asian economies from poor 
exporters of primary products to sophisticated producers of high value-added manufactured goods (Chang & 
Evans, 2005). In the post-Second World War period, a small set of countries in East Asia stands almost alone 
in having significantly improved their position in the world hierarchy of nations.  
Their experiences of the first tier of developmental state NICs were compared to the second-tier to shed light 
on their process of structural transformation. They revealed strong economic performance accompanied by 
rapid growth and a manufacturing-based economy like the first-tier. The notion of a developmental state 
postulates the possibility of replication and is thus a model of how economies should operate, based on 
actual experiences (Ikpe, 2008). The structural transformation in a developmental state takes on various 
forms. For instance, in the case of East Asia, the developmental state was aimed at speeding up growth while 
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enhancing opportunities to participate in the modern economy through the expansion of public services such 
as education, health and agricultural extension. These states were associated with rapid industrialisation and 
the adoption of new technologies to move into higher value-added production activities. There was typically 
a shift from subsistence agriculture to more commercial, export-oriented farming, textile processing and 
other manufacturing, and service-based sectors (Kohli, 2004; Fritz & Menocal, 2006; 2007; UNECA, 2011). 
The previous developmental states generally enjoyed the support of their constituencies because they were 
associated with promoting rapid economic growth and providing economic benefits to their people (Weiss, 
2000; Leftwich, 2002; Chang, 2003a). The ruling elites in these countries demonstrated high levels of 
commitment to poverty reduction and they began to address equity issues in the early stages of their 
transformation process. This development approach is commonly referred to as growth with equity or 
egalitarian growth. The political elites depended on delivering growth with equity to strengthen further their 
legitimacy and support base (Booth, 1999; Yang, 2000). In addition, rapid and sustainable economic 
development generated a broader growth coalition and supportive policies, which sustained an institutional 
and political framework, and this success became the survival basis and legitimacy of the regimes in East 
Asia (Haggard, 1989). This does not mean that the state necessarily has a superior ability to identify a better 
course for the national economy, but it can deliver provision around organised economic activities during a 
time of major economic change (Chang, 1994). 
One aspect of the East Asian miracle, which has received insufficient attention in the literature, is the issue 
of agrarian reform (i.e. agricultural land distribution or reform). Their practice of agricultural land 
distribution/reform helped to facilitate the subsequent growth of agricultural output and the transfer of 
agricultural surplus to non-agricultural sectors (Erik & Henry, 2004). In Taiwan, for instance, the 
redistribution of wealth from landowners to small farmers was equivalent to 14% of GDP. A similar process 
of land and other asset redistribution occurred in South Korea (Watkins, 1998). The agricultural land reform 
significantly contributed to poverty reduction, increased rural productivity and income, increased savings 
and investments, and political stability, and promoted the creation of dynamic economic interlinkages 
between the urban and rural sectors so that the benefits of growth were spread equitably across society 
(Stiglitz, 1996; Watkins, 1998; Chu et al., 2000).  
The Asian developmental states reduced inequality via targeted policies and incentives, such as agricultural 
land reform, the introduction of high-yielding agricultural technologies and the development of human 
capital, which fostered upward mobility, including the lower-income classes of the society. In fact, it was 
only after the programme of land reform that investments in the social sectors bear the fruit of rapid and 
sustainable economic transformation (Watkins, 1998; Chu et al., 2000). Thus, effective and pragmatic state 
intervention could trigger a virtuous circle in the development process. The more inequality was reduced; the 
developmental state model could be legitimated and trusted by the nation (Chu et al., 2000). As Watkins 
(1998) explains: 
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For many experts on East Asian development, the evidence strongly suggests that the far-reaching agrarian 
reform, which includes land redistribution, improved credit, and efficient marketing infrastructure, is a 
precondition for optimizing the human welfare benefits of agricultural exports. Access to land, credit, and 
marketing infrastructure enable the rural poor to produce and invest for their way out from poverty. In turn, 
redistributive reforms in these areas helped to unleash the productive potential of the poor, reinforcing the 
linkages between high growth and a widespread sharing of its potential. Dynamic smallholder agriculture 
rather than large-scale commercial agriculture has been one of the foundations for growth in East Asia 
(Watkins, 1998:25). 
Land-reform programmes were supplemented by the provision of extension services to ensure that 
agriculture was not only egalitarian, but also more efficient and effective. Land reform provided a cheaper 
food supply by improving agricultural productivity and production (Doner et al., 2005). In contrast, 
‘[c]ountries from Latin America and Africa built agricultural growth strategies upon the foundation of 
enclave economies dominated by powerful commercial interests. The majority of the rural poor are excluded 
from participation in global markets, except as labourers on commercial farms’ (Watkins, 1998). 
To summarise, the concept of the developmental state assumed the role of the state in facilitating the 
structural transition from an agrarian to a modern society. The developmental state plays a social engineering 
role to obtain long-term economic development and achieve a high level of social well-being. The existence 
of committed political leadership, an autonomous bureaucracy equipped with sufficient capability, legitimate 
and context-specific institutions, and the existence of close and productive state–private sector relationships 
are a few necessary factors for a successful developmental state model. A developmental state shows a 
systemic commitment to adaptive and problem-solving approaches (which is a precondition for getting the 
right policies/strategies), to context-specific policy choices and institutional formulation. This distinctive 
political and institutional model should be considered as an option in a range of political economies with 
different levels of state autonomy, institutional coherence and authoritative penetration, and varying degrees 
of accountability and embeddedness, which are configured differently in each society. 
An export-oriented development strategy, for instance, leads to equitable resource allocation, creating 
economies of scale and production efficiency through technological development, capital formation, 
employment creation and, hence, to achieving fast economic growth accompanied by human capital 
development. Rapid export growth has been an important feature of East Asia’s remarkable record of high, 
fast and sustained economic growth. Another important strategy is agrarian reform (which depends on the 
domestic political condition); it is one of the important tools adopted by many of the developmental states to 
reduce poverty, address the legacy of dispossession, transform the structure of their economies and ensure 
equitable growth. This implies that agricultural land reform is a necessary condition for equitable rural 
development and poverty reduction. It also has the effect of increasing state penetration of rural 
communities, which is crucial to strengthen the state’s capacity and the state–society coalition to ensure rural 
transformation. Overall, the development success of the East Asian developmental states, accompanied by 
the rapidly growing development of human capital, was achieved through proper public investment in the 
social sector. Based on the experiences of the East Asian countries, it is vitally importance for the 
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developmental state to promote agricultural transformation in particular and economic development in 
general. In addition, they showed how context-fitted, well-functioning institutions are vital to accelerate the 
development and transformation processes of a nation.  
2.3 Theories of institutions 
Almost all the theories of institutions (the OIE, NIE and IPE) recognise the important role they play in the 
economic development. The significance of institutions and the way in which they work are shaped by the 
specific economic and political trajectories of a country. It is necessary, however, to take a closer look at the 
concepts of institutions and their evolution and design proposed by the various schools. The OIE and IPE are 
heterodox in outlook, whereas the NIE builds on more orthodox frameworks (particularly, neoclassical 
economics). For instance, the OIE is closely linked to evolutionary economics, which is quite distinct from 
the neoclassical paradigm. The OIE analysis focused on society’s role in defining values, norms and 
institutions, without denying the interaction and feedback processes between the individual and society 
(Parada, 2002). The NIE School adopted an individualistic approach and its point of departure is the 
individual’s rationality. In the analysis of the NIE, institutions are derived from the individual’s behaviour 
through interaction with others (Chang, 2003a; Ford, 2011). In contrast, the OIE argued that individual 
rationality is not a sufficient condition but it is necessary; rather, an existing social structure is fundamental 
for building institutions. This is because individual rationality depends on cultural and institutional support 
(Hodgson, 2009).  
2.3.1 The old institutional economics  
The OIE, in the tradition of Thorstein Veblen and John Commons, understood institutions as a special type 
of social structure with the potential to change agents, including their purpose and preferences (Hodgson, 
2006). At the same time, institutions are special structures to organise life and human relations, and are 
therefore, in turn, efficient factors of selection (Veblen, 1899). The phrase ‘a special type of social structure’ 
implies that not all social structures are institutions. For instance, social structures that include sets of 
relations that may not be codified in discourse are not institutions (Chang, 2002; Hodgson, 2006). An 
institution can exist only if people have similar beliefs and mental attitudes, because the mental 
representations of institutions are partly constitutive of that institution. Therefore, institutions are special 
types of social structure that involve codified normative rules of interpretation and behaviour (Searle, 2005). 
For Veblen, institutions are ‘the customs and settled habits of thought common to the generality of man’ 
(Veblen, 1919: 239). These evolutionary elements are rooted in culture and are explained by the historical 
movement of social structures. These social norms and customs solidified into institutions, which in turn, 
shape customs and habits of thought. The causal relationship between individuals and institutions underlies 
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Veblen’s notion of cumulative causation13 (Hodgson, 2009). It is the ‘theory of a process of cultural growth 
as determined by the economic interest of a cumulative sequence of economic institutions stated in terms of 
the process itself’ (Veblen, 1898: 398).  
Veblen (1899) tells us that human life is a struggle for existence and it is a process of selective adaptation. 
The evolution of social structure has been a process of natural selection of institutions, in which institutions 
are both the object and the factors in the process of selection. Institutions are not only the result of a selective 
and adaptive process which shapes the prevailing types of spiritual attitudes and aptitudes but they are also 
special methods of life and human relations, so they, in turn, are efficient factors of selection. Indeed, 
variations in culture, customs and habits cause changes in social structures. Changes in material 
circumstances breed further change through human agency. Human agency is required for the continuity of 
development and serves as an engine for the process of economic development (Veblen, 1898). Veblen was 
neither holistic nor reductionist but moved between the social and individual aspects with methodological 
consistency. He recognised the multiple influences of the social aspect on the individual (Hodgson, 2004).  
According to Veblen, humans have certain instincts that embody both potential and propensities. These 
instincts are inherited genetically and culturally, and manifest depending on the historical and material 
conditions in which individuals reside. This indicates that human nature adapts to the demands of the 
condition. These human instincts fall into two general categories, which are either advantageous or 
disadvantageous to the whole- social status (Veblen, 1899). His notion of growth rests in evolutionary 
systems and cumulative causation. Therefore, his concern was not with the short-term fluctuations in output 
but rather with the long-run structural changes and the composition of output. Thus, increasing output is not 
a sufficient (but it is necessary) condition for economic development. Rather, to realise sustainable economic 
growth, output must grow smoothly with the progress of technological advancement and the development of 
skills (Veblen, 1899). This is critical for Veblen because, in the very process of growth, the institutional 
fabric of the economy is transformed, and vice versa. Technology itself is an institution as both object and 
factor of selection, shapes institutions and the social mind-sets in the development process. Thus, 
technological progress has an evolutionary function, challenging existing institutions and power relations 
embedded in them (Ford, 2011). 
Scholars such as Clarence Ayres, J.R. Commons and Wesley Mitchell, who follow the Veblenian tradition, 
place institutions at the centre of their analysis. They recognise the role of technology in economic growth 
and the non-automatic nature of its dissemination, as well as the centrality of cumulative causation in 
                                                     
13
 In the writings of Veblen and Commons there is both upward and downward causation; individuals create and change 
institutions, just as institutions mould and constrain individuals’ aspirations and motivations. Re-constitutive downward 
causation from specific social structures to individuals operates by creating and moulding habits (Hodgson, 2009). 
Institutions are social structures that can involve re-constitutive downward causation, acting to some degree upon 
individual habits of thought and action. The existence of re-constitutive downward causation does not mean that 
institutions directly, entirely, or uniformly determine individual aspirations, merely that there can be significant 
downward effects (Sperry, 1991; Hodgson, 2003a; 2006; 2009; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004). 
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development. For institutionalists, the human element (such as status, group identity and ideology) is at the 
centre of causation between individuals and institutions, and plays a dynamic role in eroding ineffective 
institutions in the economy. Economists such as Clarence Ayres, J.R. Commons and Wesley Mitchell saw 
the Veblenian insight as one in which policy could be the tool to fashion capitalist institutions in a way that 
would promote efficiency and limit its tendency to reproduce and deepen economic inequality (Ford, 2011).  
Commons believed in the institutionalised mind, but he did not develop a theory of how the individual mind 
was institutionalised.  He believed that institutions moderate behaviour, enabling and liberating individuals 
and groups, as well as constraining those (Commons, 1931). Commons proposed his famous definition of 
institutions as being collective action to restrain, liberate and expand individual action (Hodgson, 2003b). 
The relationship between collective and individual action is the foundation of ‘going concerns’14 and their 
working rules, i.e. the institution is equal to its ‘going concern plus its working rules’ (Chavance, 2012). The 
notion of collective action is important to Commons’ institutional approach. This notion concerned what 
Commons called ‘collective will’, i.e. the overall outcome of the individual and collective decision-making 
processes. The idea of collective will does not undermine the role of individual decisions. Commons’ 
standpoint does not represent extreme individualism or extreme collectivism (Parada, 2001). His approach is 
distinguished from individualist institutional theories by the prominence he attributed to ‘collective action’, 
and by his hierarchical view of the ongoing concerns, with the working rules that keep them going 
(Chavance, 2012). Commons believed that the formal institutions emerge and change only through the 
actions of decision-makers and legislators who change legislation (Parada, 2001). 
Institutionalism gained wide acceptance at a global perspective as economists began to apply the institutional 
paradigm to the study of development issues and international economics (Peach, 2003). The OIE has 
survived to inform modern economists and it has made a particularly useful re-emergence in the field of 
development economics (Ford, 2011). The OIE highlights the role that habits, norms and institutions play in 
directing human behaviour/perceptions without discarding the rationality of individual behaviour, albeit 
constrained by the social and economic environment (Parada, 2002). However, not all the ideas of 
institutional economics emerged at the same time; rather, institutions were nurtured over time through 
processes based on ‘learning- by-doing’. In the mid-1970s, there was a development in economic thought 
bearing the name ‘institutional’, which emerged from so-called neoclassical economics. It was termed 
qualified institutionalism, so as not to be dismissed as a return to a radical Veblenian school, and the NIE 
was born based on the so-called neoclassical economics approach. 
                                                     
14
 ‘The going concerns animated by a common purpose, governed by common rules of its own making, and the 
collective behaviour in attaining that common purpose. Individuals who are members of several going concern, from 
the small family to the state itself, the largest going concern’ (Commons, 1924: 145 quoted in Chavance, 2012). 
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2.3.2 The new institutional economics 
Conventional neoclassical economics takes the institutions of the modern Western economies as its basic 
framework for the rest of the world. This economic model is based on institutions such as well-defined 
property rights, perfect information and frictionless transaction costs, to mention a few. Moreover, since the 
market is viewed as the most efficient mechanism for allocating resources, alternative institutional 
arrangements become less relevant. For instance, because minimal state intervention is assumed, government 
interventions are warranted only when market failures occur in the economy (Lin, 1989; Chang, 2002). 
Nevertheless, in the real world, different institutions exist parallel to the market institutions for better 
performance of economic development. Although rooted in neoclassical economics, the NIE incorporates 
many of the social sciences to focus on the social and legal norms and rules (institutions) that underlie 
economic activity. Douglas North and Oliver Williamson
15
 have become synonymous with this branch of 
institutional economics. The underlining assumption is that institutions emerge because of the interaction of 
individuals, and that certain institutions exist in the market because they are assumed to have low transaction 
costs (Ford, 2011). The NIE considers that the transaction costs, which are determined by institutions and 
institutional arrangements, are the key to economic performance (Williamson, 2000). Institutional 
arrangements determine the modes of managing transactions and contractual enforcements. Institutional 
arrangement is probably more accurate than the most popular use of the term ‘institution’ (Williamson, 
1993). According to Rutherford (1995), the basic distinction between the NIE and the OIE is:  
New institutionalists see the development and functioning of institutions largely in efficiency and 
economising terms (rational individuals are ‘economizing’ in behaviour), as opposed to the old 
institutionalist who tends to see, many other social and political factors (status, group identity, ideology, and 
economic and political power) as also involved. Indeed, new institutionalists have often dismissed the old 
institutionalism as lacking in theoretical rigor and containing few, if any, interesting insights, while old 
institutionalists have tended to be equally dismissive of the new institutionalism, finding it based on the same 
set of basic neoclassical assumptions they rejected long ago (Rutherford, 1995:444).  
Williamson placed the emphasis on transaction costs, adapted from Coase’s (1937) ‘The nature of the firm’. 
Hence, Williamson’s interest in institutions focused on governance structures such as transactions and 
negotiations among different economic actors. The mutual interdependence of different economic actors in 
the economy requires a governance structure that can organise their economic activities. The challenge is 
that changes in these structures change the comparative costs, such as the institutional environment, and this 
shifts parameters for the actors (Williamson, 1979; 1998; 2000; 2003; 2010). Although he recognises that 
these economic agents may try to influence the legal institutions, this is not a decisive factor in his analysis. 
In the end, this leads him to praise the institutional reforms of the Washington Consensus, which places 
private property and contract enforcement at the heart of the policy agenda (Herrera, 2006). This implies that 
institutions that protect property rights are crucial to economic growth and promote investments. Like 
                                                     
15
 Williamson coined the term ‘new institutional economics’ in 1975 to distinguish the NIE approach from the old 
institutionalism. 
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Williamson, North was not keen to replace neoclassical theory and maintained the assumptions underpinning 
the microeconomics of competition for scarce resources. Therefore, the study of economics as a theory of 
choice is subject to constraints. For North, institutions are central to economic activity and are developed by 
economic agents to minimise uncertainty (North, 1993). Therefore, North defines institutions as: 
Institutions are the rules of the game in society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
structure human interaction, provide incentives for individuals to engage in productive or unproductive (for 
that matter) economic, social or political interactions. They are composed of formal rules (statute law, 
common law, regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour, and self-imposed codes of 
conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both (North, 1993:5).  
An institution is a set of formal and informal rules of conduct that facilitate coordination or govern 
relationships between individuals or groups in the economy. North argues that institutions provide a stable 
structure for cooperative human interactions in the presence of incomplete information and many players, 
especially from the perspective of increased transaction costs (North, 1990). He distinguishes institutions 
(the rules of the game) from organisations, which are the players of the game, grouped together by similar 
functions and purposes (North, 1990; 1993). North believes that institutional change or modification takes 
place when individuals attempt to maximise behaviour. He argues that individuals and organisations, with 
their bargaining power in a society, are also the agents that have a stake in maintaining the system. For 
North, the primary driver of institutional change and economic growth is the entrepreneur within an 
organisation. Entrepreneurial learning dictates both the rate and direction of economic growth and change. 
The more competitive the market is, the higher the rate of learning, resulting in more rapid economic change. 
The type of learning that takes place governs the direction of economic change and reflects the mental modes 
of the individuals involved and the competitive structure, which is determined by the institutional context. 
The primary incentive structure is, of course, strong property rights. 
North elaborates on the relationship between institutions and transaction costs as ‘the neoclassical result of 
different markets only obtains when it is costless to transact. Institutions matter when it is costly to transact, 
institutions, and specifically property rights, which are crucial determinants of the efficiency of markets’ 
(North, 1993: 2). However, the real-world circumstances are opposite to these underlying assumptions of the 
NIE rooted in the neoclassical economic theory because market failures/imperfections are inevitable in 
practice. The NIE’s perspective of institutions is anchored in ‘transaction costs theory’. There is always 
some efficiency rationale behind the evolutionary process of institutions aimed at the reduction of these 
‘transaction costs’. He further argues that the state is the institution that enforces the so-called rules of the 
game. This indicates that the NIE sees the state as the necessary third-party enforcer of the rules of the game 
that lower ‘transaction costs’ and guarantee ‘property rights’ (Parada, 2002; Chang, 2002). With regard to 
perfect competition (in theory), North argues that this holds true only if ‘property rights’ are established and 
sustained as a condition for competitive markets. ‘It is polities that shape economic performance because 
they define and enforce the economic rules of the game; therefore, the heart of development must be the 
creation of polities that will create and enforce efficient property rights’ (North, 1993:7). In this case, North 
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says that institutions are the entities that can enable economic agents, particularly by improving efficiency, 
and that they are not only constraints. The state has a place as far as it supports the objective of maintaining 
the institution where it is existent and nurturing it where it is deficient. The NIE is theoretically bound to a 
notion of the ‘competitive-market place’ as the natural ordering of economic life. 
To summarise, the NIE theory is individualistic and deductive in nature. Indeed, the World Bank adopted the 
philosophical underpinnings of the NIE in the early 1990s, as ‘institutions matter’ became universal in the 
form of ‘global-standard institutions’ (GSIs) in the Anglo-American economic context. Developing countries 
are routinely told to adopt ‘best practice’ or the global-standard institutions used by the richest countries, 
when many of them clearly do not have the capabilities to run such institutions effectively. The GSIs are 
very subjective and they ignore the fact that the same institutions can perform different functions depending 
on each country’s historical, political, economic, social and cultural contexts (Chang, 2000; 2011). In 
general, we understand from the NIE’s arguments that institutions are the rules of the game, with emphasis 
placed on the minimisation of transaction costs and the establishment of strong property rights through 
minimum state intervention in the economy. The establishment of robust property rights and ‘good 
institutions’ that nurture ‘good governance’ has become a common ‘strategy’ for promoting economic 
growth worldwide since the onset of the SAPs and Washington Consensus (Groenewegen et al., 1995). In 
this context, Chang offers a direct response to the NIE, which was based on the neoclassical economics. 
Chang’s argument in the IPE is a methodological return to the OIE and criticises the assumptions of the NIE.  
2.3.3 The institutional political economy 
The IPE is a methodological return (i.e. it developed based on the insights of the Veblenian institutional 
theory) to the OIE and brings the insights of the Veblenian institutional theory to the field of development 
economics. It argues that institutions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for understanding the 
nature of economic development. Institutions do matter but the way in which they are understood is crucially 
important. For instance, institutions may be good and natural in developed countries but when they are 
transplanted in the developing countries, this can have great consequences. Institutions are far more complex 
in practice and sometimes societies may hurt because policy-makers misunderstand them (Chang, 2002; 
2003b; Chang & Evans, 2005). The IPE argument was developed as a remedy for misconceptions about the 
nature of the relationship between development and institutions. From the IPE perspective, institutions are 
regarded as ‘both constraining people’s behaviour as well as being constitutive of their motivations and 
perceptions; IPE employs a “political economy” approach in analysing both the role of the state as well as 
the market’ (Chang, 2002; 2003a; 2011; Chang & Evans, 2005; Hodgson, 2006). 
From the IPE perspective, institutions are ‘systematic patterns of shared expectations, taken for granted 
assumptions, accepted norms and routines of interaction that have robust effects on shaping the motivations 
and behaviour sets of interconnected social actors’ (Chang & Evans, 2005:99). This indicates that institutions 
are not taken as given, but run much deeper; indeed, into Veblen’s customs and habits of thought that take 
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human nature (behaviour) as one social element. Therefore, the IPE acknowledged the idea of the OIE’s 
context, which does not take human motivations and perceptions as given, but rather as ‘being fundamentally 
shaped by the institutions surrounding the individuals. This is because institutions embody certain values 
(such as worldviews, moral codes and social norms) and by operating under these institutions, individuals 
inevitably internalise some of these values thereby altering themselves’ (Chang, 2002). This constitutive role 
of institutions is a central hallmark of the institutionalists’ approach and differs from the NIE, which sees 
institutions as a product of utility, maximising behaviour by individuals with preformed preferences (Chang, 
2002; 2003a; Chang & Evans, 2005; Hodgson, 2006). 
This constitutive role of institutions operates through three basic mechanisms. First, institutions have the 
capacity to shape what human beings perceive to be in their interests; second, the common issues that can be 
infused by institutions are valid for political action; and finally, institutions shape what is perceived to be 
legitimate forms of such political action (Chang, 2002). Institutions are constraining as well as constitutive 
of individuals’ motivations and perceptions, and this can be understood as a two-way causal relationship, i.e. 
from individuals to institutions and from institutions to individuals. From the perspective of the NIE, it is a 
one-way causal relationship from individuals to institutions, as cause and effect, respectively (Chang, 2002; 
Chang & Evans, 2005; Hodgson, 2006). Proponents of IPE acknowledged that institutions fundamentally 
shape the motivations of human beings. Institutions are shaped by human motivation and perceptions as 
well. The institutionalism of IPE goes much further to see at least the ‘temporal priority’ of institutions over 
individuals rather than ‘temporal priority’ of individuals over institutions. The IPE sees institutions not as 
simply constraining individual behaviour, but also as constitutive of individual motivations and perceptions 
(Chang, 2002; 2003a). In contrast, the NIE considers individual motivations (which they call individual 
preferences) as the ultimate factors that determine institutions. This indicates that institutions may be able to 
shape behaviour of individuals by punishing or rewarding them, but they are not able to change the 
motivation of individuals because institutions constrain human behaviour (Hodgson, 2000; 2006).  
Institutions packaged as ‘good governance’ or GSIs by the developed countries are not necessarily beneficial 
to the developing countries because these institutions are imposed (or adopted) using a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach, irrespective of the developing county’s particular context. The developed countries took decades 
to develop these institutions based on learning-by-doing in their own contexts (Chang, 2003a; 2005; 2011); 
hence, these institutions may not be applicable in the developing country to accelerate development. The 
current developing countries should not try to adopt institutions using ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach but should 
nurture or adopt institutions based on their own contexts. The imposition of unnecessary institutions may 
come at the expense of other relevant institutions. Chang demonstrates that once the developed countries 
reached industrial supremacy or secured the highest status in the world economy, they shifted their policy 
stances accordingly. They began to advocate free trade, to prevent the outflow of skilled workers and 
technologies, and became strong protectors of patents and trademarks (copyright). They turned states in 
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developing country into ‘gatekeepers’, malevolently ‘kicking away’ the development ladder – which had 
served them so well – to ensure that other latecomer countries could not follow suit (Chang, 2002; 2003b).  
Most of the current developed countries actively used policies, such as infant industry protection and export 
subsidies, to promote their development process. For instance, the United States continued to use 
protectionism until it emerged as the world’s leading industrial superpower, after which it became the 
vanguard for ‘free trade’, even though it had acquired such supremacy through the nationalistic use of heavy 
protectionism (Chang, 2003b). As Chang argues, the current discourse on institutions and development 
suffers from two theoretical drawbacks. First, it is assumes that the causality runs from institutions to 
economic development, ignoring the possible effects of development on institutions. Second, this causality 
relationship between institutions and development is theorised in a rather simplistic, linear and static way. 
Therefore, this discourse fails to recognise that this relationship is not linear, but differs across societies, and 
changes over time, even within the same society (Chang, 2011). By focusing almost exclusively on one 
direction of causality, from institutions to economic development, the NIE’s dominant discourse on 
institutions and development gives us only a partial picture (Chang, 2011). One needs to look at the causality 
in both directions to gain a comprehensive understanding of this interaction to give the appropriate policy 
advice to developing countries to nurture responsive institutions.  
Chang (2011) provides some evidence of how economic development changes institutions. For instance, 
increased wealth from economic growth may create a greater demand for higher-quality institutions (such as 
political institutions with greater transparency and accountability); greater wealth allows for more affordable 
and better institutions; economic development also creates new agents of change, demanding new 
institutions. If the causality runs in the direction of development to institutions, resources being expended by 
developing countries to adopt the GSIs might be better used for other policy aspects that could stimulate 
economic development more directly, or promote institutional development that could also foster economic 
development. Hence, the developmental state provides a classic example of how institutions make a 
difference in economic change, which, in turn, improves the quality of institutions and helps to reshape 
relative trajectories of economic growth. This seems to acknowledge that sound economic policy is not 
enough and that the institutional context cannot be ignored (Chang & Evans, 2005). The state needs to 
provide the formal institutional framework in which effective and developmental economic activities can 
proceed safely, securely and peacefully, although the state should not attempt to do this better than the 
market (Leftwich, 2005a). From this argument, it is clear that there is a problem in the market–state 
dichotomy in extreme cases that either market or state failures are an inevitable result. Thus, based on the 
experiences of the previous developmental states, there must be a proper mix of market and state, and this 
can be achieved only through building diverse institutions to address these failures.  
In general, proponents of IPE are interested primarily in the institutional functionality and integrity of the 
entire macroeconomic system of a given countries and how this relates to the institutional and market 
dynamics of the global economy (Chang, 2002; Chang & Evans, 2005; Evans, 2005). The argument is that 
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the formal and informal institutions are determined by the institutional arrangements that pertains each 
country. ‘These institutional arrangements, in turn, are the product of a particular leadership style, 
organisational cultures, social histories, moral norms (with respect, in particular, to corruption), 
informational flows, transactive relations, and a constellation of ideas about institutional life’ (Swilling & 
Annecke, 2012:91). It is obvious that institutions matter, that they are subject to change, and that people are 
trying to clarify social choices with regard to alternative institutional changes to improve the economic 
efficiency and welfare performance of the economy. The basic reasons why institutions are indispensable are 
the limitations of both human ability and the environment in which individuals live. An individual as a unit 
of production is too small to internalise much of the gains from economies of scale and externality in the 
economy. Cooperation and integration are inevitable due to these limitations, thus institutions are an 
appropriate tool to realise cooperation and integration.  
To summarise, the last few decades have witnessed the rise of not only orthodox NIE, but also heterodox 
institutional economic theories such as IPE (Chang, 2007). Experiences illustrate that building successful 
institutions depend on a country’s specific innovations and adoptions. Learning more about the real-life 
experiences of institutional change could help to enrich theoretical understanding by revealing aspects of 
reality that theoreticians have neglected or failed to grasp due to the inherent limitations of their theories. 
This could help countries to build context-fitted institutions, which can serve multiple functions in the 
economy (Chang, 2002; 2007). ‘The functional multiplicity of institutions makes the task of building 
institutions most difficult and challenging, as there is no inevitable simple relationship between the desired 
functions that need to be performed and an institutional form. Unfortunately, this point has been rather 
neglected in the mainstream discourse on institutions and development’ (Chang, 2007: 5).  
Building institutions is not merely a technocratic exercise; it needs the involvement of different 
stakeholders
16
 and society as whole. All institutions, including the market, are defined in relation to the 
structures and obligations of the relevant actors. These rights and obligations are ultimately a political act – 
all institutions, including the market, cannot be free from politics (Chang, 2002; Hodgson, 2006). However, 
in practice there is no single approach to building institutions because of the different contexts of countries. 
Countries build either different institutions to address the same issue concurrently, or different institutions to 
address different issues, depending on their contexts. Emphasising institutional diversity across time and 
place is relevant but this does not mean that there are not common features in either building institutions or 
institutional practices across countries. There are institutions that could apply universally, regardless of time 
and place, and others with relatively minor modifications. However, the applicability of some may be limited 
due to domestic capabilities, domestic political conditions or international politics (Chang, 2009). 
                                                     
16
 Stakeholders generally defined as including all interested economic agents and social groups (public, private sector, 
farmers, urban residents and civil society). In broad terms, stakeholders have three key functions: decision-making, 
coordination of views and activities, and oversight (controlling, monitoring and evaluation). 
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The existence of diverse and context-specific social, economic, or political institutions has a powerful effect 
on the economic and social development process, and they can either facilitate or hinder the process of 
economic growth, depending on the context. States that have effective institutions can facilitate social 
cooperation and channel resources towards boosting productivity, and this can have a considerable impact on 
the development process. The institutional capacity of a state can affect its ability to promote a variety of 
technologies and involve various stakeholders by providing incentive and disincentive measures. When 
constructing a developmental state in latecomer countries, it is important to focus on a country’s unique 
institutional architecture and policy orientation, because far-sighted institutions will determine its capacity to 
formulate and implement development policies and programmes. Getting institutions wrong can result in 
failure. A developmental state must be able to mobilise resources for public investment, promote 
industrialisation based on coherent industrial policies and strategies, and promote and predicate its 
development agenda using a participatory approach.  
2.4 The need for and the rise of the developmental state in Africa 
For approximately fifty years since independence, African policy discussions were essentially limited to the 
debate about whether Africa would be better-off following in the footsteps of the its erstwhile colonial 
masters and adopt undiluted capitalist institutions, or if the socialist alternative was more suited to accelerate 
development in Africa (Fine, 2010; 2011). Most post-colonial African states are underdeveloped and many 
of them described as developmental failures (Edigheji, 2005). Contemporary African leaders are preoccupied 
by debates about how to accelerate and sustain development in post-colonial African states; some advocate 
state intervention as a strong agent of development and others a free-market economic system (Stark, 2010). 
There is a lack of evidence to support the proposition that less state intervention facilitates more sustainable 
economic transformation (Kohli, 2004). The literature suggests that successful state intervention involves 
close cooperation between the state and society, as well as insulation of the bureaucratic elite to minimise 
corruption, rent-seeking
17
 practices and state capture by interest groups (Evans, 1995).  
In addition to the role of the state, there are numerous variables that influence a country’s economic 
performance, including global economic conditions, resource endowments, demographic factors, patterns of 
savings and investments, levels of technology, entrepreneurship capacity, human capital and institutions 
(Kohli, 2004). An activist state has been considered as a key ingredient in rapid and sustainable development 
and conversely, malfunctioning states have contributed heavily to developmental failures in many SSA 
countries (Evans, 1995). Therefore, the recent economic crisis proved that unregulated markets are 
unworkable and unsustainable in the long-run because markets are not always self-regulating. This gave 
                                                     
17
 Rent-seeking practices divert scarce economic resources from productive activities to misallocation and wastage, thus 
limiting economic growth and distorting the overall development process. It is also the use of public resources to obtain 
economic gain without reciprocating any benefits to society through wealth creation. Rent-seeking poses a threat to the 
credibility and legitimacy of a government and can decay its structures and capacity. It has unmitigated negative long-
term on political and economic development. For instance, bureaucratic corruption is one of the rent-seeking behaviour 
in developing countries. 
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credibility to state intervention in the economy and made the developmental state model a more convincing 
development ideology for the latecomer developing countries (Edigheji, 2010; UNECA, 2011). Getting the 
‘prices wrong’ from a free market perspective may well create conducive grounds for renewing the notion of 
the developmental state for sustainable development and transformation.  
The state ideology and institutions are considered as the main determinants of the political capacities of a 
developmental state. States with extraordinary commitment to economic growth, a close alliance with 
economic agents, control of interest groups and having well-developed professional bureaucrats tend to be 
more capable of defining and implementing an agenda of economic transformation. Without a coherent 
development ideology and effective institutions, it is difficult to pursue development objectives. For 
instance, predatory states that lack a developmental ideology face many challenges (Evans, 1995). 
“Economic resources controlled by the state are instead likely to be put to corrupt use and end up in the 
hands of elites for private consumption, leading to failed efforts at state-led development (Kohli, 2004:22).  
Transforming African countries from the existing low-income agrarian to high-income industrial economies 
remain a major development challenge and should put at the forefront of the development agendas of 
countries. In the present global situation, the conventionally accepted wisdom of the free market-led 
development model as a necessary condition for transforming backward economies to a high level can no 
longer be taken at face value. In the aftermath of the 2007/08 global financial crisis, many Western 
economies were left in shambles, resulting in major state interventions (UNECA, 2011; UN-Habitant, 2014). 
This indicates that the market system does not provide efficient allocation of resources in a sustainable 
manner due to natural monopoly, existence of externalities and informational asymmetries, and other aspects 
of market imperfections. Therefore, to strengthen the role of the market and proper resource mobilisation in 
developing countries unprecedented state intervention should be at the centre to correct widespread market 
failures, market formation, and capital transformation to accelerate the development process.  
The developmental state literature has proceeded primarily, but not exclusively, by providing a cumulative 
basket of successful case studies, with East Asia at the fore, and a few bright spots elsewhere such as Brazil, 
Botswana and Mauritius (Fine, 2011). Although there were countries that claimed to be ‘developmental 
state/s’, but they were unsuccessful due to different factors. For instance, the failure of the South African 
state to be developmental owes much to its capacity to neutralise pressure for more progressive policy and 
coincidentally to pre-empt the creation of that pressure in economic, political and ideological arena (Fine, 
2010). Indeed, the recent global financial meltdown has impelled made many African scholars and policy-
makers to rethink the role of the (developmental) state in Africa. 
2.4.1 Towards the need for a developmental state paradigm 
The post-Second-World-War era initiated a move towards greater state involvement in the economy. African 
countries passed through a series of policy regimes such as import-substitution strategies, export-oriented 
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policies, the SAPs, privatisation and commercialisation, and most recently, a liberalisation policy, among 
others (Kohli, 2004). The reigning developmental state ideology was (in part) fuelled by disappointing 
outcomes of the neoliberal paradigm i.e. there is a renewal of interest in the developmental state, after a 
decline in the decade around the turn of the millennium. In the recent literature, the idea of developmental 
state has been most closely associated with the rise of East Asian economies (Fine, 2010). However, from its 
early days, the United States was a pioneer of the developmental state paradigm. The core developmental 
theory, like the ‘infant industry argument’ was invented by none other than the first American finance 
minister (Treasury Secretary), Alexander Hamilton, in his 1791 ‘Report on the subject of manufactures by 
the treasury secretary’. However, it was a few decades until the pro-development faction came into being and 
made it possible to implement Hamilton’s programme. From the 1830s until the Second World War, the 
United States remained the most protectionist country in the world. Especially, between the mid-nineteenth 
and mid-twentieth centuries the US government invested heavily in infrastructure, education, and R&D, 
particularly in agriculture (Chang, 2002; 2007).  
Even after the Second World War, when the country had achieved industrial supremacy and started 
championing the cause of free trade and the free market, the US developmental state practice survived this 
different approach. During the entire post-Second World War period, the United States had a ‘hidden 
developmental state’; i.e. it had a very strong developmental network state, as opposed to the developmental 
bureaucratic state of East Asia. It focused on translating cutting-edge technological research into commercial 
use through cooperation with a network of people who had high levels of technological expertise, situated in 
various state agencies, industries, universities and other research institutes (Block, 2008). This indicates the 
developmental state model continued to apply by developed countries today, especially in times of economic 
crisis. For example:  
Responding to the crisis in 2008, the United States Government under former President George Bush 
announced a $700 billion bailout for the US financial market, and in the following year, the Obama 
administration introduced a fiscal stimulus package of $787 billion. In the UK, the state injected £37 billion 
to bail out its financial institutions. Similarly, governments across the world introduced stimulus packages, 
all attesting to the increasing role of the state in economic recovery and development (UNECA, 2011: 95). 
All these situations point to the integration of market and state to promote socio-economic development, 
address market failures, and transform the market and capital for industrialisation and modernisation. In 
practice, developing countries face daunting market failures and institutional inadequacies, which create 
vicious circles and poverty traps in their economies. These pitfalls can be adequately addressed only by 
means of active state intervention. Therefore, the developmental state paradigm competes as one of a viable 
alternative development approach to neoliberal ideology (pure capitalism) to accelerate economic growth 
and, at the same time, limit ‘socially wasteful economic rent’18 activities. This implies that in a 
                                                     
18
 Economic rent becomes wasteful only if self-interested individuals use it to create personal wealth at the expense of 
the society, and only if the state is incapable of using it for the benefit of the society in the form of public investments. 
Nevertheless, economic rent is relevant for the accumulation of social, physical and human capital by promoting public 
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developmental state, considerable attention has to pay to the capacity of the state (i.e. state 
bureaucracy/institutions and policy management) to achieve development goals/objectives. This is because 
one of the defining features of developmental states is that they are concerned primarily with the structural 
transformation of modernising economies by strengthening state capacity and institutions (Evans, 1995). It is 
true that the legitimation of developmental states is derived primarily from their ability to promote sustained 
economic growth and development by suppressing individual interests that affect the economic interest of 
the masses (Chibber, 2002). 
Therefore, the rationale behind promoting a developmental state model in the African context rests largely 
on the inability of previous development approaches to diversify and transform its economies, and generate 
steady and sustained high growth rates (Benedict, 2014). The significance of a developmental state in the 
development discourse is indispensable though there are renewed debates over what kind of state would 
boost the socio-economic and political development of the continent (UNECA, 2011; Mkandawire, 2012; 
Benedict, 2014). ‘‘African states have three major development tasks for achieving economic 
transformation: planning the process, formulating appropriate policies and implementing the plans and 
policies. Economic transformation in Africa demands the state to play a central role; using a comprehensive 
development framework in planning, articulating and implementing policies aimed at ensuring efficient 
allocation of ’resources’ (Benedict, 2014:106). 
Most African leaders have reached a consensus on the inability of the neoliberal ideology (pure capitalism), 
to achieve the African Renaissance, and some countries have claimed the ‘developmental state’ model as an 
alternative to the official development model (UNECA, 2011). For instance, Zenawi, late Prime Minister of 
Ethiopia, keenly promoted a developmental state ideology in Ethiopia in particular and for Africa in general 
as one of the alternative development ideologies. As a politician and a scholar, he contributed important 
theoretical works and analyses on the negative impact of neoliberalism on the developing economy (Zenawi, 
2006). If there is to be an African Renaissance in the twenty-first century, there has to be a major paradigm 
shift rather than a marginal adjustment in the existing free-market development model (UNECA, 2011).  
Market forces alone cannot induce economic growth in developing countries (Sindzingre, 2004). In Africa, 
particular attention has been given to ‘state commitment and capacity because the way states function is 
increasingly seen as one of the most important factors affecting development in the poorest countries’ (Fritz 
& Menocal, 2007:531). The ‘Asian Tigers’ have attracted the widespread attention of academicians and 
development practitioners alike because of their shift from agrarian economies to paragons of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
and private investment (Evans, 2010). Economic rent has often been the origin of capital accumulation, which is known 
to have made possible sustained development in many of what are today the most developed countries and therefore, it 
is expected that the current developing countries use their potential economic rent for capital accumulation, which will 
be critical to address their political-economy problems and structural constraints.    
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industrialisation and sustainable development. Their developmental state model serves as a template for 
rapid and sustained development:  
The concept of the developmental state continues to be the most fertile conceptual issue in development 
economics more than a decade after its formulation, for it has explained the exceptional growth performances 
of East Asian countries as resulting simultaneously from a specific combination of economic, political and 
institutional structures. It has, however, most often ignored by orthodox studies in development economics 
and viewed by quantitative analyses as belonging to political economy rather than pure economics 
(Sindzingre, 2004:2). 
The developmental state is not an end in itself but an instrument to attain specific objectives (in the case of 
African countries, catching up) such as rapid economic transformation. Therefore, what matters is the 
collective aspiration and intent to develop and transform the citizenry to a better standard of living 
(Mkandawire, 2001; 2010). To achieve this objective, Fritz & Menocal (2007:534) recognise:  
A strongly committed leadership and competent bureaucracy should be in place as common factors among 
developmental states because the developmental orientation of a state is not a permanent condition but rather 
a dynamic feature with a limited time horizon. Such leadership provides the vision and capacity to transform 
society; it gives priority to national development and eschews ‘self-enrichment’ and short-term political 
gains.  
In addition, aspiring developmental states should focus on providing the appropriate framework for 
institutional innovation and determine the adequacy of their institutions, mobilise the sustainable use of 
scarce resources, invest in the development of human capacity, consolidate regional cooperation, and 
facilitate their transformation agendas. In short, the developmental state model is a relatively good 
alternative for the renaissance and transformation of the existing stagnant political economy of the continent, 
if the nation states adopt and practise it in the contexts of their respective unique environments. The 
developmental state arguably offers the greatest promise for Africa given the diversity (heterogeneous 
characteristics) of countries differing in statehood formation, colonial and post-colonial history, and social 
and cultural pacts. The nation-state in the rest of Africa – except Ethiopia –has a more recent history, 
stemming from the Berlin Conference of 1885 (‘Scramble for Africa’) and its post-colonial definition at 
independence (Geda & Degefe, 2005; Geda, 2008). This is one of the main arguments for regional 
integration as a possible (viable) development path. From this perspective, it is difficult to use the Ethiopian 
case (discussed in chapter 4) as a model for the developmental state in other African countries. However, this 
does suggest that other African countries, which have a colonial history, may not be able to copy the 
Ethiopian model – instead they will have to adapt developmental state thinking to their respective contexts.  
2.4.2 Debates on the need for developmental states in Africa 
The concept of the developmental state has remained an ongoing debate among different disciplines. 
Discourses related to the developmental state in Africa pivoted on two major arguments. The first is whether 
the establishment of the developmental state is feasible because of the continent’s peculiar realities and the 
global environment, which has changed significantly since developmental states were introduced in East 
Asia. The second has focused on what form and shape the envisaged developmental state should take. There 
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has been widespread doubt about the prospects for the emergence of a viable developmental state in Africa, 
partly because of the generally poor record of state-led development efforts by some post-independence 
African governing elites (Mkandawire, 2001). Capacity deficiencies across all the institutions ranging from 
state institutions non-state civil societies to the private sector have adversely affected governance systems on 
the continent and will continue to do so unless they are adequately addressed (UNECA, 2005). This 
cumulative reality has pushed the conclusion that Africa lacks adequate political superstructure, committed 
leadership, and well-articulated, context-specific institutions, which are necessary for the pursuit of 
developmental policies and strategies (Birdsall, 2007).  
Another doubt about the prospect of a viable developmental state in Africa arises from the conditions that 
underpinned the emergence of these states in Asia, which were unique or specific to their context at that 
time. Moreover, the global political and economic environment changed, particularly with the emergence 
and dominance of the neoliberal model. In the transformed global environment, the constraining forces to 
interventionist logic have been the emergence of multiple, autonomous development actors, and global 
agencies (Beeson, 2006). The argument is that even the Asian developmental states would not necessarily 
replicate their success if they were to attempt it the in current global context. Therefore, it would be 
ineffectual for Africa to take the developmental state path. This argument emanated from the literature on the 
developmental state, where some advocated the ‘impossibility theorem’, i.e. the proponents of this thesis 
asserted that the developmental state approach is not viable in Africa and, more specifically, expressed 
scepticism as to whether the East Asian development experiences could serve as a model for Africa. Some of 
reasons outlined are: (1) Lack of ideology and dependency behaviour of African states. (2) The African state 
is not able to commit itself to development strategy and capture by special interest groups. (3) Lack of 
technical/analytical capacity; (4) the changed international environment did not permit for infant industry 
protection; and (5) poor performance records of the past due to lack of developmental commitment and the 
persistence of ‘neo-patrimonial’ tendencies19 (Mkandawire, 2001).  
Although the World Bank’s 1993 report acknowledged that the developmental state in East Asia played a 
major role in its economic transformation, it concluded that Africa could not have built an effective 
developmental state like the East Asian countries (World Bank, 1993). The report reached such a conclusion 
because of the following factors: (1) ‘Ideological, Africa simply could not imagine development’. (2) ‘Rent-
seeking, the argument being that the state was captured by rent-seekers who insisted that the state pursues 
their particular interests at the expense of national interest’. (3) ‘African states simply did not have enough 
                                                     
19
 Countries in the Global South can be categorised as cohesive-capitalist developmental states, fragmented-multiclass 
states and neo-patrimonial states. Many developing country states are fragmented-multiclass states, including many 
Latin American and some Southeast Asian countries. The prevalence of fragmented-multiclass states in the developing 
world underlines the twin facts that the process of state formation has proceeded quite far in much of the developing 
world but that such states remain troubled institutions, especially in the light of the many tasks they have set for 
themselves. Highly effective cohesive-capitalist developmental states are rare in the developing world and are 
concentrated mostly in East Asia, and a few in Africa and Latin America. The grossly dysfunctional neo-patrimonial 
states tend to be concentrated in SSA countries (cf. Kohli, 2004). 
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human resources and technical capacity to pursue the developmental state model’. (4) ‘Globalisation had 
closed the window for state interventionism as it left little room for states to intervene in their respective 
economies’ (World Bank, 1993).  
The ‘impossibility theorem’ in general advanced based on the following three arguments: (1) ‘The East 
Asian developmental state institutions are contextual and time-specific and beyond emulation’. (2) ‘The 
developmental state is unfamiliar to Africa, but unique to East Asia because it was made possible by 
“Confucian societal values” such as education, hard work, and business ambition, and a culture not 
transferable’. (3) ‘It is neither possible to transfer the institutions of developmental states nor emulate the 
approaches used because these states are transitional and arise out of specific geopolitical and historical 
contexts’ (Onis, 1991; Hong-jong, 2003).  
In contrast, the proponents of the possibility thesis in Africa asserted that the current external and internal 
environments are relatively more tolerant (if not very conducive) for the adoption of the developmental state 
in Africa than was the case during the era of SAPs. There have many changes in the global political economy 
emanated from the success story of the East Asian developmental states, the failure of SAPs in most 
developing countries, the rise of new southern economic powerhouse, the consolidation of South–South 
political and economic integration, as well as the consolidation of continental and regional integration to 
mention a few. All these factors could create fertile ground for claiming an alternative development model 
outside the neoliberal fence by breaking the ‘no alternative perception’. Therefore, the ‘impossibility 
theorem’ on the viability of the developmental state in Africa does not hold water because there are African 
countries that have claimed and practised a developmental state model, both recently and in the past. 
The proponents argued that the blanket generalisation about the poor performance and lack of potential for 
African countries to achieve rapid state-led development is just as biased as the usually unqualified regard 
for the achievements of the East Asian developmental state model (Mkandawire, 2001; UNCTAD, 2007; 
UNECA, 2011). The arguments related to the impossibility of the developmental state model in Africa based 
on the past weaknesses of the continent may not be relevant today, because the developmental state will be 
built on ‘trial and error’ or ‘learning-by-doing’, rather than on the adoption of a complete institutional 
framework without any challenges. This was certainly true for the East Asian developmental states that, 
during the course of their development processes, continuously adjusted and reformed their institutions. State 
institutions can be flexible and cope effectively with the changing requirements to remain competitive and 
sustain log-term economic and human development (Chang, 1994; 2002). Historically, these states do not 
have everything right from the outset but have learnt by doing and have been willing to make radical changes 
in the development process (Chang, 2007).  
The proponents of a developmental state option have promoted the role of competent state intervention with 
effective institutions and state bureaucracy to design and implement pro-poor and pro-development policies 
and strategies. ‘‘They have concluded that not only can African countries draw broad lessons from the East 
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Asian experience but they also currently possess sufficient ingredients to address their development 
challenges by adopting developmental-state ’approaches’ (UNCTAD, 2007:75). They argued that there is no 
adequate reason to prevent Africa from adopting the developmental state paradigm, despite multi-
dimensional capacity weakness being a major source of the continent’s current underdevelopment. In fact, 
the developmental state would be able to target and systematically address many of these capacities, 
institutions and other related constraints. Indeed, the developmental state in Africa could lead to a 
renaissance in terms of socio-economic development more effectively than the neoliberal alternatives 
(Mkandawire, 2001). 
Accordingly, Mkandawire (2001; 2010), Evans (2008; 2010), Fritz & Menocal (2007), Edigheji (2010) and 
UNECA (2011) are among the proponents of the developmental state in Africa. Mkandawire (2001), in 
‘Thinking about developmental states in Africa’, sought to clarify the characteristics of the developmental 
state and consider its possibility in SSA. He stressed the importance of the social-engineering process that 
created the developmental state and dispelled attacks by neoclassical theorists. Furthermore, he presented a 
convincing argument not only about the possibility of the East Asian type of developmental state (which was 
authoritarian) but also about the prospect of a ‘democratic developmental state’ in Africa. African countries 
should borrow, he argued, some of the good experiences from the Asian Tigers and try to adapt them to their 
unique conditions (Mkandawire, 2001).  
The proponents of the idea of the developmental state in Africa believe that promoting the idea of a 
developmental state in Africa is essential to overcome many of the development challenges. For instance, 
Botswana and Mauritius have confirmed the possibility of not only a conventional developmental state but 
also a ‘democratic developmental state’ in the SSA region in the twentieth century. The recent discourse is 
concerned with how certain aspects of the twentieth-century developmental state could apply today and what 
are necessary features need to consider. Peter Evans (2010), among others, is optimistic about the possibility 
of a developmental state in the Global South but emphasises the importance of ‘the strength of the state 
bureaucracy’ (Evans, 2010). However, the proponents of the developmental state paradigm have couched 
much of their analysis in terms of institutional capacity but many African countries have lack such capacity 
(Fine, 2011). 
The construction of a developmental state requires commitment from every sector but, more importantly, 
from political leaders and state institutions. This is because policy-makers and executives are generally 
organised under state institutions in different structures of government. In East Asia, once the government 
said it was going to do something, it did it. Thus, nations in the SSA countries who build developmental 
states would expect their governments to introduce strategies to attract and retain high-quality staff for public 
service (Huff et al., 2001) and implement what they promise, based on a deliberate participatory approach. 
To summarise, the possibilities of developmental states in Africa have become a subject of interest to 
scholars, development practitioners, international institutions, and African decision-makers alike. Almost all 
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scholars agreed that market-dominated capitalism (i.e. neoliberalism) does not fit in Africa, and that 
socialism (planned economy) is almost out-dated. The developmental state paradigm could be a middle path, 
combining significant state intervention in the economy with market forces (Edigheji, 2005; Edigheji, 2010; 
Meyns & Musamba, 2010; UNECA, 2011; Routley, 2014). Africa has registered remarkable progress in both 
political and economic governance and institution building since the turn of the new millennium. However, 
the image of Africa remains mixed with pockets of development and governance progress. Further efforts 
should require making the continent the future global economic powerhouse. To realise this, claiming a 
context-specific developmental state model rather than making marginal adjustments to the existing 
neoliberal paradigm to overcome the existing development constraints would be indispensable. 
One of the crucial aspects that would strengthen the developmental state in Africa is investing in human 
capabilities, which is the engine of the overall development process. As Evans (2010) states, unlike the 
twentieth century developmental state that focused on manufacturing, the twenty-first
-
century developmental 
state will focus on a knowledge-based economy. This means concentrating on the development of human 
capabilities – their strategic orientation should be people-centred and people-driven development to boost 
capacity to mobilise the people around the development projects. Far-reaching and well-functioning 
institutions will be required and this would involve increasing investment in human capital
20
, based on 
pragmatic social-sector programmes. Implementing pragmatic social-sector policies and strategies would 
help to promote economic diversification, new value chains in the economy, increased capability and 
massive labour absorption, encouraging labour-intensive economic activities and a productive capital-
intensive manufacturing sector (Swilling & Annecke, 2012). Therefore, the developmental state ideology is 
not merely a simple recipe for the successful advancements of a nation it is an ideology that puts 
development agenda at forefront. The developmental state ideology is not a dogma but a means to accelerate 
the development process in developing countries through active state intervention. 
2.4.3 The developmental state and institutions in Africa 
The last few decades have witnessed spirited debate over the role of institutions in fostering and frustrating 
the development process. The debate appeared to be polarised between the orthodox, NIEs, and a variety of 
heterodox analysts associated with the IPEs approach. The former focuses on the free-market camp enabling 
institutions in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, and the latter argues that enabling institutional development 
from a context-specific perspective may influence the performance of economic development. The 
importance of institutions for the developmental state has received much attention since the 1990s, and the 
consensuses are that institutions matter in economic performance is no longer controversial. In addition, 
                                                     
20
 The developmental state of the twenty-first century will be oriented around the knowledge economy as opposed to 
manufacturing, with broader participation and rewards than those confined to an industrialising elite coordinated by a 
state bureaucracy (Evans, 2008). 
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cross-sectional variations in economic growth performance have been shaped by the presence (or absence) of 
well-articulated institutions (Chang, 2002; Kiiza, 2006). Development planners and decision-makers should 
be aware of the importance of organisations and the potential usefulness of building context-specific, well-
functioning, and effective institutions. These are not acquired through the wholesale importation of ‘best-
practice’ institutions, as is evident from the effectiveness of the home-grown developmental states in East 
Asia (Johnson, 1982).  
Building the institutional arrangements is process of ‘trial and error,’ and the institutional arrangements must 
evolve over time to respond to changing conditions. Such institutions affect the state’s capacity to define and 
implement its developmental programmes in a legitimate and credible fashion to achieve the development 
goals at different levels (Edigheji, 2010; Evans, 2010). The institutionalisation of the developmental state has 
received much attention in recent times to strengthen the development process. However, the leadership 
capabilities to build effective institutions and networks of institutions are the main challenge, especially in 
the developing countries that wish to adopt the developmental state model. 
Developing countries face two fundamental challenges. First, ‘the challenge of achieving rapid and 
sustainable development’ and, second ‘the demand to have a greater voice and participation by all citizens in 
the process of decision making at different levels’ (Leftwich, 2005b). These challenges are complex because 
the institutional requirements to accelerate the development process are structurally different (Leftwich, 
2005b). Developmental state institutions should be context specific but share common characteristics that 
explain their superior economic performance. ‘Getting institutions wrong’ would result in failure of 
development practices and establishing the right institutions will enhance the capacity of the developmental 
state to promote its development efforts. 
Institutions interact with one another through broad and overarching sets of processes in which the state and 
economic and societal actors interact to make decisions. Institutions shape but do not determine human 
behaviour in economic, social and political life, so vibrant and context-specific institutions are crucial to 
address these issues in a proper and sustainable manner (Chang & Evans, 2005; Leftwich, 2005b). However, 
institutional contexts vary from society to society and the same developmental policies and strategies may 
not have the same outcomes in all societies. Institutions may promote or hinder development process 
depending on their type and their operation. The state should recognise that there are ranges of different 
institutions, such as social (governing social interaction and behaviour), economic (the rules and procedures 
governing economic behaviour) and political (governing the relations of power and decision-making), which 
often overlap and sometimes conflict to produce unintended or undesired outcomes. It is the manner of their 
interaction that so decisive in shaping the political economy of a country that in the creation and distribution 
of resources within the existing context and resource endowments (Leftwich, 2005b). Essentially, these 
institutions govern, express and sustain relations of power in the economy, as well as have a powerful effect 
on human behaviour and on the political economy of the nation; they are not easy to change in favour of 
individual interests.  
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Developmental state must do two things when building institutions: (1) ‘develop a more adequate vision of 
how institutions shape economic behaviour and outcomes’, and (2) ‘create a more systematic and general 
understanding of how institutions themselves are formed and change over time related to overall change in 
the economy’ (Chang & Evans, 2005). To realise this, it is better to focus on institutions as key instruments, 
which enable the achievement of goals that require more coordination than individual rationality or rules of 
the game. It is better to understand them as constitutive of the interests and worldviews of economic actors 
and, therefore, institutions and economic actors are mutually constitutive (Chang & Evans, 2005). 
Institutional capacity building in the developmental state proceeds in parallel with political interventions 
aimed at restructuring the distribution of political and organisational power with a view to encouraging the 
construction of productive coalitions to support the economic transformation process. High-quality 
institutions are associated with higher average growth rates and lower levels of inequality. Strong social 
cohesion/s (broad-based, state–society coalitions) produces better institutions and these, in turn, lead to 
higher level of growth and a faire distribution of economic resources (see Figure 2.1). 
The four dragons of the East Asian developmental states managed to achieve successful economic 
development by establishing workable institutions that enabled them to implement effective and coherent 
development strategies within a generation. By contrast, institutions have played a minor role in economic 
development in many African countries because there is an over-concentration of political power in the 
hands of political elites, and institutions are weak and non-context specific. In Africa, lack of effective 
institutions and committed political leadership, and an inability to enforce rules and regulations, often leads 
to corruption/or mismanagement of resources, which affects the overall development process. These 
institutional differences (in both formulation and capability) between East Asia and Africa, which arise from 
divergent ideologies, have resulted in significant differences in their economic development status. 
Therefore, the political elites of the emerging developmental states in Africa should draw lessons from East 
Asia and commit themselves to building well-functioning institutions by either modifying the existing ones 
or by creating new ones.  
Figure 2.1: The role of institutions, development policy and strategies for developmental state  
Source: Author’s own drawing 
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It requires political commitment, stability and a continuity of development policies and strategies to achieve 
broad-based (inclusive) and sustainable development. Hence, building a developmental state in a 
participatory democratic approach is appropriate to overcome the wide range of challenges by creating an 
opportunity for broad-based and sustainable development (Chang, 2002; 2003a; Huyen, 2004). Visionary, 
committed and patriotic leadership and competent state institutions are indispensable for the effective 
functioning of the developmental states in a democratic approach (UNECA, 2011). In a region with diverse 
ethnic and cultural groups, stability will continue to be paramount in building effective developmental states 
via accommodating and empowering the vital interests of different stakeholders (Balema, 2014). 
The emergence of more accountable governments and the introduction of more sensible development 
policies will be essential to ensure socio-economic and political justice (Radelet, 2010). Accordingly, 
Mkandawire discourages those who are proponents of authoritarian regimes (influenced by most of the East 
Asian developmental states) and who believe this is the only way in which developmental states can function 
cohesively (Mkandawire, 2010). There has been vigorous debate about whether authoritarian or democratic 
governments have been associated with strong economic performance in developing countries over the last 
decades. Overall, the relationship is mixed but in Africa, democratic governments like Botswana and 
Mauritius have been successful, while many of the authoritarian governments have failed (Radelet, 2010). In 
practice, for a state to become developmental it does not necessarily need to become authoritarian 
(Mkandawire, 2010). Nationalism can drive development and other social goals within a developmental state 
while giving an opportunity to all stakeholders to participate in the development process in inclusive 
approach. The deep sense of crisis and embarrassment in many African countries in the past has provided a 
new motivation for national development (Mkandawire, 2001).  
To sum up, nurturing diverse institutions and building institutional capacities in the economy is socially 
engineered and required commitment from all stakeholders in the society. To build institutions, African 
developmental states need to consider the following points: first, they should avoid past institutions that are 
completely incompatible with the current situation; second, they need to improve some of the existing 
institutions to make them compatible with the current situation; and third, they must nurture new institutions 
based on their own context. Institutions are not rigid or static once they are established – they are dynamic 
and flexible, and change in accordance with the political and economic dynamism of global and local 
conditions. It is vital that African countries to recognise and understand the role of diverse institutions in 
fostering economic growth and development because institutions are on the increase and the development 
challenges are daunting. The current literature shows that the structure of social, political, and economic 
institutions influences economic growth and development processes. African states should, therefore, adopt a 
suitable development ideology, such as the developmental state, elaborate their development agendas, and 
implement these to satisfy the needs of the masses. Political legitimacy should be derived from running a 
successful economic process without suppressing the freedom of the nation. Hopefully, the new African 
developmental state will present a solid base for social engagement in economic transformation, 
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strengthening the demands for a new and equitable national and international order. To realise this, a 
developmental state model requires strong political will and commitment, a long-term vision, a broad-based 
state––society coalition, and determination by political elites, and by the nation in general. 
2.5 The groundwater irrigation economy 
2.5.1 The groundwater-based irrigation development and practice 
As a production input in agriculture, irrigated water is an important socio-economic ‘good’ when it plays a 
positive role in improving the livelihood of the farm household and ‘bad’ when it has negative externalities 
(Hussain & Hanjra, 2004). Agriculture is by far the largest user of water resource, accounting for about 70% 
or more of the total water used globally (Turner et al., 2004; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Siebert et al., 
2010). Similarly, 70% or more of all groundwater withdrawals are also used for irrigation purposes, 
particularly in arid or semi-arid regions of the world (Siebert et al., 2010; Shah, 2014). Irrigation plays a 
major role in boosting agricultural production (Huang et al., 2006; Zhou et al., 2009). 
However, the adoption of irrigation technology is both expensive and complex in terms of capital and 
institutional requirements. Investment in irrigation rose rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s because of high 
agricultural output prices, which seemed to guarantee a high rate of return on this investment. More than 
60% of the world’s irrigated plots are found in Asia – from the early 1960s to the end of the twentieth 
century, the number of irrigated plots was doubled. Technological advancements helped to facilitate this 
expansion of irrigation infrastructure. Irrigation development can be divided into two stages: first, ‘the 
development of surface water irrigation systems, largely through public investment’ and, second, ‘the 
exploitation of groundwater irrigation initially through public investment and subsequently largely through 
private investment’ (Barker & Molle, 2004).  
Since the 1950s, the use of groundwater irrigation for agriculture has grown significantly in many arid, semi-
arid and even humid regions of the world. While groundwater use for agriculture is growing globally, the 
extent and pace of growth differs, with different implications for resource productivity and governance 
regimes. Groundwater irrigation has grown and changed in keeping with the changing socio-ecology
21
 (Shah, 
2014). It is more productive than other types of irrigation and it offers reliable water resources that can 
contribute significantly to offsetting the effects of climate change. In addition, it is generally less prone to 
pollution than surface-water irrigation (Siebert et al., 2010). Groundwater has been at the heart of the ‘green 
revolution’ in agriculture across many Asian nations because it has permitted cultivation of high-value crops 
in arid regions, thus having a significant impact on the livelihood of smallholder farmers (Shah, 2007). 
                                                     
21
 There are four common groundwater socio-ecologies, such as ‘arid agrarian systems’, ‘industrial agricultural 
systems’, ‘smallholder intensive-farming systems’ and ‘groundwater-supported, extensive agro-pastoralism systems’. 
These differ in hydro-climatic and demographic characteristics: land-use patterns, the organisation of agriculture and 
the relative importance of irrigated and rain-fed farming (cf. Shah, 2014). 
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Groundwater irrigation, together with modern agricultural inputs, such as high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds, 
fertilisers, chemicals, and other agricultural inputs is associated with better yields. This is because it offers 
better control over water availability and reduces the risks and variations in production during periods of 
drought and unpredictable rainfall (Gandhi & Namboodiri, 2009). ‘Groundwater is typically the only 
perennial source of water supply in semi-arid areas and groundwater aquifers can continue to yield water 
during dry year even when surface water bodies dry up. With expected changes in rainfall patterns due to 
climate change, groundwater offers a more reliable source of water than surface water bodies, assuming 
proper management’ (Allaire, 2008:3).  
The emergence of groundwater-based irrigation over the past century has proceeded in three waves. The first 
wave was in Italy, Mexico, Spain and the United States, where large-scale groundwater use began in the 
early 1900s, but this seems to have peaked or stopped growing. The second wave began during the 1970s in 
South Asia, in parts of the North China plains, the Middle East and North Africa. It also occurred in some 
South Asian and Southeast Asian countries such as Sri Lanka and Vietnam (Barker & Molle, 2002; 
Giordano, 2006). The third wave of growth in groundwater use is likely to occur in regions of Africa, 
although there are likely to be challenges due to drought and a lack of rainfall to restore the groundwater 
supplies. Supply-side factors, such as government subsidies for pumps and electricity, have helped to 
promote intensive groundwater irrigation utilisation. Governments have facilitated the development of 
groundwater irrigation by providing subsidies for pump sets and energy, as well as credit support to 
beneficiary farmers (Sekhri, 2011).  
For instance, in the early 1980s, irrigation investment peaked at 60% of the total agricultural expenditure in 
the Philippines, and more than 50% in Sri Lanka. In Vietnam during the 1990s, slightly more than half of 
public agricultural expenditure was still devoted to irrigation (Barker et al., 2004). The government of 
Taiwan has also been subsidising the irrigation sector: between 1993 and 1997, government subsidies 
accounted for almost 70% of the total expenditure of the irrigation associations (Lam, 2006b). Besides these 
supply–push factors, the boom in groundwater irrigation is the result of a strong ‘demand–pull’ from farmers 
because of the significant value it offers for smallholder agriculture. Increasing population pressure on 
farmlands also pushed the use of irrigation technology as a value-add to stabilise production, encourage 
diversification and intensive farming practices. The added-value comes from its ‘stabilising effect,’ its 
‘intensification effect,’ and its ‘diversification effect’22 (Shah, 2014). Groundwater irrigation is generally 
associated with cultivating high-value market crops; for instance, in China, a large-scale survey of farmers 
found that it resulted in the cultivation of cash crops, accounting for 70% of the cotton crop, 62% of the oil-
seeds crop and 67% of the vegetables (Wang et al., 2009). 
                                                     
22
 The stabilising effect is groundwater is buffering role during droughts and dry spells when surface supplies run dry. 
The intensification effect, important in smallholder farming systems in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, refers to the 
capacity of groundwater users to intensify land use by cultivating two, three, or more crops each year. The 
diversification effect refers to smallholders being able to access high-value markets or export crops that require year-
round water control, which groundwater wells offer (cf. Shah, 2014:18). 
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Most of the irrigated land found in developing countries is the result of public investments and public 
operating subsidies to improve the livelihood of the farming households, in particular, and to transform the 
agricultural sector in general. Irrigation benefits the poor farming households by ‘lowering their risk of crop 
failure’, creating ‘higher, all-year-round farm employment’ and ‘increasing their yield’. It enables 
smallholder farmers to adopt diverse cropping patterns and to switch from ‘low-value’ subsistence 
production to ‘high-value’ market-oriented production. Increased agricultural production makes food more 
available and affordable for the poor landless households, who are the main beneficiaries of reduced food 
prices (Hussain & Hanjra, 2004). When considering investing in irrigation systems, particularly groundwater 
irrigation, farmers should consider factors such as ‘the availability of water’, ‘the depth from which the water 
must be pumped’, ‘financing’, ‘energy sources and energy prices’, ‘crop patterns’, ‘labour availability’, and 
‘input and output prices or markets’ (Amosson et al., 2001). 
The expansion and importance of groundwater irrigation varies across continents, regions, sub-regions, 
countries and agro-ecological regions within a country based on their endowments and capacity to utilise 
resources. The availability of groundwater is determined mainly by aquifer and climate conditions and 
groundwater irrigation is often found in regions where conditions are favourable and where groundwater 
recharge compensates groundwater extraction (Siebert et al., 2010). As Table 2.1 indicates, the global 
cultivated area under irrigation is estimated to be about 301million hectares (Mha), 38% of which is 
groundwater irrigation. The nations with the largest equipped areas groundwater irrigation are India (39Mha) 
and China (19Mha). In contrast, only a small proportion of SSA agricultural land is equipped for irrigated 
cropping, and groundwater extraction for irrigation is extremely limited (Siebert et al., 2010). 
Table 2.1: Area equipped for irrigation (AEI) and actual area irrigated (AAI)  
Continent/ 
region  
AEI-TOT 
(000 ha) 
AEI-GW 
(000 ha) 
AEI-GW 
(%) 
AAI-TOT 
(000 ha) 
AAI-GW 
(000 ha) 
AAI-GW (%) 
Africa 13 576 2 506 18.5 11 527 2 157 2.3 
North Africa 
SSA 
  6 377 2 092 32.8 6 017 1 817 - 
  7 198    413 5.7 5 510    340 - 
America 48 903 21 548 44.1 39 566 17 621 19.3 
Asia 211 796 80 582 38.0 185 139 72 531 70.8 
East Asia 
South Asia 
67 625 19 330 28.6 58 263 16 351 - 
85 106 48 293 56.7 77 968 45 381 - 
Europe  22 651    7 349 32.4 13 301 4 816 6.6 
Oceania    3 967       949 23.9 3 054    693 0.8 
Total (World) 300 895 112 936 37.5 252 579 97 821 100 
Source: Adapted from Siebert et al., 2010 
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Irrigation development can create a positive economic environment regardless of its negative impact on the 
ecology, point and non-point pollution. These benefits include crop intensification and diversification; 
increased productivity and production; the creation of seasonal employment opportunities which improves 
beneficiary income and expenditures patterns; enhanced food security and an increase in the supply of 
agricultural outputs (Lipton et al., 2003; Hussain & Hanjra, 2004; Hussain, 2007; Zhou et al., 2009). Asian 
countries have had a more successful history of using groundwater irrigation than other less developed 
countries, in particular the SSA. In Asia, for instance, between 1970 and 1995, cereal production more than 
doubled from 300 million tonnes to 650 million tonnes (Hussain & Hanjra, 2004). This remarkable growth 
production was largely due to irrigated agriculture, coupled with the use of HYV seeds, fertilisers and 
chemicals. Nearly 40% of the cropland in Asia is under irrigation, which accounts for about 70% of the total 
cereal production (Shah, 2007; Siebert et al., 2010). Unfortunately, this is not the case in SSA and the region 
remains vulnerable to frequent drought, even though they are potential water resources for irrigation. 
2.5.2 The groundwater irrigation situation in sub-Saharan Africa 
Agricultural growth is the key to the development of the rural economy and it could make an important 
contribution to reducing poverty and eradicating hunger in Africa (You et al., 2010). The development of 
irrigation is an important basis for agricultural development across the continent. Most farmers in the region 
practice rain-fed agriculture and agricultural productivity is the lowest in the world, partly because of the 
underuse of irrigation (You et al., 2010), despite being well endowed with water resources for this purpose. 
SSA faces far less pressure on water resources from population growth than Asia. The Asian experience has 
some potentially important lessons for SSA, where food and water security are becoming increasingly 
interconnected with the growth of irrigation. In Africa, the achievement of food security would mean 
massive job creation, improved livelihoods in the agricultural sector and overall broad-based growth through 
forward and backward linkages in the economy (Global Water Partnership, 2013). 
In the SSA region, 60% of the population is directly dependent on the agricultural sector for their livelihood. 
There is more than 197million hectare (Mha) of land under agriculture, which is the largest industry in many 
countries in the region (You et al., 2010). About 7Mha are irrigated, which is just 6% of the total cultivated 
area, compared to 38% in Asia (Siebert et al., 2010), 14% in Latin America and a global average of about 
18% (You et al., 2010). Two-thirds of this irrigated land is situated in three countries: Madagascar, South 
Africa and Sudan. Therefore, food production in the region is almost entirely rain-fed. However, irrigation is 
important to help farmers cope with seasonal droughts (i.e. when farmers have irrigation infrastructure they 
tolerate the impact of drought) and it plays an integral role in the transition from subsistence to commercial 
farming. The Southern Africa sub-region, led by South Africa, draws on about 6% of the total renewable 
water resources for agriculture (You et al., 2010:3). Agriculture is the biggest consumer of water in South 
Africa, but De Lange indicates that agriculture’s share of the usable supply has decreased from 
approximately 70% in the 1960s to roughly 60% in 2013 (De Lange, 2016:248). This difference is due to the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
70 
 
fact that the former focused on only renewable water resources while the later indicated all types of water 
resources.  
Many of the SSA countries do not have ‘physical water scarcity’ (although it is unevenly distributed across 
the region), but they are confronted with ‘economic water scarcity’, i.e. a lack of capital and technology 
(skill) to covert the water resource for economic benefit. Economic water scarcity happens when physical 
water resources are available, but there is a lack of economic resources and incentives to convert the water 
resources into economic benefit (Van Koppen, 2003; Svendsen et al., 2009). For instance, groundwater 
development in the region is hindered by the relatively high cost of well construction compared to India and 
China. While pump manufacturing facilities and well-construction companies grew rapidly in China and 
India during the 1970s and 1980s, this has not occurred in SSA. Investment costs in irrigation development 
are relatively high because of a shortage of competitive private companies in the region providing well 
construction, pump supply and pump maintenance services (World Bank, 2008).  
This indicates that a shortage of capital (technology), financial and human capacity (skills), and institutions 
are the largest constraints faced by poor farmers in the region in accessing new irrigation technologies 
(Svendsen et al., 2009). Farmers must draw from their own savings (if they have any), borrow from family or 
private money lenders, use remittances or sales from farm proceeds, obtain loans from formal credit 
institutions, or benefit from different subsidies or donation packages (Abric et al., 2011). Subsidies used for 
pumps, well digging, fertilisers, energy and other inputs (Abric et al., 2011). For instance, direct grants or 
subsidies for deep-well, groundwater irrigation development for smallholder farmers have been implemented 
in the Raya Valley in Ethiopia (Gebregziabher et al., 2013) and for shallow wells in Nigeria (Abric et al., 
2011). It is estimated that the total investment costs of the fadama systems in Nigeria have been 
US$ 1 650/ha (Abric et al., 2011), and US$ 6 250/ha (including electric power, powerhouses and installation 
for drip and sprinkler systems) in the Raya Valley in Ethiopia (Gebregziabher et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
costs are elevated in the region due to corruption (i.e. deviations from policies and regulations, and 
organisational and institutional imperatives) in issuing drilling contracts and the inappropriate design of 
wells, etc. (World Bank, 2008). 
Statistics on groundwater usage in SSA are sparse and incomplete. In recent years, there has been a growing 
trend in many countries to establish groundwater infrastructure for irrigation purposes at both subsistence 
and commercial scales to increase the food supply and tackle poverty (Tuinhof et al., 2011). Groundwater 
resource development remains generally low (except in localised areas of southern Africa and around some 
of the major cities for potable water). However, there is excessive resource exploitation for commercial 
agriculture in some regions, even though groundwater resources for irrigation are not significant. For 
instance, the Kajiado district of Kenya (immediately south of Nairobi), the Limpopo Basin karst aquifers of 
South Africa, and similar limestone aquifers in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia, all suffer from shortages of 
groundwater resources due to over exploitation and a lack of rainfall to restore groundwater potential. Thus, 
effective planning and sustainable implementation of groundwater resource development should be 
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prioritised to meet the critical social welfare targets and livelihood opportunities by augmenting investment 
in infrastructure (Tuinhof et al., 2011). 
It is important to increasing the use of groundwater resources for irrigation purposes to accelerate the growth 
of the agricultural sector, especially in arid and semi-arid areas. There are two mechanisms for doing this: 
first, ‘[e]xtensive groundwater use for small-scale irrigation on village communal land and by smallholders 
(using low cost water wells) for horticulture and drought proofing staple crop production’; second, ‘[m]uch 
intensive use of groundwater irrigation to produce cash crops for national and international markets’ 
(Tuinhof et al., 2011). Only a small proportion of agricultural land of the region is equipped for irrigated 
cropping, and groundwater use for irrigation is extremely limited (Siebert et al., 2010). However, a recent 
assessment of the SSA region indicates that the total figure for groundwater irrigated area increased to 
1248Mha, representing 20% of the total irrigated area in the region (Villholth, 2013). This is significantly 
higher than earlier estimates of 0.4Mha, about 6% of the total irrigated area (Siebert et al., 2010).  
‘Groundwater is accessed through diverse schemes, varying by scale, funding source, ownership of land and 
resources, type and depth of groundwater utilized, crops grown, degree of market orientation and systems 
used to extract the groundwater’ (Villholth, 2013:375). Table 2.2 shows that‘[a] simple typology that 
encompasses the most prominent forms of GWI in SSA, which distinguishes between two overall 
parameters: depth of the groundwater utilized and funding source’ (Villholth, 2013:375). The deeper systems 
tend to provide more secure and perennial water availability, but these require larger initial investments, 
higher maintenance and operational costs, and farmer organisation to deal with water sharing and 
maximising the benefits from the infrastructure. The public sector also tends to have better control of 
implementation, farmer training, monitoring of deep-well systems, and strengthening institutional 
arrangements, both at scheme and community levels (Villholth, 2013). 
Table 2.2: Typology of groundwater irrigation in SSA 
 
Funding sources 
 Depth of wells 
Deep (greater than 20 m) Shallow (less than 20 m) 
Private (farmers 
themselves) 
Commercial, large-scale, mechanised, export 
oriented 
Examples: flower-farms in Ethiopia, centre-
pivot grain farms in Zambia 
Informal, small-scale, farmer-driven 
Examples: vegetable growing 
schemes in northeast Ghana 
Public (public sector, 
NGOs or international 
donors) 
Deep-well systems, subsidised 
Examples: public schemes in Raya Valley 
groundwater irrigation in Ethiopia 
Shallow-well systems, subsidised 
Examples: fadama systems in 
Nigeria 
 Source: Adapted from Villholth (2013) 
In general, understanding the potential and role of groundwater irrigation for poverty alleviation and food 
security achievement in SSA is increasing rapidly due to recent public- and private-sector investments at 
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different scales. Various development irrigation models, ranging from community-based, deep well, 
groundwater schemes to individualistic, shallow groundwater schemes have been implemented so far. In the 
SSA region, groundwater resources are still abundant in many areas but the development of these resources 
requires financial and human resources, as well as institutional capacities to extract these resources 
sustainably to meet the needs of both the present and future generations. Diverse and effective, context-
specific institutions at different levels are crucial to use the existing water resources sustainably (both 
economically and ecologically) for irrigation to eradicate poverty from the region, like the South and 
Southeast Asian countries did. Without the proper institutions, finance and skill developments, common-pool 
resources like irrigation will either underprovide or be overused. ‘Common-pool resources are natural or 
man-made resources shared among different users, a condition that produces a competition for their 
utilization leading often (although not necessarily) to their degradation or even to their destruction’ (Bravo & 
Marelli, 2008:1). Therefore, the institutional aspects (the software vis-à-vis physical infrastructure) should 
give the same emphasis as installing the irrigation infrastructure (the hardware).  
2.5.3 Economic importance of groundwater irrigation development 
Irrigated water will remain one of the critical agricultural technologies/inputs that help to increase the supply 
of high quality agricultural outputs by increasing productivity and creating a surplus for the markets, thus 
increasing household income and improving the livelihoods of the farming households. Access to reliable 
and adequate irrigation increases employment opportunities in the rural economies (because irrigated 
farming is labour-intensive) and helps to diversify their income base (Kumar, 2003; Hussain & Hanjra, 2004; 
Svendsen & Turral, 2007). Similarly, access to irrigation enables farmers to adopt new agricultural 
technologies that help to increase their productivity. There are three possible reasons for increased output: 
(1) ‘Irrigation improves yields through reduced crop loss due to erratic, unreliable, or insufficient rainwater 
supply’. (2) ‘Irrigation allows for the possibility of multiple cropping and to an increase in annual output’. 
(3) ‘Irrigation allows a greater area of land to be used for cropping in areas where rain-fed production is 
impossible or marginal’ (Lipton et al., 2003; Schoengold & Zilberman, 2007).  
The expansion of irrigation results in more intensified agricultural land use and groundwater-based irrigation 
is better than surface irrigation for this purpose. Numerous studies indicate that farmers favour groundwater 
irrigation because the resource is always available and they have autonomy over its control (i.e. it does not 
have head and tail conflict like in canal irrigation). This lowers the risk of investment in other inputs (HYV 
seeds, fertilisers and energy), which in turn leads to intensification, diversification, higher and more stable 
outputs, and higher net incomes compared to rain-fed or surface water irrigation systems (Shah et al., 2013). 
Smallholder groundwater irrigation may well be a suitable and socio-economically acceptable alternative and 
supplement to surface water irrigation and rain-fed agriculture practices (Villholth, 2013). 
For instance, in Indian districts after the 1970s, the increase in groundwater-irrigated areas has been so large 
that it contributed too much higher output per hectare than surface-water irrigation. Groundwater irrigation 
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played a large role in strengthening rural livelihood and alleviating poverty on the Asian continent between 
the 1960s and 1970s related to their ‘green revolution’ programme. This region has almost achieved food 
security at both household and national levels. This ‘green revolution’ programme in the agricultural sector 
has done more to alleviate rural poverty than most of the public intervention programmes that were expressly 
designed for this purpose. In scale and depth, its socio-economic impact is comparable to some of the 
world’s most successful development programmes (Shah, 2007). For instance, China has been able to feed 
21% of the world’s population with only 9% of the world’s arable land and 6% of its freshwater. It has lifted 
hundreds of millions out of poverty, while maintaining some of the highest rates of economic growth in the 
world (Doczi et al., 2014). Its total irrigated area increased by over 30% and its per capita grain yields 
increased by over 10%, resulting in an increase in total yearly grain production from 446 to 590 million 
tonnes (World Bank, 2014a). Much of its 30% growth in total irrigated area came from regions that 
previously relied on less productive rain-fed agriculture. Thus, the percentage of irrigated land in China’s 
rose by about 3%, from 10% of the total in 1990 to 13% in 2012 (Doczi et al., 2014). Figure 2.2 illustrates 
how investment in groundwater irrigation is beneficial for the rural farming households. 
Figure 2.2: Impact of groundwater irrigation investment on poverty 
 
Source: Adapted from Tesfay (2008) 
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2.5.4 Groundwater irrigation sustainability and management 
Water is a particularly difficult natural resource to manage compared to others natural resources (such as 
forests or soils) so the need to address issues of water governance has increased. To improve water 
governance one must understand the main players and various factors involved (Global Water Partnership, 
2013). Irrigation systems are complex and involve numerous decisions and actions of actors with different 
capacities in different situations. A good irrigation system involves irrigation resource users (farmers) and 
irrigation managers (service providers and controllers) and is characterised by a well-maintained 
infrastructure. Irrigation management has related to the broader issues of water-resource management and 
economic development (Lam, 2006b).  
In the 1980s, the focus on irrigation governance shifted to the irrigation management transfer or participatory 
irrigation management approach. This approach involved farmers at the grassroots level, starting from 
project design and initial investment right up to the maintenance and operating schedules. The past three 
decades have thus seen the spread of WUAs and other farmers’ organisations such as irrigation boards and 
cooperatives, which are supposed to play active roles in maintenance and operations, and management of 
irrigation schemes (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Xie, 2007; Kadigi et al., 2013). Different countries have 
developed their own WUAs and irrigation management transfer or participatory irrigation management 
approaches based on their specific cultural, political, institutional, economic, and climatic conditions (Xie, 
2007). Although in theory WUAs sound great, the outcome in practice remains mixed, resulting from 
differences in implementation (Kadigi et al., 2013).  
Irrigation management is moving towards joint management and partnership between governments and 
farmers, and their water groups/associations. It is crucial to involve farmers in irrigation management, giving 
them a voice in decision-making regarding water distribution, systems operations and maintenance, to 
develop co-ownership or a sense of ownership of the resource and/or the irrigation infrastructure (Xie, 2007). 
Experience with farmer irrigation management indicates that for successful community management, 
irrigation has to be central to the improvement of livelihoods and this result in low economic and financial 
costs, and low transaction costs of the organisation. Developing local leadership skills, context-specific 
institutions and the awareness of the community are critical for the success of this management approach 
(Gebremedhin & Peden, 2002; Xie, 2007). In turn, this participatory approach is crucial to boost the 
awareness of the community about the impact (economic and environmental) of the overexploitation of 
water resources. Engineering infrastructure alone does not bring about better irrigation performance – 
although it obviously plays an important role in the efficient extraction of water. It is more useful to examine 
how improved engineering infrastructure configures with other factors to affect irrigation performance, and 
to identify the conditions under which improved engineering infrastructure can make a difference in 
irrigation performance (Lam & Ostrom, 2010). Water adequacy and reliability are determined by not only 
the physical setting and engineering infrastructure, but also by the effectiveness of institutions to manage the 
resource in a sustainable and efficient manner.  
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Sustainable management of groundwater resources is essential to avoid aquifer depletion, which would cause 
declining agricultural output, and reduces the harmful environmental consequences (Shah, 2007; 2014; 
Allaire, 2008). Sustainability is considered in terms of space, time, scientific status, available technology and 
social development. Nevertheless, traditionally groundwater irrigation development has been associated with 
terms such as ‘safe or perennial yield’ without integrated groundwater resource management plans. This 
concept of ‘safe yield extraction’ must be changed to a ‘sustainability’ approach through integrated water-
resource management practices (Alley & Leake, 2004). Unregulated groundwater extraction can cause water 
tables to fall to levels that require significant time to recharge. India is a prime example of this (Shah, 2007; 
2014; Allaire, 2008).  
In most cases, the issues of groundwater management and sustainability were neglected because of an 
apparent abundance of the resource – priority was given to its extraction and utilisation. For instance, this 
serious overexploitation of groundwater resources occurred on the Asian continent. Although several direct 
and indirect management strategies have been put in place to address this issue over the last three decades,  
pragmatic and viable solutions have not yet been proven (Qureshi et al., 2009; Shah, 2014). Instruments that 
have been used in an attempt to influence behaviour of users to maximise the benefit of groundwater 
irrigation resource include ‘administrative regulation’, ‘economic instruments’, ‘water-saving technologies’, 
‘entitlements’, ‘community aquifer management’, ‘supply augmentation’, ‘conjunctive use of resource 
management’, ‘energy pricing and rationing’ and ‘a land-use management system’ (Shah, 2014). 
The major barriers that prevent transition from the groundwater irrigation expansion to the management 
mode are a lack of information and non-existence of proper institutions. For instance, information related to 
groundwater availability, quality, withdrawal and other variables are limited or non-existent (Qureshi et al., 
2003). Data about available resources, and who draws how much and when, are crucial for managing the 
resource. To fill this gap and address the sustainability issue necessitates institutions at different levels and 
different approaches to developing community awareness of the issues. Institutions will not be effective if 
the community is unawareness of the benefits and cost of unregulated extraction. Besides institutional 
barriers, government control of groundwater resource-use in countries of the Global South is often a two-
edged sword: on one hand, it costs them many resources (which they often do not have or need for poverty 
alleviation programmes) and, on the other, doing so is often politically contested (Shah, 2007). 
However, ‘[c]rafting institutions for governing irrigation systems is challenging and requires skills in 
understanding how rules produce incentives and outcomes when combined with specific physical, economic 
and cultural environments’ (Bravo & Marelli, 2008:7). Water-resource governance needs ‘the range of 
political, social, economic, and administrative systems to develop and manage water resources at different 
levels for different purposes’ (Rogers & Hall, 2003). There is no ‘one best way’ to organise and govern a 
country’s groundwater irrigation economy because of the combination of different resources, people, society, 
economy and polity that change across space and time (Shah, 2014). In addition, rules governing the supply 
and use of any physical system are devised, tried and modified over time. Hence, it is necessary to invest 
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considerable time and resources in learning more about how various institutional rules affect the users’ 
behaviour at the grassroots level. When institutions are well designed, opportunism (i.e. free riding, rent-
seeking and corruption) is substantially reduced (Ostrom, 1990; Bravo, 2008). Nevertheless, the choice and 
building of workable institutions are not an easy task and it demands strong commitment from both 
government and the society. The recent discourse regarding the solution to the problem of sustainable 
irrigation resource management and infrastructure is neither state nor market but somewhere in between, 
which requires the involvement of farmers in the decision-making process in all aspects. This indicates that 
the state needs to create a broad coalition of state–society institutions and involve the community in 
strengthening institutions. 
For institutions to become effective in the long-run, the following points need to be taking into consideration. 
These are: ‘continual assistance to improve the infrastructure’, ‘the existence of written rules’ developed 
through the involvement of stakeholders approach, ‘the imposition of fines and punishment’, ‘leadership 
commitment and consistency’, and ‘collective action for system operations and maintenance’, which may 
have supported the sustainability of the intervention effects and irrigation performance (Lam & Ostrom, 
2010). Development of adequate social capital, which suggests that inclusive state–society ‘synergy’, is 
instrumental in realising development potentials in the various domains of collective action (Evans, 1995). 
Research on East Asian irrigation management suggests that a ‘synergy’ between farmers and irrigation 
managers can help bring about good irrigation performance (Lam, 1996). The successful management of 
irrigation involves a co-production process in which there is complementarity between the efforts of 
irrigation managers and farmers (Lam, 1996). This co-production process can also create a sense of 
ownership or co-ownership of the irrigation infrastructure, which helps sustainability in the long-term.  
Across Asia, there are two major models of institutional arrangements for managing irrigation infrastructure 
and resources.
23
 Improving water management in Asian agriculture is essential to redress the growing water 
scarcity and improve water quality. This will require significant and complementary changes in policies, 
institutions and management techniques (Hazell, 2009).  
In South Asian countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal, a national irrigation department is 
in place to look after most, if not all, activities related to irrigation, including planning, construction, 
irrigation management, operation and management. The irrigation department usually highly centralised with 
a unified chain of commands stemming from the central government to field offices (Lam, 2006a:167–8). 
In the South Asian case, the irrigation department is the institution that monopolises responsibilities and 
authority related to irrigation resource management. On the other hand:  
                                                     
23
 Owing to historical and cultural differences, irrigation institutions have evolved and embarked on different 
trajectories of institutional development. For instance, while Taiwan and South Korea both adopt the parastatal type of 
irrigation institutions, in Taiwan these have been moving towards a more autonomous and self-governing mode, 
whereas in South Korea these have been subject to increasingly tight control by the central government (cf. Lam, 
2006a). 
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In East Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, a number of parastatal organisations are in place 
to operate and maintain irrigation systems located within one or more hydraulic regions. These parastatal 
organizations are legally formed and owned by farmers, own properties, and operate on an independent 
budget. Their structure and procedures, however, resemble a typical South Asian irrigation bureaucracy, and 
are subject to the supervision of governments at higher levels. These parastatal organizations often work 
closely with a large array of farmers’ self-organizing institutions at the field level (Lam, 2006a:168).  
A major feature of Taiwan’s irrigation institutions is that they provide arenas and support for problem 
solving by farmers at the local level. Farmers belong to self-organised irrigation groups or WUAs, which are 
responsible for operation and maintenance. The major lesson from the Taiwanese experience is that a robust 
irrigation system was built on institutions that allow effective coordination of the activities of farmers, 
enhance the development leadership and problem-solving efforts in various scopes and scales in a 
complementary manner. These institutions enable individuals and organisations at different levels to engage 
in continuous learning and adaptation to the changing environment (Lam, 2006b). Many social systems and 
policy situations could be described as ‘complex’, depending on different factors. An appreciation of the role 
of such a ‘complex system’ and a better understanding of how institutions can help cope with such 
‘complexity’ are fundamental to policy analysis and action (Lam, 2006b). Another example is China, which 
has invested substantially to increase and protect water supplies by modernising irrigation systems. They 
have adopted advanced water management policies, institutions and technologies. They have also increased 
watershed protection by means of extensive approaches that range in scale from the trans-boundary to the 
national and farm levels. Both supply and demand management are important tools in China's water policy 
(Global Water Partnership, 2013).  
To summarise, in most countries, irrigated water is one of the important inputs that boost agricultural 
productivity. Although not all irrigation schemes are for the public good, many of them are and this means 
that government provision or subsidisation is necessary. For instance, the Japanese government has invested 
heavily in irrigation projects but their management is often delegated to village associations. This practice 
was transferred to Korea and Taiwan through Japanese colonialism in the twentieth century. It is not 
surprising that in all agricultural success stories, the government has played a key role in providing irrigation 
infrastructure, although the modes of financing, construction and management of irrigation projects have 
differed across countries and over time (Chang, 2009). The irrigation management approach in any country 
depends on a variety of internal and external factors, which policy-makers and implementers cannot ignore. 
These factors influence their choice of different policy instruments to govern their irrigation economies. For 
instance, in countries where a small proportion of the population depends on groundwater irrigation for their 
livelihoods, it is not difficult to adopt relatively tough regulatory measures. In contrast, where a large portion 
of the population depends on groundwater irrigation, it is more difficult to implement tough regulatory 
measures so a more participatory management approach would probably be more suitable (Shah, 2014). 
Groundwater resource management is dependent on a complex social system, socio-ecological situation, 
level of economic development, political commitment and the society’s level of awareness about the 
sustainability of the resources. This requires raising the level of awareness, providing reliable information 
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and running advocacy campaigns at all levels to develop a consensus on the seriousness of these challenges. 
Likewise, it is vital to adopt diverse institutions to achieve sustainable water-resource management in order 
to change the livelihood of the beneficiary farm households, as well as to transform the agricultural sector to 
facilitate the overall development process. 
2.6 Summary 
Institutions are essential for economic development and social transformation. The differential ability of 
countries to engineer effective and equitable economic processes depends on their institutional capacity and 
diversity (Chang, 2002). Institutions expected to determine the capacity of the state to formulate and 
implement policies and strategies in a credible manner to attain the social well-being of citizens. However, in 
practice, building institutions is not an easy task; some are internal to the institutions themselves, while 
others have a more social dimension that requires long-term strategies to regulate social behaviour. There are 
costs associated with nurturing and running new institutions, so institutions are not easy to change. In 
practice, building institutions has been achieved through a mixture of deliberate imitation and adaptation of 
experiences from elsewhere, as well as local innovations (based on the national economic, social, cultural 
and other aspects). Institutional capacities for growth and development are socially engineered, based on 
‘learning-by-doing’ or ‘trial and error’ and differed across societies/nations. 
The IPE acknowledged the concept of the OIE, which does not take an individual’s motivations and 
perceptions as given, but argues that these are shaped by the surrounding economic, social and cultural 
institutions. The OIEs understood institutions as a special type of social structure with the potential and 
power to mould the capacities and behaviour of agents: they have the capacity to change aspirations instead 
of merely enabling or constraining them (Hodgson, 2006). The OIE economists claimed that it is necessary 
to examine the state’s role in development through the allocation and deployment of resources to improve 
the collective life of the society (Hodgson, 2006). The argument of the IPE, therefore, is consistent with that 
of the OIE regarding the role of the state and the existence of a wide range of diverse institutions for the 
allocation of resources for purpose of sustainable development and social transformation.  
The IPE adopts a political economy approach for the analysis of both the state and the market characterised 
by institutional diversity (Chang, 2002). In contrast, the proponents of neoliberal economics (i.e. NIE) have 
little to say about the issue of institutional diversity because they believe in an abstract market economy. 
Moreover, the NIE School claims that markets can and should be free from politics. However, in practice, 
the emergence of markets often needed heavy state involvement and a well-functioning market economy, 
which is impossible without the existence of a well-functioning state. For instance, the developmental crises 
that many developing countries faced in the last two decades of the twentieth century were due to the 
assumption of the primacy of market institutions and the belief that these developed naturally so long as the 
state did not interfere with their evaluation (Chang, 2003). However, in practice, markets function effectively 
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depending on the existence of diverse institutions (including the state) to regulate who can participate in the 
system and who cannot.  
The IPE postulates a two-way causation between individual motivations and social institutions, rather than a 
one-way causation from the individual to institutions, as proponents of the NIE believe. It takes strong 
institutions and politics to break the conceptual shackles of a neoliberal political economy, which dominated 
the debates on the role of the state (minimal state intervention) in economic development during the last two 
decades of the twentieth century (Chang, 2002; 2003a). Furthermore, the proponents of the IPE believe that 
mainstream institutionalists are highly problematic when it comes to understanding the relationship between 
institutions and economic development, seeing it as linear and uniform across space and time (Chang, 2011). 
They ignore the impact of economic development on institutions and focus exclusively on how institutions 
affect development. Instead, the proponents of the IPE believe that economic development has a significant 
impact on nurturing new institutions and modifying existing ones, and that institutions are crucial for 
economic development. It is obvious that a well-functioning institutional system helps the state to tackle 
socio-economic, political and cultural problems, and achieve the development targets they have set. 
Nevertheless, well-functioning institutions alone will not achieve the development targets of a country – this 
must be accompanied by human capital development and technological progress. The role of an effective 
state and the participation of all stakeholders in the development process are equally necessary. When 
designing effective and strong institutions, a developmental state should build distinctive capacities to 
achieve its development agenda in a legitimate and credible manner. 
The appropriate role of the state in development and social progress has been a central concern of policy-
makers since the beginning of capitalism and the rise of development economics after the Second World War 
made this aspect of economics even more important (Chang, 2003a). Following this, the notion of the 
developmental state has renewed in the Global South and played a significant role in the economies of the 
East Asian and Southeast Asian countries since the post-Second World War. A developmental state is 
distinguished by achieving significant economic growth, as well as resource allocation and redistribution to 
realise social benefit, which contributes significantly to a better standard of living for a large proportion of 
the population (Johnson, 1999; Leftwich, 2008). These significant improvements served to legitimate the 
developmental states in the East Asia. Building the developmental state requires commitment from every 
stakeholder in the economy but, more importantly, from the state institutions, i.e. political elites.  
The capacity of the developmental states to implement effective and coherent development policies and 
strategies depends on the combination of bureaucratic autonomy, a broad-based state–society coalition/s, 
institutional and socio-political capabilities, among others. For instance, the East Asian developmental states 
believed that achieved equitable growth based on a concerted effort by the state to formulate and implement 
appropriate policies and to nurture institutions based on their own contexts. Some attributes of a 
developmental state worth mentioning are:  
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 It is an activist state and it is not an overseer, i.e. it is an active participator in the development 
process;  
 It is consistent in its pursuit of development objectives;  
 It evolves in the light of the changing needs of the society in which it is embedded;  
 It is well-stated, risk-taking (can assist entrepreneurs to take risks);  
 It is legitimate and paves the way for democracy in the long-term; and  
 It establishes a ‘pilot agency’ within the central bureaucracy whose policy heartland is the industrial 
profile of the economy and the future growth path of the country.  
The East Asian countries adopted a developmental state model to break free from the vicious circle of 
poverty and to sustain economic growth. Many of them made great progress in catching-up, although this has 
not been straightforward. The East Asian development experience indicates that countries in catch-up 
situations can quickly transform their economies. Nevertheless, this does not mean that state intervention 
addresses all development evils and outcomes are mixed, depending on the execution capacity of the states. 
The East Asian experiences show how the developmental state can promote agricultural transformation and 
economic development in general. For instance, the Asian Tigers initially abolished landlordism and 
distributed the land to the rural masses, and eventually embarked on successive development efforts by 
formulating and implementing appropriate policies and nurturing well-functioning institutions. The success 
of land reform in Japan, Korea and Taiwan was possible, partly because of the strict imposition of land 
ownership ceilings in the early days of land reform (Chang, 2009). The role of the state has positively 
affected investment in public goods such as agricultural research, education, extension, irrigation and 
infrastructure, thereby increasing agricultural productivity. South Korea and Taiwan, for instance, produced 
subsidised agricultural inputs via using state-owned enterprises and distributed to farmers through state-
managed agricultural cooperatives (Chang, 2009). State-led rural development (accompanied by pro-poor 
policies with respect to agricultural diversification) leading to higher incomes for farmers was crucial to their 
success and, conversely, the absence of this led to failure in many of the SSA countries. 
However, there is no single blue print development model that is recommended for every country that will 
lead to success at the same pace. The good development model is the one that a nation adopts based on its 
own context to achieve sustainable development. However, the East Asian developmental state can indeed 
serve as a good example of development model than the Euro–American development (neoliberal) model, 
for today’s developing countries. This is why because a developmental state approach expected to have a 
room to adopt according to the country’s context. This means, it is considered not as rigid as the neoliberal is 
one (i.e. imposed based on predetermined terms and conditions). The developmental state model can be 
expected to adjust/re-adjust based on the contexts of the respective countries and on the dynamism of the 
existing global political economy.  
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For instance, adopting an appropriate or context-specific development ideology and good developmental 
policy choices are considered as the key instruments in the success story of Botswana and Mauritius 
(Beaulier, 2003). Therefore, if other SSA countries want to replicate this success story, they should be 
expected to adapt the development model to their own contexts and make appropriate development policy 
choices when they design their development projects. The question is, where good policies come from and 
why are some more effective than others in achieving substantial development outcomes? The answer simply 
lies on having (or not having) a context-fitting developmental model and effective institutions. The quality of 
institutions is critical more than anything for the success of the developmental state, and evidence from East 
Asia bears this out. Building vibrant institutions and a competent state bureaucracy to formulate and 
implement development projects are crucial requirements and a priority agenda for the developmental state 
model (Carroll & Carroll, 1997).  
The question is can other SSA countries replicate the success stories of the developmental states. The 
argument presented in this thesis is yes this is possible (though not necessarily in all of them) if they consider 
their context and adapt accordingly. However, this does not mean that all SSA countries should follow 
exactly the same policies and strategies as these successful countries have adopted, and not all SSA countries 
expected to adopt the developmental state model. For success, they should base their developmental models 
on their own socio-economic, political, cultural, geographical, and historical circumstances, which are 
different in each country. However, what is essential to sustain the development process in these countries is 
a capable developmental state with development policies that boosts public investment in social, physical, 
and human capital, effective institutions, macroeconomic stability, and the role of market. To build 
successful developmental states, in particular, the SSA countries should pay attention to the broad-section of 
embedded state–society or coherent state–society relations among the common features of the classic 
developmental states. An effective broad-based state–society relationship depends on the capacity of the 
state bureaucracy and on the existence of strong civil society organisations. The existence of a broad-based 
state–-society relationship is considered one of the essential instruments to achieve economic transformation 
by creating a development opportunity for all stakeholders, or by allowing the involvement of all groups of 
the society in the development process.  
In general, committed political leadership must strive to adopt contextually appropriate policies. Even 
though it can be bitter and challenging, it is possible for African governments to adopt and articulate good 
development polices and strategies. This is possible only if the political elites start looking inward 
(recognising their own internal problems) rather than outward (externalising their problems), and resist 
pressures coming from their former colonial masters and the international institutions to conform to 
neoliberal paradigms under different terms and tied-conditions, which ultimately hijack their own national 
development interests.  
As a production input in agriculture, irrigated water is an important socio-economic ‘good’, playing a 
positive role in improving the livelihood of farm households, and ‘bad’ when it has negative externalities 
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(Hussain & Hanjra, 2004). Irrigation can certainly improve agricultural productivity, together with other 
modern agricultural inputs. However, irrigation technology is both expensive and complex in terms of capital 
and institutional requirements, and is often managed in the context of national governance. Governments 
have facilitated rural development by providing considerable public subsidies for the installation of irrigation 
infrastructure and other modern agricultural inputs to support the beneficiary farm households and to 
transform the agricultural sector in general. Irrigation management relates to the broader issues of water-
resource management and economic development issues that demand the involvement of various 
stakeholders and diverse institutions at different levels; increasingly this means joint management and 
partnership among different stakeholders. Building local leadership skills and institutional capacity, and 
changing the awareness of the beneficiary farmers are key factors for the successful participatory irrigation 
management approach.  
However, building suitable and workable institutions is not easy and it demands commitment from both 
government and society. The problem of sustainable irrigation management is that it is neither state nor 
market based; it is somewhere in between, which requires decision-making by all stakeholders at different 
levels (Lam, 2006b). The development of adequate social capital, such as inclusive state–society 
cooperation, helps to realise the development potentials in the various domains of collective action (Evans, 
1995). Research on the East Asian model suggests that a synergy between farmers and irrigation managers 
can help to bring about good irrigation management performance (Lam, 1996) because farmers develop a 
sense of ownership or co-production management through their participation. It is clear that effective state 
intervention is required to nurture effective and diverse institutions according to their respective contexts and 
the nature of their infrastructure.  
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3 CHAPTER THREE: POST-INDEPENDENCE AFRICAN ECONOMIES: AN 
OVERVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
The majority of the population in SSA live in poverty. The process of globalisation has left most African 
countries marginalised and many countries lack basic social and physical infrastructure services. Their 
economic performance has failed to cope with the fast-growing population and, consequently, at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, Africa is unable to compete equally in the global economy (Annan, 
2000). Immediately after independence in the 1960s, many countries in Africa attempted to adopt either a 
state-led development approach or a pro-capitalist development alternative, which theoretically advocates the 
role of market primacy and assumes that markets are natural institutions, while states or other institutions are 
human-made substitutes (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999; Mkandawire, 2001). However, in the real world, the 
establishment of well-functioning market institutions depends on the existence of strong and well-
functioning state institutions (Chang, 2002; 2003a); i.e. the emergence of markets often requires state 
intervention. The reigning development paradigm required a strong state to lead the development efforts in 
the light of limited markets and private capital after these countries attained their independence. 
Accordingly, the sub-period was characterised by a relatively high growth performance in the GDP and per-
capita income. The GDP of the SSA region grew, on average, 5% per annum with a 2% per-capita income 
growth rate for nearly one-and-a-half decades after their independence (Fosu, 2009). However, the early and 
late 1970s constituted a period of supply shocks, both positive and negative. The negative shocks derived 
primarily from higher petroleum prices and droughts in many African countries, and the state controls 
became even more binding and widespread (Fosu, 2009).  
While many countries experienced negative supply shocks, others enjoyed the commodity price boom for a 
short while until the commodity price declined again. Unfortunately, positive shocks tended to lead to 
enthusiastic government spending which often resulted in a sub-optimal, intertemporal allocation of 
resources. When the boom invariably ended, governments were became ‘cash-strapped’ and forced to 
borrow to continue the ‘often bloated’ projects or simply abandon incomplete ones. In either case, there 
would be efficiency losses and a sharp deterioration in the socio-economic conditions. These myopic boom–
bust phenomena tended to reduce overall growth resulting in a drop in the average, annual per-capita income 
to approximately 1% (Fosu, 2001; Fosu & O’Connell, 2006; Collier & O’Connell, 2008). Although SSA 
countries generally experienced poor economic performance during this period, there are notable exceptions 
that achieved an average GDP growth rate of least 4% annually, which was about 1% above the population 
growth rate (Fosu, 2009). This considerable recovery has occurred since the late-1990s. Since the beginning 
of the new millennium, the annual GDP growth rate of SSA economies has averaged between 4% and 4.5%. 
Furthermore, a number of strong performing countries have experienced booms in their respective exports, 
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including oil and other commodities. However, in terms of trade, the whole region has improved 
considerably since the late-1990s (Fosu, 2009).  
This chapter provides an overview of the African economies, since their post-independence with the 
exceptions of Ethiopia, which has never been colonised. It is crucial to see the overall picture to understand 
whether the previous development models have been successful or not, and to identify development 
constraints and opportunities to strengthen the development process. Furthermore, this historical assessment 
provides an opportunity to see whether African countries (not necessary all of them) need to shift their 
development ideologies from the current predatory system or unregulated the so-called free market to 
workable and context fitted development paradigm or not.  
3.2 Africa’s post-independence economic situation (1960s–1970s) 
Economists have identified path dependence as one of the important features of the growth process. This 
means that what eventually happens to an economy depends greatly on the point of departure or initial 
conditions. There is ample evidence to suggest that large qualitative differences in economic outcomes can 
arise from small differences in initial conditions. The initial conditions affecting economic growth are: the 
level of per-capita income, human capital development, natural-resource endowment, the structures of 
productivity and production, the degree of economic openness and its form of integration, the development 
of physical infrastructure, and institutional variables such as governance, land tenure and property rights 
(Romer, 1993; Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). In the case of Africa, these conditions include the nature of 
colonial rule and the institutional arrangements inherited from the former colonies, the decolonisation 
process, and the economic and political interests of the former colonial masters after independence. 
Identifying these initial conditions incorrectly can undermine policy initiatives and outcomes. In practice, 
government policies are not simply a matter of choice made without contextual consideration of a given 
country (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). To avoid some of the unpleasant comparisons and to develop 
appropriate development policy directions, it is important to appreciate the differences and similarities in the 
initial conditions.  
From the 1960s, newly independent African countries looked forward to a vision of development based on 
state-led economic development. These so-called developmental states guided by the thesis of modernising 
the society through state-led capitalism and the industrialisation strategy of import substitution (Mkandawire 
& Soludo, 1999; Mkandawire, 2001). Until the late 1970s, Africa’s development strategy spurred a 
reasonable level of economic growth, in line with other parts of the world, and at one time, some of them 
ranked with the best-performing East Asian economies (Mkandawire, 2001). During the immediate post-
independence period, most SSA countries had strong governments that took the task of nation building and 
the development agenda seriously. In several cases, they managed to attain a positive and robust rate of 
economic growth. However, a disastrous combination of external shocks (a sharp rise in the oil price and a 
collapse in the price of their primary commodities) triggered an economic collapse, which started around the 
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late-1970s and caused the African debt crisis of the 1980s. The primary commodity-dependent nature of 
these countries made them extremely vulnerable to declining trade and commodity price variability 
(Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999; Mkandawire, 2001; UNCTAD, 2003; Sindzingre, 2004; Nabudere, 2006).  
For instance, the ratio of export to GDP in Africa (and SSA) collapsed from 33% and 31% in 1974 to 27% 
and 25%, respectively, in 1975 and did not recover in a sustained manner until the end of the twentieth 
century (World Bank, 2007). The export ratio was much higher in Africa in 1974 than in Indonesia (28%), 
South Korea (27%), and Thailand (22%). In the subsequent years, all these countries overtook Africa, 
reaching an export to GDP ratio ranging from 41% to 44% in South Korea, and 67% to 74% in Thailand, 
compared to Africa’s ratio of 33% to 38% in 2000–2005 (World Bank, 2007). Nevertheless, the political and 
economic historical record of the continent reveals a very mixed output. Most of the first generation of 
African leaders was preoccupied with development and nation building, to the extent that the post-colonial 
state in Africa has been dubbed as ‘developmental’ by some observers (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999; 
Mkandawire, 2001). Africa’s economic performance has not always been as dismal as is usually portrayed in 
the literature, as Table 3.1 indicates its growth record between 1960 and 1975 (Bangura, 1992; Mkandawire, 
2001; Arrighi, 2002). The analysis of the development experience in most developing countries (i.e. those 
that experienced growth in GDP per capita of at least 3%) over this period reveals that 11 of the best-
performing 50 countries were in Africa (and nine in SSA). The fastest-growing developing countries up to 
1975 were from Africa, i.e. Gabon and Botswana’s growth rate exceeded that of Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, and Thailand in 1960–1975 (Rodrik, 1997). 
Table 3.1: GDP growth rate (in %) in some selected African and East Asian countries 
East Asian countries 1960–75 1975–89 African countries  1960–75 1975–89 
Singapore  7.4 5.1 Gabon  7.87 –3.4 
Japan  7.05 3.53 Botswana  6.16 6.17 
South Korea  6.47 7.0 Lesotho  6.0 2.15 
Hong Kong  6.12 6.61 Swaziland  4.76 –0.86 
Taiwan  5.86 6.57 Nigeria  4.15 –2.41 
Thailand  3.94 4.72 Tunisia  4.14 2.25 
   Togo  3.49 0.22 
   South Africa  3.39 –0.39 
   Côte d’Ivoire  3.30 –1.56 
   Egypt  3.04 2.93 
   Guinea  3.02 –1.27 
Source: Adapted from Rodrik (1997) 
However, the two oil shocks of the early-1970s and late-1970s badly affected many African economies and 
decelerated their economic growth. After almost two decades of independence, in most cases the existence of 
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a single party or military rule undermined the independent democratic movements. The promise of 
development and abundance for all turned out to be illusive for the majority. These states stagnated in 
underdevelopment and were inclined to accept uncritically Western modernisation and a development 
ideology that failed miserably (Obi, 2001). Only a few African countries, such as Botswana and Mauritius, 
have sustained their growth path up to the twenty-first century, and hence, they are classified as ‘African 
miracles’ or ‘democratic developmental states’ (Mkandawire, 2001; Fritz & Menocal, 2006). Most African 
countries stepped into deep economic crisis in the 1980s and their economic growth has continued to fall. 
Furthermore, the adoption and implementation of SAPs since the 1980s discounted the role of the state in 
economic development in Africa, and negated the prospects for growth and the consolidation of the 
developmental state on the continent (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999; Mkandawire, 2001). African 
development lies more with what is approved externally and less with what is done internally; countries have 
fully embraces the neoliberal paradigm, which has destroyed the state’s role in shaping and defining their 
agendas of self-reliant development (Obi, 2001).  
The fact is that Africa’s state-led development approach at independence often failed to build a strong 
developmental state and achieve sustainable economic and social outcomes. Most countries could not 
engineer economic ‘take-off’, ensure industrialisation, or diversify the economy. Given the external factors, 
the internal factors, such as the rise of authoritarian military dictatorships and one-party regimes, created an 
obstacle to building a hegemonic development ideology and coalitions. Most of the regimes lacked strategic 
partnerships with the indigenous private-business sectors and the society. They depended on the capital of 
former colonies, rather than building a local corporate sector through domestic resource mobilisation 
(Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). Consequently, there were low rates of savings and investments, flawed 
industrialisation strategies, and low investment in R&D and human capital development. All these are the 
result of extreme dependence on external conditions and consequent shocks (such as the rise of oil prices 
followed by debt crisis). Thus, Africa remains the most underdeveloped region in the world. Poverty, 
inequality, lack of basic infrastructure and institutions are some of the core development challenges of the 
continent. 
The two oil price shocks of 1973–1974 and 1979–1980 are the main factors for the collapse of the African 
economies, and the subsequent debt crisis aggravated the situation further. The rise in oil prices had an 
adverse impact on the trade balance of oil-importing countries by undermining domestic investments and 
triggering a fiscal crisis in most countries. The second oil shock coincided with sharp rises in real interest 
rates and the global recession of 1981–1982, which depressed African exports. Based on the erroneous 
assumption that quick recovery from the global recession would soon restore the prices of non-fuel 
commodities, most countries resorted to external borrowing to finance fiscal and external imbalances, which 
lead to another problem of debt crisis (Balassa, 1981; 1995; Kuznets, 1988; UNCTAD, 1998; 2007). For 
instance, ‘[s]ome Asian countries with a strong manufacturing base chose to restrict the increase in their debt 
indicators by expanding export volume via a variety of export promotion measures and industrial policies. 
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Many other developing countries did not adjust in such way that either because their economies were not 
sufficiently diversified or because they deliberately chose not to’ (UNCTAD, 2007:103). When looking at 
the case of Africa, the continent’s exports remain undiversified, focusing on primary commodities, i.e. 
natural resources and agricultural produce. Africa’s heavy dependence on primary commodity exports poses 
difficult and persistent problems, in that the effective management of the production and export of natural 
resources often requires state intervention, compounded by prudent macroeconomic policies and strong 
institutions.  
What were the differences and similarities between SSA and the East Asian NICs at that time? For many 
African countries, there was little room for adjustment because of their non-diversified economies and the 
decline in non-fuel primary commodity prices during the global recession. The East Asian developmental 
states and SSA countries have a common feature of external orientation, i.e. a dependence on external trade 
to drive their economic progress. The difference between the two regions was that the Asian economies were 
more diversified in terms of technological intensity and composition of exports, while their counterparts in 
SSA relied almost exclusively on unprocessed primary export commodities (UNCTAD, 2007). Indeed, if 
there was any failure in development-policy formulation, it was the lack of strategies to diversify their 
economic bases through, for instance, ‘export-investment nexus’ or ‘investment-profit nexus’ (Mkandawire, 
2001; Arrighi, 2002). As illustrated by the experiences of the Asian NICs, progress in increasing the 
technology intensity of exports is a means of addressing vulnerability and dependency to remain on a 
sustainable growth trajectory (Sindzingre, 2004). Much of the variance in growth performance during the 
adjustment period in Africa could be due to differences in productivity and export performance in the 
industrial sector (Pieper, 2000). 
Furthermore, the external environment, particularly the geopolitical context of SSA and the NICs of Asia 
was also markedly different. The antagonists of the Cold War had different relations with each of these 
groups, largely due to their different geographical locations, which produced diverse outcomes. On the one 
hand, the United States granted its Asian allies preferential access to its domestic market and this was critical 
for the ‘take-off’ of the region, as were the large amounts of aid it provided. For instance: 
During the Korean War, in 20-year period 1950–70, US aid to Japan averaged $ 500 million a year. Aid to 
South Korea and Taiwan combined was even more massive. Huge amounts of military and economic aid to 
South Korea, and investment in infrastructure as well linked to the Cold War. From 1946–78, military and 
economic aid to South Korea amounted to $13 billion ($ 600 per capita) and to Taiwan $5.6 billion ($ 425 
per capita) (Arrighi, 2002:30–1). The true dimensions of this munificence are revealed by the fact that the 
nearly $6 billion in US economic aid to South Korea in 1946–78 compare with a total of $ 6.89 billion for all 
of Africa and of $ 14.8 billion for all of Latin America in the same period (Arrighi, 2002:31).  
On the other hand, SSA became the theatre/playground for playing out Cold War confrontations between 
West and East. Misrule of state power for the purpose of the private gains overlooked and even in some 
cases totally disregarded the social wellbeing (Arrighi, 2002 & Sindzingre, 2004). These differences in the 
initial conditions between East Asia and SSA were highlighted further by differences in their inherited 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
88 
 
legacies in the domains of state formation and national economic integration. These huge disparities in the 
post-colonial economic heritage of political economy configurations were critical in shaping the coping 
strategies or abilities of the two regions in the aftermath of the oil crisis (Arrighi, 2002).  
To conclude, external factors and institutions have had a much larger influence on Africa’s economic and 
political prosperity than is usually acknowledged. Sometimes, these have had direct adverse consequences 
for the nature of political and economic governance in some countries, although this is not entirely free from 
the internal debilitating (economic and political) dynamics, which resulted from some of these processes. 
Favourable external environments often lead to positive economic outcomes. In the 1960s and early 1970s, 
some African countries proved that they were capable of achieving robust economic growth in such 
circumstances. However, this robust economic growth was not sustained due to the two oil crises, followed 
by the debt crisis on the continent. After this economic recession, almost all African countries (except those 
who entered into the socialist camp or adapted socialism or a planned economy) were forced to adopt the 
‘Breton Wood Institutions’ or SAPs as a panacea for their crises by the international financial institutions. 
3.3 The African economy during the reform era (1980s–1990s) 
The history of the global political economy is replete with the initiation of different reform programmes. 
Thus, the issue of economic reform is not peculiar to only the developing countries. The content, context and 
strategy of reforms vary across countries and regions because of different factors. Various countries 
implemented different economic and political reforms at different times to address the distortions (if any) 
and to make progress in their economies. The variation of factors for economic reform are often largely 
dependent on the prevailing socio-political and socio-economic circumstances of a given country and often 
moderated by the prevailing context of the international political economy (Adeyemo et al., 2008; Luqman 
& Lawal, 2011). The SAPs/Washington consensus is one reform programme initiated by developed 
countries and their institutions as a remedy for the economic crisis happening in many developing countries.  
The commonly known ‘Washington Consensus’ menu masterminded by World Bank and IMF was presented 
to the table to Africans attached with painful conditionalities. Consequently, development aid was released 
provided that governments were willing to swallow the prescribed ‘‘poison pill’: namely, deregulation, 
privatization, devaluation, free market, free trade, minimal role of state etc. Simply, African governments 
were trapped into dilemmas of the choice between ‘the devil and the deep sea’. Lately, almost all of them 
were compelled to endorse the neoliberal development ideology (Daddi, 2013:5).  
However, there are several arguments regarding the outcome of SAPs in Africa between the proponents and 
non-proponents of the programme. Economists, who are proponents, agree on several indicators of the 
success of the adjustment programme in Africa (Jega, 2000). These include improvements in the GDP 
growth rates, investment motivation and the efficient use of resources, which reveal an increase in 
productivity. Although there are pockets of successes here and there, some of the social crises that emanated 
from the implementation of adjustment programmes during the 1980s and 1990s have been blamed on recent 
economic reforms in Africa (Jega, 2000). The SAPs implemented in Africa were rooted in the neoclassical 
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economic tradition, which is premised on the notion of an open and competitive economy and minimalist 
state intervention. Although these adjustment policies dictated by the World Bank and IMF were deemed 
suitable for matured economies, their strict applications resulted in worsening the socio-economic conditions 
of many transition economies in Africa (Olukoshi, 1995;1998; Jega, 2000). The SAPs are not working as 
expected in Africa and have not made much of a difference. The World Bank placed considerable value on 
the SAPs, answering its own question: 
Is adjustment paying off in Sub Saharan Africa? The answer is a qualified yes. Adjustment programs may 
not have raised all countries' GDP growth, exports, savings, and investment rates to those of adjusting 
countries in other regions. However, the stronger reformers in Africa have turned around the decline in 
economic performance and are growing for the first time in many years. There also are signs that new firms 
are being created, that exports are growing, that private investment is picking up, and that savings 
performance is improving (World Bank, 1994:131). 
The World Bank regretted that after more than a decade of SAPs in Africa, reforms remain incomplete, but 
this was not due, it was argued, to the inefficiency or poor design of the SAPs but rather to the lack of 
implementation capacity by Africans themselves. Whatever the reason, the bottom line is that the SAPs have 
not delivered the promised recovery and growth, and several important gaps and weaknesses of the 
programme are increasingly acknowledged. There is considerable concern that the reforms undertaken to 
date are fragile and that they are merely returning Africa to the slow growth path (World Bank, 1994). Table 
3.2 presents the economic performance of Africa during the pre-crisis and post-crisis era (the SAPs) based 
on some selected macroeconomic indicators. These show that the development prescriptions that were 
provided by the developed countries to Africa over the last four to five decades did not resolve the 
underlying socio-economic and political problems or induce industrialisation (Chang, 2002; UNCTAD, 
2009). The states that wholly endorsed the neoliberal development ideology eventually ended up in a total 
economic mess, with catastrophic results: unemployment, poverty and inequality worsened beyond 
expectation (World Bank, 1994) 
As indicated in Table 3.2, since the 1980s African economies have deteriorated in almost all economic 
indicators except for the rates of population growth and inflation. From independence to the end of 1990s, 
the growth curve for African economies was an ‘inverted U-shape’, with the turning point taking place in the 
early 1970s. Indeed, to understand the deterioration in performance, it is important to shed some light on the 
dynamic characteristics that made the good performance of the post-independence era unsustainable. In 
addition to these macroeconomic indicators, African agriculture lags far behind other developing countries in 
terms of productivity, modern technology utilisation, and other factors such as irrigation, high variety seeds, 
fertiliser and marketing due to rural infrastructure bottlenecks. Thus, food prices have been rising rapidly for 
more than two decades, without an adequate supply response to keep pace with population growth, despite 
increased food imports (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). Until recently, African countries faced unfavourable 
terms of trade due to their high imports such as capital goods, and the export sector was characterised by 
unprocessed primary commodities. Long-term investment, which is one of the fundamental indicators for 
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development, was not stimulated due to low levels of savings and low-income mobilisation (Mkandawire & 
Soludo, 1999). 
Table 3.2: Africa’s economic performance, 1965–1994 
 
Indicators (average) 
Performance (in %)  Performance (in %) 
pre-crisis period/era  post-crisis (SAPs)period/era 
1965–73 1974–79 1980–85 1986–89 1990–94 
Population growth rate  2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Growth rate of GDP  5.7 3.5 1.8 2.5 1.9 
Growth rate of per-capita GDP  3 0.7 –1.1 –0.5 –1.1 
Growth rate of agricultural output  2.7 3 1.5 2.7 2.1 
Growth rate of manufacturing output 7.3 6.7 5.2 2.5 1.3 
Investment as a ratio of GDP 16.5 20.9 16.3 15.6 15.3 
Growth rate of investment  9.6 6.9 –4.8 1.2 0.8 
Savings as a ratio of GDP 16.2 19.7 14.9 13.8 12.7 
Growth rate of exports 8.2 2.6 0.4 3 0.6 
Growth rate of imports 7.4 6.2 –2.4 0.7 0.4 
Rate of inflation  5.8 13.8 18.8 21.7 27.2 
Source: Adapted from the World Bank (1994) 
Furthermore, the external debt of SSA has more than doubled over the adjustment period without any 
increase in economic growth to sustain its servicing in the future. Africa’s infrastructure and human capital 
formation, which was deemed fragile in the beginning of the adjustment period, deteriorated even further. 
For instance, Box 3.1 alludes a misguided direction in educational policy by the World Bank for African 
countries during the SAPs. Africa’s capacity to manage the crisis has been further eroded by a massive ‘brain 
drain’ caused by a sharp decline in real wages, massive retrenchment, and continuous vilification of civil 
servants by corrupt members in corrupt institutions (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). The institutions for 
development are either very weak or non-existent in most African countries. The success indicators of the 
African economy in the adjustment era were simply used by the World Bank to design more policy 
instruments (such as the accelerated development of 1981, sustainable development of 1989 and adjustment 
in Africa in 1994), instead of success in real economic growth (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999).  
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Box 3.1: Educational policy reform in Africa during the SAPs period 
‘The World Bank plays a major role in defining education policies in Africa, both by providing direct funding and 
tying up local counterpart funds in the direction of its choices, and by providing the intellectual basis for the new 
policy directions in African economies. World Bank policies on education have largely been influenced by the 
literature on the rate of the return on education (RORE), which provides a market-compatible rationale of state 
expenditures on education’ (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999: 46). The World Bank has been an important participant in 
such analysis and has drawn some conclusions from it that Bennell (1996: 183) summarised as follow: 
 ROREs for all levels of education generally exceed the aggregate social opportunity cost of capital; 
 ROREs in developing countries (and especially Africa) are higher than in the advanced market economies; 
 The private and social ROREs are highest for primary education, followed by secondary education; 
 Private ROREs to higher education are usually considerably higher than the corresponding social ROREs; 
 The pattern of ROREs remains stable as countries develop with only relatively minor declines in ROREs. 
However, Bennell (1996:183) ‘summed up the policy implication as First, all education at whatever level is a 
relatively attractive investment not only for individuals but also governments. Second, with certain caveats, in most 
developing countries primary education should receive the highest investment priority, followed by secondary 
education. Third, government subsidization of higher, and to a lesser extent, secondary education is excessive given 
the large differentials that exist between private and social ROREs. To remedy this misallocation of resources, 
students should be made to contribute significantly more to the costs of their own education. While social and private 
ROREs have tended to decline as a country’s per capita income increases, all levels of education remain relatively 
attractive vis-à-vis other types of public investment.’ 
This indicates that how the SAPs undermined the augmentation of broad-based and specialised human 
capital by their reliance on a static analysis of human capital returns and needs. Only recently, the dire 
shortage of critical skills and personnel in Africa has been recognised as an impediment to policy 
formulation and implementation. Much of the so-called ‘lack of capacity’ in Africa is donor imposed. For 
instance, nearly 40% of multilateral aid and financial assistance is spent on foreign experts, and about US$ 4 
billion goes annually to funding foreign technical assistance in Africa. If this money had been used for 
training programmes to build and strengthen institutions, for technological upgrading and R&D, the African 
human capital situation would most certainly be very different (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). 
A higher level of education enhances a country’s social and economic capacity because education is a crucial 
instrument for building vital human capital. Building human capital is indispensable to accelerate economic, 
social and political transformation. African countries should learn from the historical experiences of 
developed and emerging developing countries about the significance of investment in human capital at all 
levels, which plays a key role in development. In all these instances, tertiary education has played a key role 
in the process of rapid and sustainable economic transformation through building the required middle- and 
high-level human capital. Because of incorrect policy direction on education during the era of the SAPs and 
the internal softness of African states (i.e. a lack of institutional capacity, legitimacy, societal cohesiveness 
and lack of administrative or political ability to implement development projects), Africa currently lags far 
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behind the rest of the world in the accumulation of the necessary human capital. Therefore, it is time to 
initiate pragmatic social-sector development programmes and invest considerable public funds to narrow the 
existing human capital gap.  
Half-hearted pursuit of SAPs has not improved economic performance in many SSA countries. The evidence 
suggests that the culprit is not wrongheaded policies but that poorly functioning state institutions are at the 
root of the economic problems plaguing ‘neo-patrimonial’ states (Lewis, 1994; Kohli, 2004). What factors 
distinguished the neo-patrimonial states from the developmental states? Kohli (2004) elaborates on how a 
predatory/neo-patrimonial form of state can be distinguished from successful developmental states, as 
follows:  
 Leadership tends to pursue more personal and sectional goals than public goals such as nation building. 
 Neo-patrimonial states are generally staffed by individuals whose level of competence and 
professionalism as civil servants tends to be low. 
 Relations of state elites to private sectors tends to be mutually corrupt, with state resources 
strengthening private rents that support the powerful positions of the ruling elites. 
 The state’s downward reach is limited; these states generally suffered from a serious political 
disconnect between the state and the citizenry due to the absence of any normative glue to bind rulers 
and followers in a joint national development project. 
 Use of state resources for personal benefit or for the benefit of personal associates; which is a reflection 
of poor public institutions, i.e. lack of development ideology and shared national development projects. 
Table 3.3: Distinguished features/typology of ‘neo-patrimonial’ and developmental states 
Features  Predatory/neo-patrimonial Developmental states 
State 
bureaucracy 
Dysfunctional, based on patron-
client relations  
Functional: serves general interest, meritocratic recruitment, 
rules-driven, efficient; close synergy with political leadership: 
shared development vision 
State–society 
relations  
State captured by particular 
urban elites  
Embedded autonomy: state acts autonomously, but embedded in 
dense networks with rising industrial capitalist (state centric) 
Development 
vision 
None 
 
High economic growth, diversified economy, redistribution 
subordinate to growth 
Government’s 
system  
Personalised dictatorship; 
example: Zaire 
Authoritarian (military or multi/dominant party rule); 
examples: South Korea, Taiwan  
Key agents of 
development 
None Dominant leaders or dominant party 
Source: Adapted from Pillay (2007:207–8) 
Hence, state-led development in the predatory form obviously lacked purpose or capacity and thus turned 
into a development disaster (Kohli, 2004). Based on embeddedness (E) and autonomy (A), Peter Evans 
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identifies three types of states, namely, ‘predatory’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘cohesive’ developmental states (see 
Figure 3.1). ‘Predatory’ states may be more abundant in the less developed world than ‘cohesive-capitalist’ 
developmental states. The latter are deliberately and carefully constructed, whereas the former reflects the 
more common failure of state construction, and the subsequent evolution of traditional politics behind the 
modern state imported from ex-colonies (Kohli, 2004). While intermediate states, such as Brazil and India, 
either lacked autonomy (like Brazil whose state apparatus was not based on meritocratic recruitment and was 
thus short of competence), or lacked embeddedness (like India, although its bureaucratic apparatus was 
qualitatively close to the successful developmental states) (Evans, 1995; Kohli, 2004). Most states in SSA 
(except for Botswana and Mauritius) fit into this category, the ‘predatory’ states, which share the above-
mentioned common characteristics of the neo-patrimonial state. 
Figure 3.1: Predatory and intermediate states and cohesive developmental state 
 
Source: Adapted from Evans (1995) 
Nevertheless, from the beginning, the international institutions and donor organisations forced African 
countries to swallow the free-market ideology using a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach without considering their 
political, economic, social, institutional and cultural contexts. However, a free-market ideology is not all bad, 
but it is not appropriate for African countries with immature economies, which do not fit with it. To initiate 
development in Africa, state intervention is necessary to mobilise resources, address market failures, 
construct or transform markets and capital. 
The important question here is why did African countries remain a backward continent for four decades of 
the twentieth century? The literature points to the nature of their political economy, which is characterised by 
a ‘neo-patrimonial’ regime. It is plausible that the current backwardness of African economies is the result of 
the nature of their political and economic institutions vis-à-vis many other internal and external factors, such 
as a lack of committed political leadership, adopting a non-contextualised development ideology and the 
negative impact of colonialism.
24
 The primary objective of colonialism in Africa was to extract natural 
                                                     
24
 Britain, in her colonies in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, created a fragmented and ineffective state (based on her 
indirect rule) on a social base hardly suited for ready transformation into a modern state. That is, the British in Nigeria 
created a country but not an effective state. The British in Nigeria sought to pursue their agenda of political control and 
economic exploitation very differently than the Japanese did in Korea: Japan sought to control and exploit while 
transforming the traditional Korean society, whereas the British in Nigeria pursued similar goals while squeezing the 
traditional society. The Japanese in Korea thus left behind the rudiments of a modern state and an industrial economy 
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resources rather than promote a productive agenda on the continent. The colonisers built no reliable 
institutions and infrastructure for the purposes of sustainable development; instead, they deliberately 
marginalised the continent from the global economy. Africa was considered a source of factors of production 
and a market for their industrial commodities, not a centre for investment and production. Thus, limited 
capital was attracted to Africa, which depended largely on the extractive sectors to earn resource rents 
without real value being added to the economy. This rent-seeking activity is the legacy of colonialism and is 
the main problem, even today. Absolutist and patrimonial political systems developed by colonialists and the 
softness of post-colonial African leaders have become persistent over time in most parts of the continent. 
Most political and institutional aspects in Africa are derived from their colonial masters or imposed from the 
international institutions and directly or indirectly fulfil the interests of the developed countries. The problem 
in many African countries is the lack of development of indigenous political and institutional dynamism 
based on the unique features of their respective countries. They need to promote indigenous political and 
institutional dynamism to accelerate the development and transformation process. For instance, the political 
elites of Botswana used the traditional institutions (Tswana tribal institution) to consolidate their modern 
state institutions and to encourage for the broad-based participation of all economic actors (Eriksen, 2011; 
Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 2011).  
3.4 The African growth miracle and structural transformation (from 2000) 
The period from around 2000 marks the beginning of the ‘African growth miracle’. This means that the start 
of the twenty-first century saw an era in which African economies grew relatively faster than the rest of the 
world (McMillan & Harttgen, 2014). SSA’s economy expanded on average by 4.6% per annum of GDP 
between 1999 and 2010 (5.2% excluding South Africa, which had the lowest growth rate during this period). 
Six of the world’s 10 fastest growing countries were in SSA. The region’s growth is underpinned by strong 
private and public investment. Gross fixed-capital formation in the region has increased steadily from about 
16.4% in 2000 to 20.4% in 2011 (World Bank, 2013a). The increment of investment rates has contributed 
directly to boosting the productive capacity of the economy and helped to accelerate economic growth. FDI 
flows have also increased steadily in recent years; and it continues to be the source of capital flow and an 
important source of funding for the current account deficit in the region (World Bank, 2013a). Even though 
there is an increment in FDI, most of the FDI is focused on primary natural-resource extraction and is 
inclined to the resource-rich countries and to the service sector, such as telecommunications and financial 
institutions, to the detriment of the productive sectors of manufacturing and other job-creating sectors. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
on which a rapidly industrialising political economy could be built, while Nigeria in 1960 found itself ill-prepared to 
pursue such a journey (cf. Kohli, 2004:327–8). Economic exploitation/extraction was a part of colonialism, through 
direct or indirect political control, but the structures and process of establishing that political control varied. This 
variation occurred in part due to the differing realities on the ground; different colonisers brought different ideologies 
with them and the urgency, motive and capacity of colonisers differed across place and time (cf. Kohli, 2004). 
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Box 3.2: Some facts about growth, inequality and poverty in Africa 
 ‘Africa’s economic growth has been truly remarkable. GDP per-capita in SSA has grown in the last decade at a rate 
of about 2.5–3.0% per annum compared to essentially zero per cent between 1960 and 2000. Six of the ten fastest 
growing economies in the world are in SSA. One can truly characterize the present growth spell as a quantum 
jump.’ 
 ‘Among the more important factors that contributed to the acceleration of the pace of growth appear to be high 
commodity prices, a large inflow of FDI natural resources and land, falling fertility rates, and better governance.’ 
 ‘Half of the population is still poor but significant progress has been achieved. The headcount poverty ratio has 
fallen from a high of 58 per cent in 1996 to 48 per cent in 2010, using the US$1.25 a day extreme poverty line.’ 
 ‘Yet, the total number of poor below the extreme poverty line increased from 349 million in 1996 to 414 million in 
2010.’  
 ‘Income inequality is extremely high with six of the world’s ten most unequal countries being in Africa (South 
Africa’s present Gini coefficient25 is 0.65). Income inequality increased slightly within Africa as a whole, the Gini 
coefficient on average rising from about 0.43 in 2000–2004 to 0.46 in 2005–2009.’ 
 ‘Despite the creation of 37 million new and stable wage-paying jobs over the past decade, only 28 per cent of 
Africa’s labour force holds such positions. Instead, some 63 per cent of the total labour force engages in some form 
of self-employment or ‘vulnerable’ employment, such as subsistence farming or urban street hawking.’  
(Thorbecke, 2014: 5). 
Unemployment and poverty are huge challenges in African economies and need to be tackled by adopting 
appropriate development models and building strong institutions. The conversion of Africa’s growth into 
poverty reduction is hindered by higher initial income inequality (see Table 3.4), the challenge to mobilise 
economic rents, including rents from natural resources for the benefit of a broader section of society, and 
continuing underperformance of its agricultural sector which is the mainstay of many African economies. It 
is without doubt that persistent high levels of inequality present serious challenges to poverty eradication, 
frustrates sustainable development objectives, and undermines the quality of economic development. Poor 
quality of life could spark social conflict. Therefore, economic growth alone is not enough to guarantee the 
sustainability of economic development and the equitable distribution of income, assets, education and other 
opportunities are important for the quality of sustainable development (Bhorat & Westhuizen, 2010).  
However, a detailed assessment of the international experience spotlights two caveats to the generally 
accepted view (consensus) that “growth is good for the poor”. Firstly, the impact of economic growth on 
poverty differs significantly between countries Secondly, as incomes grow, it is highly likely that its 
distribution will change – economic growth often brings with it some change in levels of income inequality 
(Bhorat & Westhuizen, 2010). 
                                                     
25
 The World Bank defines it as the most widely used measure of the degree of inequality. The coefficient varies 
between zero, which reflects complete equality, and one, which indicates complete inequality. An index of 0.5 denotes 
the cutting point; an index greater than 0.5 indicates worse inequality, and one lower that 0.5 indicates a better 
distribution of income or low inequality in the economy. 
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Table 3.4: Continental and regional disparities in income inequality (the Gini coefficient) 
Continent/years 1980–
99 
1990–99 2000–09 Regions/years 1980–99 1990–99 2000–
09 
Latin America 0.521 0.512 0.522 Southern Africa 0.524 0.533 0.485 
Africa 0.411 0.459 0.439 Central Africa 0.289 0.451 0.45 
Asia  0.367 0.387 0.375 Western Africa 0.393 0.441 0.422 
Europe  0.239 0.305 0.325 Eastern Africa 0.324 0.384 0.41 
    Northern Africa 0.409 0.364 0.374 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2011) 
This indicates that the quality of the continent’s economic development is still poor and the economic 
recovery has not created adequate employment opportunities to reduce poverty and inequality. As Table 3.5 
shows, in contrast to SSA, poverty reduction proceeded in the rest of the developing world, including China. 
By any standards, the level of poverty in Africa is unacceptable and, therefore, African countries need to 
make an extraordinary commitment to eradicate it from the continent. Although the proportion of people 
living below the poverty line between 2000 and 2010 was smaller than between 1990 and 1999, the absolute 
number of people living below poverty line was much larger in 2000–2010. In Africa, there is weak regional 
integration of trade and investment to facilitate economic growth and reduce poverty to an acceptable ratio, 
unlike other developing countries (for instance, China reduced poverty by more than half within a decade). 
Therefore, African countries need to consolidate their regional integration to address severe poverty 
(UNECA, 2012). 
Table 3.5: Head count ratio of poverty in developing regions (in %) 
Regions/years 1990–99 2000–10 
Developing countries (included China)  30.6 16.1 
Developing countries (excluded China) 28.5 17.8 
China  35.6 11.6 
Sub Saharan Africa 58 48.5 
Source: Adapted from the World Bank (2013a) 
Africa and particularly SSA have experienced relatively better economic performance since the turn of the 
millennium. Its GDP rose almost twice as fast in the first decade of this century compared to the last two 
decades of the twentieth century (UNECA, 2010). Growth in the SSA region is pushing numerous countries 
to middle-income status. For instance, in 2006, 13 countries in the region were categorised as middle-
income. Today this figure has increased to 21 and according to the projections of the World Bank, 10 others 
could attain middle-income status by 2025 if the current growth trends continue (Africa Progress Report, 
2014). Even though economic improvement has been widespread, meaningful economic diversification and 
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transformation has not yet been realised. There are still relatively high levels of unemployment, inequality 
and poverty, and a lack of social safety nets/social security, and limited social development in many 
countries. In the absence of meaningful diversification and transformation, many countries remain vulnerable 
to external shocks and are heavily dependent on informal-sector employment and output (UNCTAD, 2008; 
UNECA, 2010). The continent needs further diversification and meaningful structural transformation in all 
sectors of the economy to address the existing economic problems and to realise sustainable economic 
development.  
Structural transformation assumes the reallocation of economic resources away from the least productive 
sectors of the economy to more productive ones. It involves two elements: the rise of new productive 
activities and the reallocation of resources, typically from agriculture to industry and modern services, 
leading to higher economy-wide productivity and progressively raising incomes (McMillan & Rodrik, 2012).  
Table 3.6 shows how structural transformation is measured using different key indicators. For most 
developing countries, this usually means shifting labour from subsistence agriculture to commercial 
agriculture, manufacturing and modern services (Martins, 2014). Without the first, there is little to move the 
economy forwards, and without the second, productivity gains are not diffused to the rest of the economy. 
Structural transformation of African economies was: (1) ‘Largely growth reducing between 1990 and 1999.’ 
(2) ‘It was largely growth enhancing between 2000 and 2005.’ (3) ‘In the recent past it has been most 
pronounced in countries that stand to benefit the most, as measured by the share of the labour force in 
agriculture.’ (4) ‘It has been higher in countries with better governance and more effective institutions’ 
(McMillan & Rodrik, 2012).  
Structural transformation is considered, therefore, to be a critical prerequisite for economic and social 
development dynamism. It plays an instrumental role in sustaining economic growth, generating productive 
employment and raising standards of living. There is a significant cross-country heterogeneity, and there has 
been little evidence of structural transformation in Africa. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, 
structural transformation in Africa was largely growth reducing, but this has changed since the new 
millennium. This positive contribution of structural transformation to economy-wide growth paints a 
somewhat more optimistic picture of growth in Africa in the twenty-first century (McMillan & Harttgen, 
2014). Nevertheless, this does not mean that all African countries have experienced growth reducing and 
enhancing structural transformation. For instance, estimates based on a sample of more than 24 countries in 
SSA between 2000 and 2010 show that the share of the labour force employed in agriculture declined by 
about 10%, but this was matched by a 2% increase in manufacturing and an 8% increase in the service sector 
(Young, 2012). 
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Table 3.6: Measuring structural transformation using some key indicators  
Economic indicators Socio-cultural indicators  Institutional indicators  
Labour/employment 
share (in %) by sectors: 
 Agriculture  
 Industry  
 Service  
 Manufacturing  
Value added (as % of 
GDP) by sectors: 
 Service  
 Manufacturing  
 Industry  
 Agriculture  
Labour productivity by 
sectors: 
 Agriculture 
 Industry 
 Services 
 Manufacturing  
Composition of population (in %): 
 Rural share of population  
 Urban share of population  
Human capital development: 
 Proportion of people with college degree 
from accredited institution 
 Proportion of graduated in science and  
technology fields 
 Gross domestic investment in R&D 
 Strength and diversity of domestic private 
sectors  
Social indicators: 
 Health and education 
 Fertility and life expectancy 
 Maternal and infant mortality 
 Access to water & sanitation 
 Access to telecom & electricity 
 
Effectiveness of institutions: 
 Administrative capacity 
 Taxation capacity 
 Legal and technical capacity 
 Coordination capacity 
 Responsiveness of institutions  
 Extent of corruption &rent-seeking 
 Peace and political stability 
 Security of property rights 
Competitiveness and cost of doing 
business: 
 Governance and connectivity 
 Inclusiveness 
 Environmental sustainability 
Political participation: 
 Voter turn-out at national election  
 Degree of civil engagement 
 Religious and inter-group harmony 
Source: Adapted from UN-Habitat (2014) 
The movement of labour from semi-subsistence agriculture to more productive sectors of agriculture, 
manufacturing or services needs to sustain increases in overall productivity and standards of living. This 
holds true from a theoretical standpoint and the actual experiences of countries throughout their stages of 
development. Traditionally, the concept of structural transformation was framed in terms of a reallocation of 
economic activity in three broad sectors–agriculture, manufacturing and services – that accompany and 
facilitate economic growth and development (Duarte & Restuccia, 2010). ‘Africa’s growth miracle’, which 
started in about 2000, coincided with a period of intensified globalisation, with the largest developing 
country, China, coming to the fore and a boom in primary commodity prices into the global economy 
(African Economic Outlook, 2013; McMillan & Harttgen, 2014). It is beneficial to examine the recent 
process of structural transformation in Africa and its role in economic growth, and the allocation of factors of 
production for countries at different stages of development because structural transformation is integral to 
poverty alleviation in Africa (McMillan & Harttgen, 2014).  
As the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2013) explains, the drivers behind positive structural transformation are the 
quality of institutions, human capital accumulation, and the share of the labour force in agriculture. 
Multivariate analysis recently observed that, (1) ‘the improvement in the quality of governance leads to more 
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positive structural transformation’; (2) ‘human capital accumulation as measured by changes in primary 
school completion is positively correlated with structural transformation’; (3) ‘countries with a higher share 
of the labour force in agriculture are experiencing greater growth-enhancing structural transformation’ (Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). Developing countries with the most rapid growth rates have typically reallocated 
the most labour into high productivity manufacturing, allowing aggregate productivity to catch up (Duarte & 
Restuccia, 2010). For instance, both in Asia and Africa structural transformation has been driven by 
increases in the share of employment in the manufacturing and service sectors. However, the difference 
between the two regions is that in Asia the share of employment in manufacturing is roughly double that in 
Africa (McMillan & Harttgen, 2014). 
The importance of learning processes, capabilities and factor endowments suggests that building a strong 
primary sector (both agriculture and natural resource extraction) facilitates the structural transformation 
process. The primary sector can drive structural transformation through:  
1. ‘Linkages with non-agricultural sectors and diversification into adjacent activities’;  
2. ‘As a source of employment opportunity for a number of rural residents and as a source of potential 
demand for new non-agricultural products’;  
3. ‘As a source of government revenue, which can then be important to invest in more productive 
sectors and pushing structural transformation’;  
4. ‘As a source of FDI, it brings capital and technological know-how that serve as an indicator as to 
which sectors have potential returns’ (African Economic Outlook, 2013).  
For structural transformation to be effective, Africa needs to focus on developing capabilities and domestic 
entrepreneurs in suitable business environments. Capabilities can be understood as a mix of specific 
technological knowledge and skills related to the quality of public services (infrastructure, education, health, 
etc.) and financial services, institutions, regulations and human capital capability. Macroeconomic and 
political stability are important factors to build the overall capability in the economy (Hausmann et al., 
2011).  
To summarise, transforming African economies from a low-income agrarian to high-income industrialised 
economies remains a major development challenge, and resides at the forefront of the development agenda. 
One of the key lessons is the need for a diversified economy that can create formal jobs and wealth, reduce 
poverty and inequality, use resource rents to enhance the well-being of the masses through public investment 
and enhance economic transformation. Structural transformation will also enable African countries to 
tolerate external shocks and improve their position in the global economy. Currently, most African countries 
have not yet transformed and diversified their economies due to different internal and external factors (see 
Table 3.7). Governments should play a central role in guiding and promoting economic diversification and 
transformation in a meaningful manner. It is therefore important for the state to be accountable and 
responsive to the needs of its population, and guide sustainable social and economic development. Free 
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markets and privatisation of public enterprises did not generate the required investment to expand output, 
exports and employment during the era of the SAPs; this served only to weaken the African states. 
Therefore, there is an urgent need for these states to develop capacity to design and implement policies to 
restructure their economies based on the alternative paradigm, which integrates the role of market and state. 
Table 3.7: Internal and external constraints for African transformation 
Internal External 
 Lack of context-specific development model 
and institutions  
 Macroeconomic instability due to poor 
policy, poor planning and implementation 
capacities 
 Weak institutional and human capacities 
 Limited public investment in soft and hard 
infrastructure and social sectors 
 Political instability and lack of democratic 
practices 
 Inefficient resource mobilisation and 
utilisation/management 
 Weak regional and multi/bilateral integration 
& cooperation for development  
 Limited policy space, once imposed from developed countries, 
based on different terms and conditions; i.e. attacked by the 
neoliberal ideology since the 1980s 
 Developmental partners overstate the importance of market-led 
approaches for development that block the view of alternatives 
approaches 
  Barriers to trade that undermine export revenue and constrain 
the export of manufactured goods 
 Disproportionate concentration of the Organisation of 
Development Assistant (ODA) in social sectors opposed to 
productive sectors 
 The concentration of FDI in extractive sectors with limited 
investment in value-added sectors 
 Climate change and its impact on infrastructure and livelihoods 
Possible solutions 
  Adopt a proper contextualised development ideology (a developmental state) and then design and operate coherent 
development policies and strategies, which can be complemented by nurturing strong state–society and state–
private-sector coalitions that are vital to achieve the development policies and strategies. 
  Build well-functioning and legitimate institutions and human capital (invest in people) - this is because states with 
robust, dynamic and flexible domestic institutions and well-equipped human resources achieve better economic 
growth and development. 
  Mobilise and utilise their own domestic resources efficiently rather than looking for these from advanced countries 
or former colonial masters. 
  Increase the role of both public and private sector investment to address infrastructure constraints, and priority 
should be given to labour-intensive production sectors to address unemployment, poverty and problems of 
inequality. 
  Consolidate regional, multi- and bilateral integration/cooperation for mutual benefit in a win-win approach to 
maximise mutual benefit. 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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3.5 Summary and synthesis  
There is a strong desire to find an alternative development ideology by many African countries because of 
the failures of development ideologies adopted in the past since their independence. African economies need 
sustainable growth, removing dependency on the primary sector of the economy, and transformation from 
the current predatory (rent-seeking) political economy. They need to determine their point of departure and 
destination based on their own context, free from unnecessary external pressures. Africans need to determine 
their own agendas via widespread consultation among themselves. Considerable human and physical 
resources are necessary for development and much of these resources should be mobilised from the 
continent. Resources that are mobilised from outside through bilateral and multilateral relations should be 
free from any terms and tied-conditions that affect their internal affairs. Learning from the experiences of 
others, African governments should aim to modify their development strategies to meet their own 
development agendas. Genuine efforts of the states are essential to integrate the needs and interests of the 
poor segments of society into the development process, with pro-poor and pro-development policies and 
strategies.  
The development approaches deployed to date in many African countries have been inadequate to satisfy 
their economic and social development agendas. They need to rethink the role of the state in Africa’s 
economic transformation and accelerate the economic development process. The failure of earlier states or 
market-dominated development approaches has given rise to a search for another development approach. It 
is undoubtable that the developmental state paradigm, which accommodates the role of state and market for 
diversification and transformation, would be an alternative development model for many of the developing 
countries of Africa, as in the East Asian economies. Therefore, African states need to take into consideration 
some of the necessary common features of successful developmental states, the potential pitfalls of state 
intervention and the free-market model, the role of different stakeholders and other factors when 
practising/adopting the developmental state based on their own unique contexts. 
The successful developmental states in Africa are those with the political will and the necessary capacity to 
articulate and implement policies to increase human capabilities, enhance equity and encourage sustainable 
economic and social transformation. Future growth and development depends on investment in human 
capital, physical infrastructure, the management of resource rents, and the efficient utilisation of their 
resource rents to diversify their economies. African countries will struggle to build the essential human 
capital and physical infrastructure through public investment, which is required to eradicate the widespread 
level of poverty and backwardness (Swilling, 2010). An educated population become agents/actors in the 
economy and producers of diversification and intensification, as well as consumers and innovators of 
modern technologies that facilitate the development process. Therefore, the emerging developmental states 
would need to focus on rebuilding and strengthening state capacity to expand human capability and promote 
an equitable and efficient allocation of resources. The expansion of innovative human capability is the 
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ultimate goal to attain sustainable development and transformation, and nurture far-reaching institutions at 
different levels to achieve an innovative development process. 
It is clear that African political economies have been constrained by different internal and external factors 
(see Table 3.7), which have contributed to Africa remaining backward and poor continent. However, since 
more recently, scholars, African decision-makers and planners have been looking at and adopting alternative 
development ideologies (including the developmental state) to accelerate their development process by 
tackling these internal and external constraints head on. The hope is that if African nations can adopt the 
developmental state ideology wisely, based on their own contexts, they can generate strong and sustainable 
economic and social development, and thereby reduce their vulnerability to these internal and external 
constraints, improve the continent’s position on the global stage, and improve the lives of millions that live 
in poverty. 
To realise these and other development objectives, the existing predatory state or rent-seeking political 
economy needs to be transformed into a pragmatic developmental state model, which requires the 
establishment of institutions of pluralism (i.e. accommodating all stakeholders in the process). This means, 
promoting civic engagement and values through a dense network of horizontal associations/networks and 
eliminating vertical networks of patronage/clientelism. This enables the participation of many stakeholders 
[i.e. including all interested economic agents and social groups - public, private sector, farmers, urban 
residents and civil society] in the development process (Dia, 1996). Evidence shows that no political 
transformation is possible nowadays without the broad-based coalition/s that allowing the involvement of all 
the groups at different levels of society in the development process.  
The question is how can a state ban such patronage and rent-seeking political economy in the initial stages of 
building a developmental state model? To tackle these challenges, states that adopted the developmental 
state model would need to establish a stable and broad-based developmental coalition/s accompanied by 
committed political leadership and a relatively autonomous state bureaucracy. One of the defining features of 
the developmental state is that it must be autonomous from the influence of the private sector, yet encourage 
its productive capacity by creating a fertile business environment (Evans, 1995). Evidence from the 
successful developmental states has confirmed that the private sector is the engine of development, and that 
these states have the capability to manage rent-seeking by means of the reward and punishment mechanism 
(the ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’) based on the performance of the private sector. This can be effective only if the 
relationship between the state and private sector is based on transparent rules and regulations. However, the 
coalition/s must not be hostile to the private sector – it should create a fertile business environment to 
accelerate the development process. The state however must be independent of the private sector’s interests, 
influences so that it can punish the rent seekers, and reward the value creators.  
The question is what would be the best coalition/s in the emerging African developmental states? Obviously, 
agriculture should be the engine to accelerate economic growth in African countries, which is what happened 
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when the developed world embarked on its development process. Although the contribution of agriculture to 
GDP has been declining in many African countries and the focus has been on the services sector, if due 
attention was paid to modernising and adding value to the agricultural sector, these countries could achieve 
their intended economic growth because they have the potential to do so. Widespread and relatively 
equitable ownership of resources (i.e. land, labour and agricultural inputs) and modern agricultural inputs are 
vital to accelerate the development of the agricultural sector and overall economic development. This would 
complement the diversification and intensification activities, and facilitate the transfer of resources from 
agriculture to non-agriculture (i.e. through strong backward and forward linkages) sectors, which, in turn, 
would incentivise farmers and domestic producers to boost their productivity.  
Therefore, rural residents could potentially be the foundation of a stable, broad cross-section developmental 
coalition/s in many African countries. This is because majority of their population live in rural areas and are 
dependent on the primary sector of the economy (i.e. agriculture and its allied sectors). Agrarian reforms or 
agricultural land reform (i.e. agricultural land distribution) and other resource distribution to be considered as 
one way of eradicating rent-seeking political economy, though it is extremely difficult to do so in most 
African countries due to different historical problems. In general, agrarian reforms are required for African 
countries to become developmental states and to share the fruits/benefits of the developmental state by the 
majority. As a result, the situation in the rural areas would be considered conducive and permissible for 
building developmental states through formulating and implementing effective rural development 
programmes.  
Equitable growth through assured fair resource distribution is considered as one of the important policy tools 
that have been adopted by most developmental states to restructure rural societies, reduce poverty and 
transform their economies (Kim, 2009; Van Donge et al., 2012). A developmental state is necessary for 
successful agrarian reform and the experiences of the East Asian developmental states bear this out. Agrarian 
reform comprises land and agricultural reform and has the potential to transform both national economies 
and the rural societies. An egalitarian distribution of resources was common to all successful East Asian 
economies; radical agricultural land reform was one of the crucial factors that contributed to egalitarian 
income distribution and rural transformation (Kim, 2009; Van Donge et al., 2012). Furthermore, the urban 
middle class and workforces could also become members of this developmental coalition/s. This is why the 
urban middle class and workforces would be expected to easily mobilise under the appropriate environment 
than the scattered rural population.   
A developmental state would expect to create dynamic and rapidly transforming, market-conforming 
economies, if countries adopted policies based on their unique features, free from unnecessary external 
pressures. The emerging developmental state needs favourable internal and external environments to 
succeed. Currently, the external environment seems at least tolerant (if not totally conducive) of the 
emergence of a developmental state (i.e. for state intervention) because the recent global financial crisis 
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raised a debate about the reliability of the neoliberal model, not only for developing countries, but also for 
developed countries (Stiglitz, 2011).  
To make the internal environment even more conducive to the emergence of a developmental state, African 
states should start looking inward to address their internal problems. They should not just sit back and wait 
for suggestions from external players, but should develop their own context-specific polices and strategies 
and decide on their own points of departure and destination. Then they can allow the external players to get 
involved based on their national plan rather one that is imposed. This indicated that countries need to  
insulate their domestic economies from being penetrated by extensive foreign capital this can be useful for 
the implementation of development project through technological upgrading and human capital 
development, freeing them from the cycle of a low growth economic trajectory and dependency on the 
foreign capital. However, this does not mean that African countries will not encounter challenges in building 
a developmental state. Some groups who benefit from the existing system will oppose the new development 
model. In addition, they will also face challenges from the developed countries and international 
organisations to sustain their national and organisational interests in a business as usual environment. 
Consequently, whatever challenges countries face in practice, the developmental state (state intervention) is 
now seen as an alternative development model for developing countries to transform their economies, based 
on the right mix of the roles of the market and the state to address both market and state failures. Given the 
social pluralism (both ethnic and cultural) of African societies and the artificiality of national borders created 
during colonialism (i.e. their borders are conflict prone) the creation of developmental states can only be 
handled by adopting diverse institutions. These institutions should be based on the local context and be 
compatible with the interests of their constituencies rather than imported from the developed countries in the 
name of ‘good governance packages’/‘good standard institutions’.  
To summarise, a number of countries on the continent have shown interest in establishing a developmental 
state to accelerate their development process (UNECA, 2011). This could have a ‘flying geese’ effect on the 
rest of the continent, as happened in the first and second-tiers of the East and South Asian developmental 
states consistent with the flying geese paradigm (Kasahara, 2013). The emerging developmental state could 
become a regional phenomenon through regional integration and Pan African efforts by the African Union. 
However, building a developmental state depends on the country’s specific context and the existence of 
political leadership commitment to changing the existing ‘predatory’ political economy. The ideology is not 
a ‘blue print’ and it cannot be universally adopted. It is a flexible, dynamic and pragmatic development 
ideology and it should be adopted based on the specific contexts of nation states. Developmental states exist 
in several forms, but all maintain the hegemony of value creation and are autonomous from the private 
sector, or interest groups, tackling rent-seeking, patronage and maintaining policy continuity for sufficient 
long-term success. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF THE EMERGING DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN 
ETHIOPIA 
4.1 Introduction 
For most of the twentieth century, Ethiopia was considered one of the most ‘starved’ and ‘conflict-prone’ 
countries in the world. The country was synonymous with famine, poverty, drought, deprivation and 
backwardness. From 1991 onwards, the state has tried to adopt an ideological that commits it to embarking 
on a transition from being a predatory and quasi-failed state to being a protective and developmental state 
(Negash, 2011; Nishi, 2013). It will be argued that Ethiopia has turned the corner in terms of social, political, 
and economic changes through development and reform policies that were articulated and implemented. 
Prior to this, during the 1980s, the economy was on a downward trend, with the average GDP growth rate of 
2.3% and per-capita growth rate of –0.4%. The 1990s and early 2000s have registered relatively improved 
GDP growth rates, averaging 3.7%, and positive per-capita growth at 0.7% per annum (MoFED, 2002a). 
There is evidence that the current government, under the ruling party of the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF in power since 1991), launched development policies and 
strategies that considered have big contribution to boosting economic development and to addressing the 
existing socio-economic problems of the country. 
The country was in a dire political, social and economic situation when the current government took power 
from the socialist/military government. The country was suffering from a command economy that was 
isolated from the external economy. The new government’s first task was to design policies and strategies 
that would change the historical trajectory of the country. The priority was to achieve what the official 
ideology described as sustainable economic growth to escape from the existing extreme poverty by making 
agriculture the central focus of the development policy. This has been in place for the last two decades 
(Melke, 2013). There were two basic reasons for the government’s decision to focus its economic policy on 
agriculture. Firstly, most of the population lives in the rural areas. Secondly, a lack of capital (human, 
physical and financial) made it difficult to start up a capital-intensive industrial base (Nishi, 2013). The 
guiding principle was political stability and integrity of the state could be achieved by ensuring the political 
and economic rights of the nation to facilitate what is now regarded by the official government publications, 
some development agencies and certain academicians as the ‘miraculous’ economic development (Fourie, 
2011; Teshome, 2012; Melke, 2013; Fantini, 2013; Africa Progress Report, 2014; Priewe, 2016).  
Since the downfall of the socialist regime, the new government put in motion a series of policies and 
development interventions. It abolished the state-controlled economy, shifted towards a market-oriented 
economy, and opened the door for the private sector to play a considerable role in the economy (MoFED, 
2002b). Given that the agriculture sector considered as the backbone of the Ethiopian economy and it 
unsurprisingly employs about 80% of the population and it remained as the dominant contributor to GDP 
(MoFED, 2006). To realise this state was tried to adopt the ‘Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation 
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(ADLI)
 26
 policy’ as per the context of the Ethiopian economy; it was considered as a means to transform 
smallholder agriculture and kick-start the project and process of industrialisation. Government saw the ADLI 
development strategy as ‘‘an evolving strategy subject to pragmatic experimentation and ‘adjustments’ based 
on the learning-by-doing approach rather than an immutable approach (MoFED, 2002b).  
The nature of the post-1991 development policy and consequent role of the state needs to be contextualized 
within Ethiopia’s unique history. It could be argued that compared to the rest of Africa, Ethiopia is an 
exception has never been colonized, has been the longest recorded history of ‘independence’ and has been 
shielded from the cold winds of metropole-directed global integration. The nation state in the rest of Africa 
has a more recent history, mostly stemming from the Berlin Conference of 1885 held at the height of the 
‘scramble for Africa/for colonies’ and the post-colonial definition at independence. The colonial 
apportioning of the continent led to post-colonial states whose development prospects were significantly 
compromised by colonial constructs (Geda & Degefe, 2005; Geda, 2008). In the argument that follows, an 
attempt will be made to argue that Ethiopia is a developmental state. However, given its unique history, the 
Ethiopian developmental state emerged within specific conditions that may not exist in other African 
countries. Thus, the Ethiopian approach cannot be regarded as a model in simplistic terms for other African 
governments. 
This chapter covers the historical background of the Ethiopian economy from the 1960s to the end of the 
twentieth century and discusses the emergence and progress of a developmental state model in the country. 
The specific objective in this chapter was to assess the role of the emerging developmental state in economic 
development and building context-specific institutions in the context of Ethiopia. Accordingly, the research 
questions addressed are:  
 What conception of the developmental state has been incorporated into the Ethiopian state’s official 
development ideology, as reflected in both its official documents and the written perspectives of its 
key representatives?  
 Is Ethiopia’s conception of the developmental state adequate for the context in the light of the 
international and African literature on the subject?  
4.2 Background to Ethiopia’s political economy: An overview 
Unique among African/SSA countries, the ancient Ethiopian monarchy maintained its freedom from colonial 
rule. Modern Ethiopia emerged at the turn of the twentieth century under Emperor Menelik-II, who routed 
the Italian Invasion of 1896. Ethiopia has a long history of statehood; and present-day Ethiopia is linked to 
                                                     
26
 The ADLI was planned as a phased development strategy starting in the agricultural sector, which would then offer 
inputs and create demands for the non-agricultural sector. Growth in the agricultural sector was expected to drive by 
yield increases using modern agricultural technologies. The ADLI aimed to bring structural transformation in the 
productivity of the smallholder agricultural sector and to streamline and reconstruct the manufacturing sector so that it 
could make extensive use of the country’s natural and human resources (MoFED, 2002b). 
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the territorial incorporation process of Emperor Menelik, who ruled the country from 1889 to 1913; and 
followed by the Emperor Haile Selassie (for about four decades) and the Socialist regime (for about two 
decades). However, almost all African states were designed/or built by Western colonial powers plus the 
artificial borders created by the coloniser, which caused internal mayhem, colossal collateral loss and 
unprecedented tragedy (Geda & Degefe, 2005; Geda, 2008; Fourie, 2011; Melke, 2013; Fantini, 2013).   
The Ethiopian political economy was characterised by internal conflicts throughout the twentieth century. 
This means that Ethiopia’s political economy was marked by internal conflicts, drastic policy changes and 
reversals, unlike other African countries linked with a history of colonisation. This is because Ethiopia had 
successfully resisted colonialism during the era of African scramble. These political processes influenced the 
behaviour of the economic agents. Ethiopia had little interaction with the global economy, and the country 
remained agrarian. The first half of the twentieth
 
century witnessed three distinct regimes and each of these 
reorganised the country’s economic, political and administrative policies, which resulted in significant 
economic, social, political and institutional instability. However, there were some signs of progress in 
Ethiopia at the turn of the twenty-first century but these were insignificant in terms of their impact on the 
livelihood of the population.  
4.2.1 The imperial/monarchy regime (1930–1974) 
The Imperial regime lasted for more than four decades, and during this time, the landed aristocracy and 
peasants (tenants) constituted the major socio-economic agents. Land was an economically and politically 
contested resource, reflecting the antagonism between a landed aristocracy (including the church) and the 
peasantry. The control of land was invaluable to any economic agent that aspired to power (Geda & Degefe, 
2005; Geda, 2008). This means that the political power of the regime was largely linked to the size and 
quality of the land that it owned, i.e. land was a key economic source and served as a base to consolidate 
political power for the ruling aristocracy at the apex. Most rural households were fundamentally tenants 
living under the ruthless conditions of the landlords.  
During this period, there was an attempt to modernise the country through the expansion of modern schools 
and health facilities, infrastructure development under the endorsement of the first constitution, and the 
beginning of formulated medium-term development planning (Geda & Degefe, 2005). In terms of 
modernisation, the first comprehensive and integrated development plan appeared in 1957/58, which covered 
the period between 1957/58 and 1961/62. The main goals of the plan were to improve transportation, 
communication and construction, as well as agricultural development. Similarly, the second five-year plan 
(1962/63–1967/68) emphasised the development of the agricultural sector, but mostly the large-scale 
commercial farms and exports, and investment in infrastructure and mining. The last imperial or the third 
five-year plan was for 1968/69–1973/74 and it focused on the productive sectors of the economy such as 
manufacturing and agro-industry. This plan included two crucial objectives that showed the government’s 
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commitment to expand the education sector and the emphasis placed on smallholder agriculture (Keller, 
1988; Wubneh & Abate, 1998, cited in Balema, 2014). 
However, the overall performance fell short of the targets envisaged by the consecutive five-year 
development plan. Moreover, their impact on changing the economic structure and development was 
insignificant. The agricultural sector, in particular, suffered from misguided policies that gave priority to 
large-scale commercial farm development and almost totally neglected smallholder peasant farming. Despite 
the great attention given to the industrial sector, its growth was slow and unsatisfactory. Coupled with the 
adverse impact of the feudal land-tenure system, the subsistence agricultural sector resulted in miserably low 
agricultural productivity, which declined throughout the regime. These conditions led to famine, starvation 
and the displacement of people from their homes in search of food. In addition, there was gross inequality in 
terms of wealth, power and privileges. 
Thus, the country remained backward, begging for committed political leadership and pragmatic 
development policies and strategies for its renaissance. The backward subsistence agricultural practices were 
the result of an archaic land-tenure system, and a drought caused the agricultural output to remain stagnant. 
The archaic land tenure system was one of the main constraints to agricultural development and tenants were 
left with little incentive to adopt modern technologies to boost their productivity. It was obvious that a 
comprehensive land-reform programme was needed to increase output, employment, and income equality in 
the agricultural sector and among the rural residents (Chole & Manyazewal, 1992). These factors caused the 
collapse of the imperial regime and the emergence of the military regime –– the country jumped from the 
feudal (Imperial) to the military regime dictatorship. 
4.2.2 The Derg/military regime (1974–1991) 
The Derg regime came to power after the collapse of the imperial regime in 1974, under the revolutionary 
slogan, ‘land to the tiller’ (Meriet larashu in Amharic). The Ethiopian working class, teachers, and students 
spearheaded the 1974 revolution, and an assortment of petty bourgeoisie elements overthrew the aristocratic 
feudal system of the imperial regime, who had ruled the country for more than four decades. In terms of 
ideology, the Derg adopted the socialist ideology or command economic system under the motto of ‘Ethiopia 
first’ (Ethiopia tikdem in Amharic) where market forces were deliberately repressed, and socialist policies of 
production and distribution process were vigorously pursued. The Derg regime emerged as an interest group 
and started to consolidate its power by setting up different institutions (peasant associations and 
cooperatives, marketing boards, a huge military force, a nationwide workers’ party, etc.) aimed at building a 
socialist state (control regime) with strong military power. The Derg imposed a control regime that 
implemented polices aimed at benefiting the socialised and penalising the private sector. The period 
witnessed deteriorating economic conditions and mounting discontent throughout the nation (Geda & 
Degefe, 2005; Geda, 2008).  
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One important characteristic of this regime was that it oversaw a complex land tenure system where the state 
and church maintained control over a majority of agricultural land. After 1974, the Derg government 
nationalized rural land, abolished tenancy, took state control of commercial farms, and redistributed lands. 
Numerous controls were also placed on the movement of agricultural goods and on agricultural prices during 
this period (Dorosh et al., 2011:3).  
In 1975, the Derg implemented a relatively ‘radical project of land reform’ that entailed the nationalisation 
of all urban and rural land on the way to building a socialist state. In contrast, the Derg regime actively 
engaged in eliminating the role of the private sector in economic activity. Private ownership was legally 
prohibited and entrepreneurship was openly discouraged, which reduced economic activity in the private 
sector. Moreover, the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) forced peasants to supply their agricultural 
output to the government marketing board at fixed prices.
27
 Furthermore, numerous controls were placed on 
the movement of agricultural outputs and on production quotas during this period (Geda, 2008). 
However, the military government had no clear policies and strategies on how to develop the agricultural 
sector beyond the abolition of the old land-tenure system. Land reform alone could not result in significant 
additional wealth or resources for the poor peasants, even though it freed them from their proprietors’ 
(landlords) exploitation. The land reform was a redistributive and levelling reform; its strength laid not so 
much in giving rural communities increased resources and wealth as it did in presenting equal, if modest, 
opportunities for everyone (Dessalegn et al., 1998). When the issue of agricultural development policy 
became pressing, the government implemented the collectivisation policy, which was declared in 1978. This 
proclamation required peasants to organise themselves into service cooperatives, whose function was to 
market surpluses, purchase and distribute inputs, and run retail shops (Negarit Gazeta, 1978, cited in Balema, 
2014). However, the agricultural sector suffered because of various misguided policies pursued by the 
military government. The policies discriminated against smallholder farmers, while favouring state farms 
and producer cooperatives; the state fixed low prices that depressed the income of farmers and curbed their 
purchasing ability for necessary farming inputs and other essential items. Furthermore, the agricultural 
surplus extraction policy was enforced through compulsory deliveries of grain quotas. Low prices of 
agricultural products and restricted market space were some of the causes for the deterioration of the sector 
(Kebede, 1992; EEA, 2000).  
The overall trend of the economy during this socialist period shows decline and stagnation. Regarding terms 
of agricultural production, the rural income deteriorated and the rural population became destitute. The living 
conditions of the people also deteriorated during this 17-year period. For instance, the great drought of 
1984/85 and the consequent famine affected nearly eight million people. It is estimated that one million may 
                                                     
27
 The government established the AMC in 1976 aiming to stabilise producer and consumer prices, to ensure the timely 
and efficient supply of farm inputs, and to ensure adequate supplies for the public-distribution system. However, from 
its commencement, the AMC ensured that it extracted maximum surpluses for the government. Farmers had to sell a 
certain quota of their grain to the AMC at a fixed price; any surplus was sold in the market. There was a wide gap 
between the AMC’s farm-gate price and the actual market price. Consequently, it is hard to imagine that smallholder 
farmers would have more grain than the required quotas due to their low productivity and production. 
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have died from the famine, and thousands were displaced through the forced resettlement programme. 
Repeated famines left the rural population destitute and eroded their capacity to withstand any crisis (Chole 
& Manyazewal, 1992). In general, the period of the Derg regime witnessed a deteriorating economic 
structure, widespread discontent with the regime, strong resistance from rebel forces across the country, and 
external economic strangulation. This was compounded by military failure, especially in the northern part of 
the country. Consequently, the regime finally collapsed under the coalition of rebel forces known as the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in May 1991.  
4.2.3 The EPRDF regime (from1991 to the present) 
With the downfall of the Derg regime, the new government adopted more market-oriented ‘Structural 
Adjustment Programmes’ between 1991 and 2002 that were rationalise by leading representatives as 
necessary for economic transformation (Teshome, 2012; Balema, 2014; Oqubay, 2015). It abolished 
agricultural price controls and followed the ADLI development strategy, using a greater share of the nation’s 
resource investments to increase agricultural productivity and boost growth linkages with the rest of the 
economy. The agriculture sector has become the leading sector in the economy because the majority of the 
population (84% in the 2007 census) resides in rural areas earning a livelihood from this sector. ADLI is the 
policy principle officially adopted by the Ethiopian government, to promote its national development (Ohno, 
2009). The new government has tried to implement and engineer the market economy within the Ethiopian 
context, which meant not adopting a fully-fledged, free-market approach but introduced state intervention in 
the economy in terms of redressing the distributional implications of economic policies in the main 
economic sectors. As Geda (2005) indicates, economic growth in the first decade of the EPRDF government 
was quite impressive compared to growth under the Derg regime. Such good economic growth resulted from 
the adoption of favourable economic policies and strategies, complemented by peace and stability, which in 
turn created an environment that was conducive for the economy to grow positively.  
Ethiopia managed to achieve respectable rates of economic growth in the last decade of the twentieth century 
under the EPRDF government. Close to 5%, average GDP growth was substantial when compared to the 
performance of other African countries. For instance, the average GDP growth rate for SSA and Africa was 
2.1% and 2.4%, respectively, during the same period (World Bank, 2001). However, it was insufficient to 
resolve the multifaceted and deep-rooted problems of the country. Widespread poverty and other social 
complications
28
 have been prevalent for decades and the situation prescribed rapid economic growth and 
                                                     
28
 For instance, the health coverage of the country was 40% in 1995/96 and increased to about 60% in 2002/03. The 
primary school net enrolment rate was 36.6% in 1995/96 and increased to about 61% in 2002/03. The incidence of 
poverty was 49.5% (51.6% and 36.5% in rural and urban areas respectively) in 1995/96 has been declined to 41.9% 
(41.1% and 46.7% in rural and urban areas respectively, which the incidence of poverty increased in urban areas) in 
2002/03. In 1995/96, the total road network was 23thousand km and the road network reached 30.8 thousand km in 
2002/03. In 1995/96, there were no Internet and mobile subscribers but in 2002/03, the number of Internet subscribers 
has reached around 9.5thousand people. At the same time, the number of mobile subscribers was only about 51thousand 
people between 1995/96 and 2002/03 (Statistical Abstract, various issues of CSA, cited in Teshome, 2012). 
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social transformation to address those widespread constraints. The EPRDF government adopted a universal 
land-reform programme and the Constitution guaranteed a decentralised system of land administration. Land 
and natural resources are the common property of the people of Ethiopia, and the law explicitly prohibits 
land sales and any other form of exchange such as mortgages. Farmers and pastoralists are entitled to land 
use rights free of charge for cultivation and grazing. The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (FDRE) article (40), sub-articles of (3, 4 and 5) affirms that: 
The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested in the 
State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of 
Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange. Ethiopian peasants have a right to 
obtain land without payment and the protection against eviction from their possession. In addition, Ethiopian 
pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from 
their own lands (FDRE, 1995:14).  
Although there is mounting evidence of land grabbing in parts of Ethiopia in practice, the Constitution 
explicitly recognises that farmers cannot be deprived of these rights. By allowing both renting in and renting 
out of land, the use of the land is more liberalised and universal than it was during the Derg regime, and 
inheritance rights have strengthened. The state–society ownership of land reaffirmed the preservation of 
smallholder farmers’ land-use rights; however, smallholder farmers have not been allowed to ‘sell, exchange, 
or mortgage agricultural land’. According to official government ideology, this land-ownership system 
aimed to reaffirms (1) efficiency and productivity based on the idea of sustaining rural development, and 
agricultural growth requires an efficient system of land administration. (2) state–society ownership of land is 
required to strengthen household food self-sufficiency, and assure equity and fairness in term of resource 
distribution (Chinigò, 2014).  
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Table 4.1: Summary of political events and economic policies of the regimes in Ethiopia  
 Imperial regime (1930–1974) Derg regime (1974–1991) EPRDF regime (from 1991) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 M
a
jo
r 
p
o
li
ti
ca
l 
ev
en
ts
 
Conquered many southern regions 
and failed coup attempts in 1960. 
Insurgencies by the Eritrean 
Liberation Front 
Land tax bills opposed by 
aristocracy, reduced monarchy 
power base, and tried to make 
administrative change in the 1955 
constitution. 
 
There was an intense power 
struggle between 1974 and 1977. 
Within six months, the Derg state 
chief was killed. Mengistu came 
out as the Derg leader in 1977. 
Owing to civil strife, the Derg 
was forced to introduce a short-
lived mixed economy in 1990. 
When Soviet support decreased in 
the late 1980s and the armed 
struggle was escalated by the 
EPRDF, the Derg regime 
eventually collapsed in 1991. 
Transitional government of Ethiopia 
embraced market-oriented economic 
policies and adopted SAPs.  
Eritrea became independent in 1993, 
and Ethiopia is a land-locked country, 
which has had a huge impact on the 
economic growth of the country. 
A new constitution was adopted in 
1994 and the first multiparty election 
was held in 1995. 
War with Eritrea began in 1998 and 
lasted until 2000 and it remains in a no 
war and no peace situation). 
  
  
B
ro
a
d
 e
co
n
o
m
ic
 p
o
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ci
es
 
Export promotion in the 1950s 
with elaborate incentive packages, 
including tax holidays to attract 
FDI. 
When the economic outcome from 
export promotion did not meet 
expectations, the monarchy 
adopted an import-substitution 
strategy in the 1960s with 
prohibitive taxes; import tax rates 
ranged from 5–%–100%. 
Aligned with the Soviet and 
adopted all centrally planned 
economic policies. 
Tightly controlled foreign 
exchange and maintained a highly 
overvalued currency. 
Import tax rates ranged from 5% 
to 200%. 
Emphasised agriculture as a priority 
sector with the adoption of the ADLI 
strategy and decentralisation was 
announced in 1992. 
The currency was devalued by more 
than 100% in 1993 (from 2.5 to 5.5 
ETB/US$), and further devaluated 
Ethiopia became a member of the 
COMESA in 1994 and harmonisation 
tariffs in line with the COMESA 
agreements in 2002. 
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g
ri
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u
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l 
se
ct
o
r 
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The land-tenure system was 
complex, ownership was skewed, 
and the state and the church 
maintained control over large 
shares of agricultural land  
Communal lands were non-
transferable and private transfer of 
land was non-existent.  
The existence of large and 
privileged state farms; and 
farmer’s rent as high as 50% of 
their produce. 
Prices determined by the market 
forces locally, but the import taxes 
were prohibitively high for 
selected import-competing 
commodities. 
Opposition to the land tenure 
system mobilised rural peasants 
and urban intellectuals with the 
popular slogan ‘land to the tiller’, 
this was one of the central forces 
that eventually brought down the 
monarchy in 1974 
Land reform: nationalised private 
and church properties abolished 
tenancy and redistributed land.  
Ordered all commercial farms to 
remain under state control 
Distribution of agricultural inputs 
controlled by public enterprises, 
such as fertiliser import, and 
distribution and pricing controlled 
by government.  
Cooperatives favoured in terms of 
access to inputs. 
Enforced grain-production quotas, 
set prices of most commodities, 
and put restrictions on goods and 
labour movement across regions. 
Marketing controlled by the state-
owned enterprises. 
Agricultural income-tax rate was 
progressive and as high as 89% 
and high taxation on exports of 
main crops as high as 100% of 
farm-gate price. 
Agricultural-input market liberalised 
in 1992, while land remained public in 
the hands of the government (no sale 
or exchange, except lease and rent). 
A few types of inputs dominate 
Agricultural-input marketing; fertiliser 
and seeds are still dominated by the 
public sector. 
Maximum duty rate in 1993 reduced 
from 230% to 80%. 
Output-market liberalised and quota 
system lifted. 
Public marketing enterprise: Ethiopian 
Grain Trading Enterprise established 
in 1992 to intervene in agricultural 
markets to ensure price stability. 
Government cancelled all taxes levied 
on export of goods, including major 
export products, while a 5% sales tax 
was paid on selected agricultural 
products. 
The maximum tariff on imports was 
reduced to 50%, down from 230%. 
Source: Compiled from Rashid et al. (2009) 
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4.2.4 Economic growth and the structure of the economy in the twentieth century  
Ethiopia suffered from internal political instability throughout the twentieth century up to the removal of the 
military regime. . Ethiopia has embraced several dominant ideologies and associated economic policies since 
the mid-1950s. In the last four decades of the twentieth century, the economy changed from a liberalised 
economy (during the imperial regime) to socialism or a controlled one (during the military regime) and then 
back to liberalisation again (under the EPRDF regime up to early 2000s). During the imperial and the Derg 
regimes, the country’s development strategy was dependent on import-substitution industrialisation (ISI); the 
strategy focused on industry and almost neglected the agricultural sector, especially smallholder agriculture. 
Priority was given to industry in a context where the economy was still dependent on agriculture for its 
capital accumulation, food supply, raw materials, foreign-exchange generation, and market demand. 
However, the ISI strategy failed to produce high overall GDP growth rates and, instead, contributed to the 
slow growth of food and industrial output, foreign exchange and savings. The growth process of the 
economy was thus constrained by the limited attention given to agriculture (Dorosh et al., 2011). However, 
from the mid-1990s, the post-Derg regime made a radical shift from a policy of industry first to one of 
agriculture first, with a focus on smallholder agriculture, known as the ADLI development policy. The ADLI 
policy thus aimed to provide the macroeconomic policy framework for the development of successive, 
medium-term, five-year development plans for the country. The ADLI policy recognised the importance of 
improving rural infrastructure, social sectors and different institutions as key instruments to facilitate 
agriculture–industry (rural–urban) linkages (MoFED, 2002b). 
Therefore, the overall growth recorded over the past four decades of the twentieth century was mixed and 
erratic because of the implementation of different policies and strategies by these different regimes. Most of 
the variables (see Table 4.2) indicate the dismal performance of the economy, the only positive being the 
level of inflation, which shows remarkable stability. This is largely attributed to price regulation in the pre-
1991/92 period and to the good macroeconomic performance and positive weather out turn in much of the 
post-1991/92 period. Economic growth in Ethiopia is largely determined by the political economy, climatic 
risks, the strength and efficiency of institutions, the quality of public policies, and risks related to war and 
property rights (Geda & Degefe, 2005; Geda, 2008; Fourie, 2011; Teshome, 2012; Melke, 2013; Fantini, 
2013; Chinigò, 2014). 
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Table 4.2: Evolution of major macroeconomic aggregates (1961/62––1999/2000) 
Indicators/periods  1961/62–
1966/67 
1967/68–
1971/72 
1972/73-
1976/77 
1977/78–
1981/82 
1982/83–
1986/87 
1987/88–
1992/93 
1993/94––
1999/2000 
Real GDP growth 
rate (in %) 
4.7 4 1.3 2.3 3.7 –0.01 5.7 
Investment as % of 
GDP  
13.5 12.6 9.7 11 14.3 13.4 15.9 
Saving as % of GDP 11.4 11 9 4.7 6.5 7.1 5.3 
Investment–saving 
gap 
2.1 3.6 0.7 6.3 7.8 6.3 10.6 
Export and import as 
% of GDP  
24.1 22.1 26.5 29.1 26 20.2 37.8 
Export as % of 
import 
83.6 86.6 95.8 53.6 53.7 52.3 56.4 
Inflation in % NA 1.7 11.4 10.7 3.4 18.8 3.8 
Source: Adapted from MoFED (2002a)  
Since 1960, economic growth rates have varied significantly both across and within each of the three 
regimes. During the imperial regime, as Table 4.3 indicates, although per-capita rates were negative over a 
few years, the overall growth rates in all three sectors were positive. Since 1961/62, until the collapse of the 
imperial regime in 1973/74, GDP grew on average at 3.7%, agriculture at 2.1%, and both industry and the 
service sectors at around 7%. The structure of the economy also changed a bit, i.e. the share of agriculture 
declined and the share of the industrial and service sectors increased. The share of agriculture in GDP 
declined from 76% in 1961/62 to 68% in 1973/74, and the share of both industry and services grew by 3% 
and 11%, respectively. Even though each regime has exerted some form of control over the sector, the Derg 
regime did more harm to the agricultural sector than the other two regimes. For instance, the regime 
controlled almost all aspects of the agricultural markets through set production quotas and agricultural output 
prices, and empowered state enterprises to control practically all aspects of the agricultural markets (EEA, 
2000).  
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Table 4.3: Sectoral growth and share in GDP 1961/62–2001/02 (in %) 
 
Periods/ 
sector  
1961/62–1973/74 1974/75–1990/91 1991/92–2001/02 
Growth 
rates  
Shares in GDP Growth 
rate 
Shares in GDP Growth 
rate 
Shares in GDP 
Real GDP 3.7 100 2.3 100 4.6 100 
Agriculture  2.1 68 0.6 56 2.3 47 
Industry  7 9 3.6 11 5.3 11 
Services  7.3 23 3.8 33 6.9 42 
Source: Adapted from Rashid et al. (2009) 
Hence, the agricultural sector on average registered a little more than half a percentage point growth. In 
contrast, between 1991/92 and 2001/02, the country achieved an overall GDP growth of 4.6% per year, 
agricultural growth of 2.3%, industrial growth of 5.3%, and services growth of almost 7%. The share of 
agriculture in the total economy declined from 56% in 1991/92 to about 47% in 2001/02 (see Table 4.3). 
Relative growth in agriculture has taken place since the early 1990s, mostly driven by the expansion and 
intensification of crop areas, and the promotion of labour productivity through investment in basic education 
and health. Furthermore, strong emphasis has been given to extension services, the supply of fertiliser and 
rural credit provision to boost agricultural intensification and land productivity.  
4.3 Theoretical background to the ADLI as a development policy  
Development economists, and particularly agricultural economists, have focused on the contribution of the 
agriculture sector to overall economic growth in general and rural development in particular. The role of 
agriculture in development related to its important linkages: (1) it provides labour for industrial workforces, 
produces food surplus for an increasing population with higher incomes. (2) It boosts the level of saving for 
investment in the economy; it enlarges market for industrial outputs. (3) It provides export earnings to pay 
for imported capital goods, and it produces raw materials for agro-processing industries (Vogel, 1994; 
Mellor, 1995; Delgado et al., 1998; Mellor & Dorosh, 2009). Some economists highlighted that agriculture’s 
productivity and institutional linkages with the rest of the economy produced demand incentives (rural-
household consumer demand) and supply incentives (agricultural products with small price rises) that 
promote modernisation as well as transformation (Vogel, 1994).  
A strong performing agricultural sector is fundamental for overall economic growth in most of developing 
countries, which have a potential like Ethiopia. Improving agricultural performance generates income in both 
rural and urban areas due to both direct and indirect spill-over effects of the sector. As agricultural income 
increases, farm households save more and spend more, stimulating growth and investments in other sectors 
of the economy. Furthermore, agriculture provides tax revenues and supplies a wide range of raw materials 
to domestic, agro-processing manufacturing industries (Stringer & Pingali, 2004; Ohno, 2009). A strategy 
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that involves the prioritisation of the agricultural sector, designed to promote the overall economic and social 
changes, is referred to as the ADLI development strategy (Ohno, 2009); and has been discussed under 
different names by various scholars using similar terms (Mellor, 1995). The major essence of the strategy 
lies in shifting a greater share of the nation’s limited resources to the agricultural sector to increase 
agricultural productivity and production by promoting technological innovation and adoption (Mellor, 1995; 
Ohno, 2009).   
In developing countries, like Ethiopia, the agricultural sector intended to have strong production and 
institutional linkages with the rest of the economy in general and with the domestic agro-processing 
industries in particular. Stimulating the productivity of the agriculture sector, and creating strong demand 
and supply incentives could help to foster the domestic industrial sector. The ADLI development strategy 
attempts to steer a low-income economy towards a more equitable and self-sustaining growth path, if they 
give proper emphasis on productivity, income and consumption demand linkages (Vogel, 1994). Under the 
ADLI development strategy, the first priority is given to accelerate the growth of the agricultural sector by 
providing modern farming practices, encouraging investment in soil and water conservation/natural resource 
conservation, boosting both small-scale and medium-scale irrigation schemes, and expanding the supply of a 
trained/skilled labour force (i.e. skilled extension workers) to assist small-scale farmers. The second priority 
is to facilitate the expansion of domestic industry related to agro-processing, mainly through investment in 
basic infrastructure such as transport, communication, water, energy and others. The third priority is to 
expand and diversify exports to cover the expenses of growing capital-intensive imports (Mellor, 1995). A 
high rate of agricultural growth has far-reaching positive implications for the overall economic growth of 
developing countries in terms of increasing employment and accelerating poverty reduction (Mellor & 
Dorosh, 2009). 
The ADLI development strategy is a national development strategy focused on agriculture as the leading 
sector, and developing industry with a strong emphasis on agriculture–industry forward and backward 
linkages. It aims to accomplish the goal of industrialisation by expanding the internal demand for 
intermediate and consumer goods by domestic industries. This, however, is dependent on ensure the linkage 
effects of agriculture with the industrial sector because a prosperous farming sector requires, in theory, a 
large volume of inputs from the industrial sector. The question is whether this in fact materialised in practice. 
Furthermore, additional agricultural incomes are supposed to be spent on industrial consumer goods 
providing further investment in the economy. On the other hand, increased demand from industrial 
expansion, in turn, is supposed to provide an expanding market for agricultural products. The objective of 
the ADLI development strategy is to strengthen the linkages between agriculture and the industry by 
increasing the productivity of the farm households, expanding medium- and large-scale private commercial 
farms and by allowing expanding domestic industries (particularly agro-processing industries).  
The strategy is simultaneously considered as a growth programme, an industrialisation programme, an 
employment programme (since agriculture is considerably is labour intensive), and an income-distribution 
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programme (Mellor, 1995; Mellor & Dorosh, 2009). The ADLI development strategy consists of building a 
domestic mass-consumption market by improving the productivity of the agricultural sector and letting 
farmers share the fruits. It focuses on improving the productivity of small and medium-scale agriculture 
through the formulation of an appropriate rural-development programme, which is critical for its success. In 
practice, small and medium-scale agriculture has strong linkage effects with the domestic industry and 
benefits the majority more than large-scale agriculture, which depends on a mechanised farming system.  
To implement the ADLI development strategy in a successful manner to improve the productivity of the 
agricultural and allied sectors; it requires improving the physical and institutional infrastructure of the rural 
areas to transform the agricultural sector. In Southeast Asia, for instance, the primary requisite is water 
control, such as increasing irrigation, improving the management, maintenance and redesign of the existing 
irrigation systems, and investing in tube-wells and hand pumps, all of which play a significant role in 
increasing productivity of the agricultural sector (Vogel, 1994; Stringer & Pingali, 2004). Other practical 
steps include constructing rural roads, natural conservation, technological improvements (for intensification 
and diversification), and credit supply for smallholder farmers by expanding microfinance institutions and 
credit cooperatives. Furthermore, the development of marketing institutions (both input and output markets) 
and other agricultural-support institutions (extension services, agricultural research institutions, farmer 
training centres and farmer cooperative associations) are crucial for the diffusion of good practices and 
adoption of new knowledge (Vogel, 1994; Stringer & Pingali, 2004; Mellor, 1995; Mellor & Dorosh, 2009). 
The state plays a crucial role in the diffusion of modern agricultural technologies and in institutional 
arrangements. The ADLI development strategy encompasses mainly smallholder farmers whose resources 
and capabilities are extremely limited. Furthermore, the state invests in the agricultural sector, such as in 
transport, energy, communication, R&D, education, health and input supply systems. It also encourages and 
promotes governmental agencies to provide export promotion, agricultural-extension services, rural credit 
and advisory services to maximise the benefits of the farm households (Mellor, 1995). The successful 
implementation of the ADLI development strategy depends on the political commitment of the leadership 
and the specific country’s economic, social and political environment. The ADLI development strategy is 
recognised as the main development strategy in Ethiopia where 80% of the population livelihoods directly 
depend on this sector (Ohno, 2009) and its approach may be relevant to other developing countries with 
similar contexts. Furthermore, the ADLI development strategy seems most promising for developing 
countries with potentially large domestic markets and an already existing domestic industrial base provided 
they adapt the strategy to their own contexts (Mellor, 1995). The ADLI strategy demands high public 
investment in the agricultural sector and continual increases in public spending. In line with this, the 
government of Ethiopia has been allocating a high proportion of public resources to the agricultural and 
allied sectors through its pro-poor spending strategy.  
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4.4 The emergence of a developmental state model in Ethiopia 
The policy makers or political elites of the ruling party in Ethiopia accepted that the so-called free-market-
led development approach would not address all the market failures and development problems. Zenawi, the 
late Prime Minister of the country, argued that the neo-liberal paradigm is a dead end and incapable of 
bringing about the African renaissance in general and the Ethiopia renaissance in particular. Hence, he 
insisted a fundamental shift to a new paradigm (rather than a marginal adjustment of the existing one) and 
the need for African states in general and Ethiopia in particular to move towards becoming developmental 
states. As a result, Ethiopia changed its development paradigm after evaluating the effect of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) between 1991/92 and 2002/03 (Zenawi, 2006). As discussed in chapter two, 
historical processes in certain countries have shown that state intervention has been critical in the 
development process of the developing countries. Zenawi accepted this view of development, which is why 
he generally accepted that no nation achieves successful economic development without state intervention. 
For instance, development success in many of the East Asian countries confirms that the role of state 
intervention in economic development remains crucial (Zenawi, 2006).  
In contrast, as indicated in chapter two, the development path of Africa has mainly been attributed to the 
dominance of economic liberalism in global development discourses with the main objective to reduce 
significantly the role and capacity of the state in the economy. Many scholars argue that SAP may have 
aggravated the deterioration of human security in many African countries. Many of African states 
experienced negative policy outcomes such as de-industrialisation, low foreign direct investment, and poor 
economic growth, high levels of poverty, low level of per capita income, low HDI and enhanced dependency 
on donors/ex-colonies (Mabasa and Mqolomba; 2016). Obviously, Ethiopia also did not free from all these 
shortcomings resulted from SAP. In essence, the argument is SAP did not work in developing countries like 
Ethiopia. Hence, Zenawi and the political elites of the ruling party were influenced by the literature as well 
as by good practices on the East Asian developmental states. They decided to adopt it as a model, and 
indigenize it to Ethiopian conditions, i.e. the explanation for the emergence of developmental state is 
twofold: that SAP did not deliver the goods, and ideological learning from elsewhere could be indispensable 
to address all the development ills observed in Ethiopia. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on the developmental state that essentially argues that a state could be 
considered as a vanguard of development by addressing market failures and supporting the indigenous 
private sector for capital formation and transformation to accelerate the economic development process. The 
state in developing countries, like Ethiopia, is one of the crucial institutions to fulfil the basic needs of the 
public in the areas of education, health, agriculture, water and other basic development requirements, which 
have not been fully provided by the market. Accordingly, influenced by this very same literature, the top 
political elites of the ruling party recognised that the neo-liberal paradigm failed to uproot the rent-seeking 
system because it denied the role of state as a driver for economic development. The political elites tried to 
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understand the naïve view of ‘market is good, government is bad’ which promoted a minimalist state could 
not be an appropriate alternative model to Ethiopia (Ohno, 2009). 
As a result, the Ethiopian Government changed its development paradigm after seriously evaluating the 
effects of SAP after almost a decade (i.e. between 1991/92 and 2002/03). The role of government in the 
economy has increased to create conducive business environment to all economic actors/agents to contribute 
their effort in the development process of the country (Zenawi, 2006; Teshome, 2012, Fourie, 2011; Fantini, 
2013). After searching an alternative development path, in the early 2000s the ruling party officially 
committed itself to the developmental state ideology to transform the economy and enable the country to join 
the middle-income country club within a specific period (Ohno, 2009; Fourie, 2011; Fantini, 2013). It 
customised the ideology in accordance with its unique political, economic, social and cultural context by 
considering to bring structural change by prioritising and modernising the agriculture sector, and moving 
towards industrialisation (Bekele & Regassa, 2012). Significantly, this ideological shift, which Ethiopia 
envisages, is inconsistent with the traditional political and economic conditionalities of the Western donors. 
In contrast, it shares commonalities with the development strategies of East Asia countries although they are 
not the same and quite different in context (Ohno, 2009; Fourie, 2011; Fantini, 2013).  
The government aims to stimulate economic growth primarily by increasing public investment in key 
infrastructure and the social-services sectors in an inclusive approach. In its Foreign Affairs and National 
Security Policy and Strategy document the government acknowledged that a “lack of democratisation, 
poverty, and backwardness are threats to the national survival of the Ethiopian statehood system. There can 
be no doubt that the attainment of speedy economic development, democratisation, and peace is fundamental 
to the survival of the country, which finds itself in a state of abject poverty and backwardness” (Ministry of 
Information, 2002:1). Furthermore, the policy document identified ‘national humiliation and shame of 
poverty and backwardness’ as the principal threat to national security, and rapid development as the 
necessary response (Ministry of Information 2002). This indicates that poverty and backwardness are 
perceived to be the core problems of the economy (i.e. they are the source of all other socio-economic 
problems); and alleviation of them has been placed at the forefront of government policy. Provision of 
social-sector development programmes like education, health and others are seen as critical to address these 
core development problems of the country (Ohno, 2009, Negash, 2011). That means a direct and explicit 
social policy focusing on eradicating poverty proposed by government as a ladder to strengthening economic 
growth and social cohesion. More specifically, the recent five-year medium-term GTP articulated the 
country’s vision as follows: “to become a country where democratic rule, good-governance and social justice 
reign , upon the involvement and free will of its peoples, and once extricating itself from poverty to reach the 
level of a middle-income economy as of 2020-2023” (MoFED, 2010:21). Besides the democratic values 
embedded in the overall vision, the GTP further explicates the vision on poverty alleviation by giving 
specifics on the aspects of the economic vision. It says that Ethiopia’s vision of economic sector specifically 
includes: 
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building an economy, which has a modern and productive agricultural sector with enhanced technology and 
an industrial sector that plays a leading role in the economy, sustaining economic development, securing 
social justice and increasing per capita income of the citizens so as to reach the level of those in middle-
income countries (MoFED, 2010:21).  
The explicitly stated emphasis on economic development and the clarity of goals, such as eradication of 
poverty and pushing the economy into a middle-income status by a definite date, indicates the 
developmentalist orientation of the contemporary Ethiopian state. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
Ethiopian state already has an ideological orientation that is similar to the ideological orientation of the 
developmental states that were regarded as a model by the political elite who needed an alternative to the 
SAP (Bekele & Regassa, 2011). 
Figure 4.1: Long-term targets: Transition of the Ethiopian economy into middle-income 
 
Source: Adapted from MoFED (2010)  
The Ethiopian developmental state declared war on poverty and backwardness and its strategy focused on 
reducing and eventually eradicating it (Ministry of Information, 2002; Negash, 2011). Since Ethiopia 
adopted the developmental state ideology accompanied by pro-poor and anti-poverty policies and strategies, 
it has registered relatively high economic growth over the last decade. Such encouraging economic growth 
has resulted from considerable investments of public resources across a number of key infrastructure and 
socio-economic sectors (Negash, 2011; Teshome, 2012, MoFED, 2014; UNDP, 2015; World Bank, 216). 
For instance, its growth in per capita income was remarkable at about 6.1% for the period, compared to 5% 
and 4.8% for Rwanda and Mozambique respectively (Priewe, 2016). This continuous economic growth for 
more than a decade is even more surprising, since it occurred in one of the poorest countries in the world and 
since the policies applied differ substantially from mainstream thinking in the tradition of the Washington 
Consensus (Priewe, 2016). For instance, as different institutions agreed that the level of poverty was reduced 
to less than 30% in 2011 from a high of about 58% in 1995 and life expectancy also significantly rose to 
about 63years (CSA, 2012; UNDP, 2015).  
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The Africa Progress Report states that this reduction was achieved through broad-based economic growth 
with agriculture making a major contribution, coupled to more equitable spending and the promotion of 
labour-intensive manufacturing (Africa Progress Report, 2014). This indicates that the political leadership 
and society reached almost in a consensus on the common agenda of the country, namely addressing 
‘poverty and backwardness’, and then showing their commitment to overcoming it by exerting the required 
efforts at different levels (Ministry of Information, 2002; MoFED, 2010). The country’s capacity to address 
poverty, backwardness and other socio-economic ills is, therefore, dependent on the performance of the 
agricultural sector because the sector supports about 80% of the rural livelihoods (Fourie, 2011, Fantini, 
2013).  
Ethiopia adopted this development model after the ruling elites examined the practices of the developmental 
paths of the East Asian countries and the large-scale global reaction to the failure of the neoliberal model in 
the developing world, particularly in Africa (Fourie, 2011; Fantini, 2013). It modelled its development 
project on the industrialisation experiences of the East Asian countries in the 1960s and 1970s, with Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan and, more recently, China often being mentioned as examples (Fourie, 2011; Fantini, 
2013). This indicated that the political elites or decision makers’ drew lessons from one or more countries, 
but were conscious of the need to apply this to their own political system (Fourie, 2011). The academic 
literature agrees that although it is desirable that countries learn from the experiences of others, it is essential 
that implementation must accord with conditions in their own specific contexts because just copying models 
without contextualising them can create problems. Accordingly, Ethiopia seems to have learnt lessons from 
experiences of many countries rather than following a particular model (Fourie, 2011; Fantini, 2013; 
Kebede, 2015). Even though these East Asian developmental states were authoritarian, they did develop their 
economies in a specific period. However, the Ethiopian developmental state is complemented by a system of 
political and fiscal decentralisation since the country approved its constitution in 1994/95. In addition, the 
developmental state adapted in Ethiopia tried to take into consideration the exceptionalism (like cultural, 
religious, multi-ethnicity, economic ways of life, independence from colonialism and others issues) of the 
country.  
Although much on the developmental state has been demonstrated on the East Asian Tigers, the Ethiopian 
developmental state tried to include further elements of democratic participation (included among which 
periodic electoral democracy, popular participation in the development and governance process, state driven 
socio-economic development and broad-based coalition), consensus building and cooperation within social 
partners (Ohno, 2009). The concept of ‘democratic participation’ and ‘embedded autonomy’ introduced by 
Evans (1995) highlights the centrality of cooperation, negotiation and consensus building around the 
developmental agenda.  Here it need to take into consideration all these are  not a sufficient condition for 
limiting authoritarianism, rather they are a necessary precondition for preventing the centralisation of power 
which can often reinforce authoritarian tendencies. Hence, following political decentralisation, fiscal 
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decentralisation
29
 was implemented in two phases. The first phase of decentralisation covered the period 
1995/96-2002/03 (where responsibilities were devolved from federal to regional level). During this phase, 
the lower tiers of government (the woredas) did not have the power to decide on how much of their budgets 
to allocate across sectors leaving this power completely to the regional states. Understanding this 
shortcoming, the government pushed fiscal decentralisation down to woreda level. Therefore, the second 
phase of decentralisation was undertaken since 2002/03 (responsibilities were further devolved from regional 
to woreda level). As a result, it is evident that public service delivery in education, health, roads and others 
sectors has improved substantially at village level (UNDP, 2015). Although there is an emerging consensus 
within the political elites and increasingly broader layers of society that a developmental state model is 
central to accelerating economic growth and social transformation, this does not mean that the officially 
claimed model does not face criticisms from intellectuals and other stakeholders (FDRE, 2011; Balema, 
2014). Though the adoption of the developmental state ideology and related policies has had positive effects, 
there are debates, which not everything worked as intended, and new contradictions arise as a result. For 
instance, some of them strongly questioned whether the current Ethiopia is really a developmental state by 
highlighting the persistence of deep-rooted poverty in the country. Others agreed with the developmental 
state ideology of the country, but strongly doubtful whether the developmental state of Ethiopia is 
democratic by fingering abuse of power by government officials and ignorance of basic democratic values 
such as freedom of press by the ruling party. Hence, more than a decade after the ruling party has officially 
claimed the developmental state model; there is still fierce debate and disagreement continuing on such basic 
issues: What is a developmental state? Is developmental state relevant to Ethiopia? What type of 
developmental state should Ethiopia follow? Which country should be a model for Ethiopia to learn from; 
and so on (Jebena, 2015).  
Ethiopia has adopted some of the policy innovations from the East Asian developmental states, particularly 
South Korea and Taiwan to accelerate its economic development through mobilising the existing resources.  
Therefore, the last decade (since the developmental state model officially claimed) has been considered as a 
period of vigorous policy learning and experimentation for Ethiopia (Fourie, 2011; Fantini, 2013; Balema, 
2014). Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic nation, which it took into consideration, 
implementing democratic reforms, including decentralisation of power to village level, recognising freedoms 
and rights, and inviting widespread participation of the people; i.e. ranging from periodic elections to taking 
part in their local affairs (Balema, 2014). The policy-makers/the political elites claimed the developmental 
state model via paid due attention to the good practices from East Asia but tried to adapt them to the unique 
context of the country (Fourie, 2011; Fantini, 2013; Kebede, 2015). Achieving economic development, 
following the logic of these claims, would necessarily (though not sufficiently) help to facilitate the process 
                                                     
29
 A system of fiscal decentralization transfers funds for the provision of basic services in health, education, agriculture, 
and local infrastructure to local governments based on formulas applied at the federal and regional levels. A region’s 
level of development is a primary element of those formulas, with less developed regions receiving higher per capita 
transfer levels than more developed regions (Khan et al. 2014). 
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of democratisation. However, building a democratic developmental state is not an easy task in Ethiopia 
because it is characterised by multi-ethnicity and diverse economic and political interests. This is why these 
claims need to be critically evaluated.  As argued in chapter two building a capable, credible and committed 
developmental state is vital to accelerate the development process of a nation (Daddi, 2013; Melke, 2013). 
All of this has put Ethiopia on the path to achieving its primary goals of enhancing economic growth and 
transformation, and reducing levels of poverty (Balema, 2014). 
 However, there are different challenges and the possibility that some of the criticisms or challenges are valid 
as a result of anti-government protest observed in parts of Ethiopia. To mention some of the observed 
challenges are, first, lack of politically neutral and professionally competent state bureaucracy. This implies 
lack of ‘embedded autonomy’ of state bureaucracy due to excess interferences of the ruling party on the state 
bureaucracy. Second, the existence of widespread corruption and rent-seeking practices in both the public 
and private sectors and a lack of good governance add to the concerns about the accountability and 
transparency of the political leadership. The state has failed to contain the corruption and rent-seeking 
behaviour/practices that is overrunning the state apparatus at an alarming pace. As a result, many relevant 
development projects have not been implemented adequately on time and the policy outcomes have been 
negatively affected (Asayehgn, 2012). Third, the creation of job opportunities, especially for the educated 
youth, unequal growth between urban and rural areas (for instance, poverty is high rural areas than the urban 
areas) are remaining a serious challenges for the Ethiopian Economy (CSA, 2011). Fourth, the observed 
social inequalities, high unemployment rates in both the urban and rural areas and abject poverty that 
continuing as the major challenges of the Ethiopian economy and have been considered as the major causes 
of the recent anti-government public protest After the ruling party officially claimed the model. The 
Ethiopian state had an ideological framework for justifying/ designing and the articulating its long-term 
socio-economic development strategies and programmes. These policies and strategies geared towards the 
priority agenda of reducing multidimensional poverty, which was expected to have a positive spill-over 
effect on the overall development process. Under this priority agenda, the state has employed several socio-
economic policy instruments to tackle productivity and production challenges in the agricultural sector. The 
agricultural-led development strategy is seen as further helping to boost the infrastructure and social services 
of the rural population and is considered as the cornerstone for the structural transformation of the Ethiopian 
economy. The expansion of basic infrastructure is regarded as having the potential to facilitate the linkage 
between the urban and rural economies. Accordingly, massive public infrastructure investment has been at 
the center of the country’s economic strategy in order to address historic infrastructure deficits and provide 
the conditions needed for subsequent economic growth (Teshome, 2012; Fantini, 2013; World Bank, 2016). 
This integrated public investment is intended to enhance infrastructure development and reduce 
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unemployment challenges in the economy. For instance, in the urban areas, the state promotes micro and 
small enterprises (MSEs) development to address unemployment problems in the urban areas.
30
  
Though it might therefore be inflated, the official government source confirmed that MSEs created 
temporary and permanent employment opportunities for about 3.96 million citizens throughout the country 
in 2010/11- 2012/13. This has contributed to the decline of urban unemployment rate from 18% in 2010/11 
to 16% in 2012/13 (MoFED, 2014). MSEs are integrated in the construction of new public universities, sugar 
industries, integrated housing development, rural road construction under URRAP programme and railway 
networking and construction, power generation, as well as cobblestone (urban road construction) (UN-
Habitant, 2014). The industrial extension and financial supports accorded to MSEs have helped some to 
grow. In 2012/13 fiscal year alone, 1775 enterprises graduated/up graded from MSEs to medium scale 
enterprises (MoFED, 2014). Although this was a good attempt by the government, there are many 
shortcomings in practice from both the government and the beneficiary sides. Some of them are giving a 
priority opportunity to politically affiliated groups, lack of implementation capacity, lack of skills (low level 
of productivity and competiveness of the enterprises), lack of enough market opportunities and timeous 
credit supply are a few them (Asayehgn, 2012; Jebena, 2015). 
In addition to the expansion of infrastructure, the state also focuses on human capital development, which is 
critical for technological and entrepreneurial capacity accumulation. Investments in social sectors (in 
education and health services) have expanded and the human-resource development indicators have 
improved. For instance, the Human Development Index of the country has improved from 0.350 (i.e. 
inequality-adjusted HDI is 0.349) in 2004/05 to 0.461 (inequality-adjusted HDI is 0.459) in 2012/13 (UNDP, 
2015). This shows an average human development loss of 0.5% per annum due to inequalities in health, and 
access to education and income. Thus, altthough this is an encouraging trend, the country still falls within the 
Low Human Development category; but if the current growth in HDI is sustained, it could attain the Medium 
Human Development category by 2025. These efforts by the state have enhanced the well-being of the 
nation, freeing millions of poor Ethiopians from the intergenerational cycle of poverty, and improving the 
life expectancy of the nation (CSA, 2012; Teshome, 2012;UNDP, 2015).  
Furthermore, the state recognises the role of the private sector as an engine of economic growth in the 
development process and continues to formulate policies and strategies to ensure the competitiveness of the 
emerging private sector to play a vital role in the development process (FDRE, 2012; Fantini, 2013; MoFED, 
2014). The state’s current high investment in infrastructure development and improvement in service 
delivery has given rise to numerous opportunities and created an enabling environment for the active 
                                                     
30
 Ethiopia’s development strategy is geared towards pro-poor economic and social development. Pro-poor economic 
growth over the last decade has led to a considerable increase in per-capita GDP and an impressive decline in the 
national poverty rate. Further, the sustained and robust economic growth has helped to alleviate unemployment 
problems. For instance, overall unemployment in urban areas dropped to 16% in 2013 from 20.4% in 2009 though 
unemployment remains high (IMF, 2014).  
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participation of economic agents (including the private sectors) in the economy (Fantini, 2013; World Bank, 
2013b). Without a well-developed infrastructure and service delivery system, the involvement of the private 
sector would be unthinkable because of the profit motives of this sector. Since the lack of infrastructure 
resulted in high transaction costs for the private sector, the state was the only institution that could invest in 
the physical infrastructure, and provide direct credit to strategic industries and protection to infant industries 
at the initial stage of industrialisation until they are able to compete into the free-market on their own (UN-
Habitant, 2014). 
Despite these inspiring achievements in the economy yet, the democratic system of the country still needs 
further institutionalisation. It is obvious that people who live in poverty and backwardness, lack the 
capability and time to practise their rights and responsibilities (Rahmato et al., 2008; Balema, 2014). 
Regardless of the existing challenges, it is possible that the process of strengthening democracy does go hand 
in hand with poverty eradication and development endeavours. Only through significant economic growth 
can democracy and economic development be further enhanced and consolidated, and their interrelation and 
interdependence be sustained and strengthened. Democracy in Ethiopia is not an option; rather it is the only 
means of survival as a united country (Balema, 2014). This is because Ethiopia is a country of more than 
eighty ethnic groups differing in language and culture and today democracy is considered as one of the basic 
components human right. In the case of Ethiopia, therefore, it is not possible to postpone democracy as a 
trade-off of economic growth; rather it is must regardless of the pace of its success (Teshome, 2012; Kebede, 
2015).  
4.4.1 The ADLI development strategy in Ethiopia  
Ethiopia has potentially a productive labour force in the younger generation, and has considered a potential 
wealth of natural resources for economic growth and development. The percentage of the population who are 
considering economically active in Ethiopia was about 60% in 2014/15 (UNDP, 2015). This indicates 
Ethiopia’s demographic transition is taking place faster than in comparison to the rest of developing African 
countries. However, the rapidly rising working-age (economically active) population has its opportunities 
and challenges (Teshome, 2012; World Bank, 2016). Because most of the population lives in the rural areas, 
bringing structural transformation to the rural economy is the primary challenge of the claimed 
‘developmental state’ (Negash, 2011). In Ethiopia, smallholder agriculture was neglected for most of the 
twentieth century, and food production/supply did not match the population growth/demand. The current 
government tried to understand the deep-rooted problems of the economy as being structural and requiring a 
long-term policy and strategy to resolve them. The ADLI development strategy was adopted, taking 
agriculture as its point of departure and as the growth engine of the economy. Further, it considered by the 
policy makers to paved the way for the adoption of specific sectoral policies and strategies. The ADLI 
development strategy has seen by government as ‘an evolving development strategy subject to pragmatic 
experimentation and adjustment’ based on the ‘learning-by-doing’ approach, rather than on an immutable 
approach (MoFED, 2002b).  
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As a result, the government perceived the ADLI development strategy “to stimulate a broad-based growth 
path, addressing poverty and food insecurity and obviating the need for specific forms of social protection, 
pro-poor growth outcome for Ethiopia would not be achieved through a collection of ad hoc and targeted 
programs of the safety net variety. A pro-poor outcome results from a pro-poor strategy” (MoFED 
2002b:28). Therefore, the rationality behind the ADLI developmental strategy is to bring structural 
transformation
31
 (i.e. within the agriculture sector itself  by increasing the productivity of smallholder 
agriculture), and to modernise and reconstruct the manufacturing sub-sector (i.e. transform from the 
agricultural sector to industrial and its allied sectors) through wide backward and forward linkages (Chinigò, 
2014). 
The rural development policies and strategies of the FDRE attempted to address the existing constraints and 
create conducive conditions for the transformation of the rural economy. These strategies include promoting 
labour-intensive agricultural development and the maximum usage of the land for enhanced benefit, the 
continuous improvement of agricultural practices, devising appropriate direction to target different agro-
ecological zones, and pursing a development path that is integrated with other sectors of the economy.
32
 The 
policy advocates the need for popular participation in designing local development plans and programmes, 
and the improvement of overall governance to enhance the sense of ‘belonging’ and the conviction that 
would motivate the implementation of these policies. These policies and strategies could transform the rural 
sector from subsistence farming to a diversified and commercialised one with strong links to the urban 
sector, but the outcome will depend on the success of the implementation capacity of the state. In turn, the 
implementation capacity also depends on the ability of the leadership to tirelessly motivate the rural 
population, continuously build upon achievements and review processes, directions and initiatives (MoFED, 
2002b).  
The ADLI development strategy was practised as ‘Core ADLI’ (from the early 1990s to the early 2000s) and 
as ‘Enhanced ADLI’ since the early 2000s (Ohno, 2009). Primarily, the ADLI strategy has targeted 
smallholder farms to achieve rapid growth in agricultural productivity and production, increase income for 
rural households, attain national food self-sufficiency at both household and national levels, and produce a 
                                                     
31
 Structural transformation assumes the reallocation of economic resources away from the least productive sectors of 
the economy to more productive ones. It is the rise of new productive activities and the reallocation of resources, 
typically from agriculture to industry and modern services, leading to higher economy-wide productivity and 
progressively raising incomes (McMillan & Rodrik, 2012). For most developing countries, like Ethiopia, usually it is 
shifting labour from subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture, manufacturing and modern services. Structural 
transformation is considered as critical prerequisite for economic and social development in a given economy. It plays 
an instrumental role in sustaining economic growth, generating productive employment and raising standards of living 
(Martins, 2014). Structural transformation is driven by the need to transform the economy and to translate the rapid 
economic growth into sustained and inclusive growth through economic diversification that creates productive jobs, 
reduces poverty and inequality, and enhances access to basic services. 
32
 Rural transformation could not be achieved without the expansion and development of infrastructure, both in the rural 
and urban areas. The expansion and improvement of education and health services, rural road and transport services, 
safe drinking water, credit and extension services, rural electrification and communication and other essential services 
are critical for rural development and transformation. 
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surplus, which could be marketed to the urban residents and domestic industrial sectors (MoFED, 2002b). 
Smallholder agriculture has been considered as playing a vital role in boosting growth, reducing poverty and 
ensuring food security, alongside medium- and large-scale agriculture. Smallholder farmers typically 
produce staple food consumed by the household and cash crops to generate an income (Africa Progress 
Report, 2014). The government tried to provide modern agricultural technologies and better farming 
practices, improved seeds, fertilisers, irrigation, rural roads, extension and marketing services to the 
smallholder farmers (MoFED, 2002b).  
Figure 4.2: Linkage of input-output in Core ADLI 
 
Source: Adapted from Ohno (2009)  
An increase in agricultural output is expected to stimulate domestic industrial production by providing food 
and industrial materials/inputs. In turn, the industrial sector could also produce inputs into agriculture such as 
fertilisers, farming tools and equipment, as well as consumer goods for rural households. This dynamic 
linkage is intended to support the first stage of industrialisation (aimed to focus on the light industries and 
agro-processing) until the economy moves into a higher level of economic development and 
industrialisation. As Figure 4.2 indicates, this kind of direct forward and backward input––output linkage 
between the two sectors is referred to as ‘Core ADLI’ (Ohno, 2009). For instance, the implementation of 
‘Core ADLI’ is clearly observed in the leather industry, where domestic animal hides and skins are supplied 
to tanneries and manufacturers to produce finished leather or final products, such as leather jackets and shoes 
for domestic sales and export (MoFED, 2002b; Ohno, 2009). However, its impact may not be large enough 
to lead and sustain overall industrialisation process of the country. This indicates that ‘Core ADLI’ is 
possible, but that alone may not be enough for achieving a desired high economic growth, or industrialisation 
(Ohno, 2009). On the other hand, in the ‘Enhanced ADLI’33 strong emphasis is placed on growth 
                                                     
33
 The Enhanced ADLI operates in the agricultural sector and can offer surplus labour, agricultural-land tax revenue, 
cheap food and foreign exchange and export earnings for the promotion of industrialisation. In turn, the urban industrial 
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acceleration, which supposed to be achieved through commercialisation of the smallholder agriculture and 
private sector development. In the enhanced ADLI policy targets are not limited to smallholder farmers in 
rural areas, but include large-scale commercial agriculture (including horticultural farms), urban micro and 
small producers, and medium- and large-scale manufacturers (MoFED, 2006; Ohno, 2009). These all 
resulted in the review of Ethiopia’s industrial policy in line with the ADLI long-term development policy 
and strategy. Politically, expansion of the policy’s scope to encompass urban producers is understood as the 
state’s response to include them in the officially claimed ‘developmental state’ model (Ohno, 2009). 
Figure 4.3: Resource transfer between agriculture and domestic industry (Enhanced ADLI) 
 
Source: Adapted from Ohno (2009)  
Summary of the main points from Figure 4.3:  
 Production linkages’, whereby increases in agricultural output lead to increase supply of inputs used in 
non-agricultural production, or increase demand for non-agricultural outputs used in the agricultural 
production sector;  
 ‘Consumption linkage’, whereby increases in agricultural income lead to an increase in the demand for 
non-agricultural consumption goods; 
 ‘As agricultural productivity grows, the supply of semi-skilled and skilled labour to the non-agricultural 
sector will increase’. This means that the investment of agricultural surplus income in children’s 
education will ultimately increase the supply of skilled labour to the other sectors.  
This shows that agriculture is the sector from which growth should emanate, and growth in agriculture will 
lead to industrial growth by offering skilled and semi-skilled labour inputs, and a demand for its products. 
The ADLI development strategy acknowledged that agricultural-sector development is not an exogenous 
process; it must be sustained because it adds value through its interaction with other sectors in the economy. 
Generally, the ADLI development strategy is integrated with all the other sector strategies, with agriculture 
                                                                                                                                                                                
sector can transfer resources and technologies through production support, food and service delivery, agricultural 
protection and public investment (cf. MoFED, 2002b; Ohno, 2009).  
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at the forefront. The transformation of agriculture was expected to trigger a structural transformation in the 
economy. Substantial expansion of the agriculture sector would reduce and ultimately eradicate poverty from 
the rural areas. Furthermore, it would have the same effect in the urban centres through its significant spill-
over effect, as agricultural growth would encourage growth in the manufacturing and service sectors. This 
implies, the ADLI strategy considered as an engine of economic growth by achieving initial industrialization 
through strong input-output linkage between agriculture and industry. It is difficult to find such an example 
of economic take-off in East Asia developmental states rather Ethiopia tried to realise its economic growth in 
such mechanism (Ohno, 2009).  
4.4.2 The developmental state and the ADLI development strategy  
Formulating and implementing development policies and strategies are related directly or indirectly to the 
political situation of a given country. The developmental failure of most African countries resulted not only 
from the technical shortcomings of economic policy, but also from political factors such as a lack of 
committed political leadership and the will to promote the national development agenda. A consistent 
political regime with a vision of national development should be put in place before the formulation of 
concrete policies and strategies. Adopting a developmental state paradigm may create suitable conditions for 
the emergence of such a political regime that could build effective institutions, policies, and incentive 
systems to stimulate domestic value creation and economic rent distribution.  
By adopting a ‘developmental state’ model and formulating a long-term, workable development strategy, 
Ethiopia intends to radically transform the existing political economy from a system in which rent-seeking is 
the dominant behavioural pattern to one in which value creation is central. The main objective to transform 
the political economy to enable more equitable sharing of the national cake and ensure long-term stability 
and sustainable development (Ohno, 2009). A state led by strong and committed political leaders  could 
strengthen the role of all economic agents, such as farmers, workers, merchants, entrepreneurs and foreign 
firms, and force them to consolidate their value-creation behavioural patterns through incentive (‘carrots’) 
and disincentive (‘sticks’) mechanisms. For instance, smallholder farmers are the most important partners in 
the political coalition in the Ethiopian developmental state (see Figure 4.4). Even with the smallholder 
farmers, the state offers top-down guidance for the improvement of productivity through various ‘carrots’, 
and responds to their voices through policy formulation in a ‘bottom-up’ fashion. 
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 Figure 4.4: East Asian developmental state model 
 
Source: Adapted from Ohno (2009)  
However, the East Asian developmental states formed a political coalition with capitalists (i.e. with the 
business sector as per the context of their respective countries) instead of smallholder farmers. The East 
Asian developmental states, therefore, are often seen to be based on a narrow but vibrant coalition between 
the state and capitalists (Evans, 1995). In contrast, in Ethiopia, capitalists (both local and foreign enterprises) 
are not seen as main players in the political coalition of the developmental state. Although they are very 
important strategic partners in the development process of the country, the state does not intend to rely on 
them for votes or funding. Instead, the state looks at capitalists as a subject for policy-making, supporting 
their value-creation while punishing their rent-seeking practices; there is conditional cooperation at arm’s 
length (Ohno, 2009). 
In Ethiopia, the relationship between smallholder farmers and the developmental state is the most significant 
and broad-based coalition. Smallholder farmers account for about 80% of the population and are the support 
base of the ruling party (Ohno, 2009). This is similar in Botswana, where the democratic developmental state 
built a broad-based political coalition with cattle owners. This broad-based coalition is coincided with Peter 
Evans’ argument that a broader incorporation of social groups is both possible and desirable in the 
emergence of the new developmental state in the twenty-first
 
century. This state–society coalition must be 
derived from democratically organised public deliberation from the bottom up (Evans, 2010), but 
considerable infrastructural and institutional abilities are required to create and sustain such broad-based 
developmental coalition (Mkandawire, 2010). Therefore, the twenty-first-century developmental state must 
promote the capabilities of its citizenry through the provision of collective public goods such as health and 
education (Evans, 2011). 
The minimum condition for smallholder farmers to accept the political coalition is the perception that the 
state will not suppress them or drive them into despair. A greater incentive would be the receipt of both 
conditional and unconditional support to improve their livelihood, such as famine relief, food aid, food for 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
131 
 
work, education and health services, as well as other social-security packages (Ohno, 2009). For instance, the 
developmental state in Ethiopia introduced the PSNP,
34
 one of the conditional social security programmes 
targeting to the most drought prone areas that among others made major contributions to public works as 
well as the prevention of environmental degradation (Thorbecke, 2014). Furthermore, the government tried 
to provide productive assistance in agricultural technology such as fertiliser, seeds, irrigation, and rural-
credit services through the expansion of rural financial institutions. The farm households supposed to 
increase their productivity and agricultural income through using these agricultural inputs and encouraged to 
become producers of cash crops (Ohno, 2009). In Ethiopia, all these agricultural inputs are provided to most 
the smallholder farmers with the objective to increase their productivity and production under the rural 
development programmes. For instance, agricultural extension services have been greatly strengthened in the 
last decade by assigning three agricultural extension workers and establishing farmers’ training centres 
(FTCs) throughout the rural areas/villages. 
Figure 4.5: Ethiopian ‘democratic developmental state’ model  
Source: Adapted from Ohno (2009) 
Over the last decade, the productivity and production of smallholder farmers have improved because of 
implemented reliable rural development policy via putting the agricultural sector at the forefront of the 
development policy (Ohno, 2009). The policy aims to increase agricultural productivity to raise overall 
production and to invest in those industries, which have production or input linkages to the rural economy 
(agriculture). For instance, budgetary allocations for the agricultural sector are among the highest in Africa; 
for instance, Ethiopia has considered large agricultural extension workforce that directly support to the 
smallhoder farmers at village level (World Bank, 2016). Another motivation factor for farmers to increase 
                                                     
34
 Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is one successful social security programme in Ethiopia that consists of 
three components: ‘Public works’ that builds community infrastructure (for instance, a large-scale network of rural road 
and other physical infrastructure) and agricultural-related assets (soil and water conservation and irrigation can help to 
improve farm productivity and production). ‘Direct support’ that provides social assistance to the poor and to those who 
are unable to participate in the public-works programme. ‘Household assets building programme’ which empowers 
rural households to increase their income, food production and asset holding, i.e. assets security and new household 
asset formation (cf. Thorbecke, 2014). Therefore, the PNSP is one of the largest social protection intervention 
programmes in Ethiopia to achieve food security at household level. 
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their productivity and production was the agricultural land reform,
35
 which took place in the late-1990s and 
gave constitutional guarantees for the ultimate land-use right (Ohno, 2009). According to Joseph Stiglitz 
(1996), analysis on ‘Some lessons from the East Asian miracle’, land reform has three economic effects: (1) 
‘Increased rural productivity and income, which resulted in increased savings.’ (2) ‘Higher incomes created 
the domestic demand that is important in these economies before the expansion of export markets.’ (3) ‘The 
redistribution of income contributed to political stability, an important factor in creating a good environment 
for domestic and foreign investment’. The development direction in Ethiopia is looks almost similar with the 
East Asian countries, i.e. transformation out of agriculture is the main development direction. By increasing 
productivity and production, the state shows its commitment to creating reliable transformation from the 
bottom; i.e. by creating capital from the rural sector/economy. To realise this, Ethiopia pursued the farmers’ 
movement known as ‘developmental army building’ (‘Yelimat serawit ginbata’ in Amharic) in main 
development fronts such as in agriculture, education and health to boost the role of the community in local 
development programmes (Fantini, 2013). This is one of the new micro-institutions below village level to 
rationalise rural development interventions, input distribution and experience sharing on their farming 
practices. Furthermore, they are also compelled to participate into communal or development works, 
contributing in labour, cash or kind to the construction of public infrastructures like roads, schools or health 
posts (Fantini, 2013). 
4.5 The role of a developmental state in development  
Many international organisations, including the World Bank and IMF, have reported the achievements in 
economic growth and poverty reduction in Ethiopia. As UNECA (2011) depicts, Ethiopia is one of the 
success stories and is praised by many international organisations and donors as a model for the whole 
continent. This implies (directly or indirectly) that they have given credit to the role of the developmental 
state model, i.e. the role of state intervention. For instance, the IMF stated that Ethiopia has been one of the 
fastest-growing economies in Africa, having registered a double-digit GDP growth rate for the last decade 
(IMF, 2013). Its economic performance is impressive for a non-oil-producing country and it is rated as one 
of the fastest growing economies in the SSA region (FAO-WFP, 2012; World Bank, 2012; African 
Economic Outlook, 2012; IMF, 2013; Africa Progress Report, 2014). Ethiopia’s growth prospect remains 
robust and sustainable, reinforced by sound macroeconomic management, and committed high-level political 
leadership, massive investment in infrastructure and human capital development (World Bank, 2013b).  
                                                     
35
 Most East Asian and Southeast Asian countries underwent some form of land-reform redistribution early in their 
history so that they started with a relatively egalitarian land distribution that greatly facilitated the subsequent growth of 
agricultural output and the transfer of the agricultural surplus to non-agricultural sectors (Kuznets, 1988; Erik & Henry, 
2004). Land reform was viewed as a significant part of an environment that provided economic freedom to small-scale 
farmers, which was vital to the economic success of South Asian development states. This indicates that agricultural 
policies and land reform are a sufficient condition for a developmental state to emerge and bring socio-economic 
change to the broad mass of the rural population (Van Donge et al., 2012). 
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Furthermore, the latest acknowledgment came from US President Barack Obama at the end of September 
2014 at the bilateral talks with Ethiopia’s high-level official delegation during the 69th United Nations 
General Assembly. Obama, in his talk with the Ethiopian leaders, acknowledged the tremendous 
development leaps the country has achieved. He said that: 
When I spoke previously at the African summit about some of the bright spots and progress that we are 
seeing in Africa, I think there is no better example than what has been happening in Ethiopia, one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world. We have seen enormous progress in a country that once had great 
difficulty feeding itself. The president further stated Ethiopia is now not only leading the pack in terms of 
agricultural production in the region, but will soon be an exporter, potentially not just of agriculture, but also 
power because of the development that has been taking place there (25 September 2014). 
What makes the Ethiopian economic growth different is that it is not dependent on the extraction of natural 
resources such as crude oil or minerals, like other African countries that have such resources (Fantini, 2013; 
Africa Progress Report, 2014; Priewe, 2016). Ethiopia is one of a few SSA countries, which grew to a 
remarkable extent out of subsistence agriculture with the combination of public investment without special 
natural resource endowments. A key ingredient for this unique economic growth is the practice of the idea of 
a developmental state by the Ethiopian government or followed state-led development approach, which 
guided successful East Asian countries to a sustained high growth trajectory (Fantini, 2013; Priewe, 2016). 
This means that economic progress is not coming from natural-resource rents but from massive investments 
in agriculture, infrastructure, and the development of social sectors (like education, health…). In Ethiopia, 
the agricultural sector has a huge potential to grow, which will infuse further strength to the overall economy 
(Fantini, 2013; IMF, 2013; World Bank, 2013b; Africa Progress Report, 2014; Priewe, 2016). Nevertheless, 
such situation is not unique only for Ethiopia because there are other economies around the world including 
many of the East Asian developmental states that have grown without natural resource extraction.  Ethiopia 
has registered a robust average GDP growth rate of 10.6% since it officially adopted the ‘developmental 
state’ model. This is above the required estimated growth rate of 7% to achieve the MDG of halving poverty 
by 2015. Furthermore, it is above both the East African average (7.6%) and the SSA average (5%) (Nganwa, 
2013). Despite some discrepancy over the figures between the international institutions and the government 
of Ethiopia, there is a consensus that Ethiopia has registered sustained economic growth over the past 
decade. The country has also met most of the MDGs and, consequently, will soon join the middle-income 
group.  
However, Ethiopia has one of the lowest shares of industry and manufacturing in GDP in the SSA region. 
The manufacturing sector is typically associated with structural transformation, and productivity gains 
remain relatively small compared to other SSA countries (Martins, 2014). As Table 4.4 shows, the structure 
of the economy has changed from a predominantly agricultural economy to a relatively predominantly 
service economy, although agriculture remains critical for broad-based growth and the government continues 
to give it priority. The economy is not diversified enough into the manufacturing sub-sector; agriculture and 
the service sectors each contribute about 40% and more than 40% to GDP respectively, and about 80% of 
employment is still concentrated on the agriculture sector. This shows that the source of growth has 
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gradually shifted from agriculture to the service sector because much of the domestic private sector (assumed 
as the engine of growth) is engaged in the service sector. Even though the service and agriculture sectors 
have been the main drivers of structural transformation over the last decade, the manufacturing sector has 
made a relative contribution to the economy since recent times. The private sector is now motivated to 
engage in the manufacturing sub-sector due to different investment incentives provided by the government 
and the expansion of the basic infrastructure (such as road, power, telecom, railways, airlines and other basic 
services). Public investment is the main source for the expansion of the basic infrastructure to create a viable 
environment for the involvement of the private sector in the productive sectors of the economy.  
Table 4.4: Average GDP growth rate and sectoral share to GDP in Ethiopian economy (in %) 
Years/ 
indicators 
2003
/04 
2004
/05 
2005
/06 
2006
/07 
2007
/08 
2008
/09 
2009
/10 
2010
/11 
2011
/12 
2012
/13 
2013/
14 
2014/
15 
SSA 7.1 6.2 6.4 7.1 5.6 2.8 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.4 - 
Real GDP 11.7 12.6 11.5 11.8 11.6 10 10.6 11.4 8.8 9.9 10.6 10.2 
Agriculture  16.9 13.5 10.9 9.4 7.5 6.4 7.6 9 4.9 7.1 5.4 6.4 
Industry 11.6 9.4 10.2 9.5 10 9.9 10.8 15 17.1 18.5 21.2 21.8 
Service  6.3 12.8 13.3 15.3 16 14 13.2 12.5 11.1 9.9 11.9 10.0 
 % share of sector to total GDP  
Agriculture  46.7 47 46.7 45.9 44.6 43 42 41 43.1 42 40.2 38 
Industry  13.9 13.5 13.3 13.3 13.1 13 13 13.4 11.5 13 14.3 15.6 
Service 39.4 39.5 40 40.8 42.3 44 45 46 45.4 45 46.2 46.4 
Source: Compiled from IMF for SSA, MoFED, NBE, CSA and World Bank 
From building a road network to expanding basic social services and making a big push in the energy sector, 
public investment is considered as the engine of growth in the economy. Ethiopia is spending about 20% of 
its GDP to reengineer its infrastructure, such as roads, schools, health institutions, railways, air transport, 
hydroelectric and irrigation dams, and telecommunication services (Asayehgn, 2012). The quality and 
availability of the growing infrastructure through extensive public investment are essential for overall 
sustainable growth. For instance, in the energy sub-sector, the construction of the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (Talaku Yehidasie Gidb in Amharic, see Box 4.1), which is being built in Benishangul-
Gumuz regional state of Ethiopia, approximately 500km northwest of the capital Addis Ababa on the Blue 
Nile River as part of the  ‘green economy development strategy’ of the country.36 It is self-funded 
hydropower project (i.e. being built with the finance entirely mobilise from domestic sources) indicative of 
                                                     
36
 Greening the economy or green economy strategy is not a new concept, but rather a re-emerging issue that has gained 
in recent years increasing prominence within international and respective countries’ development policy debate. The 
‘green growth’ discourse leaves the free-market (neoliberal) paradigm assumptions in place and focuses on policy 
change, emphasising the role of markets and state to augment the existing technological opportunities for improving 
scarce resource efficiency (Death, 2014). 
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the country’s rebirth and on its completion it will be the biggest hydropower project in Africa that will 
generate above 6000MW electricity (Oqubay, 2015; Yihdego, Khalil & Salem, 2017). This demonstrates that 
the state is looks committed to tapping into its vast endowment of natural resources and renewable-energy 
potentials. Although constraints on the availability of finance and lack of skilled human/technical capabilities 
to tapping the existing potentials are acknowledged, hydropower, wind, solar and geothermal energy are 
potentially available resources in Ethiopia. These will deliver electricity with minimum greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and will help Ethiopia to achieve its green economy development strategy, i.e. building a 
green economy and climate-resilience strategies (FDRE, 2011).  
Box 4.1: An overview of the GERD: benefits and impacts 
Hydroelectric dams are increasingly popular in water rich countries of SSA, especially those less endowed with oil 
resource. The Nile River (Blue and White Nile), which is one of an international rivers as its water resources have 
shared by eleven countries. The Nile River’s drainage basin covers 3,254,555km2, forming approximately, 10% of 
the total area of the continent of Africa and it is 6,853km long, and, thus, it is one of the longest river in the world 
(Yihdego, Khalil & Salem, 2017). Ethiopia has long claimed a right to use Nile water, but it was only in 2011 that 
the government of Ethiopia announced that country would begin construction of a large dam on the Blue Nile River, 
near its border with Sudan. The GERD, which is one of the largest dams in the Africa continent, will impound the 
Blue Nile River in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia. However, the construction of the dam and its 
potential impacts has led to serious debates in the downstream of the region. Egypt and Sudan are located 
downstream and depend heavily on the Nile River for agricultural, industrial, and domestic purposes (Yihdego, 
Khalil & Salem, 2017). 
The GERD with estimated a total cost of around US$5Billion, is considered by the Ethiopians as a symbol of 
modernity, proud of it as a home-grown project, development, hope and reducing poverty. The dam, which is the 
largest hydropower project in Africa, generating more than 6,000MW electricity, will not only meet the country 
demand but will also be exported to the neighbouring countries (Kahsay et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015). For 
Ethiopians, the dam is empowering regardless of any ethnicity of political affiliation and will empower Ethiopia’s 
plan to become middle-income country and become low carbon emission by 2025. It entirely financed by the 
Ethiopian government (i.e. by the people) and the dam to be source of pride for Ethiopians. It has created more than 
10,000 jobs opportunity during the construction of the dam (Yihdego, Khalil & Salem, 2017).  
The GERD is the biggest project in the history of Ethiopia. So far, the government of Ethiopia has not produced any 
document about the environmental and social impacts of GERD. Thus, little is known about the impacts of the dam 
(Yihdego et al., 2017). However, there are studies highlighted some issues that require more attention, which resulted 
in the following findings: 1) At least 5,110 people living downstream will be resettled and villages located near the 
dam (home to 7,380 people) will also be resettled. However, there was another independent study estimate is that 
about 20,000 people are to be resettled (International Rivers, 24 January 2014
37
). 2) The high lands of Ethiopia are 
most sediment-prone and, thus, will pose a big risk for sedimentation of the reservoir and, consequently, will affect 
                                                     
37
 “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Fact Sheet” https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/the-grand-
ethiopian-renaissancedam-fact-sheet-8213  
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the dam’s power generation capacity and life span. 3) The Benishangul-Gumuz region, where the dam is located, is 
one of the few places in Ethiopia that has remnant forest vegetation. The dam’s reservoir will flood 1,680km2, which 
comprise 90% of the forest area and a source of livelihood for the local community and represents an excellent 
variety of biodiversity. 4) Studies have indicated at least 150 species of fish in the Ethiopian portion of the Nile 
River, which resulted in high consumption of fish by the local population, implying the dam will affect the natural 
habitat and the fishery. 
However, according to Jennifer (9 July 2013)
38
, the Ethiopian government has a solid plan for resettlement of the 
affected people. The resettled people are happy in their newly built houses and are compensated more than what was 
expected. Except a few elderly people, all other locals believed that the dam is a sign of hope and prosperity for them 
and for the country in general. The area around the dam will comprise of a 5km buffer zone for control of malaria. In 
general, though the real scale of the environmental impact of the dam is unclear; what certain is that a successful 
GERD will play an important role in empowering development and will contribute to the future of Ethiopia 
(Yihdego, Khalil & Salem, 2017). 
To support economic development at an annual growth rate of more than 10%, it is necessary to expand the 
electric-power supply at a rate of more than 14% per year and the country has enough potential to meet this 
demand (FDRE, 2011). A sustained demand for energy is critical to support the expansion of the country’s 
energy sector, which in turn will be vital to support the country’s economic growth and to facilitate the 
economic transformation from being highly dependent on the primary sector to having broader, productive 
secondary and tertiary sectors. With such a growing demand for energy related to industrialisation and 
urbanisation, the government has been tried to recognise that harnessing clean and renewable-energy sources 
is critical. This is a fundamental enabler of modern economic development, needed to power cities, fuel 
industrial activities electrify rural areas and pump water for irrigation purposes in agriculture. 
As Swilling (2010) states, investing in resource productivity and energy efficiency is an opportunity to create 
jobs, improve infrastructural services, build new knowledge industries, and rebuild the ecosystem’s capacity 
to support life. For instance, Ethiopia is one of a few African countries to have made substantial 
commitments to ‘green new deals’ aimed at stimulating economic growth through the creation of millions of 
‘green-collar jobs’.39 Adopting the green economy path promotes socio-economic targets such as rural 
development, health and the creation of employment in high value-added production. In addition, Ethiopia 
intends to be a carbon neutral country by mid-2020 via a combination of investments in renewable energy 
and reforestation, which in turn could attract substantial carbon finance (Swilling, 2010).  
                                                     
38
 "Another view on the Nile: an interview with Jennifer Veilleux". Catherine Pfeiffer blog 
http://catherinepfeifer.blogspot.com/2013/07/another-view-on-nile-interview-with.html  
39
 Green jobs are work in agriculture, manufacturing, R&&D, administration, and service activities that contribute 
substantially to preserving or restoring environmental quality. The green-economy strategy in Ethiopia focuses on four 
pillars: the adoption of agricultural and land use efficiency measures; increased GHG sequestration in forests, i.e. 
protecting and re-establishing forests for their economic and ecosystem services, including carbon stocks; deployment 
of renewable and clean power generation; and use of appropriate advanced technologies in industry, transport, and 
buildings (cf. FDRE, 2011:20).  
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As the policy document of ‘Ethiopia’s Climate Resilient Green Economy: Green Economy strategy’ 
indicates that the green economy strategy of the country is integrated with the consecutive mid-term five-
year transformation plans and sectoral strategies to reinforce the country’s long-term economic vision 
(FDRE, 2011). With the implementation of the Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy, the 
country is geared towards meeting the vision of becoming a middle-income country and building a carbon-
neutral economy. To realise this in a sustainable manner, the nation has implemented an intensive and 
pragmatic natural resource conservation and management programme by mobilising the rural community 
(FDRE, 2011). Natural resource conservation has been given priority in the consecutive mid-term five-year 
development plans including GTP-I and GTP-II because it plays a crucial role in ensuring sustainable rural 
development. Through mobilising communities, large-scale soil and water conservation activities and 
afforestation/tree planting have been carried out every year (UNDP, 2015). Such type of natural resource 
conservation mechanism is believed to have wider environmental benefits, such as increased vegetation 
coverage and carbon storage. For instance, forest coverage in Ethiopia was around 13% in 2001, but as a 
result of widespread natural resource conservation practices through broad-based participation and 
mobilisation of communities the coverage was increased to 15% by 2014 (Ministry of Environment and 
Forest, 2014). This indicates that to speed up the socio-economic development of the country by addressing 
the prevailing environmental problems; the government of Ethiopia has adopted a climate-resilient green 
economy as a development strategy. 
Furthermore, the generation of clean, renewable energy in the form of hydropower, irrigation development, 
and integrated watershed management plays a critical role in mitigating the impact of and adaptation to 
climate change (World Bank, 2010). Implementation of a green-economy strategy and huge public 
investment in renewable energy is coincided with the objective of the country’s sustainable and efficient use 
of resources to build a green economy. This will enable Ethiopia to use its available potential renewable 
energy for power generation as a means of establishing and sustaining its economic competitiveness. 
Greening agriculture and industrialisation has become a priority agenda in Ethiopia, like many other African 
countries, and greening-farming practices can increase the productivity and production of smallholder 
farmers. The greening practices are supposed to increase energy and material efficiency, thus yielding 
significant economic margins reducing ecological and climate change risks in both the short- and long-terms 
(Benedict, 2014). For instance, once the developmental states consolidated their economic development via 
technological capacity-building, institutional functionality and human developmental capabilities shifted 
from massive investments in material conditions of modernisation to establishing a knowledge-based 
economy using the opportunity of the information technology revolution (Chibber, 2002). 
Equally impressive, the country set a target to become the top electricity supplier/exporter of renewable 
energy sources in the East African region. However, the country’s current (up to 2010) generation capacity 
of power from all sources is only about 5% of its 45000MW hydropower potential (Negash, 2011). Making 
an intensive investment in the energy sub-sector will help the country to generate foreign exchange by 
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exporting hydropower energy to neighbouring countries. This indicates that the country will intend to 
become an energy hub in the East Africa region in the long-run with its estimated potential of renewable 
energy (Negash, 2011). Accordingly, the country set a target to become a key producer and exporter of 
power, to transform potentially Africa’s power sector through the construction of several hydroelectric dams 
and other alternative energy sources. The country has already signed agreements with almost all its 
neighbours to supply clean energy. This provides an opportunity to replace electric power generated from 
fossil fuels, which has much higher average costs and significantly higher emissions. By exporting its clean 
electricity, Ethiopia can share its green development experiences with the region, in addition to contributing 
positively to its balance of trade or serving as a source of foreign exchange (FDRE, 2011). As different 
sources indicated that, Ethiopia has sufficient renewable energy sources to achieve its green economy 
development strategy in a sustainable manner.  
Figure 4.6 shows how policy interactions help to achieve sustainable economic development. The country’s 
economic growth is becoming broad-based, diversified, and inclusive, with increasing contributions to the 
GDP from all sectors of the economy. The state is committed to allocate more resources to economic and 
social infrastructure aimed at eradicating poverty, and to achieve rapid and sustainable economic growth and 
development.  
Figure 4.6: Policy interactions towards sustainable economic development 
 
Source: Author’s own 
Investment in infrastructure is supposing to be vital to create a business environment that is conducive to 
economic growth, industrialisation, job creation, and poverty reduction (UNCTAD, 2005; Ajayi, 2006). 
Although Ethiopia has invested considerable public resources (as per the capacity of the economy) in key 
infrastructure development, such as roads, communication, housing, and energy in a few selected 
manufacturing sectors and, more recently, the railways, industrial zones/parks, but much still needs to 
address the existing infrastructural gap to improve institutional quality and accomplish further transformation 
of the economy. This indicates there is a need to both extra lessons and engage with the massive challenges 
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or constraints the country still faces to accelerate its development process as required. This is due to the fact 
there are still more than 22 million people living below the absolute poverty line, the absolute  income 
inequalities getting wider and wider, unemployment (particularly youth unemployment) remaining the 
challenge of the Ethiopian economy (Teshome, 2012; UNDP, 2015; World Bank, 2016). In general, the 
infrastructure in developing countries is underdeveloped and this affects productivity, so Ethiopia is not 
unique in this case. Intensive investment in infrastructure is no longer an option, but a necessity to accelerate 
the development process. The existence of adequate infrastructure is considered as the engine of economic 
development and attracted private-sector investment in the productive sectors, which will accelerate 
economic transformation/development process. 
Enhanced infrastructure development and services have a direct impact on the increment of per-capita 
income growth. For instance, by raising the infrastructure services of all SSA countries to the level of the 
regional leader, Mauritius, could add 2.2% per annum to per-capita income growth; if this reached the level 
of South Korea, the annual per-capita growth could be 2.6% (Commission on Growth and Development, 
2008). Investing in better rural feeder roads could also bring high returns by dramatically lowering the cost 
of inputs and marketing, and hence, increasing the farmers’ margins. Even low-quality feeder roads raise 
more poor people out of poverty for every dollar, than high-quality trunk roads, making them a ‘win-win’ 
partnership strategy for growth and poverty alleviation (Kingombe, 2011). For instance, in Ethiopia access to 
all-weather roads reduced poverty by 7% and increased consumption growth by 16% (Dercon et al., 2008). 
This indicates that investment in infrastructure has a strong, direct spill-over effect on increasing economic 
growth and reducing the level of poverty, which contributes hugely to socio-economic transformation. The 
other important aspect of economic growth in Ethiopia is its emphasis on wealth/resource distribution among 
the entire population by creating access to opportunities for development for both rural and urban areas. 
Ethiopia’s development strategies (development projects) and its public expenditure are both pro-poor and 
pro-growth to ensure fair income distribution. Pro-poor economic growth should be considered as one of the 
main elements of the developmental states (Zenawi, 2006). 
Table 4.5: Trends in pro-poor spending in total public expenditure (in %) 
Sectors/years 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Education  19.8 21.8 23.7 21.3 24.9 23.9 25.2 
Health  4.9  4.6 6.6 7.3 6.7 6.2 7.4 
Agriculture  15 15.2 12.9 11.7 8.8  8.9 9.5 
Roads  11.3  12.4 14.1 17.7 19.7  23.2 22.4 
Water & sanitation  6 6.1 5.7 6.1 6.3 8.2 8.2 
Total  57 60.1 62.9 64.1 66.4  70.4 70 
Source: Adapted from UNDP (2015)  
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Pro-poor growth increases opportunities for poor citizens and decreases socio-economic ills or constraints. 
Public investment in the social sector (i.e. education and health to boost human capital) and in basic 
infrastructure is essential for sustainable and inclusive economic growth.
40
 Benefit sharing (reducing income 
inequality and poverty) and participation by a large segment of the population (employment) are the two 
features of inclusive growth. The most successful project in Ethiopia has been the work for soil and water 
conservation campaign for 30 to 40 free labour days every year throughout the country implemented by 
means of proactive and organised community participation. This type of natural-resource conservation 
mechanism is believed to have wider environmental benefits, such as consolidation and natural-resource 
rehabilitation (i.e. increased vegetation cover and recharge of streams and groundwater source), carbon 
storage and the strengthening of natural-resource management.
41
 The other campaign is to provide one 
alternative source of water technology for the smallholder farm households that can be used either to 
compensate rainfall shortages or to produce extra products in the dry season. Public works have contributed 
to a large-scale network of rural roads and other physical infrastructure; the protection and improvement of 
household food security; and asset security and new asset formation. All this shows that creating 
opportunities for development by mobilising the community in local development programmes and 
increasing the share of pro-poor public investment helps to achieve sustainable economic development. Mass 
mobilisation accompanied by pro-poor public investment is pivotal in the process of sustainable and 
equitable development in Ethiopia. 
To summarise, evidences indicated that the developmental state in Ethiopia has so far registered encouraging 
economic performance through the formulation and implementation of contextualised development policies 
and programmes at different levels. The country has made spectacular leaps on multiple development fronts 
in recent years. For instance, the average GDP growth rate for eleven years (2003/04- 2014/15) was greater 
than 10%, while annual average growth rates for agriculture, industry and services were 9%, 13.8% and 
12.2% respectively (MoFED, 2014, Oqubay, 2015; UNDP, 2015). Extensive investments in public 
infrastructure and the existence of a conducive external environment (as a necessary condition) have been 
contributed a greater share for such rapid economic growth (Fantini, 2013; World Bank, 2016; Priewe, 
2016). The public investments and expenditures of the country are concentrated for more than 60% on 
poverty-oriented sectors and basic social services provision (Fantini, 2013) As a result; per capita income 
                                                     
40
 Inclusive growth attempts to link economic growth with poverty reduction and inequality alleviation by offering 
development opportunities for all groups in the economy. In addition to reducing poverty and inequality, inclusive 
growth emphasises improving the productive capacity of individuals and creating an environment conducive for 
productive job opportunities. Inclusive growth can include all strata of a society such as the poor, the near poor, middle-
income groups, as well as women and young people, who are the most vulnerable. Inclusive growth can thus be 
considered as widening the opportunities for participation, both with respect to engagement in productive economic 
activities and having a voice in the direction of the growth process itself (Ranieri & Ramos, 2013). 
41
 Natural-resource management interventions such as afforestation, terracing, construction of check dams and the 
protection of wetlands can help to mitigate or reduce the impact of climate-change pressure. For this reason, watershed 
protection is a key-policy priority and forms a central component of the PSNP, in addition to the free campaign, 
designed to strengthen rural livelihoods over the long-term while offering cash or food for work during the short term 
(World Bank, 2010). 
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grew from US$129 in 1999/2000 to US$632 in 2013/14. During this period, not only an increase in per 
capita income, but there was also a slight structural change in the economy. For instance, in 2003/04, the 
agriculture sector contributed about 47% of the GDP. By 2013/14, the share of agriculture sector in GDP had 
declined to 39%, while the share of the industrial sector and the services sector increased to 15 % and 46% 
respectively, and service sector surpassing the agricultural sector. This indicates that growth was 
concentrated in services and agriculture, while manufacturing performance was relatively modest, or low and 
need to be exerted further efforts to augment the share of the manufacturing sector (UNDP, 2015; MoFED, 
2013, 2014). Such rapid economic growth has enabled to undertake further massive public investments in 
social and infrastructure sectors, which have a direct spill-over effect on the wellbeing of citizens (CSA, 
2012). The expansion of investments by MSEs, large-scale public projects, private sector investments (in 
medium and large-scale manufacturing, hotels and restaurant, real estate and housing) have created 
significant number of job opportunities. Even though the economic growth has been creating new job 
opportunities, unemployment and underemployment remain critical challenges for the Ethiopian economy 
(MoFED, 2014; World Bank, 2015).  
Growth supported by consistent resource mobilisation and allocation is in line with carefully formulated 
development plans, institutional reforms, agricultural modernisation, and state-led development investments. 
The government has tried to mobilise domestic resources to fund its national development projects to 
achieve its development objectives. By increasing the share of domestic resources, a country aimed to avoid 
the volatility of external assistance as well as borrowing, and to increase its policy space to strengthen 
accountability and achieve greater ownership of its development strategies. Although this has not been 
sufficient to address all development ills of Ethiopia, the state has made significant strides in both economic 
growth and social development, and this has paved the way for addressing major development ills of the 
economy. There are encouraging signs of a decline in absolute poverty, and notable records of infrastructure 
and social-sector development. This is attributed to broad and multi-faceted programmes, implemented in 
both rural and urban areas such as the intensification of agriculture, infrastructural development, food-
security programmes, and urban development programmes like the MSE development. Over 60% of total 
government expenditure (see Table 4.5) is directed towards poverty alleviation (pro-poor) and pro-
development sectors (CSA, 2011), which indicating the ruling coalition’s commitment to improve the 
welfare of its citizens. While there has been rapid economic growth, inflation has emerged as a major 
macroeconomic challenge since 2007/2008. The average inflation rate was below 20% before 2006/07 but 
accelerated to 25.3% in 2007/08, peaked at 36.4 % in 2009/10 and moderated slightly to 33.7% in 2011/12. 
This high rate of inflation adversely affected people’s well-being and efforts to promote private investment 
(UNDP, 2015). However, in recent years, as a result of various stabilising measures including tighter fiscal 
and monetary policies taken by government helped contain inflation close to 10% (MoFED, 2014; World 
Bank, 2016). 
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4.6 The role of a developmental state in nurturing the private sector  
The private sector is supposed to be the engine of economic growth and industrialisation though there are 
few countries have achieved industrialisation without a successful private sector, the exceptions being the 
USSR and China (up to 1978). It is therefore imperative that the developmental state nurtures the private 
sector by creating a productive business environment and encourages them to become competitive in the 
market place. For instance, in Japan and South Korea, the state developed an indigenous private sector, 
which played a critical role in the industrialisation of these countries. These indigenous private sectors have 
since grown into some of the most powerful companies in the global economy. Japan and South Korea used 
a mixture of protectionism, subsidised credit, and other incentives for their domestic private sectors to 
develop an indigenous technological base, and then they allowed them to compete in the global market 
(Chang, 2003a). However, the state should not only provide support (incentives as carrot) but should also 
challenge to the private sector (as a stick) to perform better and become more competitive in the export 
markets; and state support should be conditional on the achievement of certain policy objectives. Therefore, 
the relationship between the state and the private sector should depend on a forward-looking performance 
directed by a ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ approach.  
A productive private sector is perceived as a major prerequisite for the overall success of the emerging 
developmental state in countries like Ethiopia. The state could expect to engage in two major ways: at the 
broader level, the state should develop strong relationships with the private sector and its constituent 
businesses, and empower domestic firms through incentives such as tax holidays, tax breaks and 
concessional loans (Kieh, 2015). Public investment in infrastructure expansion and human-resource 
development will make the private sector more profitable, and will ‘crowd in’ the private sector in the 
development process. In turn, private sectors (both domestic and foreign) expected to contribute job 
opportunities and domestic capital formation and transformation by engaging in the manufacturing and 
commercial farming sectors. The existence of modern infrastructure and effective institutions has expected to 
encourage the private sector to take investment risks in productive sectors. Therefore, increasing public 
expenditure on infrastructure and nurturing well-functioning institutions are remaining as a critical 
homework for the Ethiopian state.  
The private sector should intend to promote and encourage industrialisation. To ensure fast and sustained 
industrial development, the state need to focus on industries that are labour-intensive, industries which have 
broad linkages with the rest of the economy, use agricultural products as input, that serve as export-oriented 
and import substituting, and contribute to rapid technological transfer (MoFED, 2002a). The export-oriented 
development strategy leads to better resource allocation, creating economies of scale (due to larger 
international markets) and increasing production efficiency through technological development, capital 
formation and transformation, employment creation and, hence, economic growth. The export sector 
generates much-needed foreign exchange, which can be used to provide the public funds that required to 
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direct investment in growth-enhancing industries. The foreign-exchange earnings from the exports allow the 
import of intermediate inputs, mainly capital goods for domestic production, to stimulate exports further, 
thus expanding the economy’s production possibilities. 
The Ethiopian state has recognised the private sector as ‘an engine of growth’ and has continued its support 
to enhance the competitiveness of the sector by providing basic infrastructure, institutional support and other 
incentives. Since the lack of infrastructure and effective institutions caused high transaction costs for the 
private sector, the state is expected to be the only institution that can possibly take responsibility for 
investment in the physical infrastructure, and the provision of direct credit for strategic industries, and the 
protection of infant industries (UN-Habitant, 2014). However, the quality and capacity of the public sector to 
provide regulatory support to the infant private sector in the Ethiopian developmental state are practically 
challenging by the existence of rampant corruption and rent-seeking practices. 
It is obvious that, industrial development in general and development of the manufacturing sub-sector in 
particular, is believed by many (though not all) to be the prime driver of economic transformation and 
sustain growth (Chnag, 2003a, 2003b; Oqubay, 2015). In the manufacturing sub-sector, the state has been 
providing substantial incentives for textiles and garments, as well as leather and other agro-processing 
industries through establishment of industrial zones/parks, privatization of state owned enterprises, capacity 
building/trainings, bestowing tax holidays and tax relief, provision of basic infrastructure services, 
preferences in finance/credit provision and foreign currency allocation, and other incentive. Furthermore, the 
establishment of public institutes like Leather and Leather Product Technology Institute and Textile Industry 
Development Institute to support the respective manufacturing sub-sectors have tried to provide various 
trainings that enhanced the skill of the labour force, productivity and competitiveness (Ohno, 2009; MoFED, 
2014; Balema, 2014; Oqubay, 2015).  These sub-sectors expected to have both direct and indirect linkages 
with the agriculture sector, employ substantial proportion of skilled and semi-skilled labour forces, and boost 
export earnings. As equal as supporting the export-promoting sector, the state has been working on 
promoting import-substitute domestic industries (MoFED, 2006; 2014; Ohno, 2009) to replace imports that 
‘drain-off’ the scarce foreign-exchange earnings.  
Shortage of skilled labour force obviously constitutes as a key constraint to growth and improved 
productivity in the manufacturing sector despite the country has made progress in expanding access to 
education. In the short run, the provision of Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) could be 
used to bridge the gap of skilled labour supply to the manufacturing sector (World Bank, 2016). Even though 
the state tried to provide different supports and incentives to strengthen the manufacturing sector, the 
domestic private sector investment is inclined more towards the services sector than to the manufacturing 
sector. Considerable effort is also channelled into promoting the MSEs
42
 as the basis for the development of 
                                                     
42
 The MSEs development are essential to create a broad-based springboard for the development of competitive 
domestic industries and the private sector, create employment opportunities and, thereby, reduce the level of poverty. 
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medium- and large-scale, as well as indigenous private-sector enterprises. It did this by organising, training, 
providing land, access to loans and markets. Ethiopia’s practice of promoting and supporting MSEs more or 
less coincides with the experiences of some East Asian developmental states, such as Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan, all of whom created a strong domestic private sector that eventually grew into medium- or 
large-scale powerful indigenous companies. Although these SMEs face difficulties due to their low levels of 
entrepreneurial experience, they have relatively played significant role in creating job opportunities and an 
income for thousands of jobless people in urban areas.  
To enhance further the role of the private sector, there is regular top-level dialogue at a national level (on 
annually basis chaired by the Prime Minister of the country) between high-level of government organs and 
the representatives of private sector (such as the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral 
Associations, or Business Membership Organisations). Working closely with the private sector means, 
among others, having the means to communicate and cooperate on the reforms required to stimulate the 
economy further (Balema, 2014; Oqubay, 2015). The government and private sector appreciated from the 
onset that working together was an imperative to developing the economy, properly managing the existing 
opportunities and addressing the challenges/constraints. For instance, the government recently increased its 
effort to develop industrial zones in different parts of the country, and these zones, in turn, intended to play a 
major role in attracting a substantial amount of FDI and creating a considerable amount of employment 
opportunities (Balema, 2014; Oqubay, 2015). This systemic state–private-sector dialogue and cooperation 
helps the state to intensify its efforts to address the constraints related to infrastructure, institutional 
bureaucracy and credit issues (especially for small and medium-size enterprises) to further promote the role 
of the private sector in the manufacturing sub-sector. Competitive cheap labour, energy costs, duty and quota 
free access to the US and EU markets, tax exemptions, holidays, and building consumer markets are key pull 
factors for FDI in Ethiopia, although there are some challenges in practice (US Department of State, 2014). 
Regardless of the existing challenges in practice, the private sector is expected to exploit the existing 
investment opportunities and align its investment projects with the state’s priority areas, which are supposed 
to have significant social benefits and, thereby, play a greater role in accelerating economic growth and job 
creation. However, the contribution of FDI to the economy depends on the host country’s strategic vision, as 
well as how it fits into the overall national development strategy. In this regard, the business environment 
and the quality of physical and human capital are considered as the key determining factors to attract FDI or 
the private sector in the productive sectors. 
The state looks committed to improving the business climate to enable growth and employment creation 
from the private sector. Trade and credit policy incentives, massive public investment in key infrastructure 
(such as road, railways, communication, electricity, water and others), reform in the property rights regime, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
On the other hand, medium- and large-scale manufacturing industries create a competitive national economy by 
ensuring rapid and sustainable technological transfer, an export-oriented economy, an environment conducive for micro 
and small enterprises, and agricultural development (MoFED, 2013). 
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along with the commitment to maintain macroeconomic stability have been extensive (Teshome, 2012; 
Fantini, 2013) . Furthermore, the state established some public specialised institutes such as Leather Industry 
Development Institute, Textile Industry Development Institute and others to support the private sector to 
engage in the manufacturing sector (Balema, 2014; Oqubay, 2015). The government also tried to provide 
different incentives and support programmes to build the capacity of the private sector (as ‘carrots’) while it 
also introduced several disciplinary measures (as ‘sticks’), though there are multiple of limitations in 
execution of the se carrot and stick instruments in practice. These all efforts tried to provide by the 
government have expected to contribute positively for economic growth and increase the inflow of FDI into 
the economy (Balema, 2014; MoFED, 2013; 2014; Oqubay, 2015). These ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ instruments 
were practised widely in the East Asian developmental states to nurture their domestic private sectors. As 
UNCTAD (2009:34) explains: 
The incentives and resources provided by Government included the creation of rents. That is, policies were 
devised to ensure that private companies would secure profits above normal market conditions. Such rents 
were particularly important for inducing new investments and innovative activity. The management of rent-
seeking was thus an essential part of governance in successful developmental States. In this model, rent-
seeking was not in itself bad. But the key governance issue was to ensure that rents were derived through 
activities that had social as well as private returns and that the rents, when earned as profits, were reused in a 
way that supported national development. 
The incentives and disincentives are based on the private sector’s development performance and are 
commonly related to production and export objectives, and the incentives provided by the state are aimed at 
boosting competition among private firms. To ensure this, the private sector needs to reduce the misuse of 
resources and shield them against capture by interest groups; the incentives are gradually subject to the 
discipline of competition.  
Box 4.2: Examples of ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ instruments in the leather industry  
The strategy in which a strong state mobilizes incentives and disincentives to induce economic agents to create value 
are most vivid in the leather and leather-product industry. The goal of this industry, as set by the government, is to 
supply finished leather or finished-leather products for export and domestic markets by acquiring management and 
technology capabilities to process what had previously been sold as raw or semi-finished leather. The carrots, are a 
series of policies have been offered to the industry, including: 
 ‘Establishment of the Leather and Leather Product Technology Institute (LLPTI) to provide training, quality tests 
and some production processes;’ 
 ‘Donor assistance, foreign advisors and twinning with a British institute for LLPTI;’ 
 ‘Preferences in finance and foreign currency allocation;’ 
 ‘Business matching between domestic shoe producers and European firms;’ and 
 Monthly government business meetings to promote the industry and remove its barriers’ (Ohno, 2009) 
The sticks included a ban on raw leather (crust leather) export and high tax of about 150% on exports of crust or 
semi-finished leather, which represented about 40% of Ethiopian leather exports in 2011, to protect the domestic 
market (World Bank, 2014c). 
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However, there are critics who claimed that the ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ instruments are not transparent, and the 
policy-makers and implementers tend to patronise the private sector instead of encouraging competition and 
innovation (World Bank, 2013b). Despite tremendous efforts exerted by government to support private-
sector development, the policy mixes have the unintended consequences of ‘crowding-out’ the private sector 
in access to land, credit and foreign-exchange markets. The public investment rate of the country is the third 
highest in the world and this has had probably a negative impact on the distribution of credit, land and 
foreign exchange (World Bank, 2013b). The private sector in Ethiopia, however, has obviously not yet 
reached the stage of playing a visible and dominant role in the economy although there are several policy 
incentives and support mechanisms. The private sector is dominated by risk-averse behaviour and it does not 
eager much to engage in productive economic sectors though there are different policy packages provided by 
the government in order to engage into the productive sub-sectors (Teshome, 2012; Balema, 2014; MoFED, 
2014). At the same time, the state bureaucracy and institutions are not yet reached at a level where they can 
administer the policy direction put in place to support the private sector. The issue of competent bureaucracy 
and well-functioning institutions are considered as the main challenges for the state apparatus and these need 
to be improved (Balema, 2014). It is common that private sector in low-income countries, like Ethiopia, 
faces huge challenges in competing in the global economy, and more effective industrial policies and 
instruments that facilitating economic growth and structural transformation need to be designed and executed 
in a proper manner (Oqubay, 2015). Therefore, the government needs to put further efforts into addressing 
these constraints that create obstacles in the private sector through continuous state––private sector dialogue 
and different policy amendments, and by boosting public investment in the critical infrastructure to smooth 
the business environment. 
There is a significant amount of capital flooding into public-sector projects, which will have expected a 
positive spill-over effect for private-sector development and create conducive business environments in 
general (US Department of State, 2014). The existence of conducive business environment accompanied by 
macroeconomic stability is obviously indispensable for attracting investment (both domestic and foreign), 
which is expected to contribute for employment creation and poverty reduction. For instance, the amendment 
of Ethiopia’s investment proclamation No.769/2012 introduced provisions for the establishment of industrial 
zones, both state and private run, with favourable investment, tax and infrastructure incentives for key 
priority investment areas. The government established the Ethiopian Industrial Zone Corporation under the 
Ministry of Industry
43
 to oversee the construction and regulation of industrial zones. The key priority areas in 
the industrial sector are textiles and garments, leather, sugar, cement, metals and engineering, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and agro-processing (FDRE, 2012). 
                                                     
43
 In addition, under the Ministry of Industry there are different sectoral supporting institutions, such as: Textile 
Industry Development Institute; Leather Industry Development Institute; Metal Industry Development Institute; 
Chemical and Construction Input Industry Development Institute; Meat and Dairy Industry Development Institute; 
Food Beverage and Pharmaceutical Industry Development Institute; and National Kaizen Institute, all of which provide 
support to the private sectors. 
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Box 4.3: The development of industrial zones in Ethiopia 
Aware of the problem of land supply, the government has invested in the development of industrial parks/zones for 
private investments. In 2012/13, demand-based industrial zones were developed in different regional states and city 
administrations with a configuration of the entire necessary infrastructure. A total of 3537hectares of land was 
prepared for the establishment of industrial zones in Addis Ababa, Kombolcha, Dire-Dawa, Mekelle, and Hawassa. 
Of the five industrial sites, construction was started in the Bole Lemi industry zone site in Addis Ababa, which is 
known as the Addis Industrial Village. Privately owned industrial zones are also under development around Dukem 
and Finfine areas of Oromia region. These include Eastern Industrial Zone around Dukem, which is owned by a 
Chinese investor, and Sendafa Industry Zone, which is owned by Turkish investors. Furthermore, a company called 
Huijan International Shoe City has requested 320hectares of land to establish an industrial zone. All these initiatives 
are expected to result in the expansion of private investment, particularly in manufacturing (MoFED, 2014). The 
industrial zones are created to enable competitive conditions, to integrate the manufacturing sectors based on value 
creation, as well as to attract and expand investment. Furthermore, the first phase of Mekelle, Hawassa, and 
Kombelcha industrial parks was completed recently, the Hawassa industrial park is officially started its operation, 
and the remaining are already ready for operation.  
The operational framework for planning and implementing industrial zone development projects will be through a 
consultative process with the appropriate stakeholders at the project-site level. The benefits of the industrial zone 
development will expect to promote extensively to attract investors (both foreigner and domestic) to the zones. The 
aim is to provide capacity-building, linkage services to management, technology transfer, factory setup, boost level 
of export, create employment opportunities, and similar matters so that industries clustered within industrial zones 
operate with the spirit of sound competition. The main responsibility for initiating and carrying out these activities 
will be the responsibility of the Industrial Zone Development Corporation. 
The industrial zones are expected to provide a high potential for growth and value addition, as well as for  
strengthening both the forward and backward linkages among economic sectors and creating considerable 
employment opportunities. The industrialisation packages and the development of the industrial zones have 
in effect created another enclave for international capital in the form of FDI to boost the national economy. 
The establishment of industrial zones in Ethiopia is in line with the experiences of the East Asian 
developmental states and Mauritius who built export-processing zones (EPZs) or special economic zones 
(SEZs). For instance, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea built EPZs in the 1960s and 1970s to attract 
labour-intensive and export-based manufactured FDI. Furthermore, the EPZs or SEZs have created the 
second-tier of NICs, including China, where foreign firms were granted various preferential treatments, and 
this led to the rise of numerous export-oriented enclaves. The Chinese EPZs and low-wage labour attracted 
FDI to produce at low cost and develop the export-driven manufacturing sector, i.e. EPZs emerging as 
effective locations for FDI in the 1990s. The second-tier NICs, such as China, also rapidly liberalised their 
FDI regulations to attract labour-intensive manufacturing sectors. Consequently, competition for FDI has 
become fierce (Kimura, 2006). Such FDI-led ‘take-off’ at the beginning stage of catch up has been effective 
in the labour-abundant emerging economies like Ethiopia subject to advanced industrialisation, which 
increasingly depends on knowledge and demands sophisticated approaches. 
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FDI is an important source of private capital and has the potential to promote economic growth, 
diversification, and intensification, enhance skills development, facilitate the transfer of technology and 
access to foreign markets, improve the competitiveness of domestic firms by creating capacity for value-
addition, as well as spawn the development of new economic sectors. For instance, Mauritius and the 
second-tiers of the Southeast Asian developmental states used FDI successfully in this way, using public 
investment in infrastructure, training, and skills to attract sectors producing goods and services with a high 
value-added component (UNCTAD, 2005; Ajayi, 2006). Hence, to attract considerable FDI, Ethiopia tried to 
give special investment incentives to create a favourable business environment for foreign capital, such as 
leasing virgin farmlands, bestowing tax holidays and tax relief to foreign investors to promote large-scale 
commercial farming and the manufacturing sub-sector. These foreign companies and domestic private 
sectors, which invest in large-scale commercial agriculture, are expected to be a source of job opportunities, 
foreign exchange, and technology and knowledge transfer. Furthermore, recently the manufacturing sector 
has been drawing foreign companies to the textile and leather industries due to the existence of cheap labour, 
competitive electricity prices, duty, and quota-free access to the US and EU markets, tax exemptions and tax 
holidays (US Department of State, 2014).  
However, this attraction of FDI has free from criticism coming from a few international organisations related 
‘land grabs’ in large-scale commercial farming and the ‘crowding-out’ of the domestic private sector. 
Regardless of the extent of the problems, in practice, there are different problems related to the 
implementation of these large-scale commercial agricultural programmes, and other mega-development 
projects in the country. Many of the problems basically raised due to the political elites/state functionaries at 
different levels lacked the commitment and professionalism required to implement the development 
programmes, as well as lack of commitment from the private sectors themselves to work as per their 
agreement (Jebena, 2015). However, in practice, no one has denied the possible environmental or social 
problems associated with any development project; but what is required is that these investment projects 
should be undertaken only after a social cost–benefit analysis and feasibility study. It is expected that in 
developing countries like Ethiopia, which have the potential, the large-scale commercial agricultural 
development and other mega projects aimed to bring positive socio-economic outcomes (both in short- and 
long-terms), by improving the life of the community and positively contributing to the overall economic 
growth and development of the country. Therefore, Ethiopia can continue to use its natural resources in a 
sustainable manner to accelerate its development process if it strengthens the regulatory capacity of its public 
sector and institutions to prevent the wastage and misuse of resources by the private sectors. 
4.7 The role of a developmental state in the provision of basic social services 
State intervention in the developing economy enhances socio-economic development by allocating resources 
for health, education, potable water and other social safety nets. In such economy, the absence of state 
intervention has increased poverty and inequality, and excluded the poor from benefiting from economic 
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growth. One of the features of a developmental state is to improve the social well-being of the society 
because the free market does not care about those who cannot afford to pay the market prices. The provision 
of basic social services and essential infrastructure by the state contributes to boosting economic 
development and improving the lives of communities, particularly the poor (Fakir, 2007). The skills and 
values required to provide public services are defined by the development priorities and challenges, and the 
specific institutional conditions that exist or need to be created. The coordination of development is essential 
to ensure that the public service and operations of other public institutions are aligned with the national 
development agenda (Fakir, 2007). 
The public service should be responsive to the development challenges, while being aware of the context and 
environment in which it operates. In Ethiopia, the main basic services that are directly supported by the state 
at grassroots (village) level are education, health, agriculture, a potable water supply, electricity, and rural 
road infrastructure. The fulfilment of such basic social services is crucial because today’s development 
approach is a more holistic endeavour and capability enhancing. Accordingly, spending in the health sector 
is focused on health-extension workers (HEWs), while spending in the educational sector is focused on 
teacher and school infrastructure development. Similarly, spending in the agricultural sector is on 
agricultural-extension workers; in the water sector, spending is on maintenance and operation; and spending 
on rural roads is focuses on both their maintenance and the mobilisation of the community to participate in 
new road construction (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2010). 
The social objectives in the Constitution of the FDRE, Article (90) sub-Article (1), recognises that ‘To the 
extent the country's resources permit, policies shall aim to provide all Ethiopians access to public health and 
education, clean water, housing, food and social security’ (FDRE, 1995:33). The provision of a clean water 
supply and sanitation is embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Constitution of the 
FDRE recognised that clean water and sanitation contribute to the creation of a healthy and active workforce, 
which drives the national economy forward. Access to a water supply was measured against certain targets 
and benchmarks: there should be a public potable-water stand within a 1.5km radius in rural areas, and 
within a 0.5km radius in urban areas. The consumption standard is 15litres per person per day for the rural 
community and 25litres per day for the urban community. Based on these benchmarks, in 2010 access to a 
potable-water supply was estimated at 68.5% nationally, with regional differences of 65.8% in rural areas, 
and 91.5% in urban centres (Negash, 2011). 
Owing to the country’s strong push to achieve middle-income status by the mid-2020s (MoFED, 2010; 
Negash, 2011), the federal, regional and district (woreda) governments have prioritised the attainment of 
visible development outcomes as fast as possible, especially in the provision of basic social services, based 
on the principle of universal access for all. The state has high expectations of better performance from its 
bureaucracy (state institutions) at all levels in the provision of basic social services to the society. The 
individuals who are responsible for moving their communities towards specific development outcomes are at 
the centre of the relationship between policy-makers at the top, alongside service providers, and service 
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receivers at the bottom (Khan et al., 2014). Ethiopia’s relatively well-developed system of fiscal 
decentralisation facilitates the delivery of these basic service-provision programmes by channelling 
resources to the woreda level to finance the recurrent expenses incurred in the expansion and delivery of 
these services to the community at the grassroots level (Khan et al., 2014). 
HEWs, for instance, promote preventive behaviours, healthy lifestyle practices and provide basic or 
universal health interventions to the community, particularly in the rural areas. Furthermore, additional 
teachers are being hired to increase both gross and net enrolment rates to achieve universal primary 
education for all. The agricultural extension workers teach farmers about the benefits of better farming 
techniques such as the use of improved seeds, fertiliser, irrigation, watershed management and other modern 
farming practices to boost farmers’ productivity and production. The provision of these basic social services 
is geared towards benefiting the lower-income population to narrow the gap in income distribution. The 
development projects in the social sectors emphasise wealth distribution among the entire population in an 
egalitarian manner, by creating access to opportunities for development. This suggests that Ethiopia’s 
development strategies and public expenditure are both pro-poor and pro-growth in practice. Government 
leadership (both political and bureaucratic) has tried to play a key role in improving the performance of and 
access to basic social services (health and education sectors, water and sanitation, and extension services) by 
mobilising and effectively using resources from both domestic and external sources. Investment in the social 
sector has a significant multiplier effect for economic growth and intergenerational benefits, and ensures the 
equitable distribution of resources. 
4.7.1 The role of the state in the provision of health and education services 
The developmental state in Ethiopia has shown a strong commitment to improve the health of its people and 
per-capita government expenditure on health increased accordingly. A report commissioned by the Tony 
Blair Africa Governance Initiative, and written by the staff of the Boston Consulting Group, praised Ethiopia 
as one of the SSA countries that has been most successful in translating recent economic growth into 
programmes that enhance the well-being of its population (Baker et al., 2013). These gains have been driven 
by improvements in healthcare and the country has successfully instituted a primary health programme, 
which is transforming the health situation of its citizens. The Health Extension Programme (HEP) played a 
big role in the improvement of the primary healthcare service and the HEWs are the major force behind these 
changes (Baker et al., 2013). 
International health experts generally agree that community health workers (i.e. HEWs) should play a 
significant role in the formal health-care system. In this regard, Ethiopia is a model in the SSA region (Singh 
& Sachs, 2013). The HEP has been successful, largely because of the strong political commitment to 
strengthen the health system, with the goal of improving the coverage and access to primary health care in 
the poor rural areas. Investment in the HEWs has been part of a wider package of the HEP support services 
and is showing promising results, despite some remaining weaknesses; not all regions have shown a similar 
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level of success (Admasu, 2013). However, the government has shown its political commitment and 
leadership, which has resulted in impressive health service coverage and an enhanced responsiveness to 
community health needs. Health planning and interventions are carried out after extensive consultations and 
consensus building with multiple stakeholders at different levels (UNDP, 2015). 
Ethiopia’s HEP is a novel way to deliver affordable health-care services to the majority at the grassroots 
level. HEP brings community participation via community organisation and mobilisation through continuous 
awareness creation and behavioural change. The key strategy is the organisation of the ‘Health Development 
Army’ (HDA), also called the Women’s Development Army (WDA), which consists mainly of groups of 
volunteer women; it is a household organisation with approximately 25 to 30 members in each group. The 
HDA delivers key health messages to the community to increase the utilisation of family-planning services; 
to improve maternal health; to encourage expectant mothers to deliver their babies in health-care facilities; to 
monitor and regularly report on the health status of the members of their respective groups to health-
extension workers; and to facilitate better access to health care information. The HDA is a community-level 
movement that functions through participatory learning and action meetings. It is an unprecedented platform 
to engage the community in the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of health-care 
interventions at the community level (Admasu, 2013). The HDA is a community movement that helps to 
consolidate the gains from the HEP and promote community ownership of the programme. It was formed to 
meet the priorities set in the health development programme. The HDA consists of more than two million, 
one-to-five peer networks that have been established nationwide (UNDP, 2015). 
The HEP is one of the innovative, community-based, health-service programmes that were introduced as 
pilots in four regions of the country in 2003/04. As the Ministry of Health (MOH) states, the HEP is 
designed to diffuse the relevant basic-health services to households to raise their awareness about 
safeguarding their own and community health conditions (Ghebreyesus, 2010). To achieve this, about 34382 
female HEWs were trained, and assigned to every rural village. Similarly, about 5080 HEWs have assigned 
to urban centres to implement the HEP packages (MOH, 2010). The HEWs serve as frontline health-care 
staff in their respective communities; they increase the level of health awareness and serve as the primary 
spokespeople, disseminating information on family planning and the importance of preventing prevalent 
diseases. Various evaluations in low-income countries have found that the HEPs have a significant tangible 
effect on rural communities’ awareness of disease prevention, family health, hygiene, and environmental 
sanitation. Ethiopia’s situation is coincided with that of these other low-income countries, where 
decentralised expenditure has been shown to improve health outcomes (Faguet & Ali, 2009). 
The woreda-level spending appears to be pro-poor and pro-growth, focusing on the health and education 
sectors to create access and opportunities for communities at the local level. For instance, spending on 
education at the woreda level tends to be pro-poor, with the bottom 40% benefiting from 56% of the total 
expenditure, and the top quintile (20%) benefiting from 13% of that expenditure. The per-capita, woreda-
level spending on education was nearly three times higher for the bottom quintile than for the top quintile. 
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Similarly, for the health sector, 63% of woreda health expenditure accrued to the bottom 40%, whereas only 
10% accrued to the top quintile. The benefit from per-capita health expenditure accruing to someone in the 
bottom quintile was more than three times higher than it was for someone in the top quintile (World Bank, 
2014b). 
Table 4.6: Incidence of woreda-level expenditure by wealth quintile (in 2011) 
Sector  Bottom 40% 
share (in %) 
Top 20% 
share (in %) 
Multiple by which bottom quintile 
exceed top quintile  
Education 56 13 2.7 
Health  63 10 3.4 
Both education and health 58 12 2.9 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2014b) 
As Table 4.6 indicates, spending on primary education and health care at the woreda level is pro-poor, while 
overall education and health spending by the federal state is not necessarily pro-poor. Table 4.7 also shows 
that the primary school enrolment rate and primary-health coverage has improved from its low level in the 
1990s (MoFED, 2013). As a consequence of these and other social development measures, the life 
expectancy rate rose from 57years in 2004/05 to 62.2years in 2012/13 (UNDP, 2015). The state is also looks 
committed to achieve basic education for all and has developed a workable educational policy to improve 
access. Accordingly, the literacy rate has increased over time both in rural and urban areas as a result of 
increased in gross enrolment in primary education; the state’s goal is to achieve universal access to primary 
education for all. 
Table 4.7: Social-sector development in Ethiopia before and after the developmental state 
 
Indicators  
 Before   After   
1995/96 2002/03 2005/06 2009/10 2012/13 
Health coverage (in %)  40 60 71 89 93.4 
Number of health centres  246 412 644 2142 3100 
Number of hospitals  73 115 131 200 NA 
Education coverage (in %)    
Primary school NER  36.6 61.6 69 82.1 85.9 
Secondary school NER NA 17.1 25 38.1 39 
Source: Compiled from CSA (2011); MoFED (2010) & UNDP (2015) 
The educational sector has indeed, undergone impressive expansion in recent years through the growth of 
both formal and informal education programmes. Although the state has consistently increased its 
expenditure on education, this is not equal across regions or across rural and urban areas. This leads to 
differences in access and coverage because of different social, cultural, and economic ways of life, and the 
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commitment of state institutions at different levels. This disparity is much more pronounced in secondary 
education enrolment. Much of the bottleneck in secondary school enrolment is due to the urban 
concentration of these schools. Ethiopia’s predominantly rural population is not well served by the existing 
urban concentration of secondary schools due to different factors, including the physical distance of these 
schools. However, the largest proportion of recurrent expenditure at the woreda level is allocated to primary 
education, which is in line with the government’s commitment to realise equity and universal access to basic 
education. Public expenditure on education has been increased and this has contributed to significant 
increases in the number of schools, better teacher-development programmes, and revisions of the curricula, 
efficient planning, and resources for schools, and the implementation of targeted interventions to increase 
girls’ access to primary education. 
There is no doubt that education is one of the most important preconditions for social and economic 
development, and is a powerful catalyst in the process of modernising the society. Formal education, 
particularly, provides the necessary skills for nation-building, improves the quality of labour and other 
resources, plays a part in opening opportunities for social mobility, increases the aspiration for development 
and changes attitudes. Hence, the Ethiopian government tried to give due attention for developing and 
implementing workable education and training policies supposed as an important lever for enhancing 
productivity and production, as well as employment generation. The country has made significant progress 
and has successfully reached the gross enrolment ratio in primary education, meeting other middle-income 
countries, although the overall education profile remains relatively low (World Bank, 2015).  
However, the largest proportion of capital expenditure for education is allocated to secondary education, 
higher education and technical, vocational education and training (TVET) institutions. For instance, until 
2002/03 there were only two universities and few colleges at national level. After the country adopted the 
developmental state model, the state paid due attention to human capital development and aggressively 
expanded its higher education institutions. By 2004/05, there were eight public universities, and today this 
number has increased to 33 universities. Furthermore, the government plans to build another 13 new 
universities in the coming five-year period (medium-term plan from 2015/16 to 2019/20) to achieve the 
standard of one university per two million people on average. In addition to universities, there are hundreds 
of colleges and TVET centres (both public and private) throughout the country, which provides trainings for 
the youth, equipping them with theoretical and practical skills to grow a middle-level labour force for the 
economy. This huge public investment in education indicates how the Ethiopian state understood the role of 
human capital development for efficient and innovative development processes.  
More recently, the policy directive has expanded secondary school enrolments, and focused on science and 
technology at tertiary level, which will expect to have significant spill-over effect for the emerging economy. 
Skill development has been given top priority because ultimately it is central to both capability enhancement 
and national prosperity. However, progress in education has encountered several challenges. The first is that 
the quality of education has been deteriorating; however, the government is now trying to improve this 
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through school-improvement programmes financed under the General Education Quality Improvement 
Programme (GEQIP). This programme aims to improve educational quality by creating conducive school 
environment through teachers’ development programmes, curricula support, and improved management 
planning and budget capacity. Secondly, budget allocation should be channelled into quality improvement, 
such as the upgrading of school facilities, but operational budget constraints are pivotal. For instance, about 
35% of the recurrent budget for primary education is funded by external aid, a trend that may not be 
sustainable in the long-term (MoFED, 2013).  
Whatever the challenges in the provision of basic social services and the extent of problems in this sector, 
Ethiopia needs to build continuously its human capital to achieve national prosperity. Having enough amount 
of human capital in the economy supposed to create new opportunities for absorbing innovative technologies 
and knowledge. In addition, economic growth could be more stable and sustain because of investment in 
human capital, which is critical for an innovative approach to diversifying and transforming the economy. In 
general, committed political leadership and a competent elite bureaucracy, accompanied by well-functioning 
context-specific institutions should be at the centre to ensure balanced socio-economic growth in urban and 
rural areas in all regions. 
4.7.2 The role of the state in augmenting agricultural-extension services  
Agriculture is the backbone of the Ethiopian economy and underpins inclusive and broad-based growth. 
Under the ADLI long-term development strategy, agricultural growth is expected to spur industrialisation 
through backward and forward linkages. Moreover, agricultural development is part of a broader rural 
development strategy, including rural-infrastructure development, expansion of education and improved 
health services. The ADLI thus provided the guiding framework for successive medium-term development 
plans (Dorosh & Rashid, 2013). The agricultural sector requires better technologies to boost productivity and 
to raise farm income at the household level. Extension services are crucial to demonstrate the value of new 
agricultural technologies to farmers, and to teach them how to use these and eventually scale them up at the 
community level (Chang, 2009).  
The agricultural extension services are critical for enabling farmers to obtain information and technologies 
that can improve their livelihoods, and are an important factor in promoting agricultural development. From 
a development policy perspective, investments in extension services are essential for improving agricultural 
productivity and increasing farmers’ income (Anderson, 2007) through improved agricultural technologies 
and better practices. Farmers who are targeted by extension services need to undergo a certain process before 
they can achieve improved productivity and production. The process includes awareness, knowledge, 
adoption of technology and changes in the farmers’ productivity (FAO, 1997). 
Most extension models have common characteristics such as addressing farmers without restrictions, using 
mass-communication methods, extending agent–farmer and farmer-to-farmer relations and placing 
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professional extension workers at village level (Anderson, 2007). However, many agricultural extension 
services in developing countries have been poor in quality, underfunded and have suffered from poor 
coordination with agricultural research. Extension services are effective when farmers can absorb new 
knowledge and even make further incremental improvements (Chang, 2009). Therefore, extension systems 
need to expand beyond the transfer of technology for producing major food crops to achieve short-term 
national food self-sufficiency and food security. As developing countries achieve rapid economic growth, 
consumption patterns begin to move towards higher-value crops and livestock products. Increasing both 
domestic- and global-market demand creates many new economic opportunities for smallholder farmers to 
increase their income through greater productivity and production (Swanson, 2009). 
Ethiopia’s development policies are considered geared towards achieving rural and agricultural 
transformation, which puts smallholder farmers at the centre. Public expenditure on agriculture and rural 
development accounts for about 16% of the annual government budget, which is among the highest rates of 
spending on the continent, where only seven African countries have allocated 10% of their annual budget. 
This implies that Ethiopia might have the largest state involvement in the agriculture sector from any country 
in the African continent (Davis et al., 2010; Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2010). The government’s 
commitment to building rural roads, irrigation infrastructure, health posts and centres, schools, provide 
potable water, supply of credit and other basic infrastructure/services are supposed to be vital to accelerate 
rural development programmes. Some of the benefits of the extension services include: (1) ‘Achieving 
national food self-sufficiency and food security through technology adoption and transfer. (2)‘Increasing 
farm income through a more market-driven extension strategy that will enable farmers to intensify and 
diversify their farming systems’.(3) ‘Empowering farmers by getting them organised into groups (social 
capital) based on common interests, to gain more efficient access to both inputs and markets’. (4)‘Promoting 
sustainable natural resource conservation and management practices to address soil fertility, land 
degradation, and other major problems’ (Swanson, 2009). 
Under the agricultural extension programme, the government has increased the number and educational level 
of development agents (DAs) at agricultural colleges/TVET centres, and through the establishment of FTCs 
as demonstration centre at village level. These extension and training programmes are designed to enhance 
farmers’ capacity to use improved agricultural technologies, including the efficient use of water resources, 
and to build community-level institutional arrangements necessary for effective water-resource management. 
To realise these basic benefits, the state has assigned three DAs to each rural village to look after crop 
production, livestock, and natural-resource management. In addition, one veterinary worker is assigned to 
every three villages (tabias), as well as cooperative agents and one irrigation professional where these 
villages have access to irrigation infrastructure. The government also provides key physical agricultural 
inputs for farm households, because some of these inputs require huge public investment. Overall, the 
country has assigned about 60,000DAs (see Table 4.8) throughout the rural villages. Given that, there are 
approximately 21.8million adults (aged18–65years) who are active in agriculture, and there is roughly one 
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DA for every 476farmers and this is one of the highest ratios in the world. Moreover, the government shows 
its commitment to expand further this strong agricultural field extension presence and to diversify the 
services aimed to become one of the most intensive systems in the world (Davis et al., 2010). 
Table 4.8: The ratio of development agents (DAs) to farm households 
Indicators/countries Ethiopia  China Indonesia  Tanzania Nigeria India 
Total no. of DAs (000) 60 800 30 7 5 60 
Farmers per DA 476 625 1 667 2 500 3 333 5 000 
DAs per 10 000 farmers 21 16 6 4 3 2 
 Source: Adapted from Davis et al. (2010) 
The government acknowledged the need for enough trained human resources for the extension programme to 
continue in order to bring high rates of adoption of improved agricultural techniques to boost productivity. 
The plan to use the agricultural TVET centres to train DAs has been in place since early 2000. In addition, 
more than 10 000 development hubs or farmers training centres (FTCs) at the village (tabia) level have been 
created to enable the delivery of extension services. The FTCs are community centres where farmers receive 
information, training, demonstration, and advice related to their farming livelihood. These are managed at 
the village (tabia) level and funding for capital and operational costs come from the woreda administration. 
The FTCs are at different performance levels within the regions, as well as within in the woredas, but they 
are generally considered by the government as a strong public asset base on which the country can build and 
to reach out the rural community or smallholder farmers. This opens an opportunity to establish world-class 
extension service in the future by focusing on building the skills and capabilities of the DAs, and equipping 
the FTCs with the necessary technologies and equipment. 
The FTCs have the potential to be effective revenue-generating and teaching tools to demonstrate to farmers 
how they can increase their farm incomes. Some of these FTCs are introducing technical and market-driven 
innovations to farmers, such as ‘zero grazing’, which accelerate the fattening of livestock and allows for the 
efficient collection and use of manure for organic fertiliser and cooking fuel (Davis et al., 2010; Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, 2010). Consequently, those who considered as model farmers by government are 
using more intensive production methods; they are changing their farming systems to include double 
cropping, and they are beginning to produce different high-value crops and livestock products. Most model 
farmers are keen to change and they see the extension programme as the primary source of information, 
training, and advisory services, which can help them to increase their farm income. 
To strengthen agricultural extension services and overall rural development, the government has established 
a farmers’ movement in the main development fronts, such as in agriculture, education, and health, which is 
known as ‘developmental army building’ (Yelimat serawit ginbata in Amharic). Model farmers are selected 
based on criteria such as raising productivity and production, producing more than twice a year using 
irrigation technology, relative wealth status, supporting and encouraging other neighbourhood farmers, 
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participating in and being at the forefront of community development, and having the ability to maintain 
relations with local authorities (Chinigò, 2014). Since 2011, the developmental state has encouraged the 
establishment of micro-institutions below village level to rationalise development interventions, input 
distribution, and enable farmers to share their farming practices. As Chinigò (2014) explains, there are at 
least two types of farmers’ organisations. The first is the ‘developmental army’ (Yelimat serawit in Amharic) 
in different development fronts. The developmental army is a group of farmers that comprised 25–30 
neighbourhood farmers who are tasked to promote social, economic, and political development. The second 
type comprises one to five networks, where one of them is the model farmer, who is recognised as their 
representative. These groups help to improve the local government’s ability to serve farmers and spread 
development opportunities to individual farmers.  
To motivate the farmers, yearly farmers’ festivals are organised at district (woreda), regional and national 
levels to award the best-performing farmers. In addition, best-performing DAs, agricultural researchers and 
other stakeholders who support the agricultural sector are part of the award and motivation in this annual 
farmers’ festival. This motivation is provided by the state aimed to boost the agricultural sector, and to 
encourage other farmers and stakeholders to exert their development endeavours. In Ethiopia, extension 
services are provided primarily by the public sector and they operate in a decentralised manner, whereby the 
extension programme is implemented at the woreda and village levels under the Office of Agriculture and 
Rural Development, the Farmers’ Cooperative Agency and the FTCs. The extension services emphasise 
technology adoption and modern agricultural inputs, boosting productivity and production, and livestock and 
natural-resource management. The main objectives are to improve farm-household incomes by increasing 
productivity, ensuring food self-sufficiency and  food security, promoting farmers’ organisations like the 
Farmers’ Cooperative Association and water-users’ associations, increasing production of export crops, 
conserving natural resources, and promoting inclusive participation in rural-development programmes. 
Both the domestic and international markets for different high-value agricultural products are increasing 
rapidly and these changes in market demand offer new opportunities for smallholder farmers to increase their 
income and improve their rural livelihoods. These new, high-value crops and livestock products are also 
more labour-intensive, so these enterprises can create new employment opportunities (Swanson, 2009). 
Furthermore, empirical evidence from India and other Asian countries shows that agricultural extension 
systems that facilitate the innovation of farmers to produce market-driven products play a significant role in 
increasing farm income, improving rural livelihoods, and accelerating the agricultural development process 
(Singh et al., 2006). Hence, Ethiopia’s focus on extension services is almost coincided with the practices in 
the developing countries in Asia.  
However, this does not mean that the extension service sub-sector is free from constraints and that all farm 
households’ benefit equally. Like other social development sectors, there are differences among regional 
states, woredas and villages in terms of expenditure, performance and commitment by stakeholders, and 
agro-ecological disparities. Although spending on agriculture extension at the woreda level increases the use 
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of improved farming techniques for all groups of farmers, in contrast to education and health, the impact is 
relatively low in the bottom quintile. This may reflect financial constraints in purchasing and investing in 
improved techniques (World Bank, 2014b; Khan et al., 2014). Among other things, input prices of modern 
farming technologies are a major constraint for poorer farmers. The state could address these constraints by 
improving access to rural finance through the expansion of rural credit and saving institutions, as well as 
credit cooperatives (Ragasa et al., 2012). 
4.8 Discussion, synthesis and summary  
The success of the East Asian developmental states attributed to committed political leadership, strong 
bureaucracy, and state institutions. The political wing in these countries gave relative autonomy to civil 
servants or the state bureaucracy to decide on economic issues and, as a result, these bureaucracies were able 
to put these countries on a path of unprecedented economic growth and transformation (Asayehgn, 2012). 
The role of the state is critical so long as there is committed leadership, selflessness and highly efficient 
bureaucratic structures, and institutions devoid of rent-seeking behaviour. In Ethiopia, the developmental 
state has tried to include civil servants in the process of eradication of poverty and transformation of the 
nation. Moreover, the civil servants are playing their role in building the developmental army in major 
development fronts at the community level. However, the link between the civil servants and the public are 
weak and have not yet reached the levels achieved by the East Asian developmental states, and considerable 
effort is needed to strengthen the linkages at all levels (Asayehgn, 2012; Melke, 2013).  
If Ethiopia desires to use the state bureaucracy as a vehicle to tackle the deep-rooted developmental 
problems, it needs to improve the public administration sector, which could make the employees from the 
various institutions politically neutral and professionally competent. A recent World Bank study on the 
public-sector reform programme in Ethiopia reveals that there has been an overall improvement across the 
various levels of government bureaucratic institutions (World Bank, 2013b). Civil servants who manage the 
bureaucracy have clearly divided functions, partly they are recruited based on meritocracy, and they have 
improved their skills through various experiential learning seminars and training to upgrade their 
professional standards and skills (Asayehgn, 2012). However, it is difficult to conclude that the institutions 
within which the various functionaries operate (bureaucratic institutions) are completely autonomous and 
free from the influence of the ruling elite in practice. In particular, the higher positions in many 
governmental departments are assigned according to an ethnic-based quota system. Thus, the ethnic based 
politics of the country is considering as one of adverse factors to the autonomy of the state bureaucracy and 
structurally weaken its functions (Jebena, 2015). As a result, the bureaucratic institutions and the  
bureaucratic elites who design and manage short and long term plans of the country are not politically 
neutral, rather they are highly influenced by the ruling elites/politicians (Asayehgn, 2012; Jebena, 2015).  
This implies that Ethiopia has not yet reached to the levels of Botswana and Mauritius, or the East Asian 
developmental states, though these countries are relatively homogenous in terms of culture, ethnicity and 
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other aspects in comparison to Ethiopia. However, without competent, merit-based bureaucracy, the country 
faces failures in implementation of development projects and exposed to the rent-seeking and corruption 
practices (Jebena, 2015). As Johnson (1982:316) states, ‘‘the political system of the developmental state 
covertly separates reigning and ruling: the politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule”. This Johnson’s 
statement indicates that the politicians should provide enough space for the bureaucrats to rule by 
controlling/managing special interests for the benefit of the masses, as well as give emphasis about the 
importance of the bureaucracy for the development process. However, there is no country in the world that 
has ever succeeded in achieving this in practice and the political elites are always in a position to influence 
the bureaucracy, like what we have been stated the case of Ethiopia.     
Ethiopia’s overriding national challenge is to end extreme poverty and social inequalities based on 
contextualised development policies and strategies.  To realise this, it is necessary to develop a competent 
state bureaucracy and an autonomous institutional environment, which would be less likely to be influenced 
by the ruling political elites and interest groups. In addition, Ethiopia is tried to making a tremendous effort 
to build steady and inclusive
44
 capitalist economy and it has tried to ‘crowd-in’ the private sector (which 
considered to play a pivotal role for sound economic growth/development), as well as combat poverty and 
achieve near full employment. Ethiopia shifted away from the non-context-specific, neoliberal development 
approach, because it recognised the need for a capable context-specific developmental state to facilitate the 
development process of the nation. Active state intervention is desirable to allocate public rents (public 
resources) in a productive manner for the betterment of the people and to transform the economy by creating 
an environment that would be conducive for business to all stakeholders in the economy. Leadership 
commitment and ability to mobilise resources for building a national consensus is considered as one of the 
essential elements of the developmental state. However, in the case of Ethiopia political differences are 
chronic, which impede for the possibility of creating national consensus on all major issues. Of course, many 
of the differences are fundamental to the views of different political groups on issues such as ethnic 
federalism
45
 as a political arrangement, the appropriateness of developmental state as an ideology, the 
democratisation process of the country, conditions of human rights and political freedom, etc. (Jebena, 
2015). 
                                                     
44
 Inclusive growth is a concept which advances equitable opportunities for all economic participants (economic 
agents/actors) during the process of economic growth with benefits accruing to every section of society. That means, 
assuring economic security and welfare for all human beings (Jacobs et al., 2017). 
45
 Ethiopian ethnic federalism includes ethnically defined national citizenship, self-administration on an ethno-linguistic 
basis as enshrined in the constitution, ethnically defined political representation and decision making at all 
administrative levels. In fact, the ethnic federalism is a clear break with the past, which allows people to be involved 
with and understand local government. However, the lack of clarity and incompetence among the lower level hierarchy 
of government structure is remaining serious challenge (Jebena, 2015). 
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National consensus in a country like Ethiopia, where there are diverse ethnic groups, is paramount and 
essential
46
 but it is not an easy task to attain it in the short-run. This is due to the existence of 
diverse/heterogeneous characteristics (in terms of ethnicity, religion, culture, social structure, politics…) of 
the nation it would be difficult to build a national consensus in majority of the issues (Balema, 2014; Jebena, 
2015). Given these challenges, to realise national consensus on major issues, the Ethiopian state should 
encourage the involvement of the community or the citizen in all development aspects, make sure that all 
economic agents/actors are get equal opportunity for development and receive proportionate share from the 
fruits of the development process.  The Ethiopian state has tried to build a national consensus to fight against 
poverty, and conserve natural resources through soil and water conservation campaigns to build a green 
economy. However, there are still challenges because there are individuals or groups that move against the 
planned direction of the state and as a nation, further efforts are needed to narrow down the gap and 
accelerate the project of transformation. One of the mechanisms to narrow down these gaps are by 
accelerating the development process and improving the well-being of the masses through creating equal 
development opportunities for all. In addition, creating a broad cross-section of ties between the state and 
society helps to boost the participation of citizens in planning, implementation, and evaluation of the 
development process at different levels.  
To transform the ‘pervasive rent-seeking political economy’ to more ‘value-creation conducive’ situations, 
to accelerate development and ensure that the citizenry benefits from the fruits of this are considered as the 
key tasks by the Ethiopian developmental state (Zenawi, 2006; Ohno, 2009). The adoption of a context-
specific developmental state ideology, nurturing context-specific institutions and policy instruments could 
consider to curtailing rent-seeking and promoting value-creation practices. Creating a national consensus is 
essential to make the general population patriotic and rally behind the developmental strategies. 
Accordingly, the state tried to invest large amount of public funds for building basic infrastructure, as well as 
to provide basic social services to create an environment that is conducive to the development process. 
Although further progress is needed, Ethiopia tried to achieve a substantial expansion in energy, road, 
railways, and telecom infrastructure, as well as provision of basic social service sectors (such as in 
education, health, potable water supply and sanitation) yet. The public investment rate rose from about 5% of 
GDP in the early 1990s to 20% of GDP in 2011—the third highest worldwide (World Bank, 2013b). For 
instance, power generation capacity increased from 473MW in 2002/03 to about 4200MW in 2015/16. The 
federal and regional road network increased from 26500km in 1997 to 100,000km in 2015. Railway lines 
connecting Addis Ababa with the Port of Djibouti are completed and a Light Railway line in the capital is 
now operational (World Bank, 2016). Indeed, implementing these pro-development policies has supposed by 
                                                     
46
 Creating nationalistic attitude is important for a developmental state to make the general population rally behind 
government policies and strategies. This implies that patriotic attitude of the mass is one of the core values of people in 
developmental state. For instance, a developmental state of South Korea is well explained by the existence of such kind 
of social capital, which has now brought about what is called “Miracle at the Han River” (Kebede, 2015). 
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the government as the biggest catalyst in the nation’s high growth rates, and has laid the foundation for 
national consensus on the need for sustainable development to eradicate poverty.  
The state tried to invest substantial public resources for the development of basic infrastructure to accelerate 
the development process. The expansion of infrastructure supposed to create an environment conducive to 
the private sector to invest in the productive sectors, which is considered by the government as indispensable 
in terms of creating decent employment opportunities and boosting level of export. The private sectors also 
invest substantial amounts of resources in social sectors (education and health) to strengthen the country’s 
human capital capacity to manage resource rents and the efficient utilisation of these resources to diversify 
the economy. However, Ethiopian government has struggled to build the necessary human capital and 
physical infrastructure but the government should not yet invest more in R&D, and science and technology 
to satisfy the required human capacity to accelerate industrialisation and sustain economic development. 
Ethiopia should learn more from the East Asian countries industrialisation process, which has been driven by 
learning processes, borrowing technologies and an array of policies, including targeted taxation, protection 
of domestic industries, increase the supply of skilled and educated labour forces to the economy, and the 
development of infrastructure. 
In Ethiopia, the demand for energy has increased dramatically due to the boom in economic growth/ 
development. For instance, up to 2010, over the first decade of the twenty-first century, the demand was on 
average 10.7% per year but since 2010 onwards this demand increasing up to more than 20% per year. The 
major drivers of this growth demand in energy in the near future include expansion of the industrial sector, 
irrigation projects, a new national railway network and urban light railway system and the country’s 
implementation of the UN’s Universal Electricity Access Program (Kahsay et al., 2015).  Hence, to sustain 
economic growth and meet the growing demand for energy, the government considered further investment 
will require for the development of the country's energy sector by both the government and the private 
sectors. The expansion of the energy sector has to considered having a positive spill-over effect and has 
helped to facilitate the transformation of the economy from being dependent on agriculture to the broader 
productive industry and service sectors. Since it supposed that Ethiopia’s energy has generated mainly from 
renewable resources (i.e. hydropower, wind, solar and geothermal) this is facilitating its green economic 
development goal and enabling it environmentally sustainable. The country is constructing several 
hydroelectric dams to generate enough electricity to meet the increasing national demand and to produce a 
surplus for export to neighbouring countries. For instance, the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile has 
become the symbol of the nation’s green economy strategy based on the development of renewable-energy 
sources (Balema, 2014). Major infrastructure projects, such as the Ethiopia Grand Renaissance Dam, are 
implemented to symbolise a new and modern era for the country (World Bank, 2016). This does not mean 
that such a big hydropower project is free from different socio-economic and environmental impacts like 
other mega projects somewhere else (see Box 4.1) but what is required is tried to minimize such impacts via  
conducting appropriate feasibility study.  
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The green development process will encourage the shift from resource exploitation and harsh ecological 
impacts to a more long-term sustainable and environmentally friendly development process (Swilling, 2010). 
However, there is abounding evidence to show that the challenges and existential threats posed by ecological 
imbalances cannot be effectively managed, or addressed only by market mechanisms (Jacobs et al., 2017). 
Consequently, Ethiopia has tried to put considerable efforts into building a green economy via its relative 
huge investment in the renewable-energy sector and in sustainable watershed/natural-resource management 
programmes (FDRE, 2011). For instance, natural resource conservation (large-scale soil and water 
conservation practices) has been given due priority in the consecutive mid-term five-year development plans 
including the GTP-I and the GTP-II because it supposed to play a crucial role in ensuring sustainable 
development (UNDP, 2015). The major activities related to natural resource conservation are physical and 
biological soil conservation, agro-forestry practices, area closure and afforestation, rehabilitation of degraded 
remnant forest areas through enrichment planting and enclosure by local communities, and the upgrading of 
the existing national parks and the establishment of new national parks (Ministry of Environment and Forest, 
2014). Other advantages of building a green economy is that it utilises local resources more effectively and 
creates employment opportunities because it is more labour-intensive than traditional fossil-fuel-based 
economic activities. A green economy creates more equitable and inclusive economic growth, which is 
critical for poverty reduction. 
The developmental state in Ethiopia has started to play a crucial role in the economy by providing basic 
social services, investing in pro-poor and pro-growth economic sectors, promoting equitable resource 
distribution and responding to the market failures through its selective public-investment intervention. For 
instance, as Table 4.5 indicated that more than two-third of its annual budget is supposed to allocating into 
the pro-poor and pro-growth sectors (CSA, 2011). Although the absolute income inequality or socio-
economic differences getting wider and wider, particularly in the urban areas, the relative income inequality 
is relative low, i.e. the Gini coefficient of the country is about 0.3 (UNDP, 2015) in comparison to South 
Africa and Botswana, which their Gini coefficient is greater than 0.6.  Furthermore, it has tried to build a 
competitive economy by encouraging the growth of private-sector enterprises; boosting public investment in 
infrastructure and institutions to create conducive investment environment; promoting economic 
diversification and creating employment opportunities to address unemployment and inequalities, as well as 
the existing abject poverty. This is a kind of economic rent distribution is important for the accumulation of 
social, physical, and human capital, which is pivotal in accelerating economic growth, increasing returns to 
scale in the economy and improving the standards of living. Therefore, a developmental state is able to direct 
the development process by creating an environment conducive to the private sector and allocation of public 
resources in effective manner. This indicates that the state can be supposed to play a significant role in 
maintaining competitiveness to use public resources (physical and human) efficiently to fulfil the national 
interest. 
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The effort to build a developmental state is facing serious challenges at its infant stage though the country 
has made significant progress at different socio-economic aspects. The challenges particularly emanate from 
weak bureaucracy [due to the recruitment criteria based on ethnic quota and political affiliation (particularly 
at a higher positions), instead of meritocracy], absence of national consensus on all major national issues 
(due to ethnically polarized politics), and lack of strong institutions that assure the practical execution of 
policies and strategies (Asayehgn, 2012; Jebena, 2015). In addition, unemployment and absolute inequalities 
or socio-economic difference between urban and rural areas are getting worse since recent times regardless 
of the efforts exerted to reduce them, which caused instability in different parts of the country (Lavers, 
2016). Some of the challenges that need to be addressed to sustain the pace of the current economic growth 
includes:  
 The existence of extreme differences in political-economy ideology among the political parties 
impeded the possibility for creating national consensus at different levels on major issues. One of the 
characteristics of the Ethiopian political landscape is the diametric differences on almost all-important 
national issues, which are so strong and emotionally charged that political dialogue among the political 
elites is barely possible. 
 There have been various arguments from different scholars and political commentators with regard to 
the officially claimed developmental state by the ruling elites. On the one hand, some strongly argued 
whether the current Ethiopia is really a developmental state by highlighting the persistence of deep-
rooted poverty in the country. Others agreed with the developmental ideology the country as 
developmental, but strongly doubtful whether the developmental state of Ethiopia is democratic by 
fingering abuse of power by government officials and ignorance of basic democratic values such as 
freedom of press by the ruling party. Hence, more than a decade after the ruling party has officially 
claimed the developmental state model; there is still fierce debate and disagreement continuing on 
such basic issues: What is a developmental state? Is developmental state relevant to Ethiopia? What 
type of developmental state should Ethiopia follow? Which country should be a model for Ethiopia to 
learn from; and so on (Jebena, 2015). 
 Although a committed, capable and politically neutral bureaucracy is one of the critical components 
for building a successful developmental state, there is a lack of politically neutral and professionally 
competent state bureaucracy in Ethiopia. This implies that, lack of ‘embedded autonomy’ of state 
bureaucracy due to excess interferences of the ruling party on the state bureaucracy. For instance, the 
higher positions in many governmental departments have assigned according to an ethnic-based quota 
system and political affiliation to the ruling party (Asayehgn, 2012; Jebena, 2015).  
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 Widespread corruption and rent-seeking47 in both the public and private sectors and a lack of good 
governance add to the concerns about the accountability and transparency of the political leadership. 
The state has failed to contain effectively the corruption and rent-seeking behaviour/practice that is 
overrunning the state apparatus at an alarming pace. As a result, many development projects have not 
been implemented adequately on time and the policy outcomes have been negatively affected 
(Asayehgn, 2012). Because of the ruling party and the government might not have been taken serious 
measures on corrupt and rent-seeker officials at different levels, anti-government protests upraised in a 
year 2015/16 because of rent-seeking and corruption getting systemic at different levels of state 
apparatus.    
 There is confusion between the political and developmental goals and the existence of incompetent 
state bureaucracy at different levels (particularly at middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy), and 
growing individual and group interests contest the effective implementation of the development 
polices at the grassroots level. In short, there is a lack of national consensus on the ideology of the 
developmental state itself in general and the major development projects in particular. 
 Nepotism and favoritism are already widely spreading as customary practices in most of the 
government institutions of the country. This would undoubtedly threaten the actual implementation of 
the developmental state model in Ethiopia. Merit-based recruitment systematically discouraged and 
considered as a supplementary rather than main criterion by many of the institutions of top leaders and 
managers. Due to the prevalence of rent-seeking and corrupt behaviour, commitment to public interest 
is hardly in existence. Besides, because of lack of adequate knowhow about the concepts and benefits 
of developmental state model among the public servants, in addition to the prevalence of rent-seeking 
and corrupt behaviour, loyalty in the execution of policies of the government by the public servants is 
not as needed as required
48
. 
 Although the state perceived does not have a problem articulating mid- and long-term development 
plans, the state admitted that there are challenges in implementing these within a given period. Many 
fruitful development projects (for instance, hydropower, irrigation dams, sugar factories/plants, roads, 
railways  and other relevant projects) have been delayed more than the expected because the state 
functionaries lacked the professionalism and commitment needed to mobilise the existing limited 
resources of the nation for development (Asayehgn, 2012; Jebena, 2015). This means that intended 
plans and programmes have not been fully implemented due to lack of capacity and resources 
(financial, capital and technical capacities). 
                                                     
47
 Those in power perpetuate corruption whereas everyone else in the community on the other hand perpetuates rent-
seeking. Both are considered as the main enemies of economic development, a country’s political and economic health. 
Ethiopia like any other developing country around the world is facing both enemies at the moment and the Ethiopian 
state showed its commitment to fight them though the outcome will be seen sometime in the future.  
48
 http://hornaffairs.com/en/2017/02/01/ethiopia-public-service-in-developmental-states  
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 The creation of job opportunities, especially for the educated youth, unequal growth between urban 
and rural areas (for instance, poverty is high rural areas than the urban areas) are remaining a serious 
challenges for the Ethiopian Economy (CSA, 2011). Furthermore, the impact of climate change 
resulting in weather variability and droughts (for instance, the 2015/16 drought caused by the El-Niño 
phenomenon affected the economy in general and the agriculture sector in particular negatively 
through reductions in food production). As a result, the Ethiopian economy grew by 8% in 2015/16 
due to the recent drought affecting agricultural production with a negative spill-over effect on the 
trade/export sector (World Bank, 2016). 
 Rampant corruption reigns in the country and riots are proliferating where youngsters are expressing 
their concerns and frustrations on the emerging problems such social inequality and unemployment. 
Therefore, because of such social inequalities, high unemployment rates in both the urban and rural 
areas and abject poverty that are continuing as the major challenges of the Ethiopian economy and 
have considered as the major causes of the recent anti-government public protest. 
While facing these and other challenges in practice, the political elites of the ruling party has been officially 
advocated/claimed that Ethiopia is one of emerging developmental states in Africa. As a result, evidences 
confirmed that Ethiopia has progressed from having one of the lowest-levels of human capital development 
and highest poverty rates in the world to relatively impressive economic growth/development. The poverty 
level in Ethiopia has decreased significantly because of the considerable pro-poor and pro-development 
public-intervention programmes in the economic and social sectors (CSA, 2011; 2012).   
Accordingly, the share of population living below poverty line in Ethiopia has declined from 45.5% in 
1995/96 to 29.6% in 2010/11 (CSA, 2011; World Bank, 2012). This level of poverty further reduced to 27% 
2012/13 (World Bank, 2013b; MOFED, 2013; 2014) and furthermore the proportion significantly declined to 
23.4% by 2014/15 (UNDP, 2015). As a result, life expectancy has increased from 48 to 63years (World 
Bank, 2013b; 2016; UNDP, 2015). For instance, about one million poor people have been lifted out of 
poverty only in year 2012/13 (MoFED, 2014). Although proportion of people living below absolute poverty 
(both in rural and urban areas) has reduced, there are still about 22.6 million poor people in Ethiopia as of 
2014/15 (MoFED, 2014; UNDP, 2015). Economic growth in general has been an important driver of poverty 
reduction in Ethiopia in the last decade (2003/04 to 2013/14). In Ethiopia, each 1% of growth in GDP 
resulted in 0.55% reduction in poverty. In particular, agricultural growth was also an important driver of 
poverty reduction in Ethiopia over the same period. For every 1% of agricultural growth, poverty was 
reduced by 0.9% compared to 0.55% for each percentage of overall economic growth (World Bank, 2016). 
However, economic growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction, food security and employment 
but it is not a sufficient condition; therefore, economic growth to be poverty reduction, growth has to be 
more pro-poor (UNDP, 2015). 
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Ethiopia has supposed by the World Bank and IMF as one of the fastest growing countries in the world and, 
in many respects; its growth has been different from other emerging African lions. Firstly, it has achieved 
remarkable economic growth without extracting/exploiting its natural resources of course this not unique for 
Ethiopia because there are countries achieved similar economic growth without having enough amount of 
natural resource to be exploited. Secondly, Ethiopia is one of the African states that have reduced the level of 
extreme poverty by half, albeit from a high base, through its pro-poor and pro-development policies in the 
economic and social sectors (UNDP, 2013; World Bank, 2013b). Thirdly, there was at least a 
developmental-oriented political leadership, which is guided by a pragmatic vision and both long-term and 
mid-term, five-year development policies and strategies (Daddi, 2013). The country has made relatively 
spectacular leaps on multiple development fronts since the ruling party officially claimed the developmental 
state as a development ideology of the country (Oqubay, 2015). That means economic development 
registered yet is not adequate to ease the poverty-burden and socio-economic bottlenecks of the country.  
For instance, though the overall unemployment rate in urban areas declined from 22.9% in 2004 to 17.4% 
(which is huge yet) in 2014/15 but youth unemployment (15-29years) was 22.8% in the same year 2014/15 
(CSA, 2011, UNDP, 2015; World bank, 2016). Ethiopia is still one of the low-income countries with about 
USD632 per capita income and low Human Development Index with about 33%. It is the eleventh poorest 
country in the world by per capita income; almost half of the adult population is illiterate and the country’s 
infrastructure deficits remains one of the largest in the world (World Bank, 2016). Therefore, further efforts 
need to be required to address the entire socio-economic problems that not sorted out yet and to reduce the 
number of chronically food-insecure households, or to lifting out population living below the absolute 
poverty line. 
The practice of context specific development approaches based on the consent of the people has enabled the 
country to establish a stable political economy and register high economic growth by putting the agriculture 
sector at the forefront of the development programme of the country. However, the success of the 
agricultural development programmes only is not an end within the agricultural sector itself; rather it has a 
positive spill-over effect on the overall economic development and structural transformation. This will 
happen through strong rural–urban linkages (forward and backward linkages as indicated in Figure 4.3) and 
increasing levels of investment in infrastructure to strengthen the physical and human capital of the nation.  
In general, Ethiopia has benefited significantly from the developmental state trajectory that it officially 
claimed by the ruling elites. The government is intervening in sectors that the private sector cannot enter 
totally or partially, and is involved in infrastructure development and other social-sector programmes. Even 
though the structural transformation is slow, social services (health, education, water and sanitation) and 
economic (agriculture and energy) developments have been achieved, and fast economic growth is being 
recorded. FDI is flowing into the country because of the pulling factors such as the existence of relative 
peace and stability, tax incentives and, more importantly, the availability of land and relative cheap labour 
forces for the labour intensive manufacturing sector. This does not mean that the officially claimed 
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developmental state is free from challenges rather there are different challenges in practice. The state has 
failed to contain the rampage of corruption and rent-seeking behaviours and practices that are threatening the 
governmental apparatus and having an unmitigated negative effect on the hard work to achieve political and 
economic development. 
 As a result, many relevant development projects have not been implemented adequately on time and the 
policy outcomes are negatively affected. Even though both the ruling party and the government are aware of 
the problems, the ruling party might not have whole-heartedly endorsed/taken serious measures. In addition, 
the government’s decisions to introduce reforms might have lacked coalition support by policy advisors and 
technocrats (Asayehgn, 2012; Jebena, 2015). The year 2015/16 has been seen unprecedented anti-
government protests across small towns and cities in Oromia regional state and latter expanded to the 
Amhara regional state of Ethiopia. The flashpoint (i.e. the immediate cause) for anti-government protest in 
Oromia regional state was the Addis Ababa Master plan that sought to expand the capital’s boundaries into 
surrounding Oromia regional state. But the root causes for the anti-government protests that expanded latter 
to the Amhara region are directly related to unemployment, lack of good governance, the practice of 
corruption and rent-seeking practice are to mention a few of them and the outcome was very bad (Lavers, 
2016). Last year’s public protest/unrest was a clear indication that Ethiopians’ perception of corruption and 
rent-seeking have exceeded the threshold of their patience.  Since recent time (starting the fourth quarter of-
2016) the ruling party (EPRDF and its coalitions) starting to renew themselves via ‘deep renewal’ ((tilik 
tehadso in Amharic) at different levels to tackle/fight corruption and rent-seeking practices. This indicates 
that the ruling party and the government appreciate the seriousness of the matter at hand and have already 
started a campaign on fighting corruption and rent-seeking though the fighting of corruption and rent-seeking 
is still to be seen the result in the future and needs further research
49
. As different media outlets broadcasted, 
the objective of the ‘deep renewal’ (tilik tehadso in Amharic) is to address the socio-economic complexities 
(such as unemployment, inequality, poverty and issue of good governance) via tackling the corruption and 
rent-seeking practices, which are considered by the ruling party as the root cause of for the other socio-
economic problems.  
 
 
 
                                                     
49
 However, recent news reported by different national media outlets indicate the transfer of thousands of hectares of 
illegally acquired land by a handful of businessmen to a large group of unemployed youth especially in the Oromia 
region of Ethiopia. The government also arrested hundreds of government bureaucrats, businessmen and intermediaries 
suspected of involvement in corrupt practices. Among the detained government officials, some are from the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Cooperation (MoFEC, the former MoFED), the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, as well as from 
the Ethiopian Road Authority and Addis Ababa City Road Authority. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT AND 
GOVERNANCE IN THE RAYA VALLEY 
5.1 Introduction  
Irrigation development is considered as one of the pillars in the modernisation of the agricultural sector in 
Ethiopia. The government sees it as the main instrument to operationalise the long-term ADLI development 
strategy, which is the roadmap to transform smallholder agriculture in the country. As most Ethiopians live 
in rural areas and derive their livelihoods from agriculture (smallholder agriculture), the government has put 
agriculture at the centre of its national development plan, and its rural development strategy in particular. 
This strategy places a strong emphasis on increasing agricultural productivity by developing reliable 
irrigation infrastructure and supplying modern agricultural inputs, among others. The government recognised 
the seriousness of the problems in the rural economy (food security and poverty), so the overall goal of its 
water-resource policy is to enhance and promote the efficient, equitable, and sustainable utilisation of 
available water resources for socio-economic development on a national basis (MoWR, 2002). Irrigation 
development has been prioritised because it is seen as one of the strategies to fight poverty and food 
insecurity, generate income, improve livelihoods, and promote development in general, at both the 
household and national levels (Awulachew et al., 2007). The government prioritises irrigation development 
at various scales, especially in arid and semi-arid regions. Irrigated agriculture has multi-dimensional socio-
economic benefits as well as possible negative consequences (i.e. negative environmental effects and social 
instability), depending on whether it is managed and used sustainably (Awulachew et al., 2007; Dinka et al., 
2014). 
In line with the national development strategy, the regional government of Tigray adopted ‘Conservation-
based Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation’ and large-scale conservation efforts (check dams, 
stone bunds and reforestation) have been carried out, leading to reduced soil erosion and improved 
environmental rehabilitation. The regional state has embarked on an ambitious irrigation-development 
programme and put a plan in place to irrigate about 50% of the arable land (at different scales and it would 
be good for the regional economy if it execute as per the plan) to enhance agricultural diversification and 
intensification. This is achieved by carrying out intensive, public-led, large-scale soil and water conservation 
programmes (watershed management) in communities to prevent soil degradation, retain soil fertility, and 
boost the recharge capacity of groundwater/streams to improve agricultural productivity. Natural-resource 
conservation has been prioritised because it plays a key role in ensuring sustainable development. There is an 
intensive campaign to expand water harvesting and saving programmes using different irrigation 
technologies (both traditional and modern) and different water sources (surface, ground and rainwater). The 
use of water saving and efficient irrigation technologies improves the effectiveness of irrigation, thus 
increasing household income and reducing poverty at the household level. The federal government, as well 
as the regional government of Tigray, have formulated poverty-reduction strategies and a series of policy 
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intervention instruments to improve the food security status of farm households. For instance, substantial 
investment has been made in small-scale irrigation, soil and water conservation and safety-net programmes. 
Hence, the following research questions were addressed in this chapter:  
 How has Ethiopia’s conception of the developmental state, as articulated in its official development 
ideology and its key representatives, influenced and shaped the way in which the state has assembled 
the institutional arrangements and practices in the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation project?  
 Is there evidence of a direct relationship between Ethiopia’s conception of the developmental state 
and the actual institutional arrangements and practices in the Raya Valley project? What are the 
successes and challenges of the Raya Valley project?  
Following these questions, the specific objective was to investigate the role of a developmental state and the 
existing institutional arrangements for the sustainable utilisation and governance of groundwater irrigation in 
the Raya Valley. 
5.2 The groundwater irrigation situation in Ethiopia 
In Ethiopia, agriculture is considered an important tool in the equitable distribution of rural assets 
(agricultural land) to accelerate the use of rural technology and support the non-agricultural sector. 
Agriculture is the mainstay of the Ethiopian economy in terms of income, employment and generation of 
export revenue (Awulachew & Ayana, 2011). Ethiopia is dependent mainly on rain-fed agriculture, and this 
dependency has put most Ethiopian smallholder farmers at the mercy of meteorological variability. With 
increasing meteorological variability, due to climate change, it is highly probable that the rain-fed agriculture 
in Ethiopia will be vulnerable to its effects (Awulachew & Ayana, 2011). Irrigation development is now a 
key element of the government’s plan to develop a climate-resilient agricultural economy to ensure national 
food security, eradicate poverty from the rural areas, provide raw materials for domestic industries, and 
generate foreign currency through exports of agricultural outputs (Negash, 2011). Ethiopia has a wealth of 
opportunities to increase its irrigation and food production: the country is endowed with twelve (12) major 
river basins with an annual surface-runoff volume of 124.5km
3 
(MoWR, 2002; Awulachew et al., 2007). The 
potential cultivable land area of the country is estimated to be between 30 and 70 million hectares (Mha), but 
only about 15 to 16.5Mha of land are under cultivation. Its estimated total irrigation potential is about 
5.3Mha, out of this about 3.7Mha of which could be irrigated using surface-water sources, another 1.1Mha 
could be developed using groundwater sources, and the remaining 0.5Mha could be irrigated using rainwater 
management (Awulachew et al., 2010; Awulachew & Ayana, 2011). Irrigation contributes to rapid 
transformation of the agricultural sector as well as economic transformation in general. However, if one 
excludes traditional irrigation, irrigated agriculture, using both surface and groundwater, occurs on only 
about 0.7Mha across the country (Awulachew et al., 2010; Awulachew & Ayana, 2011).  
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Investment in irrigation is the responsibility of the federal and regional governments, the private sector and 
some donor interventions. The Ministry of Water and Energy is responsible for large and medium-scale 
irrigation development. At the regional level, the Bureau of Water Resources and the Bureau of Agriculture 
and Rural Development are also involved; the former focuses on the development and operation of hydraulic 
infrastructure of small-scale irrigation, while the latter deals with agricultural extension and marketing 
issues. Small-scale irrigation is concentrated on the production of food crops, whereas large and medium-
scale irrigated farms produce cash or industrial crops (Negash, 2011). Groundwater potential for irrigation in 
Ethiopia remains uncharted and underdeveloped due to different capability constraints; like financial and 
human constraints ((Awulachew et al., 2010). However, the development of groundwater, particularly 
shallow-well groundwater, is an important feature in the national and regional plans for small-scale irrigation 
development, and is a major avenue for the reduction of rural poverty. There are broad plans and visions 
about using the existing water resources for irrigation purpose and the government looks committed to 
augment irrigated plots by using different sources or technologies (Van Steenbergen et al., 2015).  
Groundwater irrigation has emerged as a strategy for economic growth, poverty reduction, and as a tool for 
rural households to adapt to the effect of climate change although the capacity of groundwater aquifers to 
buffer climate change depends on water storage and annual recharge (Kebede, 2010). Groundwater irrigation 
development is taking by the public as a means for smallholder farmers to escape from a nature-dependent 
(rainfall-dependent) agricultural production system. The development of small-scale groundwater irrigation 
is receiving attention throughout the country (MoFED, 2010) because it plays a significant role in meeting 
the growing demand for food and achieving long-term food security. It also fosters sustainable agricultural 
and economic development without severely affecting the environment through sustainable management.  
The Government of Ethiopia has instituted several policies and strategies to support agricultural development 
and water resources development, including the Rural Development Strategy, the Water Resources 
Management Policy and the Water Sector Policy. These initiatives aim to enhance the efficient, equitable and 
optimal utilization of water resources for sustainable agricultural and socio-economic development, and 
place small-scale irrigation as a key priority (Evans et al., 2012:2).  
There are many technologies and techniques used in Ethiopia to extract water for irrigation purposes. These 
include micro-dams or reservoirs, river and stream diversions, groundwater and hand-dug wells, lake and 
river pumping, rainwater harvesting in traditional ponds (kurie in Amharic), spate irrigation, motorised 
(treadle) pumps, and sprinkler and drip irrigation systems. In the Raya Valley, deep-well groundwater with a 
pressurised pump irrigation system is used to irrigate agricultural land through huge public investment. In 
addition, spate irrigation, which has a long history and is a common practice within the Raya community, is 
used to supplement rain-fed agricultural farming during the rainy season by diverting floodwater from 
upstream catchments through using simple furrow systems. 
The use of groundwater for irrigation is generally very low in Ethiopia due to different constraints, though 
recently it is emerging as a mainstay of irrigated agricultural development, mainly in rainfall-deficit areas. 
The planning and implementation of irrigated agriculture using groundwater is encouraging, and the 
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government shows its commitment for investing huge amounts of resources in the form of public investment. 
There are, however, valid concerns that may impede the development efforts of the government including: 
(1) ‘The limitation of knowledge and information available on the extent of the potential groundwater’. (2) 
‘The available human and institutional capacity to plan, develop and manage is limited in quantity and 
quality’. (3) ‘Drilling equipment and spare parts are so hard to obtain’ (Moges, 2012). Therefore, investment 
in institutional and human capacity development is crucial to sustain the development of groundwater 
resources for irrigation. It is also critical to develop community awareness on the importance of conserving 
and managing the resource. Doing this would help to ensure the sustainability of groundwater irrigation 
development, to optimise the opportunities for groundwater recharge and reuse it, and to regulate the long-
term equitable use of the resource. 
5.3 Background of the study area: The Raya Valley 
There is limited experience of exploiting groundwater resources for irrigation in Ethiopia and it has not yet 
converted into economic benefit in a significant manner. The development of groundwater irrigation is 
concentrated in Borena in the south (Oromia Regional State), the Kobo-Girana Valley (Amhara Regional 
State), and the Raya Valley (Tigray Regional State). These are the only implemented groundwater 
development schemes so far, but are expected to expand to other parts of the country (MoWR, 2011; Moges, 
2012). Reviews of different studies on the groundwater conditions indicate that there is a high potential 
(about 1.1Mha) for developing groundwater sources for irrigation purpose in specific parts of the country. 
These include alluvial-fan deposits along the foot of the Great Rift Valley escarpment, flood plains and 
valley fills, which are regularly recharged by seasonal runoffs from the highlands. The availability of 
groundwater resources is determined mainly by aquifer conditions and by the climatic conditions, which 
result in different levels of groundwater recharge. Groundwater irrigation is often located in regions where 
both aquifer and climatic conditions are favourable. 
The Raya Valley is one of the areas in northern Ethiopia where groundwater is believed to exist in 
abundance. It is an intermountain plain covering parts of the southern Tigray Regional State, which is one of 
the highest potential agricultural areas in the region, with good groundwater potential. The Raya Valley area 
has been identified/prioritised as one of the ‘development corridors’ by the regional state precisely because 
of its potential to increase agricultural productivity and production by using the groundwater potential for 
irrigation purpose. Despite its potential, the area has been suffering from drought due to weather variability. 
Currently, food-insecurity is still a challenge in the area, with most farmers still depending on relatively poor 
spate irrigation and rain-fed farming practices. Spate irrigation is one of the traditional practices employed 
by farmers in the Raya Valley to supplement their rain-fed agriculture. The Raya Valley has huge potential 
as an agricultural area for crops and livestock production because the low land areas of the valley are 
surrounded by mountains and have deep, fertile alluvial soil. 
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The plain area of the Raya Valley is found in the Raya Alamata and Raya Azebo districts (woredas). The 
surface-water catchment of the valley covers an area of 2576km
2
. The altitude ranges between 3600masl
50
 
and 1400masl in the inter-mountain valley plain (the Raya Valley alluvial aquifer). The Raya Valley alluvial 
aquifer is part of the Selen-Wuha River surface-water catchment of an inter-mountain plain, which is part of 
the interconnected valleys of the Ethiopian Rift Valley system. It has a total area of 1227km
2
, a trough 
bounded by the Ethiopian plateau and rift escarpment (western escarpment) in the west and the Chercher 
Mountains in the east (see Figure 5.1). The Raya Valley plain alluvial aquifer is composed of loosely 
compacted, sedimentary basin fill deposits, which is suitable for agriculture. The dominant type of 
agriculture is rain-fed agriculture with supplementary irrigation using the floodwater flowing from the 
western mountain chains during the rainy season (Moges, 2012). 
Figure 5.1: Base map of the study area (Raya Valley) 
 
Source: Adapted from Hagos (2010) 
                                                     
50
 Metres above sea level 
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Different studies assert that the Raya Valley has a groundwater potential that can be developed for modern 
smallholder irrigation. Although the original study of the Raya Valley groundwater potential for the purposes 
irrigation dates to the early 1970s, the Relief Society of Tigray (1996) in collaboration with Tigray Regional 
State conducted the first intensive and integrated study of the valley. The study estimated the groundwater 
reserve in Raya Valley to be about 7152billion cubic metres (BCM) and the recharge potential to be about 
85million cubic metres (MCM) per year (Relief Society of Tigray, 1996). Following this, the Ministry of 
Water Resources (2008) modelled the Raya Valley plain alluvial aquifer to determine the exploitable 
groundwater potential in the valley, and estimated it to be about 130MCM per year, with its total 
groundwater reserve at 7.2BCM. The average groundwater recharge in the project area is estimated to be 
about 84MCM per year. Almost all the water samples analysed from the Raya Valley are suitable for 
irrigation (WWDSE, 2008). Furthermore, Moges (2012) assessed the groundwater potential in the studied 
area and his findings were almost consistent with those of the Water Works Development Sector Enterprises 
(WWDSE); the groundwater potential reached about 7.2BCM. These studies confirm that the valley has a 
remarkable groundwater potential for irrigation.
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To tap this huge potential resource, the Integrated Raya Valley Development Programme Project or the 
Golgol Raya Development Project was initiated in early 2000 by the regional government. This development 
project views groundwater irrigation is central to integrating crop and livestock agriculture with soil and 
water conservation in a holistic way to ensure sustainability. This project aims to increase agricultural 
productivity and improve the living conditions of farm households by expanding deep-well groundwater 
irrigated agriculture based on a state–community managed approach. This has a direct effect on reducing the 
incidence of food insecurity for the rural poor by strengthening the rural households’ ability to tackle 
weather shocks such as drought or crop failures. Therefore, since the establishment of the Golgol Raya 
Development Project in the studied area, several deep wells have been drilled (see Figure 5.2) and a few of 
them installed with drip and sprinkler infrastructure for the use of smallholder irrigation. 
The pressurised irrigation system in the studied area is economically feasible based on a cost–benefit 
analysis (CBA) at both the project and scheme levels (Yirga, 2011; Gebregziabher et al., 2013), indicating 
that farmers would also benefit from using these economically feasible groundwater irrigation schemes. The 
need for groundwater irrigation in the studied area emanated from the scarce surface-water resources and 
seasonal rainfall variability, which do not provide sufficient water for cultivation. Most of the earlier studies 
had been more concerned with resource development to meet the users’ water demand for irrigation than 
with groundwater resource management and sustainability issues. Safe groundwater abstraction and proper 
groundwater management are obviously crucial for the sustainability of the resource. 
                                                     
51
 The Relief Society of Tigray (1996) concluded that the valley has good groundwater potential for irrigation, that 
could irrigate about 18 000 ha of land in the region. A decade later, the Ministry of Water Resource confirmed that 
about 33 900 ha of land is suitable for pressurised irrigation development in the projected area, unless limited by the 
availability and development of groundwater resources (WWDSE, 2008). 
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The use of groundwater is increasing rapidly, bringing several socio-economic benefits to smallholder 
farmers by enabling them to grow more crops and to minimise the impact of rainfall variability and seasonal 
drought. In the studied area, there are no perennial rivers and streams, except some springs at the western 
edge, and runoff from these springs disappears in the central part of the valley. This situation has made 
groundwater the primary source of water for irrigation in the valley and hundreds of deep wells have been 
drilled to implement modern pressurised irrigation activities. This does not mean that the distribution of the 
groundwater resources is uniform throughout the valley (see Figure 5.2). The studied area focuses mainly on 
the two main sub-basins of the Raya Valley, namely, Alamata and Mohoni, located in northern Ethiopia. 
These sub-basins have a high groundwater potential and a semi-arid climate. Because of low and variable 
annual rainfall, groundwater irrigation is crucial to mitigate the low and variable annual rainfall problems 
and build drought-resistant/resilience agriculture in the Raya Valley community. 
Figure 5.2: Groundwater irrigation potential, rain-gauge stations, and borehole in Raya Valley 
 
Source: Adapted from Fenta, et al. (2015) 
The Raya Valley is characterised by a bimodal rainfall pattern with a short rainy season, Belg (low rainy 
season) from February to March, and a long rainy season, Kiremt (high rainy season), from June to 
September, with a peak in August. The spatial distribution of rainfall is governed mainly by variations in 
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altitude. The soil is mostly loam, silt loam or clay loam in texture with a good water-holding capacity, and 
the soils are deep or moderately deep, and suitable for irrigation. Diversity or variation in agro-climatic 
zones, soil types, and socio-economic conditions of the farming communities have contributed to the 
evolution of different cropping practices in the region, and particularly in the studied area. Teff
52
 and 
sorghum are the dominant crops in the studied area; these are drought resistant and cover approximately 75% 
of the valley’s cultivated land (both in Raya Alamata and Azebo woredas). Maize is growing in small 
quantities because it is sensitive to aridity, and a few vegetables and cash crops (e.g. onions, tomato, and 
others) are cultivated using spate and groundwater irrigation.  
The livelihood of the rural population in the region, and particularly in the Raya Valley area, is directly 
dependent on human labour and the draft power of livestock. Livestock are considered as important 
components of the farming system, providing draft power for ploughing and threshing, and manure to boost 
soil fertility for crop production, in addition to serving as a source of food and cash income. The farmers 
practise mixed subsistence farming of crops and livestock, using coping strategies in times of drought or the 
outbreak of diseases. Farmers produce mainly for staple foods such as sorghum, teff, maize, as well as 
vegetables (i.e. onions and tomatoes), which are commonly produced under irrigated cultivation. 
In general, groundwater irrigation would have a significant positive impact on the livelihoods of smallholder 
farmers. Growing high-value crops under groundwater irrigation systems would enhance the livelihoods of 
beneficiary farm households in the Raya Valley, which has plenty of groundwater potential to be used for 
irrigation. As part of their food security and poverty reduction efforts, the government of Ethiopia, and 
particularly the regional government of Tigray, have tried to make considerable efforts yet in invested in 
deep-well groundwater irrigation development on a sustainable basis by consolidating the watershed 
management programme to augment the recharge capacity.  
5.4 Demographic characteristics of sampled households 
Household characteristics such as age, sex, education, wealth status, family size and gender may affect 
households’ decisions to adopt irrigation and other modern agricultural technologies. Households with more 
educated members may have greater access to non-farm income, which could enable them to afford 
agricultural technologies. Farmers with formal education are also more likely to be better informed about the 
benefits of modern agricultural technologies and may have a greater ability to use these (Pender & 
Gebremedhin, 2007, Kassie et al., 2011). Modern agricultural technologies include physical inputs, such as 
seeds or fertiliser, and new farming methods that are diffused by extension services. The technology may not 
be new as such, but novel to the beneficiary farm households in developing countries like Ethiopia. 
Experience has shown that new technology is not necessarily appropriate in every context; its suitability 
depends more on how well it fits into a specific agro-ecological context. For the successful adoption of new 
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 Teff is an endogenous staple crop/cereal used to make Enjera or a pancake that is a traditional in Ethiopia. 
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technologies, certain factors need to be taken account, including the personal attitude of the farmer and their 
socio-economic characteristics, such as wealth, landholding, education, and age, as well as the agro-
ecological context. Other factors include differences in the farmers’ physical, economic, and social 
environments and their farming systems. 
Based on the survey data from a sample of 226 households, the average age of household heads was 
40.5years, with a range of from 24 to 68years. The average family size was about 5.13, which is slightly 
above the regional and national average for rural households. The survey also showed that the size of the 
average active labour force in the household was about 3.02, and the average number of dependent family 
members was about 2.09. Therefore, the average dependency ratio of the household in the studied area was 
0.692. Regarding the educational status of the respondents, it was found that approximately 39.82% of the 
households were illiterate, while 4.42% of the respondents could read and write but did not have a formal 
education (i.e. they had a religious education). About 31.86% of the respondents had a primary school 
education, and nearly 23.5% of the respondents had access to secondary school. In total, about 59.18% of the 
sample households could read and write with about 54% of them having formal education (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Demographic characteristic of sample households 
Demographic characteristics  Educational situation 
Indictors (N=226) Mean Std. Dev. Level of education Freq. % 
Family size 5.13  2.17 Illiterate 90 39.82 
Male  2.65  1.33 Religious 10 4.42 
Female  2.53  1.39 Primary 72 31.86 
Adult members of the household 3.02  1.63 Secondary  35 15.49 
Dependent members of the household  2.09  1.54 Above secondary  19 8.41 
Dependency ratio 0 .69 0.57 Total  226 100 
Source: Own sample survey (2014) 
Farm households equipped with formal education can increase agricultural productivity by means of 
boosting adoption modern farming practices. Younger farm households may be more educated or be more 
open to trying out new technologies than the older and illiterate households. Age and education are generally 
crucial factors to increase the awareness and relevance of modern agricultural activities. Adopting modern 
agricultural practices has a positive effect on improving the productivity of smallholder households, and 
increasing agricultural production can reduce poverty by increasing farmers’ incomes, reducing food prices 
and, thereby, enhancing increments in consumption. In practice, smallholder farmers are often more efficient 
in the allocation and use of resources than are the large-scale farmers and, consequently, smallholder farmers 
are more productive. Therefore reaching out to smallholder farmers is an important component of poverty 
alleviation and rural transformation, and a key policy focus.  
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5.5 Farm size and land-holding arrangements of the farm households 
In an agrarian society like Ethiopia, ownership of agricultural land and livestock are crucial productive assets 
and are prerequisites for agriculture in Ethiopia. As in other parts of rural Ethiopia, farmers in the studied 
area can access agricultural land through land distribution, family inheritance, fixed-rent and sharecropping 
mechanisms. Fixed-rent and sharecropped mechanisms mean temporary ownership of agricultural land. It is 
assumed that irrigated plots in the studied area are similar in terms of soil type and quality, with slight 
differences. On the one hand, about 85.84% of the sample households have access to land through the land-
distribution system, and 12.83% of them have inherited land from their relatives. On the other, about 41.59% 
of the sample households have sharecropping rights and another 19.91% have fixed-rent holding 
arrangements. This means that farm households have access to agricultural land (irrigated or non-irrigated) 
through land distribution, inheritance, sharecropping and fixed-rent arrangements. Sharecropping is a 
common and long-term practice in the studied area and landholders share in the final output. It is customary 
for landholders to enter sharecropping contracts with wealthier and less liquidity-constrained tenants; in most 
cases, these are male-headed households that are likely to invest in productivity-enhancing inputs. Male-
headed households (if not all) tend to spent more on labour and agricultural inputs and, particularly, on 
irrigated agriculture and better farming management practices.  
Consequently, the average income per hectare of male-headed households is more than female-headed. The 
empirical evidence from the studied area confirmed that male-headed households invest more in 
groundwater irrigation and attain a greater income than female-headed households attain. For instance, 
labour costs for 2008/09 were 3022.2ETB
53
 and 2448.75ETB for male- and female-headed households 
respectively. Agricultural-input costs in the same period were 3008.95ETB and 2145ETB, respectively, for 
male- and female-headed households. Likewise, in the 2008/09 production year, average income per hectare 
for male-headed households was about 53372.67ETB and about 41062.5ETB for female-headed households 
(Yirga, 2011). Factors that contribute to these differences may be due to the intensive nature of irrigated 
farming, which may account for why male-headed households are better equipped than female-headed 
households are. In addition, male-headed households may have better access to markets and other farming 
activities than female-headed households may. 
The study showed that the average household-owned land (both irrigated and rain-fed) was about 4.1tsimad 
(about 1.025ha), i.e. one hectare is equal to four tsimad or one tsimad is equal to a quarter of a hectare. When 
incorporating both fixed rented and sharecropped plots (i.e. it is a temporary agricultural land holding 
arrangement), the average land holding per household increases to about 6.1tsimad (1.525ha). The average 
plot size of owned household land with access to groundwater irrigation is about 1.49tsimad (0.372ha), but 
when one adds both sharecropped and rented land with access to groundwater irrigation, this increases to 
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 ETB is Ethiopian Birr, the Ethiopian currency and during the survey period (2014), the exchange rate was 
US$1=20ETB. 
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about 2.15tsimad (0.538hectare). Farm households who do not have their own land, particularly in the 
groundwater irrigation project, can temporarily own land through either fixed rent or sharecropping 
arrangements with farming households who do not have the capacity to farm it themselves due to various 
constraints. Further, those that own plot can also gain temporary ownership of additional irrigated land 
through fixed rent or sharecropping arrangements to diversify and intensify their production, thus increasing 
their household income. 
Sharecropping occurs between households with an excess ratio of land to labour or land to draft power, and 
those who have too little land relative to their labour and draft-power endowments. For instance, in the 
sample study, 54.42% of the households were sharecroppers on irrigated plots from other households, and 
6.2% of landowners had sharecropping arrangements with tenants on their irrigated plots (see Table 5.2 and 
Figure 5.3). Sharecropping arrangements in the community are not based on relations of dominancy and 
dependency between tenants and landowners, but are undertaken to balance resources. There are two types 
of sharecropping arrangements in the studied area: (1) pure sharecropping (output sharing for rain-fed 
agriculture) and (2) cost sharing (input and output sharing for groundwater-irrigated plots). Sharecropping 
contracts are generally informal, without any written agreements, but are sometimes witnessed by a third 
party who is known and trusted by both the parties s involved. The duration of sharecropping and fixed-rent 
agreements depends on the agreement.   
However, the government has set a limit of five years on fixed-rent arrangements. This is because, as per the 
Constitution of the country, there is government–public land ownership and farmers have unlimited use 
rights. They have the right to bequeath land, and to lease their land for a limited period. They also have the 
right to obtain compensation for their investment in the land if they lose it. But selling of land is illegal and it 
cannot be used as collateral for credit as per the Constitution of the country. In the case study, there were 
peoples who rented or leased out their irrigated plots and landowners preferred to cultivate their land 
themselves. The few households that did rent out their irrigated plots tended to be women-headed, and 
elderly or poor ones who were unable to cultivate it themselves because they lacked the necessary physical 
and financial capacities. The participants also noted that there was a higher demand for rented irrigated plots 
from wealthier farmers, including landless ones, extension workers and town dwellers, and that this pushed 
up the value of the land from time to time. 
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Table 5.2: Cultivated land arrangement and average holding size (in tsimad) of the respondents 
Plot arrangement systems  Obs. % Mean  Std. Dev.  
Owned irrigated land  194 85.84 1.49 1.24 
Sharecropped-in irrigated  123 54.42 0.8 0.99 
Rented in irrigated  70 30.97 1.5 1.05 
Total size irrigated  213 94.25 2.15 1.42 
Owned rain-fed land 196 86.73 2.52 2.1 
Sharecropped-in rain-fed 128 56.64 2.81 2.71 
Rented in rain-fed 62 27.43 0.69 1.47 
Total size rain-fed 216 95.58 3.8 3.39 
Sharecropped-out irrigated  14 6.2 0.66 0.62 
Rented out irrigated 10 4.42 0.88 0.86 
Total size irrigated  19 8.41 1.29 1.31 
Sharecropped-out rain-fed 21 9.29 0.96 1.24 
Rented out rain-fed 5 2.21 0.2 0.45 
Total size rain-fed 21 9.29 0.64 1.01 
Source: Own sample survey (2014) 
Figure 5.3: Sharecropped and fixed-rent land arrangement in the study area 
 
5.6 Social status of beneficiary farm households  
Mixed (crop-livestock) farming is the dominant economic activity among the Raya Valley community, and 
livestock are an important source of livelihood. Moreover, livestock are used for traction power, and are a 
wealth indicator and a good investment to boost productivity. Livestock are also used for transport and as a 
source of manure to improve soil fertility to boost productivity. Our survey data showed that, on average, 
about 82.86% of sample households have a pair of oxen used for draft power, while approximately 17.14% 
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do not and plough their plots with oxen power that either rented or exchanged for their labour. At the same 
time, about 66.37% of the sample households own two or more dairy cows. Based on the positive impact of 
groundwater irrigation, groundwater irrigation beneficiaries on average own more livestock per household 
than non-beneficiary households in the studied area. As the household’s income increases by means of 
cultivated cash crops, such as onions and tomatoes harvested by twice or more times per year, they invest in 
livestock such as oxen, cows, sheep, goats and camels. Owning more livestock and other household assets is 
a guarantee in times of external shocks, and is a wealth indicator in the community.  
Owning more oxen obviously means that farmers can plough more agricultural land and further increase 
their crop production and farm income. In addition, higher income gained from irrigated production means 
that households are less likely to sell their livestock to fill their food gap and other requirements at household 
level. Based on the local community’s standards of wealth-status classification, about 71% of sample 
households in the study area ranked as medium-income, 18% as rich, and 11% as poor. This implies that 
almost 90% of the beneficiary households have a good social status because of the groundwater irrigation 
delivered by the developmental state’s pro-poor development programmes. The data from the studied area 
confirmed that about 91.59% of sample households had no problem fulfilling their food demand throughout 
the year, and about 8.41% only partially fulfilled their annual food requirement since they started using 
groundwater irrigation to boost their household income.  
Figure 5.4: Wealth status and housing condition of the sample households 
 
Furthermore, the sample beneficiary households confirmed that they had changed their houses from the more 
traditional grass-roofed type to a semi-modern, iron-roofed structure due to their increased levels of income 
through groundwater irrigation use (see Figure 5.4). The construction of new corrugated-iron-roofed houses 
in place of their traditional housing style is an indication of how the livelihood of these farm households had 
improved since they started using the groundwater irrigation infrastructure delivered by the developmental 
state. For instance, villages like Kara Adishawo and Wargba in the Raya Azebo woreda (i.e. villages that 
have used groundwater irrigation for many years) have changed from being local villages to rural towns. 
This proves that state intervention within a developmental state model achieved rural transformation through 
pro-poor development programmes. 
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5.7 Agricultural input utilisation of groundwater irrigation users 
5.7.1 Access to agricultural extension service by farm households 
Agriculture by nature requires better technologies and better agronomic farming practices to boost yields per 
hectare. All technologies and agronomic management require technical assistance to some degree in their 
diffusion (for instance, teaching farmers how to use and capitalise it). Accordingly, of all the SSA countries, 
Ethiopia is the one that has the greatest state involvement in the agricultural sector and has invested the most 
public funds to boost the productivity of the sector. This public investment has motivated farmers’ activity 
directly or indirectly at the field level in four main ways: 
First, farmers’ cooperatives are responsible for supplying agricultural inputs (fertilisers, selected seeds, 
loans). Second, rural credits institutions mainly state owned provide rural loans to the farm households. 
Third, participation in collective work, known as ‘communal work’, ‘development work’ or ‘social work’ is 
compulsory to local development programmes to build rural infrastructure and improve the agricultural 
environment. Fourth, largely interlocked with the former, is the agricultural extension programme, probably 
the largest in sub-Saharan Africa (Davis et al., 2010:14).  
Remarkably, the government has built the required basic rural infrastructure (including irrigation) needed to 
enable the farmers to meet the growing demand for food. The sample survey noted an increase in 
productivity of the farm households’ using the opportunities provided by considerable public support at local 
level. This is one of the main aims of the agricultural extension programme delivered by the government. 
Access to extension and training services is expected to improve farmers’ knowledge and skills for the 
efficient utilisation and management of resources. This reduces poor farmers’ anxieties about technology 
adoption and they are quick to adopt these once they see evidence of the technology’s ability to generate 
higher incomes and increased yields. For instance, evidence from Egypt showed that smallholder farmers in 
desert areas were persuaded to adopt drip irrigation once they witnessed the success of larger farmers 
(Mourshed, 1995). It is widely recognised that agricultural extension services play a considerable role in 
motivating and increasing farmers’ awareness,  adoption and efficient use of modern agricultural inputs 
(including HYV crops and vegetables) and that these are significant factors for improving productivity 
(Bhattarai et al., 2002). To improve irrigated agricultural productivity and production, an emphasis was 
placed on increasing the diffusion of modern agricultural inputs and increasing the awareness of the farm 
households to boost their productivity. 
Public support programmes for the adoption of modern agricultural technologies in the rural sector 
commonly known as agricultural extension services. For this study, extension services are defined as a 
system and set of functions that may induce voluntary change in the rural agricultural sector. The system 
dominated by public and semi-public agents that transfer knowledge and agronomic and other managerial 
capacity and diffuse agricultural inputs. The public sector is the most important player in collaboration with 
the smallholder farmers in Ethiopia’s agricultural development programme at the community level. The aim 
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of the extension service is to provide practical education to the farmers and foster the flow of information 
between farmers and their stakeholders.  
Agricultural extension programmes can have varied effects depending on the technologies they promote and 
the level of adoption by farmers. In the studied area, as elsewhere in the region, the agricultural extension 
programme has promoted the increased use of external inputs (modern agricultural inputs) integrated with 
the indigenous farming systems/practices. The survey in the Raya Valley showed that during the 2005/06 
production year, about 52% of the sample households had received government extension services and 
support (training and technical support) related to crop and horticultural production (Tesfay, 2008); this had 
increased to about 85% in the 2009/10 production year (Yirga, 2011). The current study found that by 
2013/14, this coverage had reached about 92.04% of the sampled households, i.e. almost all farm households 
had access and their awareness of the benefits of these services had changed over time. 
In villages where there is modern groundwater irrigation, in addition to the three extension agents deployed 
per village, one extra extension agent (irrigation expertise) was appointed to follow-up on the day-to-day 
activities of the beneficiaries. The main responsibilities of these agents are to provide technical support to the 
farm households to utilise modern agricultural inputs, to orient them to produce value-added crops and to 
diversify their farming systems to boost their productivity. As are presented in Table 5.3 some of the basic 
extension services are teaching farmers in practice at the FTCs, by extension agents at field level and farmer-
to-farmer methods of teaching where model farmers teaching or sharing their good practices with others at 
their village or neighbourhood level. This extension of new knowledge is most effective when farmers are 
not only able to adopt it successfully, but go further and make incremental improvements to it. Hence, 
developing the awareness of the farm community to participate in agricultural extension service programmes 
and using different agricultural technologies would help to diversify their production system.  
Although the government focuses on extension services, some beneficiary farm households revealed that 
there were certain limitations to the supports they received from some of the development agents. For 
instance, the survey indicated the following responses from farm households about the extension services 
they received: 60.18% were very helpful, 33.19% were moderately helpful, and 6.64% were not helpful. This 
indicates that there are some limitations to these extension workers including: (1) some extension workers 
have a lack of knowledge in key areas such as intensifying or diversifying farming systems. (2) They are not 
market oriented and they lack certain communication and soft skills such as how to organise farmers based 
on their interests. (3) Most of them have insufficient knowledge on how to practice the indigenous farming 
by integrating with the modern farming practices; rather have promoted the use of the external inputs. This 
shows that extension workers lack practical skills due to a lack of exposure to the indigenous farming 
experience, and their subject knowledge is narrow and geared towards technically oriented training. The 
extension work in the studied area has not been participatory enough and little consideration has been paid to 
the farmers’ prior experiences and knowledge. The extension workers’ focus on the diffusion of agricultural 
technologies instead of following up on the actual implementation of these technologies to augment 
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productivity. Furthermore, these extension workers have low job satisfaction and most of them seek 
alternative career opportunities or change their profession. Therefore, the government needs to address these 
and other limitations to capitalise on the benefits of the extension services programme. 
Table 5.3: Basic extension services provided to the beneficiary farm households 
Services/advices Obs. % 
Fertiliser utilisation/application  203 89.82 
Farmland preparation  11 4.87 
Irrigation resource utilisation and management  150 66.37 
Postharvest handling and output marketing  18 7.97 
New seed varieties application/utilisation  131 57.97 
Credit and saving services 45 19.91 
Pest and insect infestation management  109 48.23 
Improved animal production  47 20.8 
Source: Own sample survey (2014) 
5.7.2 Modern agricultural-input utilisation and agronomic management  
The major reasons for low agricultural productivity in Ethiopia is related to weather fluctuations, particularly 
seasonal rainfall variability, and the lack of access to irrigation and modern farming practices, integrated 
with the indigenous farming systems. The development and expansion of irrigation and other rural 
infrastructure inspires the beneficiary farmers to invest in modern agricultural inputs and agro-economic 
management to maximise their productivity. Because the experiences from the developed countries 
demonstrated that the sustained use of improved agricultural technologies and modern agro-economic 
management increased agricultural production (FAO, 2002), the Ethiopian government focused on the 
supply and distribution of modern agricultural inputs to smallholder farmers. These tended to adopt simple 
technologies before moving on to more a complex ones and cheaper technologies before the expensive ones. 
Because smallholder farmers tend to be risk averse by nature, it is vital that they receive adequate 
information and good practical experience on how to apply modern farming practices (i.e. probably an 
integration of modern agricultural inputs with agro-ecological farming methods to generate higher yields on 
average for much longer). 
The information can be diffused through different mechanisms such as extension agents, neighbourhood 
farmers, television, radio, and local newspapers, although this is not easy, particularly for uneducated and 
poor smallholder farmers in developing countries, like Ethiopia. Information is crucial for farmers to assess 
the suitability of the technology for their farming system and to understand the potential risks associated with 
its use. Tesfay (2008) reported that only 19% of groundwater irrigation users in the studied area used 
fertiliser, but all of them used improved seeds in the production year of 2005/06. However, this survey 
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indicated that about 90% of groundwater irrigation users used chemical fertilisers and all of them used 
improved seeds (such as onions, tomatoes, maize and teff) in their irrigated plots in the production year of 
2013/14. In the studied area, a productivity augmenting package using modern agricultural inputs (in 
particular fertiliser) was mandatory for farmers in the groundwater irrigation project; i.e. the government 
stipulated that farmers had to use modern agricultural inputs (fertiliser) in order to access the groundwater 
irrigation to multiply their yield per hectare.  
Therefore, households with access to a reliable irrigation infrastructure are more likely to use fertilisers than 
households without access to irrigation. This is why because access to reliable water for irrigation is taken as 
a precondition to use modern fertiliser by farm households. Furthermore, households use significantly higher 
amounts of fertiliser on irrigated plots than on rain-fed plots (Gebregziabher, 2008). The larger volumes of 
improved seeds used in irrigated agriculture in the studied area were tomato and onions, although sometimes 
farmers found it difficult to obtain a variety of quality vegetable seeds. The Woreda Agriculture Office and 
farmers’ cooperative associations supply most of the vegetable seeds, but farmers in this study raised some 
basic problems regarding imbalance between supply and demand, the lower quality and higher price of the 
seeds, and delays in supply (not available on time). Thus, some of the farm households are forced to buy 
these inputs from private traders and are thereby exposed to high purchasing costs. Despite these limitations, 
the farmers’ cooperative associations provide a wide variety of services, including input-supply 
management, grain marketing, post-harvest handling, processing into value-added products and the supply of 
consumer goods to members at prices that compete with local traders. Furthermore, some cooperatives are 
also involved in seed multiplication and distribution schemes, grain milling, the distribution of veterinary 
medicines, and training of members to develop a culture of saving. Therefore, cooperatives in Ethiopia have 
a niche in the production of high-value export crops, and they will consolidate the agro-processing practices 
at different levels.  
However, from an agro-ecology perspective, the intensive application of chemical fertilisers is not 
sustainable in the long-run. There are plenty of evidences to suggest that chemical fertiliser-dependence will 
result in disaster in future, but there are alternatives to address this, i.e. agro-ecological farming, which is 
much closer to the indigenous knowledge systems. The intensive, long-term use of fertilisers results in soil 
pollution and degradation, and declining productivity, unless it properly managed and integrated with 
indigenous farming practices. Obviously, soil pollution will directly undermine agricultural yields, unless 
intervention approaches change the agro-ecological and agronomic management to restore the organic soil 
fertility. Agro-ecology is a principle paradigm that applied across a wide continuum of farming traditions to 
redefine the relationship between humans and nature (Swilling & Annecke, 2012).  
Agro-ecological farming systems include mulching, green manuring, worm farming, contouring, tree 
planting, zero tillage, fallowing, diversification and the application of cattle manure (or compost) as organic 
fertiliser. Soil-fertility deficiencies can be reversed without using high external inputs, and yield increases 
are possible through soil restoration (by replacing external inputs with organically produced inputs) (Altieri 
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et al., 2011; Pretty et al., 2011). In the study area, the community uses many of these agronomic, farm-
management practices but these are supplemented by the application of modern inputs (farmers should be 
advised to merge organic and inorganic inputs to increase yields). The government believed (based on 
conventional wisdom) that smallholder farmers are backward and unproductive so it devised a strategy to 
boost the use of modern agriculture inputs to achieve food security at a national level. However, this belief is 
contrary to research which shows that smallholder farmers are much more productive (due to efficient land 
use, biodiversity and other agricultural resources) than larger farms, that is, if total output is considered 
rather than yield per hectare from a single crop (Altieri , 2009). 
The only agricultural system that will be able to confront future challenges (for instance, soil degradation 
and pollution) is one that exhibits high levels of diversity, productivity, and efficiency. Therefore, agro-
ecological and indigenous agronomic management has emerged today as the most robust pathway to 
equitable and sustainable agricultural development (Altieri, 2009; Altieri et al., 2011). Smallholder agro-
ecological management contributes substantially to improve food security and rural livelihoods, yet these 
contributions have not been adequately appreciated. For instance, practices such as water harvesting, soil-
moisture retention, mixed cropping, crop diversification, agroforestry, soil-conservation, farmer-to-farmer 
sharing experiences, strengthening local research and problem-solving capacities have had a major impact on 
farming (Altieri, 2009). Moreover, indigenous agricultural intensification practices have the following 
advantages: they increase yields per hectare and cropping intensity (i.e. two or more crops per plot), and they 
change land use from low-value crops to those that receive higher market prices (Pretty et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, agro-ecological innovations can restore soil fertility and, thus, provide the basis for long-term 
food security and form the basis for more sustainable and longer-lasting development of agriculture 
(Swilling & Annecke, 2012). Given the enduring benefits of agro-ecological farming management and the 
government’s conservational rural-development strategy, it would be advisable that to scale-up indigenous 
agronomic farming practices to minimise the impact of intensive chemical fertiliser use and to make the 
agricultural sector more ecologically friendly. The application of chemical inputs (which are not cost 
effective to smallholder farmers) is not the only solution to improving soil fertility – there are many other 
options, such as merging indigenous knowledge with modern practices, strengthening information systems at 
local level and a relational approach to interactions between humans, and between humans and ecology.  
5.7.3 Access to rural-employment opportunities 
The economies of most developing countries are dependent on human labour and oxen power for agricultural 
production, given the availability of agricultural land. Almost all rural populations in the region, and 
particularly in the Raya community, earn their living through manual labour. In comparison to mechanised 
agriculture, this requires the mobilisation of more labour for seasonal farm practices. Rural farm households, 
particularly the users of groundwater irrigation, employ large numbers of family and hired labour throughout 
the farming season. As Hussain & Hanjra (2004) noted, it is expected that irrigation will result in higher rates 
of, and more continuous, employment for rural farm workers due to the higher labour requirements for 
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irrigated horticultural activities in the dry season, such as land preparation, planting, weeding and harvesting. 
This finding is consistent with the assumption that access to reliable irrigation can generate additional 
employment opportunities for the rural communities.  
The dry season was traditionally a slack/idle period for most of the farmers in the studied area. However, 
following the introduction of groundwater irrigation, dry season cropping was introduced. This requires 
considerable labour for land preparation, planting, weeding, hoeing, watering, and harvesting of the irrigated 
crops. The survey confirmed that the farm labour requirements increased considerably after groundwater 
irrigation was introduced in the Raya Valley and this provided employment opportunities for a considerable 
number of rural households. Furthermore, the household members are busy throughout the production 
seasons. This proves that irrigation provision is a pro-poor strategy, and that the rural-development 
programme has a positive spill-over effect by creating many employment opportunities, which have a great 
impact on resource distribution, food security and poverty alleviation at both the household and community 
levels.  
The study revealed that about 80% of the sample households created seasonal employment opportunities for 
rural labourers in their community, in addition to using family labour in both the first and second seasons of 
2013/14 production year. Irrigation by nature is an intensive practice and demands a larger labour force 
throughout the production process, especially for cash-crop production. Thus, the average hired worker per 
household was 40persons in the first season and 41persons in the second in the 2013/14 production period; 
this ranges from zero to 236persons and from zero to 264persons per household in each production season, 
respectively, subject to the households’ plot size and the type of crops cultivated. In addition, the farm 
households also used family labour in the irrigated farm production activities, i.e. there were no idle family 
labourers during the production season.  
The results of this survey are consistent with the findings of Lipton et al. (2003) and Narayanamoorthy 
(2007) who found a direct relationship between access to irrigation and the ability to generate additional 
farm and non-farm employment opportunities in Asia. Owing to a higher cropping intensity, several crops 
can be grown on the same irrigated land over the course of the production process, in contrast to only one 
crop under rain-fed production, allowing for more land- and labour-intensive production. Thus, irrigation 
generates a greater demand for labour, which benefits land-poor farm households (Hussain & Hanjra, 2004). 
Even though there are variations from farmer to farmer, depending on the type of crop and cultivated plot 
size, the demand for labour is significant in the studied area. Therefore, this study concluded that the 
provision of groundwater irrigation through substantial public investment has provided the opportunity for 
seasonal employment in the rural community, and serves as a tool of resource sharing/income distribution. 
Furthermore, all age groups in the family are busy with different activities during the production season; for 
instance, cash-crop production (onions and tomatoes) generated an opportunity to use all available family 
labour, and every member of the household is busy throughout the production season. 
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5.7.4 Access to credit and training  
Smallholder farmers have highly variable flows of income and expenditure due to the seasonal nature of 
agricultural practices, so access to credit is crucial for them to manage their production and consumption 
processes. Credit is required to buy agricultural inputs/farm tools and possibly invest in infrastructure that 
could boost the productivity of the household. As irrigated agriculture is input intensive by nature (both 
labour and other inputs), this may aggravate the liquidity constraints of poor farm households and limit their 
access to the main factors of production. Therefore, the contribution of rural credit institutions is important in 
providing credit to create financial capital alternatives to the farm households to boost their investment in 
irrigated agricultural activities and increase their productivity or enable them to diversify their economic 
activities. Credit is used predominantly for the purchase of livestock, farm inputs such as fertiliser, seeds and 
pesticides, and, in some cases, for the construction of a house. 
The Debit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) is one of the credit institutions in the regional state of 
Tigray that provides credit to address the financial constraints of the farm households, to enable them to buy 
farm inputs and equipment/tools. Farmers’ cooperative associations also provide institutional credit to their 
members, both in cash and in kind, (i.e. agricultural inputs and other farm equipment). In addition to these 
formal credit institutions, in the study area there are a few informal credit-source arrangements at the local 
level. These include relatives, friends, neighbours, local moneylenders, local community insurance (iddir), 
and rotating savings and credit associations (iqub). However, the survey indicated that only 26.55% of the 
sample households had borrowed money from these different credit sources during 2013/14. Some of the 
reasons given by farm household for not taking credit include:  
 The high interest rates of the lending institutions (for instance, for DECSI’s interest rate is about 
18%, which is high); 
 Religious restrictions, especially for Muslim farm households, who are prohibited from taking credit 
with interest; 
 Borrowers are collectively liable for loans, as collateral is not required, and many of the respondents 
said that they did not want to take collective responsibility (i.e. they disliked group lending and 
collective liability); 
 Many of the respondents said that they did not have financial constraints for the purchase of 
agricultural inputs since they started using groundwater irrigation technology.  
Training is also important for farm households to understand the role and benefit of agricultural inputs to 
improve their productivity and production. The study revealed that about 66.81% of farm households had 
received training at least once since they had started to practise groundwater irrigation. The main training 
included agricultural extension (such as crop and vegetable production, fertiliser use, compost preparation 
and modern groundwater-irrigation utilisation) and natural-resource management (such as watershed 
management like terracing and agro-forestry). The Agricultural and Rural Development Office and the 
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Farmers’ Cooperative Associations Agency delivered much of the trainings, but some of it was also 
delivered by local and international NGOs. Thus, in the study area there was training on seedbed preparation, 
seedling production, optimum transplanting times, the stages of seedling growth, line planting and spacing, 
crop rotation, watering frequency, disease and pest control, harvesting stages and storage techniques. 
Further, training in line-sawing techniques, using new agricultural technologies, and how to grow different 
high-valued crops, all contribute to boosting smallholder productivity and farm income. 
In general, smallholder farmers require the necessary knowledge to use modern agricultural technologies 
such as machinery, new seed varieties, fertilisers, pesticides, energy, storage facilities, and irrigation to 
maximise their productivity. Information and learning can encompass training, external sources (e.g. 
extension agents, neighbourhood farmers, television, radio and local newspapers), experimentation and 
sharing good practices with neighbourhood farmers. Accessing these resources requires well-functioning 
factor markets, which can be a constraint in the rural areas because input demand is seasonal and small-scale. 
Collective purchasing of inputs, for instance, through farmers’ cooperative associations or the WUAs, could 
help to address these constraints by creating economies of scale and reducing the transaction costs to 
maximise the benefits of groundwater irrigation infrastructure, and rural development in general. 
5.8 Crop diversification/intensification using groundwater irrigation  
Access to reliable irrigation is a powerful factor, which provides a greater opportunity for cropping intensity, 
and multiple cropping or crop diversification (Shah et al., 2003). Before the introduction of groundwater 
irrigation infrastructure in the studied area, most farm households produced staple crops such as teff, maize, 
sorghum and barley, usually for household consumption. Vegetables and fruit cultivation was limited to 
those households that had access to irrigation from river diversion and micro-dams such as ponds. However, 
more recently, after the government introduced groundwater irrigation schemes, beneficiary farmers started 
to produce high value (market-oriented) horticultural crops such as tomatoes, onions and peppers. 
The usual crops (cash and staple crops) produced by the users of groundwater irrigation are tomatoes, 
onions, peppers, maize and teff, and others. The surveyed sample households revealed that most of the 
farmers produced more than one crop per production season. Vegetables appeared to provide the most 
intensive production and most of the farmers are able to produce twice (or more often) per year. The most 
commonly produced vegetables, in terms of the number of producers, were onions and tomatoes. As Table 
5.4 indicates, onions were grown by 76.55% of the sampled households, followed by tomatoes at 33.63%, 
using groundwater irrigation in the 2013/14 production period. Furthermore, about 70.8% and 54.42% of the 
beneficiary sampled farm households also produced maize and teff, respectively (the two main staple crops 
in the studied area), in the same production period. 
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Table 5.4: Type of crops/vegetables produced and average output (Quintal/ha) in 2013/14 
Source: Own sample survey (2014) 
As Table 5.4 indicates, there have been significant differences in productivity per hectare between cash and 
staple crops using the same agricultural technology, such as groundwater irrigation and other inputs. The 
productivity per hectare for cash crops (vegetables) is much higher than for staple crops. The average onion 
yield per hectare was estimated to be about 141.66quintals in the first season and 158.39quintals in the 
second season of 2013/14. The average tomato yield per hectare was about 148.64quintals in the first season 
and 203.84quintals in the second of the same production period. On the other hand, the average maize yield 
per hectare was about 38.94quintals in the first season and 31.36quintals in the second season of 2013/14. 
The average teff yield per hectare was estimated to be about 17.56quintals in the first season and 
14.41quintals in the second of the same production period. Figure 5.5 shows the mean productivity 
differences between staple and cash crops. 
Figure 5.5: Mean productivity per hectare for two staple and cash crops 
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 One quintal is equal to 100kg or ten quintals are equal one tone. 
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Std. Dev. Obs.  Mean  
(in quintal) 
Std. Dev. Obs. % 
Maize  89 38.94 32.38 71 31.36 16.63 160 70.8 
Teff  55 17.57 10.51 68 14.41 10.16 123 54.42 
Barley  12 22 15.59 9 13.78 11.16 21 9.29 
Peppers  6 73.33 46.76 2 34 19.8 8 3.54 
Tomato  44 148.64 132.17 32 203.84 153.1 76 33.63 
Onions 81 141.66 80.40 91 158.39 90.1 172 76.55 
Cabbage 3 191.1 186.83 5 269.2 252.16 8 3.54 
Others 15 34.15 41.04 15 24.93 27.45  30 13.27 
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The question is, if the productivity of cash crops is better than the staple crops, why do beneficiary 
households not cover all their irrigated plots with cash crops every production season. Some of the 
justifications given by the beneficiary farm households are First, if they were to cultivate their whole plot 
with onions or tomatoes, they would be exposed to price volatility, or, in short, they would face marketing 
problems. Second, they need these staple crops for two main purposes: for household consumption, and to 
use their residues (straw or fodder) for their livestock, which is likely to lead to an increase in the number of 
livestock kept by the households. Third, practising crop rotation or inter-cropping helps them to 
sustain/maintain the soil fertility of their plots. This is part of the rationale for cultivating staple crops. 
Further, even if the yield per hectare for tomatoes was higher than for onions, the market value (average 
price per quintal) for onions was slightly higher than for tomatoes in both production seasons of 2013/14 (see 
Table 5.6). However, although the productivity of staple crops was much lower than cash crops, their market 
value (average price per quintal) was higher than for cash crops. 
Figure 5.6: Comparison of market values of cash and staple crops produced by farm HHs  
 
Obviously, the yield per hectare for tomatoes and onions was much higher than that of the staple crops 
(maize and teff) using the same inputs. In effect, the average income per household for those who produced 
cash crops in each production season was about three times as much as for those who produced staple crops 
(see Table 5.5 & Table 5.7). Thus, in terms of output and total farm income, producing cash crops is 
preferred to producing staple crops, even though the price quintal for cash crops is much lower than for 
staple crops. Access to reliable groundwater irrigation contributes positively to patterns of diversification, 
intensification and increasing farm households’ productivity and income.  
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Table 5.5: Value for output of crops/vegetables (in ETB) in 2013/14 
Source: Own sample survey (2014) 
Figure 5.7: Comparison of mean income per household (in ETB) from staple and cash crops  
 
By boosting the productivity and production of the beneficiary farm households, the average farm income 
per household has increased. Therefore, groundwater irrigation infrastructure has contributed directly to the 
beneficiary farm households by increasing their income. Irrigation has also contributed indirectly to non-
beneficiaries by creating seasonal employment opportunities and reducing the prices of staple and cash crops 
by increasing the supply to local and regional markets. The economic and social benefits of groundwater 
irrigation infrastructure include:   
     Most of the beneficiaries achieved food self-sufficiency and food security at the household level; 
 Their family labour force was fully employed in farming practices and they hired additional labour; 
 The income level of the household was improved through using additional agricultural inputs and 
improving their farming practices; 
 It increased the production of marketable agricultural produce or cash crops; i.e. producing surplus 
produce and boosting the supply to local and regional markets; 
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Mean (in ETB)  Std. Dev. Mean (in ETB) Std. Dev. 
Maize  8208.61 6389.86 7339.58 5795.31 
Teff  7719.65 6428.64 6251.28 5111.72 
Barley  4838 2911.76 2466.67 1879.49 
Pepper  6750 4957.32 9100 5798.28 
Tomatoes  22473.18 28595.9 21971.72 28512.88 
Onions 22183.23 13915.88 27587.7 20293.4 
Cabbage 14666.67 8082.91 26080 7623.12 
Others 6561.87 5561.97 5826.67 5694.92 
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    It improved their level of savings or physical asset holding and their approach to farming practices 
(i.e. adopting/practising intensive farming); 
 It improved the level of consumption within the household by increasing their income levels; 
 It changed their living conditions and their ability to send their children to school, including private 
colleges, without any economic constraints; 
 It encouraged participation in many rural-development programmes and many of them became model 
farmers; 
 It developed better agronomic management practices with the support of extension services; 
 They could build new and better houses, and purchase additional livestock and other household 
assets; 
 They received a better social status in the community due to their improved wealth status.  
To summarise, irrigation can increase the intensity and diversification of crop production by enabling the 
cultivation of multiple crops per production season. It increases input intensity and moisture availability, 
which, in turn, improves productivity, and modern farming practices at the community level. Irrigation is the 
most important agricultural component for reliable production. For this reason, the Ethiopian government 
invested large sums of public finance in the provision of irrigation infrastructure to improve the livelihood of 
the smallholder farmers and contribute to overall economic growth. 
5.9 Accessibility of institutions and community participation  
Households with greater social capital and with more relationships through their involvement in local 
associations may have better access to information or inputs and, thus, may be more productive. Involvement 
in agriculture-oriented associations, such as the farmers’ cooperative associations and agricultural cadres, 
may increase the farmers’ awareness of modern agronomic and farm-management practices, and this, in turn, 
increases their productivity and production (Pender & Gebremedhin, 2007). The term ‘social capital’ is used 
to describe the importance of social relationships in social and economic life; these are based on the trust and 
solidarity that develops between people who work in groups/networks to achieve collective and mutually 
beneficial outcomes. Social capital lowers the transaction costs of working together, it facilitates 
cooperation, and people have the confidence to invest in collective activities. Therefore, it is an important 
prerequisite for the adoption of sustainable behaviours and technologies in the larger community (Pretty et 
al., 2011). Hence, social capital may increase the farmers’ ability to earn higher returns from marketing their 
products and improve their access to inputs (for instance, membership of marketing cooperatives) for 
modern farming practices (Pender & Gebremedhin, 2007).  
Given scarce or inadequate information and fragmented markets (both factor and output markets), social 
networks facilitate the exchange of information, and enable farmers to access agricultural inputs and address 
their credit constraints. Being a member of different associations reduces transaction costs and increases a 
farmer’s bargaining power, helping them to earn higher returns when marketing their produce at a proper 
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market (Wollnia et al., 2010). Although it takes time to build social capita, once established it appears to be 
an essential condition for the rapid flow of information, strengthening cooperation and mutual benefit, acting 
collectively and fostering trust in the community. Therefore, the state should support the building of social 
capital to strengthen its cohesion with the masses, and use this as its broad-based, state–society coalition to 
increase the productivity of the agricultural sector and to accelerate the overall rural transformation.  
 To increase the productivity of farm households, it is vital that they have access to agricultural output and 
input markets,
55
 reliable information and support organisations, including credit institutions. Membership of 
farmer-based organisations such as cooperatives, WUAs and marketing organisations, contributes positively 
to the farmers’ investment decisions based on reliable information. For instance, farmers’ cooperative 
associations can collect information about production technologies and consumer preferences, and distribute 
this to their members through extension visits or demonstration sessions. Therefore, membership of a 
cooperative is important for farm households to benefit from the services they provide. They elevate the 
social and economic circumstances of their members and create bonds of social solidarity, and they become 
an important instrument in bottom-up sustainable rural development.  
Thus, the survey of sample households in the Raya Valley confirmed that almost all adults are members of 
different local institutions (both formal and informal associations) in their community (see Table 5.6). 
Through their membership of formal and local institutions, the farmers augment their social and economic 
benefits by strengthening their interactions and linkages within the community. For instance, male adult 
members of households’ could be members of either farmers’ or youth associations based on their age; 
female adults could be members of women’s or youth associations depending on their age; while young, 
female adults could become member of both women’s and youth associations because dual membership is 
also possible for them. Other formal and local institutions do not have age or gender specifications and any 
adult can volunteer to become a member of any of them. These institutions allow the community to exchange 
political, economic, and social aspects within the community at the local level, or across the larger 
community. Farmers are empowered by these formal and informal groups (social capital) based on a 
common interest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
55
 Markets are critical in irrigation development and, particularly, in output markets. Output markets have been either 
the driving force behind several irrigation developments or the reason for their collapse. Produce markets that are 
predictable and reliable, to the extent that prices paid make irrigation economically viable without any distortions, are a 
prerequisite for successful irrigation development (Aw & Diemer, 2005). 
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Table 5.6: Household’s membership or networks at the community level  
 
Community association/organisation  
Households’ response   Mean membership 
 (in years)  Yes  % No  % 
Farmer’s association  122  53.98 104  46.02  9.13 
Women’s association 167  73.89 59  26.11  8.2 
Youth association 118  52.21 108  47.79  5.93 
Farmers’ cooperative association  131  57.96 95  42.04  6.23 
Iddir/funeral & wedding services 
association  
187  82.74 39  17.26  10.54 
Iqub/rotating savings group  78  34.51 148  65.49  5.37 
Feast days (Mahber) association  113  50 113  50  10.53 
Exchange/sharing draft power  77  34.07 149  65.93  10.33 
Theft prevention group  124  54.87 102  45.13  6.7 
Community-risk prevention pool  99  43.81 127  56.19  3.72 
Source: Own sample survey (2014) 
In addition to the formal institutions, there are different customary institutions at the community level to 
strengthen the interconnection and relationships of the farming communities. For instance, these include 
funeral groups or community insurance (iddir), labour-sharing groups (lifinti), sharecropping land 
arrangements (megazo), and savings and loan-type groups like rotating savings (iqub). These played a 
pivotal role in the community, enabling them to share their social and economic problems, to strengthen their 
interaction and to share information about their day-to-day activities.  
Moreover, in addition to the formal justice institutions at different levels, depicted in Table 5.7, there are 
different traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms that are closely bound to the socio-political and 
economic realities of the lifestyles of the communities. These include the customary courts (called gereb), 
which rely on the goodwill of the community to adhere to their rulings. The process of conflict resolution by 
the customary courts has appreciated and supported by the state, because these courts reduce the state’s 
institutional burden and are easily accessible to the community. These indigenous institutions enable the 
community to help themselves, and the state shows a strong commitment to achieve development and 
minimise conflicts by working closely with these institutions. All these customary institutions have their own 
rules and regulations (unwritten) developed through the consent of the members of the respective 
institutions. A combination of customary and formal institutions is also critical in the management of the 
natural resources that facilitate and improve the socio-economic development of the community. Therefore, 
indigenous institutions, like social capital, relational dynamics/networks, village obligations, and all other 
things at community level, are essential to ensure the success of the rural economy and rural transformation. 
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These formal and informal associations (institutions) are important to mobilise community participation in 
local activities and development programmes, and they serve as a point of interaction (bridge) between the 
state and society in the development process. The community has actively participated in local development 
programmes such as:  
 Participation in building small-scale irrigation infrastructure like water-diversion structures for spate 
irrigation (during the high rainy season for their rain-fed farming) and other small-scale irrigation 
practices; 
 Participation in building and maintaining the rural road programmes such as the URRAP (Universal 
Rural Road Access Programme( which started in 2010/11 at village level; 
 Compost preparation (composting) to boost soil fertility, productivity and production; 
 Participation in soil and water conservation campaigns (in the watershed-management programme) to 
protect their environment and natural resources;  
 Digging shallow wells (Ella or kurie in Amharic) for both livestock and micro-irrigation purposes; 
 Building and fencing of local institutions such as schools, health centres and posts, water institutions, 
FTCs and other local institutions. 
The community voluntarily (freely) participated in some of these community development works/activities, 
but in other instances they were partly remunerated (as off-farm activities). Therefore, this is important as a 
source of income diversification, food security, and poverty alleviation. For instance, the PSNP was one of 
the rural development programmes in which the community participated for conditional remuneration. 
Community participation in collective work known as ‘communal work’ or ‘development work’ is 
indispensable to provide local infrastructure and improve the agricultural environment by engaging in soil 
and water conservation, and diversion for small-scale irrigation purposes. 
As Table 5.7 indicates, the communities have access to the following basic formal institutions to obtain the 
necessary services. These are: village administration centres, health posts, elementary schools, grain mills, 
FTCs, village farmers’ cooperative centres, veterinary centres and social courts (Mahberawi firdbiet in 
Amharic), which can be accessed on average within a 3–5km radius, and ranges from 0.5–15km. In addition, 
the community has access to woreda markets, health centres, a district hospital, secondary schools, a woreda 
court (woreda firdbiet in Amharic), and other woreda government institutions on average within a 6–15km 
radius, ranging from 2–30km.  Regarding the accessibility to rural roads, the survey revealed that on average 
all sampled households have access to all-weather roads within half-an-hour’s walking distance. This 
indicated that there are good feeder roads to enable access to the woreda centres or small towns. A good 
rural road infrastructure is crucial for the rural population to secure access to greater resources, employment, 
and opportunities in the way of better markets, faster access to basic social services like education, health 
care and extension services, and lighter transport burdens.  
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Table 5.7: Accessibility of formal institutions by the Raya Valley community 
 
Institutions  
 Distance (in km) Time take (in minutes) 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Nearest health centre 223 3.95 4.36 37.77 39 
Nearest health post  216 2.78 2.77 25.2 18.65 
Nearest elementary school  222 1.64 1.46 13.61 10.14 
Nearest grain mill (Wofcho) 222 1.52 1.47 13.75 13.38 
Local social courts  213 1.93 2.1 17.65 19.14 
Farmers training centres  222 1.68 1.42 15.95 14 
Village cooperative centre  220 1.93 2.24 16 15 
Nearest veterinary centre  223 3.28 3.69 31.84 37.23 
Nearest local market  160 5.92 6.51 59.88 67.39 
Nearest secondary school 225 6.71 5.59 65.44 54.57 
Woreda market 225 8.31 7.71 78.79 46.47 
Zonal/district hospital  224 15.93 11.39 157.98 113.84 
Woreda court  202 8.65 9.12 81.22 46.37 
Source: Own sample survey (2014)  
Access to accurate markets can influence the farmers’ decision-making and investment in various ways, like 
availability or accessibility of input and output markets, access to information and support institutions, and 
access to credit institutions and extension services (Pender & Gebremedhin, 2007; Wollnia et al., 2010). Yet 
both input and output markets are highly fragmented, where informal brokers set market prices, usually not 
in the interests of farmers. This problem is extremely difficult during peak harvest seasons when farmers 
cultivate high-value but perishable crops. In the study area, the beneficiary farmers’ goal was to produce 
more produce by using irrigated plot, but their final income is critically dependent on the market for their 
produce; i.e. marketing is a critical for these producers. The low prices they receive for their produce reduces 
their motivation to make further investments in groundwater irrigation practices. Thus, some of the farmers 
either rent out or sharecrop their irrigated plots, rather than cultivating themselves, to minimise the expected 
and actual risks.  
The evidence from the survey indicated that about 68.58% of the sample households in the Raya Valley 
complained about market problems and a lack of fair prices for their output, particularly for cash crops 
(onions and tomatoes). Their main constraints revolved around the lack of alternative market outlets or 
information, and/or the lack of easy access to nearby efficient markets. For instance, the price volatility 
during the harvesting season remains the main problem in the studied area. About 66.37% of the respondents 
confirmed that price volatility is their main constraint, followed by the lack of market information 28.31%, 
and the great distance to the regional market and high transport costs 12.83%. The main factor that causes 
price volatility for cash crops in the studied area is the production of excessive amounts of the same/identical 
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product in a production season. As a solution, the farmers’ cooperative associations, in collaboration with the 
WUAs, have provided proper storage/warehousing as a means of stabilising the income of the beneficiary 
farm households, and in the agricultural sector in general. In addition, the government and other stakeholders 
need to work with the farmers to take the necessary actions to bring alternative buyers into the market 
(during peak harvest seasons) to protect the beneficiary farm households from loss of income. 
In general, the farm households and their members have access to some basic institutions, which are 
important to facilitate their political, economic, cultural, and social development. To obtain the necessary 
services from these institutions in a sustainable manner, the farm households have adopted them as their 
own. The farm households in the studied area interact quite often with both state and non-state institutions 
regarding their agricultural activities and other social issues. For instance, Table 5.8 indicates how often the 
farm households visited public and other institutions, including private input suppliers and neighbours in the 
field to get the needed services. This interaction is relevant to the farm households to develop their 
awareness, to share their experiences, to access modern inputs, to address the constraints related to their 
farming practices, and other social constraints in an integrated manner. 
Table 5.8: The frequency of farm households’ visits to local institutions 
Institutions  Obs. Always % Sometimes % Once in a season % 
Tabia administration  216 53.24 34.26 12.50 
Woreda Water Resource Office  160 3.13 65 31.88 
Woreda Agricultural Office  184 5.43 63.59 30.98 
Farmers’ cooperatives association  203 51.23 40.89 7.88 
Farmers training centres  201 55.72 39.30 4.98 
Dedebit Credit Institution and Saving  107 23.36 31.78 44.86 
Agricultural research centres  40 32.50 NA 67.50 
NGOs in the area  26 3.85 57.69 38.46 
Private input suppliers  111 43.24 36.94 19.82 
Neighbours/Friends  216 93.52 5.09 1.39 
Source: Own sample survey (2014) 
5.10 The WUAs and management issues of the groundwater irrigation schemes  
Irrigation can assure crop production, allow crop diversification and intercropping, but it requires proper 
management to meet the objectives set. There are different management styles associated with government-
led irrigation schemes, for instance, the agency/department managed schemes, farmer-managed or 
community-managed schemes, and public–beneficiary managed schemes. Public institutions, with subsidies 
from the government, manage most large or medium-scale government-led irrigation schemes while mostly 
the communities through the WUAs manage small-scale systems. Because Ethiopia is a federal state, 
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government organisations are responsible for groundwater development (for both irrigation and drinking 
water supplies) and this differs among the regional states. However, in all regional states, there is an 
equivalent of a Bureau of Water Resources in charge of the rural water supply, irrigation infrastructure 
development and water-resource management. In almost all the regional states, responsibility for irrigation 
management and utilisation lies in an equivalent of a Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development or 
Bureau of Agriculture. Local authorities below the level of the regional states, particularly the districts and 
the villages (tabias), are increasingly responsible for providing public services, and managing them. 
The Raya Valley survey revealed that all the groundwater irrigation schemes were managed by the 
beneficiary farm households, through their respective WUAs (or water-user cooperative associations), 
accompanied by traditional (indigenous) irrigation-management systems. Following state investment in 
irrigation infrastructure process done, the irrigated command area was distributed to smallholder farmers to: 
boost production (produce at least twice or more times per year), increase productivity (produce two or more 
crops per season) based on plot size and enhanced and promoted inclusive, democratic, and equitable 
governance over the irrigation schemes through the WUAs. This means the management practices were 
transferred to the users through the WUAs to which those who have access to irrigation become members. 
The WUAs are local institutions formed by the beneficiary farmers; these are responsible for the overall 
management of the groundwater irrigation schemes and they follow principles of equity and efficiency in the 
allocation and distribution of water resources. The respondents explained that after the installation of the 
necessary groundwater irrigation infrastructure, all beneficiaries were given training on how to use the new 
irrigation technologies, how to operate them and how to access technical supports from responsible 
institutions. The beneficiaries of the irrigation in the Raya Valley practised more of an enterprise-oriented 
model. Each of the wells was operated under a WUA, which have, on average, eleven committee members 
put in place to manage the overall groundwater irrigation system. This indicates that an effort has been made 
to involve farmers progressively in the various aspects of small-scale irrigation management related to water 
distribution, operation, and maintenance to improve the performance of irrigated agriculture. 
In the survey, about 90% of the respondents confirmed that their irrigation scheme was managed by a WUA, 
and about 95% of the farm households had participated in the general meeting of the association to elect their 
committee/leaders. Each of the groundwater irrigation schemes’ user associations has their own rules and 
regulations (by-laws)
56
. Based on their by-laws, the respective WUAs have a general assembly where all 
irrigation beneficiaries assemble to discuss the high-level issues, elect committee members, and decide on 
the fee for irrigation power-use per plot, etc. The executive committees have the following major 
responsibilities: they take care of the physical infrastructure of the irrigation scheme, monitoring pump 
operations and facilitating maintenance when necessary, supervising the normal water distribution, and 
                                                     
56
 The by-laws are the primary source of internal rules and regulations (the constitutional rules of each WUA) that 
regulate the WUA’s activities. The by-laws should not be amended frequently in order to promote stability, and should 
only be amended if strictly necessary. 
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executing other related responsibilities. The WUAs operate in accordance with their by-laws and have 
regular consultations with developmental agents, the Woreda Agricultural Office, the Water Resource 
Office, and the Farmers’ Cooperative Agency to discuss the condition of the scheme. Regardless of their 
capacity limitations, the information confirmed that many of the WUAs from the studied area are relatively 
capable and efficient to manage their irrigation schemes (see Table 5.9). The leadership capacity of these 
WUAs was derived from continuous training and consultation with the Agriculture Office, Water Resource 
Office and Cooperative Agency and the extension workers at village level, as well as sharing their good 
experiences among themselves. 
Table 5.9: Performance evaluation of the WUA/cooperative committee by the beneficiaries 
 
Indicators/activities 
Evaluation rank to the role of the WUAs committee 
Poor 
(Obs.) 
 
% 
Good 
(Obs.) 
 
% 
Very good 
(Obs.) 
  
% 
Leadership fairness & equity 15 6.64 156 69.03 55 24.34 
Resource mobilisation & distribution 21 9.29 138 61.06 67 29.65 
Infrastructure maintenance & operation 34 15.04 145 64.16 47 20.80 
Control irrigation equipment 30 13.27 149 65.93 47 20.80 
Accountability & responsibility  20 8.85 153 67.70 53 23.45 
Source: Own sample survey (2014) 
The WUAs are public interest, local institutions formed by the beneficiary farmers and have legal status; 
they were established to assure the sustainability and fair distribution of water resources. One of the most 
common reasons for governments to turn the management of irrigation schemes to users is the lack of public 
funds to cover the operation and maintenance costs of the scheme. Some argue that governments cannot 
subsidise large irrigation schemes and then bear the operational and maintenance costs indefinitely. Instead, 
farmers should cover these costs when the irrigation projects mature and the farmers reach a stable level of 
income (Aw & Diemer, 2005). Therefore, in line with this argument, in Ethiopia, and particularly in the 
studied area, the main justification for transferring the irrigation infrastructure to users is to minimise 
government expenditure and to institutionalise irrigation-cost recovery (such as operations and maintenance) 
by the beneficiary farm households. It was generally expected that the transfer of irrigation management to 
the beneficiary farm households would contribute to improved performance and increase the sustainability of 
the irrigation systems. Some of the characteristics and institutional frameworks of the WUAs in the studied 
area, and elsewhere, are as follows: 
Characteristics of WUAs:  
 WUAs are farmers’ organisations and they have a broader public interest mandate; 
 Membership is compulsory and linked to the land plot within the service area; based on the land-use 
right, every person who uses land located within the service area is a member of the association; 
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 Compulsory membership of a WUA is essential to ensure the sustainability of the irrigation resource; 
 The WUAs operate on a non-commercial basis, but they provide services to their members and 
governance of the irrigation schemes; 
 They very often use public-infrastructure irrigation schemes, i.e. infrastructure built with public 
money through a pro-rural development programme; 
 The WUAs are self-managed organisations governed by their members, but due to public interest the 
nature of their tasks are subject to some form of supervision by government institutions at the woreda 
level; 
 The tasks of the WUAs are limited to the management, operations and maintenance of an irrigation 
system and watershed management for the sustainability of the irrigation resources; 
 The state has the right (and the duty) to ensure that the WUAs operate lawfully and correctly in 
cooperation with the public in the interests of the beneficiaries, because the state made the investment 
with the objective of ensuring that farm households and rural communities benefit. 
Institutional framework of the WUAs: 
 The WUAs were granted a water-use right after the infrastructure was completed by the government; 
 Beneficiary farmers contribute to the cost of operations and maintenance or repair work (in the form 
of money, labour and/or materials), and pay electricity fees based on plot size, or per hour in some 
furrow-irrigation schemes; 
 The WAUs have their own by-laws developed with the support of the Woreda Farmers’ Cooperative 
Association and approved by the ‘general assembly’ of the association, which is the supreme 
decision-making body of the association. The by-laws define the roles, tasks, rights and 
responsibilities of the WUAs, and the committees and their members; 
 The WUA leaders, ‘management committees’, consist of about 11 members elected democratically 
by the general assembly to oversee and supervise the activities of the association; furthermore, there 
are different sub-committees under the main management committee; 
 The committee formally meets monthly to discuss irrigation and farming-related issues in their 
scheme; however, they may hold extraordinary meetings at any time if necessary;  
 There is an annual general assembly to assess progress and agree on a work plan for the year ahead. 
In addition, there are also quarterly and mid-year evaluations (gimgema in Amharic) of performance 
with all members of the association;  
 The WUAs have legal status and enter contracts, and enforce sanctions/punishment against members 
who break the rules and regulations of the association; 
 The close involvement of the WUAs has resulted in increased accountability, transparency and 
responsibility because of a developed sense of ownership in irrigation infrastructure;  
 The WUAs tend to be responsible for providing services related to water distribution and the 
provision of agricultural inputs such as fertiliser and others to their members via the Farmers’ 
Cooperative Association Agency and development agents (or extension workers); 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
201 
 
 They enhance communication between users and the extension agents, i.e. the Woreda Water 
Resource and Agricultural and Rural Development Offices, Cooperative Agency, and other 
stakeholders. 
The roles related to the WUAs can be divided into three major categories: (1) governance (irrigation-scheme 
management) related to the general assembly; (2) facilitating operations and the maintenance process; and 
(3) organising different management committees (see Figure 5.8). Some of the management responsibilities 
of the WUAs are to plan, implement, and monitor their activities, water distribution plans, and budgets 
related to operations and maintenance, the charging of electricity fees and other financial aspects. Based on 
the characteristics of the WUAs, the institutional frameworks (internal structure of the association) and roles 
of the WUAs are presented in the following figure. 
Figure 5.8: Internal structure of the WUAs in the study area 
 
Some functions of the WUA committees: 
 Irrigation-water scheduling and equity (assured equal water distribution among beneficiaries); 
 Protecting their irrigation system/scheme from any damage as far as possible;  
 Improve communication (serve as a bridge) between farmers and local government organs, such as 
the Woreda Agriculture and Water Resource Offices and Farmers’ Cooperative Agency;  
 Promote member farmers’ economic activity by increasing productivity using irrigation; 
 Promote agronomic management practices, including fertiliser and other input utilisation in 
collaborations with the development agents. 
Beside the formal institutions of the WUAs, the farm households have their own traditional dispute-
resolution mechanisms (irrigation-water governance systems) related to water distribution, as well as equity 
and efficiency, which has been practised in the community for a long time in their spate irrigation and river-
diversion forms of water management. It was confirmed in the current study that the role of the WUAs was 
supplemented by the indigenous irrigation-management practices. At the community level, 
customary/indigenous institutions are preferred to the formal institutions to share their experiences; to 
address their economic and social problems because these institutions are easy to access; they are not 
complex, are very flexible and credible, and have low transaction costs (cost effective) compared to the 
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formal institutions. The evidence from the study confirmed that communities tried to settle many of their 
disputes relating to the equity and distribution of water using their traditional ways of negotiating before 
going to the WUA committees. This confirms that the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation schemes are 
governed institutionally by co-ownership of the state and the beneficiary farm households, and the 
integration of both formal and indigenous institutions.  
As the survey revealed, the WUAs that are democratically set-up institutions by water-user households in a 
command area and they have legal status to enter contracts, and the necessary authority to manage an 
irrigation system (partial or whole); they operate and maintain irrigation infrastructure; and they have 
administrative and financial autonomy. The management structure of the WUAs is similar across all the 
irrigation schemes in the project area. Designing institutions for irrigation-system governance is challenging 
and complex. It requires skills in understanding how rules produce incentives and outcomes in specific 
physical, economic, and cultural environments. An internal challenge was that socially and economically 
powerful groups could resist the actions of the WUA committees to enforce the existing by-laws. Hence, it is 
necessary to invest considerable time and resources to learn more about how various institutional rules affect 
the users’ behaviour, where these users are heterogeneous in their attributes and capacity to bargain for 
changes to the rules. 
The WUAs have the potential to perform their basic functions but for this to be sustainable, the members and 
the management committees need training, consultation, support services, and a proper legal basis to enable 
them to function effectively. Effective institutions are required at all levels for the sustainability of the 
resources and maximise the benefits for the beneficiaries. These institutions are responsible for ensuring 
irrigation productivity and efficiency, planning irrigation development, managing the negative impacts of 
irrigation schemes, formulating and implementing policy directives and funding to ensure sustainable 
management of the irrigation structures. The historical bias towards providing infrastructure investment 
without ensuring effective institutions is a major cause of poor irrigation performance and unsustainable 
management (Faurès et al., 2007). Institutional arrangements have failed due to insufficient resources 
(human and capital), a lack of political support, a lack of proper involvement by water users, a lack of 
capacity building, and low community awareness about the actual benefit of the institution on their 
livelihood. 
In addition to the specific irrigation-scheme management, community-based watershed management 
(physical and biological soil and water conservation activities, such as gully reclamation to reclaim eroded 
areas and gullies, area enclosure and forestry by local communities, and the rehabilitation of degraded 
patches) would be a significant factor in making agriculture the driving force of economic development. This 
indicates that the role of irrigation management institutions goes beyond merely managing irrigation 
infrastructure and practices, but involves natural-resource conservation and watershed management through 
the mobilisation of their members in collaboration with the local government. Natural resource and 
watershed management are indispensable to increase the recharge of groundwater resources and streams, and 
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to realise environmental rehabilitation, which increases the aesthetic value of the ecology and improves the 
agricultural environment. Given the current favourable rural-development, framework and the government’s 
aim to make agriculture the driver of economic development, community-based watershed management 
offers a promising outcome to increase the irrigated area across the regional state. Some of the opportunities 
derived from practising natural resource and watershed-management programmes are: (1) they reduce the 
farmers’ dependency on rain-fed agriculture by using different water-harvesting techniques for irrigation 
purposes. (2) They prevent soil erosion/degradation and land degradation by addressing flooding and 
sedimentation. (3) They tackle water shortages and moisture stress by consolidating soil and water 
conservation practices. (4) They separate/enclose the local communities’ grazing land and fodder crops for 
livestock, or encourage zero grazing to protect environmental degradation. (5) They boost the role of the 
communities’ participation in environmental protection and water-resource management. 
The failure or sub-optimal operation of small-scale irrigation schemes generally related to 
structural/infrastructural (hardware) and/or management (institutional) issues. Poor water management 
practices, the farmers’ lack of skills/awareness, and a lack of proper support services for modern agronomic 
management have constrained the productivity of the farm households. Integrated irrigation development 
with proper watershed management practices are needed for sustainable irrigation water utilisation in the 
studied area, which is an environmentally degraded part of the country. It is vitally important to have diverse 
institutional options at different levels, integrated with local-level indigenous institutions, to strengthen the 
watershed management practices to sustain the water resources and, thus, the benefits of groundwater 
irrigation. 
5.11 Discussion and summary  
The Ethiopian developmental state set ambitious goals for economic development, prioritising agriculture-
based industrialisation. This is evident in the main, long-term, economic development strategy called ADLI 
(MoFED, 2002b; Ohno, 2009). Not only is agriculture at the centre of the development policy but it is also a 
significant contributor to the country’s economy. The development of irrigated agriculture is considered as 
one of the main pro-poor and pro-rural development programmes, involving the community at the local level 
in ‘public development work’. The developmental state has tried to put significant public funds into 
enhancing the productivity of smallholder farmers, strengthening the factor and output markets, expanding 
the amount of land under irrigation, thus reducing the level of poverty and the number of food-insecure 
households. 
The development of irrigation infrastructure can have either a positive or a negative impact, depending on 
the sustainable use of the resource. If the irrigation infrastructure is used and managed properly, it will 
possibly continue to contribute multi-dimensional positive benefits to farming households and the economic 
development of the country. Equally, irrigation development could have negative consequences (i.e. negative 
environmental effects and social instability) if the water resource is not managed in a sustainable manner and 
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is used inefficiently (Awulachew et al., 2007; Dinka et al., 2014). The extensive environmental conservation 
activities undertaken through the public-work programme helps to rehabilitate the degraded environment, 
supports the revival of dried rivers and streams, and recharges groundwater resources for irrigation purposes. 
Smallholder farmers have started to divert rivers to irrigate their farmlands for vegetable and crop cultivation 
to satisfy their consumption needs, and to diversify their income by increasing their productivity. This 
indicates that the state is trying to doing its best to support smallholder farmers to participate in rural 
development programmes to ensure food security and improve their socio-economic situations. 
Irrigation is considered as one of the important agricultural inputs for increasing the productivity of 
smallholder farmers. Hence, the investment in irrigation should properly target and complement by 
improvements in the application of modern agricultural farming. Institutional, agronomic, human, and 
environmental factors ultimately determine the success of irrigation projects (You et al., 2010). There are 
both a direct and an indirect relationship between government policies (such as investment in irrigation 
infrastructure) and households’ well-being. The direct effects have seen in the production and consumption 
behaviour of the households, while the indirect effects cover different dimensions at both household and 
community levels. Public investment in irrigation improves agricultural productivity and has a positive 
impact on household income diversification and poverty eradication. The availability of reliable and 
adequate irrigation infrastructure at community level increases employment opportunities, which reduces 
poverty and inequality, and increases agricultural output supply to the nearby local markets. Thus, landless 
farmers as well as smallholder farmers’ work more days per year, which ultimately contributes to food 
security, the eradication of poverty, and non-beneficiaries benefiting from an augmented supply of 
agricultural outputs (Kumar, 2003; Hussain & Hanjra, 2004). For instance, Hussain and Hanjra (2004) 
showed that access to irrigation enables farmers to adopt new technologies that lead to higher productivity 
and increased household income. Irrigation also generates new on-farm and off-farm employment 
opportunities, which has a positive effect on income at the household level.  
Reliable irrigation schemes lead to crop diversification and to the cultivation of high-value, horticultural 
crops in addition to staple food crops. Income of the farm households can be augmented by improving the 
production of irrigated agriculture. But output and input markets are fragmented and informal brokers 
exercise excessive power and set market prices, usually to the detriment of the farmers, who have weak 
bargaining power and generally must accept what the buyers offer. The problem is heightened during the 
harvest season when farmers cultivate high-value but perishable cash crops. Poorly developed supply chains, 
high transaction costs, and lack of information about the actual and future market situation are some of the 
identified constraints, which resulted in the spread of inconsistent information, and uneven power relations 
between sellers (farmers) and buyers in the market. Moreover, in the Raya Valley, the absence of proper 
warehouse/storage facilities (particularly for perishable products) is a major cause of price fluctuation and 
results in income loss for the farmers. Smallholder farmers produce and supply their cash crops at a local 
market with incomplete market information (both actual and predicted market price) and low bargaining 
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power on the price of their output. The inability to secure a reliable market has discouraged many beneficiary 
farmers from investing further on their irrigated farm, which, in turn affects the productivity of the irrigated 
farmland. Now marketing of agricultural outputs is done on an individual basis, and the prices of cash crops 
fall significantly during harvesting time when there is excess supply.  
Therefore, the Ethiopian government and other stakeholders need to address the marketing problems to boost 
benefits from the groundwater irrigation. It should also provide transport infrastructure, support producer 
associations to boost the bargaining power of the producers and initiate the development of agro-processing 
industries, either by the farmers’ cooperatives or by the private sector to address the imbalance in demand 
and supply during the peak production season. By investing in agro-processing sub-sectors, cooperatives 
would add value to the farmers’ produce and address the problems of the price volatility of agricultural 
produce, and serve as a niche for industrialisation and rural transformation. In addition, the government and 
stakeholders working with rural development should encourage effective farmers’ organisations (or 
producers’ organisations) to share experiences (information) and address problems, and to accelerate 
resource transferrals between the rural and urban sectors. Effective organisations could also strengthen the 
government’s commitment to rural development and transformation programmes. Addressing the marketing 
issues would improve the income of beneficiary farmers and enhance their perception of further investment 
because they would be able to cover their operational costs with less pressure on their assets and increase 
their asset holdings. 
The groundwater irrigation infrastructure in the studied area uses electricity. Power shortages (due to 
interruption of power supply) and a lack of transformers are among the critical problems preventing the 
optimisation of the hundreds of deep wells that have been drilled, and discouraging the development of more 
wells to maximise the existing water potential for irrigation. Thus, the government needs to supply sufficient 
electricity from the national grid and address the problem of transformer supply to utilise fully the potential 
groundwater resources in a sustainable manner to mitigate the effects of climate change in the drought-prone 
area of the Raya Valley and elsewhere. Increasing the supply of rural electrification is not only crucial to 
develop groundwater resources for irrigation purposes but also improves the livelihood of the rural 
community. Therefore, the government need to address problems related to rural electrification to facilitate 
rural transformation.  
Other challenges in the in the Raya Valley include the frequent breakdown of motor pumps (scheme 
machinery), and a shortage of spare-part suppliers and technicians (enterprises) close to the project area to 
provide the necessary repair services. This makes it difficult and time consuming to repair the machinery. 
When farmers face such problem, they are forced to travel to the capital of the regional state, which is 160–
180 km away, to get spare parts and professional maintenance services because there are no private or state 
enterprises nearby to supply such services to them. This situation has exposed the beneficiary farm 
households and their WUAs to unnecessary financial and transaction costs, which is sometimes beyond the 
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capacity of the WUAs. Therefore, the government must address these problems by setting up institutions 
(state or private) to deliver such services close to the project area.  
Despite these constraints, the combination of factors such as access to credit, educated household members, 
input supply by cooperative associations, and access to extension services have had a positive effect on 
increasing the efficiency of irrigated farming. For instance, educated farmers have relatively greater 
managerial ability, are better technology adopters, and know how to use modern agricultural farming 
practices and to improve their productivity. They can interpret the information needed to respond to market 
signals, i.e. they practise crop diversification and intensification to minimise risks related to the market. In 
contrast, uneducated farmers are more reluctant to adopt new farming techniques because they are uncertain 
and risk-averse. Therefore, improving farmers’ practical educational status by expanding adult education 
programmes would be an appropriate policy instrument to improve the production efficiency of irrigated 
agricultural practices and transform rural communities. Furthermore, access to affordable and timely credit 
has a significant positive effect on irrigated agriculture because it lowers the financial constraints of the farm 
households, and improves their market participation and competitiveness (Gebregziabher, 2008). It is 
important to build and strengthen the links among key institutions involved in agricultural development at all 
levels to ensure packaged interventions on the frontline. These include agricultural research institutions, 
extension services, input suppliers (farmers’ cooperatives and individual suppliers), and output marketers, 
rural credit institutions, private investors and educational institutions.  
Groundwater irrigation offers the potential to mitigate the effects of drought and reduces crop failure because 
groundwater is often less vulnerable to drought than other types of irrigation due to less exposure to the 
external environment. Irrigation has positive effects on income and employment and this has a tremendous 
multiplier effect on the overall economy due to increased household spending. In other words, not only the 
agricultural sector is improved but the industrial and service sectors also improved because of sectoral 
forward and backward linkages. In short, irrigation has had a significant impact on the eradication of 
poverty, achieving food security and accelerating overall rural transformation. 
To realise all these benefits of irrigation, stakeholders at all levels must focus on the sustainable and efficient 
use of water resource. This requires effective institutional arrangements, especially at the service points, i.e. 
where the irrigation infrastructure is found. Countries use different institutional arrangements to manage 
their irrigation infrastructure through the integrated government–farmer organisations such as WUAs, 
irrigation boards and irrigation cooperatives. These mechanisms are known as irrigation management 
transfer or participatory irrigation management models and are based on a country’s specific political, 
economic, and climatic contexts. Developing local leadership capacity, context-specific institutions, and the 
awareness of the farm households is essential for the success of this approach. 
In the case of Ethiopia, the institutional arrangements for water-resource development and management 
depend on different layers, for instance: (1) policy-makers and standard setters at federal level (the Ministry 
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of Water Resource and Energy) for large and medium-scale irrigation development projects; at regional 
level, the Bureau of Water Resources plans, finances and constructs small-scale irrigation development 
projects. (2) service providers at the local (district) level are the offices of Water Resources and Agricultural 
and Rural Development; and (3) the beneficiary farm households and their organisations (WUAs), local 
officers like DAs, village leaders, etc. 
However, the institutional arrangements for water resource management in Ethiopia have undergone through 
frequent changes due to various factors at different state administrations. For instance, lack of institutional 
stability associated with frequent changes in responsibilities and staff turnover, a shortage of qualified staff 
(i.e. engineer, hydrologists, surveyors, agronomist), and the subsequent lack of experience in planning, 
designing, operating and managing large and medium-scale irrigation development projects (Negash, 2011). 
Therefore, as discussed in section 5.10, the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation schemes have co-owned and 
governed by the state and the beneficiary farm households, and the integration of both formal and indigenous 
institutions to ensure equity distribution and sustainability of the resources/infrastructure. 
Table 5.10: Summary on the role of state in groundwater-irrigation development 
Indictors and descriptions/activities by government and the beneficiaries  
The official development ideology & practices 
 The state officially claimed a developmental state model as per the context of the country; 
 The state adopted  ADLI as a long-term development strategy supported by consecutive, five-year development 
plans; 
 Implementing the agricultural development programmes emanated from ADLI via empowering individual farm 
households to improve their farming practices; 
 The state showed its commitment for the implementation of rural development programmes to realise tangible 
transformation from the bottom up; 
 Under the long-term ADLI development strategy, attention is given to the development of small-scale irrigation to 
boost productivity of smallholder agriculture, to improve the status of food security, and to eradicate poverty from 
the rural area. 
Leadership or management of groundwater resources 
 Relatively committed and visionary leadership, broad-based development programmes, and local resource 
development and utilisation are given proper attention under the rural development policy and strategy of the 
country; 
 The state tried to create a broad section of state–society coalitions, and allow the involvement of the community to 
strengthen institutions, and to participate in local development programmes; 
 The WUAs are the main local institutions responsible for the governance of groundwater-irrigation schemes with 
cooperation of other local government institutions and indigenous irrigation-management committees. 
The role of the state for the development of groundwater-resource for irrigation 
 The state tried to invest substantial public funds in the installation of irrigation infrastructure but the beneficiary 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
208 
 
smallholder farmers are responsibility for operations and maintenance; 
 Irrigation is considered to be one of the crucial agricultural inputs to boost the productivity of the smallholder 
agricultural sector; 
 The Raya Valley groundwater irrigation project is developed in one of a development corridor identified in the 
regional state of Tigray, and the government has tried to develop the resources for the benefit of smallholder 
farmers; 
 The state encouraged the establishment of WUAs (water-user cooperatives) to ensure sustainable management of 
irrigation schemes and co-ownership of the resource by the involvement of the beneficiary farm households. 
Motivation of using groundwater for irrigation purpose  
 Regional/federal governments supported the development of shallow- and deep-well, groundwater irrigation 
where the potential is available, as well as other irrigation infrastructures; 
 Groundwater irrigation is considered as one of pro-rural development programmes, as well as a tool to mitigate the 
effects of climate change in drought-prone areas like the Raya Valley area; i.e. it lessens the reliance on rainfall-
dependent agricultural production systems; 
 Public investment in groundwater irrigation infrastructure is seen as crucial tool to enable smallholder farmers to 
realise rural and capital transformation. For instance, the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation is developed by 
public investment to improve smallholder agriculture, and other basic services like extension services, health, 
education, rural credit provision, and the supply of modern agricultural inputs to smooth the rural transformation 
process and distribute resources/wealth to the rural areas. 
Stimulating the recharge of groundwater resource for sustainability 
 Increasing investment in natural-resource conservation (watershed development) and management by mobilising 
the community during the free campaigns every year, and using conditional social-welfare programmes, PSNPs, 
for this purpose; 
 Public works, for instance, soil- and water-conservation programmes are considered as fundamental pillars in the 
overall environmental rehabilitation and to increase the recharge capacity of groundwater resources in the studied 
area; 
 Developing the awareness of the beneficiary farm households to use the resources in an efficient manner, and to 
practise modern agriculture, this helps to increase the recharge capacity of the groundwater resource. 
Economic benefits of groundwater irrigation  
 Crop intensification and diversification have been undertaken by the beneficiary farm households since they 
started practising groundwater irrigation, boosting their productivity and their income; 
 Using irrigation as one of agricultural inputs, increased the supply of cash crops at the local and regional markets, 
and positively contributed to price stabilisation; 
 Beneficiaries achieved food self-sufficiency at the household level, i.e. they covered their food demand throughout 
the year since using the groundwater irrigation infrastructure; 
 Beneficiary farm households started to accumulate assets, allocate the required resources to increase their 
productivity and improve their living conditions; 
 The beneficiary farm households created considerable, seasonal, rural-employment opportunities during the whole 
production season; 
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  Farmers have been empowered by getting them organised into formal and informal groups (social capital) based 
on their common interests. These institutions are used as a tool for information sharing in their day-to-day life, and 
to address their social and economic problems; 
 The groundwater irrigation infrastructure creates a development opportunity for the rural community, which helps 
to ensure equity in terms of resource sharing and improving the living conditions of the beneficiary households. 
Source: Compiled by the author 
To summarise, the Ethiopian state has invested considerable public funds in building the rural infrastructure 
required to accelerate rural development to eradicate poverty and enable smallholder farmers to achieve food 
security (CSA, 2012; World Bank, 2014)). For instance, extensive investments in irrigation infrastructure 
have had multiple of socio-economic benefits beyond the beneficiary farm households due to the positive 
spill-over effects such as generating seasonal employment opportunities at the community level, producing 
surplus agricultural outputs and boosting the consumption and saving of the rural communities. This has 
facilitated rural transformation by improving food security, alleviating poverty, and accelerating overall 
economic transformation at both the household and national levels. For instance, groundwater irrigation 
offers the potential to mitigate the effect of drought and erratic rainfall on agricultural production. It is 
considered as one of a pro-rural development programme, which plays a critical role in improving the living 
standards of the rural households by reducing food shortages and lifting them out of poverty by boosting 
their level of production. It further offers the opportunity to switch from the production of low-value staple 
crops to high-value agricultural outputs.  
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6 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
In the earlier chapters, the theories of institutions and the mainstream conception of a developmental state, 
the need for, and the rise of the developmental state were discussed. They also provided an overview of the 
African economies since independence and the significance of a developmental state in Africa as one of the 
promising development paradigm. This followed by a discussion of the role of the emerging developmental 
state in Ethiopia, with an emphasis on groundwater irrigation and governance as a case study to examine the 
potentials and the limitations of institutional environment/arrangements.  
Many Africa countries have faced different structural problems and institutional constraints because of 
adopted and practiced non-context-specific development models. African countries need to reject the current 
neoliberal and non-context-specific development model if they want to achieve reliable socio-economic and 
political transformation. Economic development and the idea of institutional quality lead to the success or 
failure of economic development. It has been acknowledged that, state intervention is necessary for socio-
economic transformation, particularly in developing countries where there is a need for proper state–market 
integration. Research has confirmed that state intervention in the form of the developmental state, limits the 
negative effect of a market dominated development approach, and can achieve an overall structural 
transformation (economic, political and social) in these countries if they adopt the model based on their 
respective contexts. 
This study is motivated by the observation that a developmental state ideology, aided by appropriate 
institutions, is important for long-term economic development in latecomer African countries in the wake of 
the failure of the neoliberal development model. For this reason, given the emergence of states in Africa 
defining themselves as ‘developmental states’, it is necessary to assess these claims critically, considering 
the literature on the developmental state, particularly from an institutionalist perspective. Consequently, the 
question seeks to address in this study is how the concept of a developmental state is interpreted in the 
African context. More specifically, the general objective is to assess how the developmental state paradigm 
has determined the institutional environment for achieving economic development in Africa through a case 
study of the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation system. Both quantitative and qualitative data were used 
from primary and secondary sources to address the research question and to satisfy the objective of the study.  
Therefore, this concluding chapter addresses the mainstream conception of the developmental state and its 
institutions, as well as the role of the developmental state in accelerating African economic development. A 
few points are proposed to strengthen the role of the developmental state in the African context and, lastly, 
few points will forward for further study to assess critically the role of the developmental state by 
considering the diversity and exceptionality of African countries.   
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6.2 Conclusions  
6.2.1 Mainstream conception of a developmental state and institutions 
A review of the literature on the theoretical and empirical evidence related to the mainstream conception of 
the developmental state and institutions was addressed in Chapter 2 of this study. As described by several 
researchers, the developmental state has become one of the alternative development ideologies for latecomer 
African countries. A developmental state is a state that promotes macroeconomic stability, establishes an 
institutional framework that provides law and order, an effective administration, promotes public investment 
in infrastructure, and boosts human-resource development by investing in the social sector such as education 
and health. Furthermore, a developmental state is described as one that can deploy the requisite institutional 
architecture and mobilise society towards the realisation of its development projects.  
The developmental state facilitates structural transition from an agrarian to a modern society. It plays a social 
engineering role to derive long-term economic development to achieve a high level of social well-being. The 
distinctive political and institutional model of a developmental state should be seen as an alternative to a 
wide range of political economies with different levels of state autonomy, institutional coherence and 
authoritative penetration, with varying degrees of accountability and ‘embeddedness’. Even though the 
developmental state has a long history, the model only became a real alternative development model in the 
1950s. In the late twentieth century, several East Asian countries transformed their economies by using the 
developmental state model in accordance with their respective contexts. Consequently, the developmental 
state has been acknowledged as a new, alternative development ideology (although it is not the only one) that 
contributed to the successful development of several countries in East Asia. In addition, the developmental 
state ideology has appeared in different parts of the world with varying degrees of success, adjustments, and 
variations. 
Considering these contextual differences, some common features of developmental states have been 
identified from the literature, based on the success stories of East Asian countries (see sub-section 2.2.2). 
These common features would serve as a point of departure for the newly emerging developmental states, 
which should then consider the political, economic, social, and cultural contexts. Empirical evidence 
confirms that there are numerous (internal and external) factors contributed to the success of the East Asian 
developmental states, including the following: 
 The existence of committed political elites and a competent state bureaucracy accompanied by far-
sighted and context-specific institutions; 
 Developmental policies and strategies that originate from internal (local) problems;  
 The adoption of an export-led development strategy creating economies of scale and production 
efficiency; 
 Substantial amounts of investment devoted to the development of human capital;  
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 Considerable attention given to nurture domestic private sectors to strengthen the national capital 
formation based on a clear ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ approach; 
 Agricultural land reform (which depends on the domestic political condition), accompanied by the 
introduction of modern agricultural practices to transform the rural population and ensure relatively 
equal resource distribution.  
Equitable resource allocation is imperative to reduce poverty and create an egalitarian society, if it is 
accompanied by high productivity in all sectors of the economy. Moreover, an advantage of geopolitics at 
the time of the Cold War was that East Asian states received a substantial amount of economic and military 
aid from the United States, as well as market opportunities for their commodities in that country. FDI, 
mainly from the developed countries or from the West and from the first-tier of NIC to the second-tier NICs, 
also played a significant role in the economic development of these states. For instance, Japan, which was a 
first-tier NIC, invested in the second-tier of NICs and this type of investment played a considerable role in 
regional economic transformation and integration. 
Therefore, the practices of Asian developmental states serve as a good development experience and open an 
alternative development pathway for the latecomer African countries to adopt a contextual developmental 
state ideology to accelerate their development processes. The developmental state is an active manager of the 
development process and promotes fair resource distribution among all economic actors via intensive public 
investment. The functions of the developmental state go far beyond the conventional sense of merely 
correcting market failures, rather playing a role like promoting/regulating market, encouraging capital 
formation and transformation. However, there is no single organisational formula or blue print that other 
developing countries can adopt the developmental state ideology. The current emerging African states should 
examine some of the common features of the Asian developmental states and adapt to their own political, 
economic, and social contexts to accelerate their development process and assure social transformation.  
To build a successful developmental state, latecomer countries need to acknowledge the role of institutions, 
which are essential for economic development and social transformation; in turn, economic development 
shapes existing institutions and nurtures new ones that can satisfy the demands resulting from economic 
development. Almost all schools (the OIE, NIE, and IPE) acknowledge the role of institutions in economic 
development, irrespective of their outlook, whether orthodox or heterodox. Institutions shaped and 
influenced by the economic and political trajectories’ of nations. In turn, institutions shape the economic and 
political situation of a country. As discussed in sub-sections of 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, the main difference between 
the NIE and IPE regarding institutions and individuals, institutions and economic development, and 
institutional diversity are: 
 Proponents of IPE postulate a two-way causation between individuals’ motivations and social 
institutions, rather than a one-way causation from individuals to institutions (individual rationality 
theory) advocated by the NIE.  
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 NIE proponents assume that the causality runs from institutions to economic development, ignoring 
the possible effect of economic development on institutions whereas the IPE assumes a two-way 
causation from institutions to economic development and from economic development to 
institutions.  
 IPE proponents emphasise the role of the state and diverse institutions in sustainable economic 
development and transformation by enhancing public-resource mobilisation and allocation, whereas 
NIE proponents advocate a minimalist role of the state in the economy and the supremacy of market 
or simply the market institution. 
 The NIE School claims that markets can and should be free from politics, whereas the proponents of 
the IPE says that the market is ultimately a political construct and, thus, depoliticisation of the 
market is impossible in practice.  
Although institutions are essential for accelerating development, developing countries still have little 
understanding of the relationship between institutions and economic development. Success stories have 
confirmed that a mixture of a country’s innovations, adoptions, social, political and development status, as 
well as its learnings, are essential to grow appropriate institutions. This means that institutions and 
institutional capacities are socially engineered, based on ‘trial and error’, and there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach; this is why institutions that are successful in one place may not be successful in another. States 
that build effective and diverse institutions (social, cultural, economic, or political) facilitate social 
cooperation and channel resources to boost productivity and this has a considerable impact on accelerating 
the development process. Inappropriate institutions are the cause of failure in many developing countries so 
it is important to emphasise a country’s institutional architecture and policy orientation when constructing a 
developmental state in latecomer countries.  
6.2.2 The significant of developmental state in Africa 
Before addressing the significance of developmental states in Africa, it is important to note a few points on 
the background of African economies, post-independence. In the immediate post-colonial period of the 
1960s and early 1970s, most SSA countries had strong governments that took the task of nation building and 
development seriously. Many of these managed to achieve positive and robust rates of economic growth for 
more than a decade until the late 1970s (Sindzingre, 2004; UNCTAD, 2007). However, this robust growth 
was not sustained due to the two consecutive oil crises, followed by a debt crisis in many African countries. 
This led to the onset of the SAPs, which caused a further decline in economic growth for the remaining two 
decades of the twentieth century.  
Soon after independence, Africa’s state-led development models failed to build a strong state to achieve 
sustainable economic and social outcomes. Most countries could not engineer economic ‘take-off’, ensure 
industrialisation, or diversify their economies. Aside from the external factors, the internal factors such as the 
rise of authoritarian military dictatorships (from internal wars and conflicts) and one-party regimes created 
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an obstacle to building a hegemonic development ideology and coalitions. Most of the regimes lacked 
strategic partnerships with the indigenous private sectors and the society (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). 
Following this economic recession, almost all African countries (except for those entered the socialist sphere 
of influence) were forced to adopt the SAPs as a panacea for their crises. However, these programmes did 
not bring the expected economic recovery and growth, in short, did not make much difference.  
After two lost decades, there was a turn around and Africa began to experience relatively strong and 
sustainable economic growth by taking the role of state into account. The period after 2000 marked the 
beginning of the African growth miracle and so-called ‘African Renaissance’. On average, the SSA 
economies expanded by 4.6% of GDP per annum during 1999–2010 (5.2% excluding South Africa, which 
had the lowest growth rate during this period). The region’s economic growth is underpinned by relatively 
strong public and private investment. Gross fixed-capital formation in the region steadily increased from 
about 16.4% in 2000 to 20.4% in 2011 (World Bank, 2013a; Thorbecke, 2014). However, the quality of this 
economic development is still poor and the economic recovery has not created adequate employment 
opportunities to reduce poverty and inequality. 
By any standard, the level of poverty in Africa is unacceptable and, therefore, African countries need to 
make an extraordinary commitment to reduce (or hopefully eradicate) poverty. The continent’s economy 
demands further diversification and transformation to address economic problems and to bring about 
sustainable economic development and structural transformation in all sectors of the economy. Therefore, to 
transform the current relatively rapid economic growth into a sustained and inclusive development process, 
African policy-makers need to adopt development policies and strategies that foster economic 
diversification, create decent job opportunities, reduce the level of poverty and inequality, and improve 
access to basic social services. 
In general, transforming African economies from low-income agrarian to high-income industrialised 
economies remains a major development challenge and need to put it at the forefront of the development 
agenda. Historical evidence showed that countries that have successfully transformed from agrarian to 
modern economies, states played a proactive role in designing and implementing policies that facilitate 
diversification and transformation. The so-called free market and privatisation of public enterprises did not 
generate the required investment to expand output, exports, and employment during the era of the SAPs. 
Therefore, African states urgently need to design and implement policies to restructure their economies 
based on the real alternative paradigm that integrates the role of the market and the state. It is clear that they 
need to shift their development ideology that does not fit to their contexts to transform the existing predatory 
and rent-seeking political economies into developmental ones.  
Therefore, the need for looking an alternative development model, like, a developmental state should be 
adopted to tackle the existing predatory and rent-seeking political economies. The assessment of the need for 
and the adoption of developmental state paradigm in Africa arise from both the literature of the mainstream 
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conceptions the developmental states and from the African perspective via rethinking the potential role of the 
developmental state. The developmental state literature might best be viewed  as an organisational 
framework for beginning to examine whether the state can do it and what precisely it is that the state has to 
do (Fine, 2010). The developmental state became prominent by the turn of the twentieth-first century in 
counter-position to the SAP/Washington Consensus in theoretical and empirical terms (Fine, 2016). The 
recent 2007/08 worldwide financial meltdown has made many African scholars and policy-makers rethink 
the potential role of the developmental state in Africa. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that the 
current financial crisis has substantially increased both the role of the state and its prominence in economic 
affairs. Likewise, enormous research outputs from the mainstream conception of the developmental state 
advocated about the critical role of the state in fostering development. 
The developmental state – as an alternative paradigm proven effective assessed by the yardstick of the 
dynamic growth experiences from East and Southeast Asia, Latin American and SSA countries. With 
pockets of developmentalism taking place around the world, there is a renewal of interest in the 
developmental state related a quest by African leaders to arrest and change the pattern and trajectory writ 
large in the chaos and aftermath of economic decline. The developmental state played a decisive role in 
many of East Asian countries (in general) and in few Latin American and African countries (in particular) 
that forced the World Bank to acknowledge that there might be something different about the role of 
developmental state as an alternative for developing countries. There is no doubt that the developmental state 
paradigm is a well-recognised alternative to the neoliberal model (Fine, 2010; 2011). Although the 
developmental state becomes an alternative development strategy in many African countries, the discourses 
related to the developmental state in Africa pivoted on impossibility and possibility thesis. As discussed in 
sub-section 2.4.2, the proponents of the ‘impossibility thesis’ say that African states would not be able to 
replicate the success stories of other developmental states because of different internal and external factors, 
such as: 
 The institutions of the East Asian developmental state are contextual, time-specific and beyond 
emulation;  
 The developmental state is unfamiliar to Africa, but unique to East Asia because it was made 
possible by ‘Confucian societal values’; 
 Many of the African states are not committed to development and many of them are captured by 
special interest groups; 
 African states simply do not have enough human resources and technical capacity to pursue the 
developmental state model;  
 Rent-seekers and corrupt officials who prioritised their private interests over societal interests rule 
many African countries; 
 Globalisation almost closed the window for state interventionism because it left little room for states 
to intervene in their respective economies. 
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The impossibility argument emanated from the proponents of a neoliberal ideology, which advocated a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach, regardless of the different contexts of countries. However, the neoliberal ideology that 
imposed on many African countries as a panacea for their economic crises had a disappointing outcome 
because it was not in accord with their contexts. In contrast, the proponents of the developmental state in 
Africa asserted that the current external and internal environments are relatively open (if not very conducive) 
to the adoption of the developmental state model. They said that the inadequacies of the free-market 
development model in Africa have promoted the role of competent state intervention and that it is possible to 
learn from the experiences of other developmental states. Because of the well-documented history of 
corruption, coups, conflicts, rent-seeking and authoritarian rule in Africa, they see the developmental state 
ideology as an effective strategy to address challenges and exploit the development opportunities to eradicate 
poverty and achieve overall transformation. Hence, the feasibility of a developmental state in Africa has 
become a subject of interest for scholars, development practitioners, international institutions, and African 
decision-makers alike. Many scholars agree that pure capitalism does not work in Africa, and that socialism 
is out-dated, even though it was considered better by some. Likewise, many African political elites and 
decision-makers are close to reaching a consensus that the developmental state is a much better option than 
making marginal adjustments to the existing neoliberal model. However, the developmental state theory is 
not merely a recipe for the advancement of a nation; rather, it is a state ideology promotes development 
although the success of the model depends on various factors. 
For instance, it is essential to have diverse institutions for a developmental state to be successful. However, 
the capability of leadership in building effective institutions and networks of institutions across all sectors 
remains the main challenge in many African countries that want to adopt the developmental state model. 
‘Getting institutions wrong’ would result in the failure of a developmental state. Establishing the right 
institutions will enhance the capacity of the state to promote its development efforts. This requires two 
considerations: (1) ‘develop a more adequate vision of how institutions shape economic behaviour and 
outcomes’; and (2) ‘create a more systematic and general understanding of how institutions themselves 
formed and changed over time related to overall change in the economy’. Therefore, better social cohesion 
(broad state–society coalitions) produces better institutions and these, in turn, lead to higher levels of growth 
and a more equitable distribution of economic resources among economic agents. 
Building effective institutions and strengthening the institutional capability will help to ensure long-term 
sustainable development projects to realise economic transformation. The political elites of the emerging 
developmental state in Africa should be committed to build well-functioning institutions by either modifying 
the existing ones, or by nurturing new institutions. This requires socially engineering and the commitment of 
all stakeholders, particularly from the state. When building institutions, African states need to consider the 
following points: (1) they should avoid institutions developed in the past, which are not compatible totally 
with the current situation; (2) they need to make the existing institutions more compatible with the current 
situation; and (3) they need to nurture new institutions based on their own context. Institutions that are 
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dynamic or flexible will change depending on the political, economic, and social dynamism of the given 
country.  
Developmental states are not new in Africa; for instance, Botswana and Mauritius became exceptionally 
successful developmental states in the twentieth century. Although there are different reasons given for the 
miracles of these two countries, the existence of committed political leadership, building effective context-
specific institutions and adapting the developmental state ideology (good policies) are critical components in 
the overall success or failure of developmental states. Other SSA countries should examine the practices of 
Botswana, Mauritius and the East Asian developmental states, adopt some of the common features in 
accordance with their own contexts, and make good development policy choices. It is obvious that 
developmental states differ in their evolution, context, trajectory, manifestations and disciplinary origins so 
every country should pursue strategies that suit their own institutional, economic, political, and social 
arrangements. For instance, there are two distinct forms of analyses of the developmental state rooted in their 
disciplinary origins: the political and economic schools.
57
 Both schools complement each other, and 
successful developmental state pursue - in practice – this dual-pronged approach (Fine, 2010; 2011 & 2016). 
Almost all African nations were at a similar level of development during post-independence period. 
However, only the political elites of Botswana and Mauritius that made good policy decisions based on a 
developmental state ideology. Therefore, the good decisions and policy choices of political elites on growth 
and transformation, serve as a milestone or springboard for African nations. These are possible only if 
political elites start looking inward (recognise their internal problems) rather than outward (externalise their 
problems), and resist any pressure from their former colonial masters and international institutions to hijack 
their national interests under different terms and tied-conditions. African economies need sustainable growth, 
removing dependency on the primary sector of the economy, and transformation from the current predatory 
political economy, which suggests the need to rethink the potential role of the state (i.e. the developmental 
state) in economic transformation and in accelerating the development process. The existing predatory state 
should be transformed into a pragmatic and context-fitted developmental state model, which requires the 
establishment of institutions of pluralism (i.e. institutions that accommodate the interest of all stakeholders). 
Evidences from research showed that no political transformation is possible without the participation of all 
group of society in the development process. 
                                                     
57
 The economic school places emphasis on the role of developmental state (state interventionism) in addressing, if not 
necessarily correcting, systemic market failures associated with economies of scale and scope, coordination of 
complementary investments within and across sectors, targeting finance for investment, to harness positive and 
eliminate negative externalities and so on. For the economic school, strong emphasis is given in identifying the 
appropriate development policies, with the presumption that they will be implemented by a developmental state because 
they ought to be. On the one hand, the political school with its own disciplinary origins stems predominantly from 
within political science and is wholly concerned with whether the state has the so-called autonomy to pursue the 
development strategy and the institutions and motivation to adopt developmental policies. It is concerned with the 
nature of the state itself whether it has the potential in general, and the independence in particular, to adopt the 
necessary policies more or less irrespective of what these might be. Here, emphasis is placed upon the necessity for the 
developmental state to be free from capture by particular interests and so to be able to adopt developmental policies (cf. 
Fine, 2010; 2011 & 2016). 
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In general, developmental states considered to have the capacity to manage the rent-seeking political 
economy by means of a reward and punishment mechanism based on the performance of economic agents 
(especially the private sector). The existence of favourable internal and external environments is crucial for 
the emerging developmental states in Africa. An overall assessment showed that it is possible to build a 
developmental state in many SSA countries today, and there are several countries, which have officially 
called themselves a developmental state to accelerate their development process through the right mix of the 
role of the state and market. The role of the state is not only necessary, but also crucial to accelerate the 
economic development process where market forces are inefficient and market failures are relatively 
extensive in Africa. Replicating the success stories of other developmental states is not sufficient for SSA – 
further policy initiatives put on table by considering the existing external and internal contexts, since some of 
the practices of other countries may run counter to their national development goals. Therefore, the 
developmental state model should build based on ‘learning-by-doing’ approach and that it is considered by 
scholar and decision-makers (politicians) as one of the promising development model for Africa given the 
diversity and heterogeneity characteristics, as well exceptionality of nations throughout the continent. 
6.2.3 The role of the emerging developmental state in Ethiopia 
Having established the ‘uniqueness’ or ‘exceptionality’ of the Ethiopian state formation and project  - a 
‘state’ that was autonomous and endowed with manoeuvrability as it was and remained under the control and 
governance of the Ethiopians and not the colonisers like elsewhere in Africa (Geda & Degefe, 2005; Geda, 
2008; Fourie, 2011). This indicates that Ethiopia is quite exception in Africa in its state formation, rich 
cultural heritage and history of resistance to colonialism (independence), religion, enduring sense of 
independence and exceptionalism, and indigenous social pacts (institutions), which were not assimilated 
and/or co-opted by colonisers. This does not however mean that the formation of the Ethiopian state was free 
of political exclusion, economic exploitation, cultural and religious domination. That means the Ethiopian 
political economy was fractured by internal conflicts, drastic policy changes, and reversals. This 
distinguished it from other African countries, which are characterised with colonial and post-colonial history. 
In Ethiopia, the first half of the twentieth
 
century witnessed three distinct regimes: the Imperial/Monarchy, 
the Derg/military, and the EPRDF. Each regime had its own economic, political, and administrative 
organisation. When the current ruling party (EPRDF) came to power in 1991,Ethiopia was a ‘quasi-feudal’, 
one-party socialist state with virtually no experience of representative democracy or capitalism (Fourie, 
2011). However, the year 1991 was considered as a turning point to Ethiopia in terms of social, political, and 
economic changes when new development and reform policies were started to articulate and to implement by 
the new government. For considerable long time, Ethiopia experienced negative growth under the Derg 
regime, then in 1991/92 returned to positive but low per capita growth until 2002/03, which was the time that 
Ethiopian ruling party officially changed its development ideology to the developmental state – the 
turnaround to high economic growth started (Priewe, 2016). This implies that there had been signs of 
economic progress at the turn of the twenty-first century but these were insignificant in terms of their impact 
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on the livelihood of the population. This is why because the initial situation (the time when the military 
regime discarded) was characterized by backward, an illiterate and impoverished social fabric and so on 
(Kebede, 2015). 
Ethiopia is one of the SSA countries (which is exception in its state formation and overall history) that the 
ruling party has officially claimed the developmental state ideology and shown a commitment to practice it 
by customising the ideology into the unique political, economic, social, and cultural contexts of the country. 
The adoption of the developmental state in the official ideology of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF ruling party) was/is attracted and inspired by the experiences of East Asian 
industrialisation of Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and more recently, China (Zenawi, 2006; Fantini, 2013). 
Hence, the emergence of the developmental state in Ethiopia has to be viewed with in two broad contexts:  
the country’s successive attempt to learn the developmental paths of different countries, and the global 
phenomena that led to the realization of the failure of the neoliberal paradigm in Africa (Zenawi, 2006; 
Fantini, 2013; Lavers, 2016). 
‘Ethiopia has been keen to learn from countries that have achieved major economic growth through the 
developmental state approach with the political leadership being unconvinced by the neoliberal economic 
reform at the end of the twentieth century’ (Alemu & Scoones, 2013:5). This implies that the Ethiopian 
political elites have attracted and convinced by the remarkable economic success of the East Asian 
developmental states. Following the official claim of a developmental state ideology, the political leadership 
and the society almost reached in a consensus on the identified common enemy of the country: ‘poverty and 
backwardness’. Accordingly, the state’s developmental policies and strategies favour a broad-based path of 
economic growth as the means of addressing poverty and inequality, which are undesirable and unnecessary 
socio-economic obstacles of the nation (Lavers, 2016). To eradicate or reduce level of poverty, the Ethiopian 
state tried to commit itself to investing a substantial amount of public resources in economic and social 
infrastructure. Investment in infrastructure has a direct spill-over effect on economic growth and poverty 
reduction and contributes significantly to socio-economic transformation and economic integration among 
different sectors (Teshome, 2012; Balema, 2014; Oqubay; 2015; World Bank, 2016). 
The Ethiopian state development strategies and public expenditure are considered both pro-poor and pro-
growth in practice (CSA, 2012; Teshome, 2012; Balema, 2014; World Bank, 2016). The Agricultural 
Development-led Industrialisation (ADLI) is a cornerstone of its development policy and both the rural and 
the industrial development policies emanated from the broader development vision of the ADLI. The 
philosophy behind the ADLI is that agricultural development plays a leading role in the industrialisation 
process by strengthening backward and forward linkages (MoFED, 2002b and Ohno, 2009). The ADLI 
strategy is ‘an evolving development strategy subject to pragmatic experimentation and adjustment’ based on 
the ‘learning-by-doing’ approach. As discussed in sub-section 4.4.1, the ADLI strategy was practised as 
‘Core ADLI’ from the early-1990s to the early-2000s and as ‘Enhanced ADLI’ from the early-2000s 
onwards. Agriculture is regarded as the sector from which economic growth should emanate; growth in 
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agriculture will lead to industrial growth by offering skilled and semi-skilled labour forces as an input and 
increasing demand for the industrial products. The transformation of agriculture was expected to trigger 
structural transformation in the economy so the ADLI development strategy has targeted smallholder farms. 
Thus, smallholder farmers are the most important development partners in the political coalition of the 
Ethiopian developmental state. This indicates that the main political base of the ruling party is smallholder 
farmers, which account about 80% of the population; small producers in urban areas are also considered part 
of the support base (Ohno, 2009; Asayehgn, 2012). As discussed in section, 4.5-4.7 of chapter four the 
Ethiopian state looks committed to bring transformation from the bottom (grassroots level) by transforming 
the agriculture sector via increasing productivity and production. To realise this, the government pursued the 
farmers’ movement known as ‘developmental army building’ (Yelimat serawit ginbata in Amharic) on the 
main development fronts, such as in agriculture, education and health, to enhance the role of the community 
in local development programmes. 
Empirical evidence has confirmed that the Ethiopian economy has experienced strong and broad-based 
growth for more than a decade since the ruling party officially claimed the developmental state ideology. 
Despite some discrepancy between the figures cited by international institutions and the Ethiopian 
government, there is a consensus that Ethiopia has registered impressive economic growth over the past 
decade, and its pro-poor and-growth spending and national ownership of its developmental plans have been 
praised by the international community. The country has met most of the MDGs, per-capita income is rising 
rapidly (having almost tripled in a decade), there is a reduction in poverty levels and improved human capital 
development and, thus, the country plans to join the middle-income group within a decade. Even though the 
service and agricultural sectors have been the main drivers of structural transformation over the last decade, 
more recently, the manufacturing sector has also made a relative contribution to the economy due to the 
special attention given by the government. Given the huge public investment in infrastructure and the social-
service sector, it is likely that the current economic growth will be sustained. 
The growth, quality, and availability of infrastructure are essential for overall sustainable economic growth. 
The country has committed substantial public resources under its pro-development strategies for building 
basic infrastructure such as roads, railways, air transport, energy, irrigation dams, and telecommunications, 
to create an environment conducive for the development process. Indeed, implementing such pro-
development policies has been pivotal in accelerating economic development and strengthening the national 
consensus on the need for sustainable development to end the vicious circle of poverty. For instance, in the 
energy sub-sector, hydropower, wind, solar and geothermal energy are available renewable resources and 
there are several energy projects under construction. Thus, the country set a target to become a key producer 
and exporter of power by constructing several hydroelectric dams and other alternative-energy sources. A 
sustained expansion of the national demand for energy, due to the boom in economic development, is crucial 
for the expansion of Ethiopia’s energy sector, which, in turn, is vital to support the country’s overall 
economic growth. Therefore, the expansion of the energy sector has a positive spill-over effect, supports the 
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overall economic growth and facilitates the transformation of the economy from being dependent on 
agriculture to the broader industry and service sectors. 
The Ethiopian state has tried to ‘crowd-in’ the role of the private sector, which expected to play a crucial role 
for economic development and has formulated policies and strategies to ensure that the emerging private 
sector plays a vital role in the development process. For instance, the state promotes micro and small 
enterprises (MSEs),
 
which are the basis for the development of medium and large-scale, indigenous private-
sector enterprises. The state’s current relatively high public investment in infrastructure development and its 
nurturing of well-functioning institutions to improve service delivery have given rise to numerous 
opportunities, and created an enabling environment for the active participation of the private sector in the 
economy. The private sector is expected to create considerable amount of employment opportunities, and 
assist economic transformation by engaging in the manufacturing sub-sector using the investment incentives 
provide from government.  
However, the private sector in Ethiopia has not yet reached the stage of playing a visible and dominant role 
in the economy, although there are several policy incentives and supports. It is characterised by risk-averse 
behaviour that prevent engagement in the productive sectors due to different pulling and pushing factors 
such as a lack of capability and regulation, corruption and rent-seeking practices, favoritism, and so on. 
Likewise, the state bureaucracy and institutions have not reached the level that to provide the required 
services to the private sectors in order to exert the required effort for the development process of the nation. 
The lack of competent bureaucracy and non-existence of well-functioning institutions at all levels are 
considered as the main challenges faced to the Ethiopian state. Whatever the challenges faced in practice, 
creating conducive business environment accompanied by macroeconomic stability are essential to attract 
the necessary investment (both domestic and foreign) to the intensive manufacturing sub-sectors. For 
instance, the amendment of Ethiopia’s investment proclamation No. 769 /2012 introduced provisions for the 
establishment of industrial zones, both state and private run, with favourable investment, tax, and 
infrastructure incentives to attract investment in key manufacturing area identified by the government. The 
identified priority areas in the industrial sector are textiles and garments, leather, sugar, cement, metals and 
engineering, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and agro-processing (FDRE, 2012). The establishment of industrial 
zones is expected to provide a high potential for growth, adding value to the economy and creating another 
enclave for international capital (FDI) to enhance the national economy. There is regular dialogue between 
high-level government officials and representative of the private sectors in an attempt to exploit 
opportunities by improving the institutional capacity and to address the real challenges/constraints faced to 
the private sectors.   
Ethiopia’s developmental state also played a vital role in the economy by providing basic social services, 
investing in pro-poor and pro-growth economic sectors, and responding to market failures through its 
selective public investment interventions. For instance, approximately 60% (over two-thirds) of annual state 
expenditure is concentrated on public development projects (such as education, health, agriculture, water 
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supply, and roads). The provision of basic social services is geared towards benefiting the lower-income 
levels to narrow the gap in wealth distribution among the entire population. Therefore, government 
leadership (both political and bureaucratic) has tried their level of best in improving the performance of and 
access to basic social services (health and education sectors, water and sanitation, and extension services) by 
mobilising and using domestic and external sources. Investment in the social sector has a significant 
multiplier effect for economic growth and intergenerational benefits, and ensures the equitable distribution of 
resources. For instance, the woreda (district) level spending is pro-poor and pro-growth, focusing on health, 
education, agriculture and the water sectors to create access and opportunities for the community at the local 
level. This indicates the emerging developmental state’s looks committed to strengthening the country’s 
human capital capacity to manage resource rents and the proper utilisation of resources to diversify the 
economy. The empirical evidence confirmed that such substantial public investment has resulted significant 
improvements in human capital development. For instance, the substantial public investment in agricultural 
extension services has had a significant impact on raising smallholder farmers’ awareness of modern farming 
practices in addition to their customary ones. Currently, access to basic social services is not the problem, 
however, the government and its stakeholders need to focus on the provision of quality services. 
In general, Ethiopia’s economic growth is considered as one of impressive economic growth around the 
world and it praised for its unprecedented economic growth since the ruling party officially proclaimed the 
developmental state as a state’s ideology. The developmental state in Ethiopia shares many of the common 
features derived from mainstream conceptions of the developmental states but tried to adapt these common 
features to its own context. The political elites are relatively committed to achieve sustained economic 
growth and development by formulating and implementing the consecutive, five-year, mid-term 
development plans. Ethiopia has progressed from having one of the lowest-levels of human capital 
development and highest poverty rates in the world to one of better economic development over the past 
decade. However, this does not mean that all economic and social problems have been solved yet; further 
efforts are required to accelerate the socio-economic development of the nation. Likewise, the developmental 
state in Ethiopia is not free from challenges such as rent-seeking attitudes and practices, corruption, 
problems of good governance, lack of institutional capacity and capability, and weak regulation mechanisms 
for the private sector (as per the principle of carrot and stick), and lack of national consensus regarding all 
development projects. Rent-seeking and corruption pose a threat to the credibility and legitimacy of the 
government, and could decay its structures and capacity and caused an extensive public protest last year. As 
a result, the government looks aware of the problems of rent-seeking and corruption, social inequality, 
unemployment, lack of good governance and other socio-economic problems as major challenges/constraints 
to the country. For instance, as different media outlets broadcasted, the ruling party and the government 
decided to carry out a kind of self-evaluation, which is called a ‘deep renewal’ process (tilik tehadso in 
Amharic) by understanding the desire of the people demonstrates their commitment for transparency and 
accountability, and the people have all the rights to be heard at different levels. However, since such self-
evaluation process undertaking by the ruling party and the government is not a finished business yet. The 
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outcome (i.e. commitment and ability to fight/address all these challenges) will be seen in the future after the 
process completed and needs further research whether the process bring a required outcome or not as per the 
request of the citizen. However, the best tool that the government had to take into consideration to stamp out 
corruption and rent-seeking is to strengthen the laws and to close loopholes that have become tools for 
cheating officials and rent- seekers. This is why because throwing people to jail alone will not solve the 
problem forever; rather closing all the ways that trigger officials/or individuals into these unethical practices 
via strengthen the laws would be considered to bring a reliable solutions. 
6.2.4 Groundwater-Irrigation development and governance in Raya Valley 
This study argues that the developmental state approach is an appropriate model for many SSA countries in 
general, and Ethiopia in particular. The Ethiopian state officially claimed the developmental state paradigm 
to accelerate its development process through state intervention in resource mobilisation and utilisation. This 
claim did have tested in the case study of Raya Valley, and informed by the theoretical framework of the 
developmental state. The study found that, overall there was evidence that the Raya Valley irrigation scheme 
did reflect the developmental state’s public investment in pro-growth and pro-rural programmes at the 
grassroots level. However, there were other challenges that were not adequately addressed. This research 
will help to refine the understanding of the developmental state approach and, specifically, the actual 
challenges that the Ethiopian state needs to address to realise fully its development objectives. 
The Ethiopian state set ambitious goals for economic development, prioritising agriculture-based 
industrialisation because agriculture is considered as the backbone of the Ethiopian economy by the 
government. Under the long-term development strategy of the ADLI, agricultural growth is expected to spur 
industrialisation through its backward and forward linkages. The development of irrigated agriculture 
through significant public investment is one of the main pro-rural development programmes, involving the 
community at local level. The development of irrigation infrastructure has had both positive and negative 
impacts on the sustainable use of water resources. Likewise, the government policies (such as investment in 
irrigation infrastructure and the well-being of households) have had both direct and indirect linkages. The 
direct linkages operate through the production and consumption behaviour of households, while the indirect 
effects cover different dimensions, at the household or community level. Public investment in irrigation 
improves agricultural productivity and has a positive impact on household income diversification and 
poverty eradication. Therefore, the government wants to operationalise the long-term rural development 
programmes that have served as the roadmap to transform smallholder agriculture. For instance, to 
strengthen the capacity of irrigation, it has implemented extensive and large-scale conservation (soil and 
water) works to reduce soil erosion/degradation, to improve the soil’s water-retention capacity, recharge the 
groundwater resources, and improve environmental rehabilitation. There is no doubt that conservation is 
critical to maintain ecological sustainability and farmers should collaborate to make the best of the natural 
capital and environmental services. An effective conservation programme is also important for social-capital 
formation, and is an essential prerequisite for a successful, widespread conservation programme. 
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Although rainfall is scarce in the Raya Valley, it has huge agricultural potential and has large groundwater 
aquifers to meet the irrigation requirements of smallholder farmers. The regional state has identified it as one 
of the ‘development corridors’, where productivity can be increased through the use of groundwater 
irrigation. Thus, the government has invested heavily in deep-well construction and a pressurised-pump 
irrigation system in the area. Use of groundwater for irrigation purpose is increasing rapidly, bringing several 
socio-economic benefits to smallholder farmers by minimise the impact of rainfall variability and seasonal 
drought and enabling them to grow multiple crops per season. Besides investing in the physical 
infrastructure, the state has invested in building the institutional and human capacity to sustain the irrigation 
infrastructure. Although irrigation does assure crop diversification and allows for multiple cropping, it 
requires proper management to meet the objectives. Management of irrigation systems is determined by the 
political, social, economic, and environmental contexts. Failure or sub-optimal operation of small-scale 
irrigation schemes is dependent on the success or failure of both infrastructure (hardware) and management 
(institutional factors). As discussed in section 5.10, the state encouraged the development of WUAs as local 
institutions to assure the sustainability and fair distribution of water resources, to minimise the government’s 
operational costs, and to institutionalise irrigation cost recovery (such as operation and maintenance costs) 
by the beneficiary farm households. Management by the WUAs is supplemented by the long-term traditional 
water management practices (called abo may or literally ‘father of the water’) of the Raya community, which 
address many of the disputes related to water distribution. A systematic combination of indigenous and 
formal institutions is very important for community co-ownership and thus the proper management of the 
water resources for socio-economic development and benefit of the community. 
Aside from proper management of the water resource, a combination of factors such as access to credit, 
educated household members, input supply by cooperative associations, and access to extension services 
have had a positive effect on improving the performance of the irrigated farming. For instance, educated 
farmers have relatively greater managerial ability, are better technology adopters, and know more about how 
to use modern agricultural farming practices. Therefore, improving farmers’ practical educational status by 
expanding adult education programmes can improve agricultural practices, particularly the production 
efficiency of irrigated agricultural practices. In general, the groundwater irrigation development in the 
studied area is one of the pro-rural public investments undertaken by the state, which is considered as one of 
the crucial instruments for resource allocation and distribution at the grassroots level. Investment in 
groundwater irrigation in the studied area plays a significant role in improving the livelihoods of the 
beneficiary farm households, as well as increasing the supply of agricultural produce. However, the Raya 
Valley groundwater irrigation project is not free from challenges (see section 5.11). Therefore, the 
government and other stakeholders need to work with the farmers to address these observed challenges to 
realise the economic benefits of the groundwater potential and create further development opportunities for 
the community, and for regional state in general.  
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6.3 Contribution of the study  
Based on the critical analysis of the mainstream conception of the developmental state literature, as well as 
African perspectives on the developmental state, this study confirms that the developmental state ideology is 
an appropriate alternative ideology to accelerate the African Renaissance. The study also shows that both the 
internal (as a sufficient condition) and external (as a necessary condition) environments are receptive to the 
adoption of a developmental state ideology in many African countries if they considering their own national 
economic, political and social contexts. In this regard, several countries show an interest for adopting a 
developmental state, and have officially called themselves a developmental state (but this requires further 
investigation to ascertain whether they are developmental state in practice or not). 
The Raya Valley groundwater irrigation project is a good example of how the developmental state can 
ensure economic benefits to farm households and it laid a foundation for capital formation/accumulation 
from the rural agricultural sector. Moreover, the Raya Valley case study showed how the developmental 
state established relatively effective institutional environments and arrangements to achieve specific 
development projects at local level. At the local level, the institutional arrangements recognised the role of 
customary institutions in resolving conflicts, as well as to sustainable resource management. Therefore, the 
Raya Valley case study is a good example (despite the challenges) of a developmental state, which serves as 
a model for other development projects elsewhere in Ethiopia. Some of the good experiences are the state’s 
commitment for rural development programme; the commitment of the rural community for natural resource 
conservation and management; the role of the WUAs and indigenous irrigation institutions for the 
governance of irrigation schemes; and how the formal and customary institutions integrated at community 
level to strengthen the interconnection of the farming communities. 
6.4  Lessons to strengthen the developmental state 
Although their initial economic conditions were similar in the 1960s, the development experiences of the 
SSA and East Asian countries show a strong divergence in economic growth and development.  However, 
many African countries have experienced longer growth spurts in recent years, although the growth has been 
uneven among African countries and typically not sustained. Hence, scholars and policymakers are 
concerned that Africa’s growth is insufficient to improve living standards for a rapidly growing population. 
There are concerns that in many countries policies and political conditions are not in place to sustain the 
current rapid economic growth, to achieve industrialisation and economic transformation, and to ensure a 
more equitable structure. Therefore, based on the historical and analytical arguments, this study confirms 
that adopting a developmental state can lead to success if there is a serious commitment from the political 
elites to develop the model in accordance with their own national context. This study has shown that the 
development experiences of the earlier developmental states are applicable in many SSA countries. This 
implies that the developmental state model would become a viable alternative development ideology for 
many African countries today to address their market failures, to promote new market opportunities and 
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transform capital by integrating the role of the market and the state. This implies that the African states can 
and must play an activist and developmental role beyond being only a facilitating actor; i.e., being little more 
than a servant of ‘comparative advantage’ because African states should not simply follow comparative 
advantage, as some would prefer. To realise this ideological/policy independence is remaining as one the 
crucial ingredients. Thus, prospects for building a developmental state in many African countries are open 
but this does not mean building a developmental state will be free from both internal and external challenges. 
This analysis of the development state in this study has highlighted both the successes and failures of East 
Asian and SSA countries – adopting a context-fitting development model make all the difference. It is 
noteworthy that most of the successful economic development stories came from practicing the 
developmental state model in accordance with their own national contexts and the proper use of 
opportunities created by the international economy. This is evident from the fact that almost all earlier 
developmental states followed an export-oriented development strategy and transformed from subsistence 
agriculture to intensive high-tech industries. This shows that national politics are, indeed, crucial to the 
success or failure of a country. The evidence has confirmed that, in many African countries, internal 
political-economic factors have resulted in the failure of policy-making and the implementing processes, 
although external factors have also played their role. The analysis of success and failure stories provides an 
important lesson for policy-makers/decision-makers of many African states in general and to those who 
attempting to adopt a developmental state ideology in particular. 
One of the important lessons derived from the success stories of the developmental states is that nurturing 
context-fitted institutions help to prevent the failures in policy formulation and implementation. Moreover, 
by mobilising and investing substantial public resources in the social sector, the developmental state can 
expect to play a positive role in creating the required human capital necessary for more sustainable 
development. Therefore, the prospected African developmental states must put human capital development 
at the centre of their national development agenda and design pragmatic social-sector development 
programmes. In addition, nurturing diverse institutions is a priority to accelerate sustainable economic 
transformation. For instance, as discussed under section 4.7, the Ethiopian developmental state tried to 
undertake a meaningful social sector development programmes for building the required human capital 
(skills development) to strengthening the economic development process. Another crucial lesson is that both 
the emerging and would be African developmental states need to pay due attention to the bilateral and 
multilateral regional and international cooperation because national development programmes could have 
significant cross-border effects within a region. Therefore, African countries need to consolidate their 
regional and international cooperation with new economic powerhouses in the Global South to attain mutual 
benefit based on a ‘win-win’ approach, free from any tied conditionalities. They also need to develop 
pragmatic ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ instruments to ensure their autonomy from self-interested groups to make 
state–society or state–private-sector coalition/s effective and to distribute economic rents in an equitable 
manner.  
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6.5 Further Research 
Before we proposed points for further research, based on the discussions and synthesis (given the diversity 
and exceptionality of countries) the following points are forwarded for reinforcing and strengthening the 
developmental state model throughout Africa: 
 The challenge for African policy-makers is how to rehabilitate the state where it has collapsed, and to 
design policies that help to achieve political stability and sustainable economic development. Then, 
African states that need to struggling to bring about sustainable development should design inclusive 
development policies/strategies that consider their socio-economic and political contexts; though policy 
making is a highly complex process that involving different ideas, interests, economic forces and 
structures that cannot be reduced to a single explanation .  
 Attention should be paid to building well-functioning institutions that engender an innovative and 
responsive bureaucracy, which allows for the broader participation of the private sector and civil society 
organisations.  
 The capacity of public institutions, particularly the state bureaucracy, is crucial to development 
performance in a developmental state. The bureaucracy advises the political executive, formulates, and 
implements public policies. Hence, to build successful developmental states, African countries must 
build transformative institutions and, most importantly, a competent and professional bureaucracy. 
 To design and implement the development policies and strategies, the political leadership, the private 
sector and civil society need to cooperate with the state bureaucracy and institutions to legally influence 
the direction of the development process and contribute their share to development. 
 It is possible for countries to borrow experiences from the earlier developmental states, but these should 
be adapted to the African experience and the specific situation of each country. The search for a similar 
development perspective based on successful experiences from elsewhere and adapted to condition on 
the respective countries is essential and common practice.  
 Ethiopia has made considerable economic progress since it adopted the developmental state ideology, 
but the state is challenged in its move forward by both internal and external factors. It needs to address 
the capability and political neutrality of the state bureaucracy and widespread corruption and rent-
seeking practices. 
 Although the Raya Valley groundwater irrigation system is in success, the following points need to pay 
attention to address by government and other stakeholders. These include some of the wells are not 
fully functional due to deficiencies in electrical supply. Extension services lacked integration with the 
indigenous agronomic farming practices due to lack of quality and capacity of service providers, and 
the existence of fragmented output markets pose risks to the smallholder farmer due to the perishable 
nature of the products and weak post-harvest handling mechanisms. Finally, mechanical failure and the 
absence of spare parts and technicians in the project area could pose problems, lack of institutional 
stability associated with frequent changes of responsibilities and staff turnover at district and village 
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levels, as well as the WUAs lacked capacity to manage the irrigation schemes as required. Therefore, 
the government and its institutions should pay due attention for institutional stability and build the 
capacity of the WUAs; and emphasis will be given for the integration of both formal and indigenous 
institutions to ensure equity in distribution and sustainability of water resource.  
Following the above conclusions, this study proposes that the developmental state ideology would be an 
appropriate alternative development model for many African countries to address their rent-seeking political- 
economy, which is one of the critical development challenges throughout the continent. Grounding 
acceptance by establishment ‘market failure’ advocates of the maladjustments and market-distorting 
intervention of developmental states, there is renewal, empirical record of demonstrated success, and 
practical experimentation that denies the voices and false prophecies of the ‘impossibility’ arguments. The 
discourses related to the developmental state in Africa is fiercely contested in scholarly and policy circles, 
but the identity and materiality of the developmental state under conditions of hyper-liberalising/globalizing 
processes,further research is necessary to assess the significance of the developmental state model by 
employing case studies from select African countries; and underscoring their  diversity, heterogeneity and 
exceptionality. This should obviously be tested further alternative development paradigms, including the 
predominant/established one. Furthermore, it needs further research by adding more cross-cases from these 
African countries called themselves as a developmental state to arrive at a more comprehensive conclusion 
about the feasibility of the developmental state ideology to disprove the impossibility argument from an 
African perspective. It is apparent that democracy is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition to 
accelerate the development process in African countries – but it is always historically contingent, and 
requires more deep reflection and thought. 
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APPENDIX-A: HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY 
FACULITY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC LEADERSHIP (SPL) 
Household Survey Questionnaire 
Dear respondent, 
This questionnaire is designed to assess information for the study entitled as The Role of the Developmental 
State in Northern Ethiopia’s Raya Valley Groundwater Irrigation Project: An Institutional Economics 
Perspective. The work is part of a requirement for the award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) at the University 
of Stellenbosch, South Africa. The general objective of this study is to assess how the developmental state 
paradigm has determined the institutional environment and arrangements for achieving economic 
development in Africa. A case study of the groundwater irrigation system in Raya Valley region is used to 
examine the potential and the limitations of institutional environments/arrangements related to resource 
utilisation and management. The information obtained used only for this purpose. Thus, your genuine and 
honest response is of paramount importance for the success of the study. The researcher kindly requests your 
cooperation in so doing. Please be sure that, any information you provide will keep confidential and purely 
used for the purpose of this study. 
 
                                                      Thank you! 
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A. General information about the respondent 
Respondent’s name and address  (in Block letter) 
A1 Respondent ID  
A2 Name of the respondent  
A3 Woreda in which the respondent lives  
A4 Tabia in which the respondent lives  
A5 Kushet in which the respondent lives  
B. General information about the interviewer 
Interviewer information  (in Block letter) 
B1 Tabia code  
B2 Name of the interviewer  
B3 Date of interview  
B4 Starting time of interview  
B5 Ending time of interview  
C. Household characteristics and household’s socio-economy condition 
1. Gender of the respondent:              [1] Male           [2] Female 
2. Age of the respondent in years: ------------------------- 
3. Respondent’s educational level: [1] Illiterate        [2] Religious          [3] Primary school  
                                                              [4] Secondary school                        [5] above secondary school   
4. Household’s marital status:       [1] Married        [2] Single        [3] Divorced           [4] Widowed              
5. How many people live in the household now (family status) 
1.Number of family 2. Male  3. Female  4.Dependent  5.Independent 
     
6. Type of house you have 
            [1] Grass roofed (Sar biet)                             
            [2] Corrugated iron roofed (own korkoro)     
            [3] Rented Corrugated iron roofed (rented korkoro)      
            [4] Family inherited Corrugated iron roofed or grass roofed        
            [5] Other specify---------------- 
7. From what sources does the household receive its income? 
            [1] Farming income                                                  [2] none farming income (petty trade) 
            [3] Livestock and livestock products                        [4] Daily labour  
            [5] Remittance from outside the household              [6] Food for work (PSNP) 
            [7] Selling charcoal, firewood and others                  [8] other specify------------------------- 
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8. Do any members of the family have participated on non/off farm activities?       
            [1]Yes                                                [0] No 
9. If yes, in what activities have participated?  
           [1] Working on other people's farm             [2] Working in other people's business 
           [3] Handicrafts                                             [4] Small business                  
           [5] Food for work                                        [6] Urban daily labour                                  
           [7] Other specify-------------------------------------- 
10. Can you please tell us the source and amount of income you received last year, 2013? 
 Source of income  0 Unit 1 Amount 2 Value ( in Birr) 3 
a Rain-fed Agriculture    
b Irrigated Agriculture    
c Livestock and livestock products    
d Off-farm employment     
e Transfers( Remittance)    
f Self-employment ( trade)    
g Other    
     NB: Off-farm employment includes safety net, daily employment… 
11. Durable asset ownership 
 Type 0 Amount(number owned) 1 Value (Birr) 2 
a Farm equipment(Tools)   
b House Assets( Biet)   
c Other   
12. In your household how many of these items do you have? 
 Items  0 Quantity  1 Value at current market price( in Birr)   2 
a Radio   
b watch   
c Mobile phone   
d Tape recorder   
e Television   
f Table   
g Chair   
h Bed   
i Improved fuel stove   
j other specify   
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13. Livestock (animal) assets owned in your household 
 Animal Type 
0 
Holding before 
Irrigation started   1 
Bought after 
irrigation started  2 
Currently 
owned(total)  3  
Estimated value  
( in Birr)   4 
a Oxen     
b Bulls (Tefin)     
c Cows     
d Heifer (Arhi)     
e Sheep     
f Goats     
g Donkeys     
h Mules/Horse     
i Cart (Gari)     
j Camels     
k poultry     
l Beehives     
m Other      
14. Do you have land to cultivate?         [1] Yes             [0] No 
15. If yes, how do you get the land? Through:  
          [1] Land distribution                             [2] Family inheritance             
          [3] Share cropping                                   [4] Fixed rent 
         [5] Lease from Government                   [6] Others Specify--------------------------------     
16. Land arrangement of the farm household 
  Type of land  0   Rain-fed  (in tsimad)    1 Irrigated  (in tsimad)   2 
a Own    
b Shared crop in   
c Rented in   
d Total   
e Shared crop out   
f Rented out   
g Total   
17. What type of soil is on the rain-fed and irrigated land that your household owns now? 
   Soil type 0 Rain-fed (in tsimad)   1 Irrigated (in tsimad)   2 
a Hutsa/Leptosol   
b Baekel/Cambisol   
c Walka/Vertisol   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
258 
 
d Keyih/Luvisol   
e Mixed type   
18. Did you have enough food to cover all your needs since using groundwater irrigation?  
             [1]   Yes               [0] No 
19. According your local standards, do you consider your household to be? 
            [1] Rich                    [2]   Medium                        [3]   Poor           
20. The household distance to basic institutional services from his/her residence.  
 Type of institutions  0  Distance in Km. 1 Time taken for one trip(in hour or 
minute) 2 
a Local-Market   
b Woreda-Market   
c Nearest health centre   
d Nearest health post   
e Hospital    
f Elementary school   
g Secondary school   
h Grain mill (Methan)   
i Farmer’s training centre    
j Farmer’s cooperative centre   
k Veterinary centre   
l Social court (Mahberawi firdbiet)   
m Court (Woreda firdbiet)   
n Other institutions   
21. Do you have ever participated in the free community work Programme every year? 
          [1] Yes                  [0] No 
22. If your answer is yes for the above question, in which activities have you participated.  
           [1] Building irrigation infrastructure such as in water diversion structures    
           [2] Building/improving rural roads such URAP   
           [3] Compost preparation (Composting) 
           [4] Soil and water conservation activities such as stone bunds or trenches or planting trees 
           [5] Shallow well (‘Ella’ or ‘Horeye’) digging for crop or vegetable production purpose 
           [6] Shallow well (‘Ella’ or ‘Horeye’) digging for livestock purpose 
           [7] Fencing school, health centre, FTC and other institutions 
           [8] Toilet Construction               
           [9] Other, please describe-------------------------------------------- 
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23. Who helped your community to undertake the activities mentioned in question 22? 
           [1] Local government (Woreda and Tabia)           [2] Regional government    
           [3] Federal government                                         [4] Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)    
           [5] Relief Society of Tigray (REST)                      [6] World Vision      
           [7] Other Ethiopian NGO                                     [8] other international NGO  
D. Networks and servicing; access to Training, extension/inputs and credit servicing  
24. In which of the following community organizations is your household is a member? 
 Community organization  0 1=Yes     2= No Since when  3 
a Farmer’s association            
b Women’s association   
c Youth association   
d Farmers’ cooperative association          
e Iddir/ kerie/ funeral association                       
f Eqquab/ rotating savings and credit group       
g Mahaber/ feast days association            
h Livestock sharing group                       
i Theft prevention group                                      
j Community risk prevention pool            
k Community care coalition   
l Other    
25. Have you ever received training related to Groundwater irrigation utilization and other agricultural 
extension services?         
           [1]   Yes                        [0] No 
26. If your answer is yes for the above question, please give us the following information 
 Type of training    
a  
b  
c  
d  
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Code of training 
I. Agriculture 
1. Crop and Vegetable production 
3. Fertiliser applications/utilization 
3. Compost preparation 
4.Irrigation utilization and  
management 
5. Improved animal breeding 
II. Storage/Marketing 
6. Post-harvest handling 
7.Marketing and  
information 
8.Saving and proper 
utilization of resources 
 
III. Natural resource conservation 
9.Water and soil conservation 
10.environmental protection and 
agro-forestry practice 
11. Other specify 
27. From which institution did you receive the trainings? 
          [1] Government (Regional or Woreda or Tabia)             [2] Associations (farmer, youth, women) 
          [3] Farmer’s cooperative association                              [4] DECSI/REST    
           [5] PSNP project                                                             [6] other---------------------------------------------- 
28. Do you think your current training is enough to transform the traditional agricultural practices and 
sustainably use the groundwater irrigation system?       [1] Yes                   [0] No 
29. Do you have access for extension service?                     [1] Yes                  [0] No  
30. If your answer is yes, for what purpose you contact the extension service providers. 
          [1] To get advice on fertiliser utilization                        [2] To get advice on farm preparation 
          [3] To get advice on irrigation resource utilization         [4] To get advice on output marketing issue 
          [5] To get advice on new seed verities                            [6] To get advice on credit & saving services 
          [7] To get advice on pest and insect infestation              [8] To get general advice on agriculture 
          [9] To get advice on improved animal production          [10] Other-------------------------------------------- 
31. Which sets of agricultural technologies are being used? 
          [1] Fertiliser application                              [2] Improve crop/vegetable varieties  
          [3] Other chemicals application                   [4] Improved animal breeds 
          [5] Crop and animal mix technologies         [6] others specify----------------------------- 
32. From where did you get these agricultural sets of technologies?  
          [1] Agriculture office                                     [2] Farmer’s cooperative associations   
          [3] Agricultural research institution              [4] Model farmers in the village                                
          [5] Others specify-------------------------------------------- 
33. How did your household pay for the inputs into farming that used during last year (2013) growing 
seasons? 
           [1] I had enough cash saved to buy inputs         [2] I borrowed money       [3] I borrowed inputs 
           [4] I had s to sell livestock to buy inputs           [5] I had to sell farm outputs to buy inputs 
           [6] I had to use safety net payments                  [7] Other------------------------------------------ 
34. What is your opinion of the agricultural extension services in your Tabia? 
           [1] Very helpful                   [2] Somewhat or moderately helpful                              [3] Not helpful  
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35. Have you taken any group or individual credit/loan as a household last year, 2013?           
           [1]   Yes                                       [0] No 
36. If your answer is yes for question no.35, could you please give us the following information? 
 Source of credit  1  Purpose of credit     2     Amount  ( in Birr)  3 
a     
b    
c    
d    
e    
f    
Source: 
1=DECSI/REST 
2=Bureau of Agriculture 
3. Association (Farmers, Women, Youth) 
4= Farmers’ Cooperative association 
5=PSNP plus program 
6=Relative(Neighbour) 
7=Town trader 
8=Local money lender 
9=other, specify 
Used/purpose: 
1=Fertiliser, insecticide and pesticides/ purchased 
2=Better seeds/ purchased 
3=water pump/ purchased, 
4=livestock/ purchased, 
5=Household consumption (food, educational…) 
6=Construction of house, 
7=Loan repayment, 
8=Social festivities (weeding, teskar, mahber…) 
9= others, specify 
37. Have you had any problem in accessing credit from the credit institutions in your locality?       
           [1] Yes                [0] No 
38. If yes, what was/were the main constraint(s)? 
         [1] Unavailable on time                    [2] Lack of collateral          [3]    Lack of credit institutions 
         [4] High interest rate                         [5] other specify-------------------------------------------- 
39. What do you think of the institutions that provide credit services to you and your community? 
           [1] Very beneficial                [2] Somewhat or moderately beneficial                 [3] Not beneficial 
E. Groundwater irrigation system servicing  
40. For how many years you are using groundwater irrigation system. 
          [1] 1-2 years                 [2] 2-4 years                    [3] 4-6 years               [4]   More than 6 years 
41. Which of the following crop/vegetable patterns mostly produce using groundwater irrigation?  
          [1] Maize                            [2] Teff                                                  [3] Barley               
          [4] Tomato                          [5] Onion                                              [6] Pepper 
          [7] Cabbage                         [8] other specify----------------------------------------------------------- 
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42. How many hectare of land cultivated using groundwater irrigation scheme (on average)? 
          [1] 0.25             [2] 0.5              [3] 1             [4] 1.25               [5] 1.5               [6] 2 and more than 2 
43. Main input costs for groundwater irrigation cultivation in 2013/14 for each season. 
 Input type  0 First Season     1 
(Total cost incurred in Birr)   
Second season         2 
(Total cost incurred in Birr) 
a Seed cost (for crop& vegetable)   
b Fertiliser   
c Pesticide   
d Insecticide(fungicides)   
e Land rent (if any)   
f Hired labour (daily labour)   
g Rented oxen (if any)   
h Harvesting    
i Electricity ( power charge)   
j Others   
44. Type of crop/vegetable pattern produced and income generated using groundwater irrigation in 
2013/14 of first season. 
 Crop type 0 Cultivated land 
(in ha.) 1 
Yield per ha  
 ( in Quintal) 2 
Total 
yield 3 
Price 
/Quintal  4 
Total income  
(in Birr)  5 
a Maize      
b Teff      
c Barley      
d Pepper      
e Tomato      
f Onion      
g Cabbage      
h others      
i Total       
45. Crop/vegetable pattern produce and income using ground water based irrigation in 2013/14 of the 
second season. 
 Crop type 
0 
Cultivated land 
(in ha.) 1 
Yield per ha  
 ( in Quintal) 2 
Total 
yield 3 
Price 
/Quintal  4 
Total income  
(in Birr)  5 
a Maize      
b Teff      
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c Barley      
d Pepper      
e Tomato      
f Onion      
g Cabbage      
h others      
i Total       
46. Have you cultivated the total of your irrigable land (plot) since you started irrigation practices?    
           [1] Yes                        [0] No 
47. If your answer is no, what are the basic reasons that have not cultivated your total plot? 
          [1] Lack of awareness regarding using modern irrigation technology  
          [2] Shortage of family labour and oxen for ploughing 
          [3] Lack of capacity to have agricultural inputs     
          [4] Lack of credit to purchase agricultural inputs        
           [5] Other---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
48. Did you ever get the required support on how to using/manage groundwater irrigation system?                          
[1] Yes                                [0]    No  
49. If yes, what type of support did you ever get?  
          [1] Training servicing              [2] Credit servicing                              [3] Technology (inputs) 
          [4] Rural infrastructures          [5] Expertise (extension support)        [6] Marketing assistance 
          [7] Crop diversification           [8] Maintenance and operation            [9] other services------------- 
50. Who decide the type of crops/vegetables to grow on your groundwater irrigated land (plot)? 
           [1] Myself (the household)                                                       [2] Tabia administration              
           [3] Cooperatives associations                                                  [4] Development Agent                   
           [5] Woreda administration (agricultural bureau)                      [6] Regional government                  
           [7] Other-------------------------------------------------------------- 
51. Do you think that groundwater irrigation scheme is/will contribute to improve the living condition of 
the beneficiary farm households?  
          [1] Yes                                          [0] No  
52.  Do you think that groundwater irrigation could be the source of pollution/water borne diseases such 
as Mosquito?        
[1] Yes                                          [0] No 
53. If yes please specify the types of water pollution/ borne diseases?--------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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54. 54. Do you believe that what you are producing at present using groundwater irrigation system is 
most profitable?       
 [1] Yes                                      [0] No 
55. If your answer for the above question is yes, which of the products do profitable? 
          [1] Vegetables                     [2] Cereals/crops                   [3] Fruits                  [4] Other, specify 
56. If your answer is vegetables, why you prefer production of vegetable? Due to: 
           [1] Easiest to cultivate                    [2] Better income than crops      
           [3] Better yield than crops              [4] Better diseases tolerance     [5] Other----------------------- 
57. If you think that your present activity is not most profitable, what are the main problems?  
          [1] Lack of enough water in the scheme             [2] Lack of extension services  
          [3] Lack of transportation facilities                     [4] Lack of supply of agricultural inputs on time 
          [5] Lack of supply of improved seeds                 [6] Less access of market        
          [7] Lack of knowledge/information                     [8] Lack of credit servicing          
          [9] Other specify----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
58. Which cost of inputs highly affects to become more profitable/productive using groundwater 
irrigation system? 
          [1] Cost of electricity/power                            [2] Cost high yield variety seeds     
          [3] Cost of fertiliser                                          [4] Cost of chemicals                             
          [5] Cost of hired labour forces                          [6] Cost of maintenance 
          [7] Other costs------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
59. Do you have faced problem of: 
1 Storage 2 Transportation 3 Marketing of your produce 
 [1]Yes        [0]No  [1]Yes          [0]No  [1]Yes               [0]No 
60. Do you have ever faced constraints related to access to market for your output?  
           [1] Yes                   [0] No 
61. If yes, what is/are the main constraint(s)? 
          [1] Unable to get market information             [2] Far distant of market place from the farm place                
          [3] High transportation costs                         [4] Lack of transportation 
          [5] Market (price) fluctuation                         [6] other specify--------------------------------------- 
62. Where did you sell your agricultural products? 
 Location  0 Distance (in Km)   1 One way travel in hour or minute   2 
a At farm gate              
b Local market   
c Woreda market   
d Zonal market   
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e Regional market   
f Other market location   
63. Do you have a customer to whom you supply your agricultural product? 
          [1] Yes                   [0] No 
64. If yes, to whom do you sell your products? 
           [1] Consumer                                        [2] Whole seller                                                [3] Retailer               
65. Who administrate this groundwater irrigation infrastructure? 
          [1] Tabia administration                                                   [2] Development agents        
          [3] Regional government                                                   [4] Woreda administration 
          [5] Beneficiary farm households (community)                 [6] Federal government 
          [7] Both community and government (co-ownership)    [8] other specify------------------------------- 
66. Do you have users’ cooperative association/ water committee in your groundwater irrigation scheme?        
[1] Yes                                                                     [0] No 
67. If your answer is yes for the above question, how do you elect member of the committee?  
          [1] By general meeting of user farm households                [2] Appointed by Tabia administration  
          [3] Appointed by woreda administration                           [4] Appointed by regional government 
68. How do you evaluate the performance your groundwater irrigation users’ cooperative committee with 
regard to the following functions?  
 Criterion   0 1= Poor  2=Good   3=Very good 
a  Leadership/fairness  
b Water resource mobilization and distribution   
c Infrastructure maintenance  
d Control and maintain irrigation equipment  
e Accountability, responsibility & transparency  
f Other activity  
69. Is there any rules and regulation in your groundwater irrigation system utilization?          
           [1] Yes                                            [0] No 
70. Do you pay any electric charge fees for using groundwater irrigation scheme?  
          [1] Yes                                            [0] No 
71. If you pay fees for electricity, could you please tell us your amount of payment per season?   
 Year   0 Total seasonal payment (In Birr)         Yearly payment  
  (first + second season)    3          First season   1 Second season    2 
a 2013/14    
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72. 72. Do you have contributed for the maintenance and operation of your groundwater irrigation 
infrastructure project?        
[1] Yes                                                                        [0] No 
73. If your answer is yes for the above question in which kind do you have contributed?  
          [1] Money              [2] Labour force                  [3] Material/capital                [4] Advising/ mobilization 
74. 74. Have you ever faced any constraints when using groundwater irrigation system for your farming 
activities?            
 [1] Yes                                                                   [0] No 
75. If yes, what are the major constraints? 
           [1] Lack of enough water in the scheme                      [2] Lack of labour force 
           [3] Lack of credit                                                          [4] Lack of extension services  
           [5] Lack of transportation facilities                              [6] Lack of supply of agricultural inputs on time 
           [7] Lack of supply of improved seeds                          [8] Less access of output market        
           [9] Lack of knowledge/information                             [10] High electric cost 
           [11] Other constraints------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
76. Indicate how frequently you have used the following institutions to get any support for your irrigated 
agricultural practice. 
 Institutions      0 1=Always  2=Once in a season   3=Some times 
a Tabia administration  
b Woreda Water resource office  
c Woreda agricultural office  
d Farmers’ cooperatives association  
e Farmers Training Center(FTC)  
f Credit & saving institution (DECSI)  
g Agricultural Research Center   
h NGOs existing in the area  
i Private input suppliers  
j Neighbours/Friends  
k Others (specify)  
 
77. Have you ever faced constraints in using any agricultural inputs for your irrigated plot?     
           [1] Yes                                                              [0] No 
78. If yes, what is /are the main constraint(s)? 
           [1] Poor quality of seed and chemicals                  [2] Less Extension support/services 
           [3] Unavailable inputs on time                               [4] Source from far distance 
           [5] High transportation cost                                   [6] other specify-------------------------------------- 
79. Please tell us the basic benefit attained from using groundwater irrigation system in terms: 
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[1] Food self-sufficiency                               [2] Improved farming practices   
[3] Improve levels of savings                        [4] fully employed on own farming 
[5] Improving food composition                   [6] Better access to agricultural extension services      
[7] Building new and better house                 [8] Improved income level of the household                     
[9] Better access to marketing services          [10] Improved the health status of the household       
[11] Receive better social status                    [12] Purchasing additional livestock/asset                    
[13] Better access to training opportunity     [14] Other---------------------------------------------------  
 
 
 Thank you for your precious time! 
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